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Abstract
This research is an exploration of ethnic narratives of the Circassian
community in Jordan, in addition to the nationalist narratives promoted by the state
of Jordan, and their reconstruction by the research participants. This research aims to
understand how the research participants, as non-Arabs, understand and makes
sense of the Pan-Arab ethnonational narratives promoted by the state through the
‘Jordan First’ nationalist campaign and textbooks of national and civic education. It
also seeks to understand the ethnic narratives of the Circassian community. It
highlights the fact that ethnic narratives are often contextualised, and come to light
always in comparison to the other. It also shows how ethnic narratives are gendered,
can include or exclude women, and gender relations are ethnicised, or in other
words used as markers for group boundaries.
The main aim of this research is to unpack the research participants’
conceptualisations of Jordan and the Pan-Arabism, and to understand the strategies
they use to include themselves within these narratives. It intends to evaluate
whether research participants see themselves as integrated into the Jordanian society
or not. Whereas the community itself is often portrayed as integrated into the
society, because many of them are in high governmental positions, and the
ceremonial guards of the Royal Family are the Circassians, it is also important to
examine whether they believe that they are, and how. This thesis contributes to the
literature on ethnicity and nationalism based on a minority with unique profile, and
also contributes to the overall body of literature on state nationalism in the Middle
East. The research has been approached through the use of both qualitative and
quantitative data collection methods. It is based on the analysis of textbooks of
national and civic education, and the ‘Jordan First’ campaign, in addition to 13
interviews and 62 questionnaires.
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1Introduction
The Personal and The Political
Having coffee and my regular morning smoke, outside the Language Centre
at the University of Jordan, a Jordanian colleague wearing a colourful badge with the
motto ‘Jordan First’ on it passed by. It was wintertime, and I was having my
cigarette outside in the cold. That was the first time I had seen the ‘Jordan First’
motto, and I exclaimed ‘what does that mean?’ My colleague answered vehemently
‘this is a campaign to prioritise the welfare of the state of Jordan over personal
greed’. I asked if I could wear one, and where she had got it. Then she hesitantly
answered ‘yes, you can if you want to. Ask at the Student Union, they might give
you one but I am not sure’. After advising me that smoking is not good for girls or
for their reputation, she left me wondering why they only ‘might’ give me a badge. I
started thinking that maybe it was because I am Palestinian.
A few weeks earlier, students were organising a demonstration on campus
against the Israeli occupation of Palestine. I was having a smoke with friends, and I
suddenly heard screaming and tear gas bombs dropping from outside the university
campus on demonstrators. Students started running away in various directions. The
bombs started falling next to me and my friends, one of whom lost consciousness. I
dropped the cigarette and helped carry her away from the action. Amidst the mess, a
male friend exclaimed ‘how come you did not lose consciousness like the other
girls?’ He then explained ‘it must be because you smoke, it makes you stronger!’ At
that time, the demonstration had already been torn apart, some students were being
carried to hospital, and the Jordanian SWAT team was encircling the university to
make sure that they caught the organisers, who could be identified with the help of
some Jordanian students affiliated to the secret intelligence services. This was also
confusing for me, because the demonstration was against ‘Israel,’ and why would an
2‘Arab’ country want to silence the ‘Arab’ Palestinians, who were demonstrating
against the illegal occupation of their own land.
A couple of weeks later, same old story. Having a smoke outside the
humanities building, I saw a group of students pushing and hitting each other. The
fight stopped for half an hour, then suddenly, a gang of men emerged carrying
truncheons and leather belts, screaming ‘women out of the way! Move out of the
way!’ I left the whole humanities building because lectures were cancelled anyway
amidst the anarchy. The next day, I asked in the department about the reason behind
all this. I was told by a Palestinian friend that a Palestinian man had had a fight with
two Bedouin Jordanians, and the Palestinian was ‘so strong that he broke someone’s
hand’. But the injured man’s tribe did not let this go, and reorganised their men to
beat the Palestinian boy’. I asked what happened then, and he said ‘all the
Palestinian men at university got together, and both sides had casualties but no one
was killed, and they did not capture the Palestinian man’.
On another occasion, I was also socialising on campus with friends, a group
of handsome men sat opposite to us. I asked one of my male friends if he knew
them. Then, he said ‘yes, they are Circassians, they are very proud people, they are
not Arabs; they come from somewhere in Russia and they consider themselves
Jordanians, and Jordanians love them’. At that time it occurred to me that during my
school years, we were taught that Jordan is an ‘Arab’ country. My school years were
in Jerusalem, and we followed the Jordanian curriculum at that time. I also
remembered being taught that all borders between ‘Arab’ countries are fictitious,
that all ‘Arabs’ are the same and that they share the same culture. In the real world,
this never seemed to be true.
The Circassians are loved by the Jordanians I heard, although they are not
‘Arabs’, while the ‘Arab’ Palestinians are not equally accepted. From that moment,
my interest grew more and more to learn about why the ‘non-Arab’ Muslim
3Circassians are welcomed on ‘Arab’ lands, while Palestinian ‘Arabs’ apparently are
not treated the same way. I also heard that the Circassians attain good governmental
positions and that they are the ceremonial guards of the Royal family. In contrast, I,
as a Palestinian, always felt excluded and discriminated against. This contrast
triggered my interest in researching the Circassians in Jordan, because it posed
questions of the differential integration of the Circassian and Palestinian
communities in Jordan.
Through my experiences in Jordan and what I had heard about the Circassian
community, I felt that the Circassians were more integrated than the Palestinians.
Integration is, however, multi-layered, and it can be looked at economically,
politically and socially. There is, therefore, no single measure for integration. On the
economic and political levels, Circassians in Jordan seem to be integrated, as it is
generally agreed that they ‘have become largely a middle-class urban community
with a strong presence in the civil services and national military establishment’
(Chatty, 2010: 122). In this sense the Circassians are accepted and have become part
of the majority, or a ‘dominant minority’ (ibid: 122). However, this does not
necessarily mean that they identify themselves, or are identified as ‘Arabs’ in a state
that defines itself as an ‘Arab’ state. This research looks at how Circassians situate
themselves in an ‘Arab’ context and how, while they are excluded from the state’s
narrative of ‘Arabism’, they are in other senses integrated into Jordanian society; a
situation which contrasts with that of ‘Arab’ Palestinians.
In light of this contradiction, I was interested in exploring whether
Circassians identify with the state of Jordan and how they understand their position
in Jordanian society. A comparative study of Circassians and Palestinians has been
impossible because the state of Jordan bans the production of any research on the
Palestinians1. Although I would have liked to do a comparison between the
1 One of my friends wanted to conduct research on Palestinian refugees in Jordan. After contacting
the department of Palestinian affairs in Jordan, she was informed that she would not be allowed to
4Palestinians and the Circassians, the Circassian experience provides rich information
about the life of a minority group in the state of Jordan, in terms of their
understanding and conceptualisation of ethnic narratives, and their interpretation
and reconstruction of the nationalist narratives promoted by the state. This research
was not only designed for that, but also because of my personal interest in
understanding the relationship between the Circassian community and the state of
Jordan, and to see if their reconstruction of nationalist narratives of the state is
different from my own construction, as a Palestinian.
My interest in Jordanian nationalism grew with time. This idea of a ‘nation’
contrasted with what I had been taught in school, that all ‘Arabs’ share the same
‘Arabic’ culture, the same ‘Arabic’ language, and that they are one nation. However,
I always felt in Jordan like a Palestinian, discriminated against, and with no legal
standing. I came to realise that what we are taught in national and civic education
textbooks from the first till the twelfth grade about the ‘Arabs’ being one nation is
not applied in reality. Realising that the Circassians are not ‘Arabs’, yet are
welcomed on ‘Arab’ Jordanian lands more openly than the ‘Arab’ Palestinians, made
me interested in trying to understand how and why the Circassians are more
accepted on social and political levels in Jordan. To understand this relationship
between the Circassians and the state of Jordan, I designed this research to unpack
the ethnic narratives of the Circassian community in Jordan, and also to unpack the
nationalist narratives of the state of Jordan. I became interested in how research
participants made sense of the concept of ‘Arabism’, and of their own ethnic
narratives as a ’non-Arab’ diasporic community. To identify and understand the
state’s nationalist narratives, I chose to refer to the national and civic education
curriculum and the ‘Jordan First’ nationalist campaign, because they are the main
platforms explaining the state’s nationalist ideologies.
conduct such research for security reasons, and that researching the Palestinians is a red line in
Jordan.
5My interest grew in the ‘Jordan First’ campaign, first and foremost, because it
gave me a feeling of exclusion as a Palestinian, and I started wondering if ‘non-Arab’
Circassians would feel the same. The ‘Jordan First’ nationalist campaign was
launched in October 2002, when I was doing my undergraduate degree in Jordan,
during a time when I felt discriminated against as a Palestinian. Moreover, the
textbooks of national and civic education that I studied at school from the first to the
twelfth grade, vehemently emphasise the fact that Jordan is an ‘Arab’ country and
Jordanians are part of an ‘Arab’ nation. During my undergraduate years in Jordan I
felt that this was not reflected in reality. For example, around 70 percent of guest
workers in Jordan are from the ‘Arab’ Republic of Egypt (Hazaimeh, 2010), but
several human rights reports have been issued about the maltreatment of these
Egyptian workers in Jordan (United States Department of State, 2010). Palestinians,
who are ‘Arab’ Jordanian nationals, are reported to be
‘underrepresented in government and suffer discrimination in
appointments to government and military positions, as well as
admission to universities and access to university scholarships’
(Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, 2002: paragraph
2).
Therefore, the ‘non-Arab’ Circassians not only represent a unique profile of a
diasporic community in the Middle East, but also cast doubt on Jordan’s claim to be
an ‘Arab’ state. It is important to bring forward here the argument that the fluidity of
the term ‘Arab’ makes it difficult to understand who the ‘Arabs’ are, or what
‘Arabism’ is about. At the same time, the fluidity of the term Circassian makes it
problematic to presume who the Circassians are, or to classify them into fixed
categories. Therefore, throughout the thesis I will be using the term ‘Arab’ in scare
quotes, due to the fluidity and ambiguity of the term. One of the main points to be
clarified is that, given that this thesis is based on the viewpoints of research
participants, the terms ‘Arab’, ‘Arabism’, and ‘Circassian’ are used according to the
meanings attributed to them by the research participants, from below. For those
6reasons, this research aims to understand the position of the Circassian community
in Jordan from their own point of view. It aims to unpack the themes of textbooks of
national and civic education, in addition to the ‘Jordan First’ nationalist campaign,
and to explore how Circassians make sense of those themes. It is designed to identify
the relationship between the Circassians and the state of Jordan, from the point of
view of research participants. It seeks to evaluate the conventional wisdom that
Circassians are accepted in Jordanian society, from the research participants’
viewpoints, and how they conceptualise this notion of acceptance. It is an
exploration of narratives of ethnicity and nationalism. It looks at the narratives of
ethnicity that Circassians use to identify themselves, as a group. It evaluates the
narratives of nationalism promoted by the state of Jordan, and how those narratives
are reconstructed by research participants. The research also investigates gender
relations as part of ethnic and nationalist narratives, and how those narratives are
themselves gendered. This thesis is designed to answer the following research
questions:
 What are the ethnic narratives mobilised by the Circassians in Jordan? Do
they differ depending on age and gender?
 What are the nationalist narratives and ideologies the state of Jordan
promotes through ‘Jordan First’ and textbooks of national and civic
education?
 How do research participants make sense of and reconstruct state narratives?
 What is the relationship between the state of Jordan and its Circassian
community? Is the conventional wisdom relating to their integration
accurate?
This thesis is divided into eight chapters, the first three start with setting the
research context, locating the research within the literature, and exploring the
methodologies used for this research. The second part of the thesis, from chapter
four, presents the research findings and answers the research questions. Due to the
7complicated history of Circassian diaspora and the Middle East generally, the first
chapter of this thesis presents some background information about the Circassian
people, where they originate from and shows how their links to Islam date back to
the Islamic Abbasid Caliphates (from 750 to 1258). Chapter one also looks at the
history of the Ottoman Empire, its expansion and dissolution. Background
information presented about the Ottoman Empire shows how the Circassian exodus
took place during Ottoman times, and how the Ottomans collaborated with the
Russians, following the Russo-Ottoman wars, to remove the Circassians from their
original homeland. The chapter also shows the bad migration conditions Circassians
went through, and how they were subjected to the Ottoman slave trade during, and
even before, their migration. It also explains how upon their arrival in what is now
called Jordan, the area was under Ottoman rule, and it also shows how the identity
of the area changed from being Islamic under Ottoman rule, to ‘Arab’ following the
defeat of the Ottoman Empire. The chapter also shows the process of formation of
the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, from an emirate under the British mandate of
Palestine and Transjordan, to a kingdom, and also explores the history of Amman,
explaining the historical context of Circassians in Jordan. The chapter also traces,
historically, the tensions between the Palestinians and the Kingdom of Jordan, the
assassination of King Abdullah I by a Palestinian, and how those tensions escalated
to cause a civil war in 1970, under King Hussein’s reign. This chapter is important to
clarify the context of the research historically and sociologically.
Chapter two provides a review of the literature around the main concepts
deployed in this research. It discusses the concepts of ethnicity, nationalism,
diasporic communities, state ethnonationalism and narratives of the state. The
chapter explains that there are two views of the concept of ethnicity, one as socially
constructed, which holds that ethnic groups do not exist naturally, and a second
concept, which assumes that ethnic groups emerge naturally or that ethnicities are
primordial. It explains how the first definition of the term ethnicity is used in this
8research, as socially constructed, and that social actors use narratives to define social
groups that are also constructed and not based on natural forms of attachment. The
chapter also discusses the concept of nationalism, and explains that I also use this
term as a social construct, and that states use narratives to promote nationalism. It
sheds light on the fact that ethnicities and nationalisms are often (re)constructed and
the boundaries of ‘nations’ and ‘ethnic groups’ are fluid. Chapter two explains that
states themselves use all available means, such as media, campaigns and education,
to promote narratives of nationalism and the nation, such as the ‘Jordan First’
campaign. Chapter two also sheds light on the gendered aspects of those concepts,
and explains how ethnicity can be gendered, and how gender can be ethnicised. It
shows how gender is central to the study of ethnicity and nationalism, particularly
because it serves as a marker of group boundaries, which in turn causes women to
be controlled as ‘bearers’, ‘preservers’ and ‘reproducers’ of the nation.
Chapter three presents the story of the research, from its early beginnings. It
explains the process of its development and the methods used, how the research
developed into its current state, and the stages the research and the researcher went
through. The research included analysis and identification of state nationalist
narratives promoted by textbooks of national and civic education, as well as the
‘Jordan First’ campaign. The analysis was followed by interviews and a distribution
of questionnaires to individuals who had identified themselves as members of the
Circassian community. The chapter also discusses the emergence of unplanned
ethnography as a consequence of a lengthy period in the field, and reflects on my
own position in the field, as an ‘Arab’ Palestinian, and my feelings during the
interviews.
Chapter four, Narratives of Ethnicity, the first analytical chapter, deals with
the narratives that research participants identified as part of their group identity. It
shows that narratives of ethnicity always depend on context and are relational, often
being used to emphasise the boundaries of the group in relation to the ‘other’ and in
9this case the ‘Arabs’. Research participants referred to two types of narratives:
narratives drawing on concepts of origin portrayed as fixed, and other narratives
that view ethnicity as changing. It explains how participants believe that family
names, roots, origin, race, blood, and colour are non-changing and everlasting. It
also demonstrates that those ‘non-changing’ narratives of ethnicity are usually seen
as inherited from the father’s side, and that women cannot transfer ethnicity and
family names to their children, because of the patrilineal kinship system of
Circassian society. Moreover, the changing aspects of ethnicity, as identified by
research participants, relating to culture, upbringing, traditions and language, are
also defined in relation to the ‘other’. The chapter briefly identifies how gender
relations are used as part of these ethnic narratives, and how ethnic narratives are
gendered. Elaboration on how gender relations are part of ethnic narratives, and
ethnic narratives are gendered is provided in chapter five, Gendering Ethnicity and
Ethnicising Gender.
The fifth chapter shows how narratives of gender and ethnicity intersect,
leading to the ethnicisation of gender, and the gendering of ethnicity. It shows how
research participants attempted to highlight the differences between them and
‘Arab’ society in terms of gender relations, by talking about differences in terms of
marriage and kinship structures, and the ‘Arab’s control’ of women vs. the
Circassian notion of ‘respect’. It shows that the preservation of language, culture and
upbringing is the responsibility of women in Circassian society. Nevertheless, the
fact that these ethnic narratives are seen as ‘changing’, in addition to the patrilineal
system of descent, undermines women’s roles in the reproduction of ‘non-changing’
ethnic narratives.
Chapters six and seven focus on the relationship between the research
participants and the state of Jordan. Chapter six draws on the narratives of state
nationalism promoted in textbooks of national and civic education, and the ‘Jordan
First’ campaign, and looks at how research participants reconstruct those narratives.
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State nationalism, or Jordanianism, is deconstructed into two main components:
‘Pan-Arabism’ and Pan-Islamism, and deconstruction shows that Islam is used to
legitimise the concept of ‘Arabism’ as a form of nationalism. This chapter also shows
how research participants tended to de-ethnicise narratives of Jordanianism to
position themselves within Jordan.
Chapter seven also shows that, despite the fact that the narratives that the
state of Jordan promotes do not view Islam as part of a nationalist ideology, research
participants in their (re)construction of the narratives of the state believe that Islam
constitutes an important part of the state’s narratives. On the other hand, the
Hashemites and the land were also used as a way to de-ethnicise the Jordanian
narrative from its ‘Arabist’ nature by research participants, although textbooks of
national and civic education promote the Hashemites as ‘fathers’ of ‘Pan-Arabism’,
and the land as an ‘Arab’ land. Chapter seven focuses on the strategies research
participants used to reflect their loyalty and belonging to Jordan, and it also
highlights their discomfort with attempts to exclude them from the Jordanian
nationalist narrative. It shows how they make an effort to create harmony from the
contradictions between ethnic and nationalist narratives. It also explores how their
feelings are torn between belonging to Jordan and being pulled towards historic
Circassia, their original homeland.
Chapter Eight, the conclusions, explores the research’s contribution to
knowledge, the limitations of the study and highlights the main findings emerging
from this research. It explores how the thesis has answered the research questions,
and how this research provides the literature with an analysis of a unique minority
group in the Middle East. It also discusses the question of the integration of
Palestinians and Circassians in Jordan, through reflecting on some research findings,
in addition to the profile of both groups in Jordan.
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Chapter One
Historical Context
Introduction
As this thesis looks at ethnic narratives of the Circassian community in
Jordan, this chapter introduces the reader to background information about the
Circassian people, where they originate from and the history of their migration and
settlement in Jordan. Further, as one of the main aims of this thesis is to explore the
relationship between the state of Jordan and the Circassian community, this chapter
provides a historical account of this relationship from the Circassians’ arrival in the
area that is now called Jordan to the present day. To do this, in the following
sections, I trace the origins of the Circassian people, their links to Islam and to the
Ottoman Empire. Circassians, a people with their own language, started coming to
Jordan from a historic area called Circassia located in North Caucasia, East of the
Black Sea, in the second half of the nineteenth century. Circassians are originally
North Caucasian. The term Circassian, nowadays, is largely used to refer to the
Adyghe people, inhabitants of historic Circassia, and includes the tribes of Cherkes,
Shapsugs and Kabardin. However, more accurately, the term is used to refer to all
people from the North Caucasus, including the Adyghe tribes originating from
Circassia, and the Abkhaz, Abazins and Ubykh, who originate from areas
neighbouring Circassia.
Circassians, or as they call themselves Adyghes, consist of different dialect
groups. However, the wars that took place in the Caucasus, which will be explained
later, and the conditions of their migration and suffering, brought these groups
together (Shami, 1996). For example, the Adyghes and the Abazins had different
flags (See figures 1.1 and 1.2); however, due to their shared history of migration they
identify themselves as Circassian Adyghes. Hewitt (1999) attempts to explain such a
relationship by saying that it could have been triggered by,
‘Their close genetic and historical ti
determination that their languages and cultures must not suffer
the same fate that overtook their confrères, the Ubykhs’
(Hewitt, 1999: 74).
Moreover, it is argued that a strong factor that leads all North Caucasian groups to
classify themselves as the same people, nation or ethnic group, is sharing
tales which are about the myths of origin of the Circassian people
Nart Sagas are discussed in chapter four in relation to Circassians in Jordan.
Figure 1.1 Adyghe Flag
In this chapter, I also
its centrality to the migration flows of Circassians and other groups of peoples from
its Eastern European provinces.
time when the Circassian migration took place
existence of the Ottoman Empire was based on Islam, which served to unify its
disparate ethnic subjects. This went along with the recognition of other religious
groups, which were allowed the space to govern themselves. This is discussed here
in order to explore the ethno
the history of their development. Furthermore, this chapter also highlights the
history of the Circassian presence specifically in Jordan; their contribution to the
building of the state and the initial problems they faced during the early years of
their settlement on what is now considered the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.
important to discuss the Ottoman Empire in this chapter, in order to highlight how
12
es as well as by a shared
Figure 1.2 Abazins Flag
provide a brief history of the Ottoman Empire, outlining
The Circassians who migrated were Muslims. At the
in the nineteenth century
-religious communities that existed in the region and
Nart Sagas
(Gay, 2005); the
, the
It is
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the identity of the land of Jordan shifted from what it was under the Islamic based
Ottoman Empire, to a different identity under the Hashemite ‘Arab’ based rule. It is
important to clarify this shift, because this thesis also explores narratives of
nationalism amongst the Circassians and for that reason I explore how ideas about
national identity have changed. The chapter also outlines the development of the
state of Jordan.
Furthermore, as I previously explained, my main interest in the Circassian
community in Jordan emerged from the contrast between their situation and that of
the Palestinians; therefore, this chapter also looks at the history of the Palestinian
presence in Jordan; the primary focus of the research, however, is the Circassians in
Jordan. I do this because I am concerned with narratives of Jordanian nationalism,
and the situation of the Palestinians is important in order to understand the history
of Jordan and the development of Jordanian nationalism. According to the United
Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East
(UNRWA), there are around 2,000,000 registered Palestinian refugees in Jordan
(UNRWA, 2010); the Palestinian refugee population constitutes around 34 per cent
of the total population of Jordan. Moreover, there are also a large number of
Palestinians in Jordan who are not registered as refugees; some claim that
Palestinians nowadays constitute more than 70 percent of Jordan’s population and
most of them have Jordanian nationality (Israeli, 2003). The Palestinians and the
Jordanians speak the same language, Arabic, and are only separated geographically
by a river.
This chapter follows the history of the Circassians chronologically, thus I
begin in the first section by looking at Circassians link to Islam, then the history of
the Ottoman Empire. Afterwards, I look at the history of Circassian migration causes
and its conditions, and then I move to the Circassian settlement in Jordan, the
history of modern Jordan post-Ottoman rule, Circassians’ position in modern Jordan
and Palestinian-Jordanian relations.
1.1 Circassians: Origins and Links to Islam
Circassian is the term used to describe the tribes believed to have inhabited
the mountainous area between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea. Circassians are the
inhabitants of the northern part of Caucasi
southern part, home to different tribes, is call
map). The region is not only home to the Circassian tribes, which call themselves
Adyghe, but also to other groups including Chechens, O
(Chatty, 2010). Although the term Circassian original
who used to inhabit Circassia and include
term nowadays is also used to refer to Adyghes, Abazins,
figure 1.4 for Map of historic Circassia).
Figure (1.3) Map of the Caucasus adapted from Chatty (2010: 93).
Circassian links to Islam existed even before their adoption of Islam, through
the Islamic Mamluk tradition,
the third of the Islamic Caliphates (from 750 to 1258). Mamluks were children from
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ly described the Adyghe tribes,
d Cherkes, Shapsugs, and Kabardin, the
Ubykh and Abk
which began during the Abbasid period of Caliphs,
for
haz (See
non-Muslim religious backgrounds, who were enslaved and taken away from their
families by the Abbasid Caliphs, and trained
Circassians constituted a large part of the Mamluks
Arabic. The Mamluk tradition also survived through the Fatimid Caliphate (909
1171). Those enslaved children were captured from areas near the Ca
north of the Black Sea. During the Mamluk tradition the Caucasus was ruled by
Khazars (7th to 11th centuries), and the Mongols (13
Bacharach, 2006). There is a general agreement that Circassian people followed a
pagan tradition, before adopting Christianity (Meri and Bacharach, 2006; T
Marigny, 1837). After adopting Christianity, presumably in the Age of Byzantine
during the fifth and the sixth centuries, Circassian groups residing in historic
Circassia also retained some of their pagan traditions.
Figure (1.4) Map of Historic Circassia (1872) (Circassian World, 2010)
2 Historical sources show that Mamluk children included Turks, Circassians and Georgians (Ayalon, 1949).
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Mamluks, taken from the Caucasus into the Islamic world, were not ordinary
slaves, as they were trained to become soldiers and were allowed to carry weapons.
During the Ayyubid Caliphate (1171-1341), Mamluks revolted against the Ayyubid
Sultan and killed him, establishing their own Sultanate (1250-1517) with Cairo its
centre of power until they were defeated by the Ottomans. Ayalon (1949) traces how
Circassians became predominant amongst Mamluks, and he further explains the
establishment of ‘Circassian supremacy’ in the Mamluk Sultanate. The Sultanate’s
power did not extend beyond the Levant Region, Arabia, Egypt, Sudan and parts of
Libya. However, the Mamluk Sultanate retained the Mamluk tradition and brought
in from the Caucasus more enslaved children. Therefore, even though Caucasia was
not Islamicised before the Ottomans established their rule there, Circassians had
links with the Muslim world and Islam from the time of the Abbasid Caliphate. The
Mamluk Sultanate was overthrown by the growing and expanding Ottoman Empire
in 1516-1517 (Quataert, 2000). However, the Mamluk tradition was perpetuated. It is
has been said,
‘During the Ottoman Era, a Mamluk typically was born outside
the region, enslaved through war or raids... Governors or
military commanders then bought the slave... brought him into
the household as a military slave or apprentice and trained him
in the administrative and military arts. Manumitted at some
point in the training process, the Mamluk continued to serve
the master, rose to local pre-eminence and eventually set up his
own household, which he staffed through slave purchases,
thus perpetuating the system’ (Quataert, 2000: 47).
The Ottoman Empire was established in 1300, as a small state near Constantinople,
which grew to a huge empire including lands in Asia, Africa and Europe. It played
an important role in the migration of Circassians and shaping the identity of the
regions it occupied. Thus the next section provides a brief history of the Ottoman
Empire due to its centrality to the history of the region and the history of migration
flows.
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1.2 The Ottoman Empire
‘The Ottoman Empire... surfaced as an amalgam of many
cultures and traditions. Its legitimacy, however, also was
rooted in a “universal” faith - the faith of Islam... Because the
Sultans conceived of themselves and their society as Muslim
and of their state as Islamic, each monarch had to comply, or
appear to comply, with the laws of his faith’ (Goffman, 2002: 8).
The Ottoman Empire, which derives its name from Osman I a leader of a tribe
of Turcoman nomads, originated in a small area in western Anatolia. By 1300,
Ottomans led by Osman were able to take over most of the Anatolian provinces of
the Byzantine Empire. They established the Ottoman Government at that time, and
Bursa became its capital. The early expansion of the Ottoman Empire depended on
creating alliances with neighbouring rulers and then making them vassals to the
Ottoman rulers (Quataert, 2000). The dynasty kept on expanded its empire through
warfare; in 1453 the Ottomans were able to capture Constantinople making it the
capital of the empire a few decades after its capture. It is noted that the Ottomans’
expansion was steady from 1300 to 1699, and they remained in power till the
beginning of the twentieth century (Shaw and Shaw, 1977).
In the early sixteenth century, the Mamluk Sultanate, ruling the ‘Arab’ areas
of the Islamic world, was in decline, and in 1516-1517 the ‘Arab’ areas of the Islamic
world were taken over by the Ottomans extending their empire East. The Ottomans
were also expanding west and they were getting closer to ‘Vienna and German-
speaking lands’ (Quataert, 2000: 1). They established their rule in western Caucasia
in the early sixteenth century, and Circassians in the Caucasus began adopting Islam
in that period of time. The Circassians, as previously explained, were one of the
oldest groups inhabiting the Caucasus Mountains. They were organised in tribes of
different socio-economic positions, some of the tribes were peasants, others nobles
and leaders (Karpat, 1985). Some of the tribes, Kabardin and Abkhaz, adopted Islam
in the sixteenth century, with more tribes started adopting Islam in the eighteenth
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and nineteenth centuries (Karpat, 1979), and by 1800 Muslims became the largest
religious group in the Caucasus (McCarthy, 1995).
Circassians’ adoption of Islam meant that they came ‘to regard the sultan as
the Caliph, that is, the supreme temporal leader in charge of the Muslim community’
(Karpat, 1985: 67). The Ottoman Empire used Islam to legitimise its rule and
government. Being in control of the major Islamic holy sites, Jerusalem and parts of
Arabia, Ottomans did not make use of ‘ideas of ethnic superiority of one community
over another, but rather on the superiority of Islam’ in order to legitimise their rule
(Chatty, 2010: 42). This idea, superiority of Islam, or Islam as the unifying factor
between an ethnically diverse Muslim community, did originate with the Ottomans,
but had been part of Islam from its beginning (Ozcan, 1997). All Islamic Caliphates
were based on this concept, which was later coined as Pan-Islamism. The usage of
Islam as the unifying element of the Muslim community has been reinforced from
the days of Prophet Mohammad, as in many of his documented sayings he explicitly
states that all Muslims are equal in law, regardless of ethnic and/or racial origin. As
the Islamic Caliphates were expanding, there emerged a need for the
acknowledgement of the existence of non-Muslim groups within Muslim ruled lands
and the need to give them the space to use their own religious teachings and laws,
and this system of governance was called by Ottomans in the nineteenth century the
millet system3 (Quataert, 2000).
The millet system was the organising principle for inter-communal relations
between Muslims and non-Muslims. Muslims had to abide by the rule of the
Ottoman state, while non-Muslims had their own courts. However, non-Muslims
were required to pay taxes specific to their position. This form of tax, called Jizya,
was imposed on non-Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire; this did not start with
the Ottomans, but was established at the time of Mohammad. It is beyond the scope
of this chapter to discuss why Jizya was imposed on non-Muslim subjects; however,
3 For a discussion of the usage of the word millet and its usage during Ottoman rule (See Braude, 1982).
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its rationale in Islamic Law is so that non-Muslim minorities can be provided with
protection. Basri (2011) explains it,
‘If a Muslim ruler fails to protect the life and property of non-
Muslim citizens, this Muslim ruler has to return the Jizyah to
the concerned non-Muslim citizen. So, it is compulsory for all
non-Muslims to pay Jizyah just as Muslims will have to pay the
obligatory Zakat in order to help the poor... Non-Muslims will
be absolved from military services but if any non-Muslim
citizen themselves wish to serve in the army; they may do so,
in which case they will be exempted from the payment of
Jizyah’ (Basri, 2011: 34).
It has been suggested that the differentiation in treatment between Muslim and non-
Muslim subjects of the Ottoman Empire shows that ‘Ottoman law did not recognise
notions of ethnicity and citizenship’ (Chatty, 2010: 46).
In the nineteenth century, Christian minorities, influenced by France, which
became, through the system of capitulations, ‘protector of all Catholics’ (ibid: 49)
financing Christian schools and missionaries within the Ottoman Empire, demanded
equal member recognition by the state. At the same time in the European areas of the
Ottoman Empire, separatist groups began to rebel with support from the Russians.
These movements prompted the Ottomans to change their way of governance and to
try to put into place the concept of equality between all religious groups. As a result
of this Christian and Jewish Ottoman subjects became more privileged than Ottoman
Muslims (McCarthy, 2001). This shift from differentiating between Muslims and
non-Muslims to attempting to establish equality through sets of law and decrees,
created an unequal status between Muslims and non-Muslims, as non-Muslims had
recourse to their foreign protectors and religious representatives, while Muslims
only had recourse to the Ottoman government (Chatty, 2010).
Despite the Ottoman’s efforts to create equality between Muslim and non-
Muslim subjects, many Christians, especially in the European part of the empire,
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were claiming states of their own. They were supported by the Russians, who
wanted to establish their rule on Ottoman lands. This led to civil wars, displacement
and dispossession of various groups within the empire, both Muslim and non-
Muslim and amongst those groups were the Circassian Muslims. This is explored in
the next section, especially with regard to Circassian migration from the Caucasus. It
is important to mention here that Circassian migration was caused by instability in
the Caucasus region, and at the same time some Circassians were taken as
agricultural and domestic slaves, which also, in addition to the harsh conditions of
their migrations, added to their suffering. This will also be discussed in the next
section.
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1.3 Circassian Migration: Causes and Conditions
‘The contemporary map of the Balkans and the southern
Caucasus displays countries with fairly homogenous
populations... Their ethnic and religious unity was
accomplished through the expulsion of their Muslim
population... the new states were founded on the suffering of
their departed inhabitants. Similarly, Russian imperialism...
brought with it the deaths of millions of Circassians,
Abhazians, Laz, and Turks. Nationalism and imperialism
appear in a much worse light when their victims take the stage’
(McCarthy, 1995: 1-2).
With the rise of nationalist movements in the Balkans in the late 18th century,
including Crimea, Bulgaria, Macedonia and others, and the Russian pursuit of
Caucasian Ottoman areas, conflict developed along religious rather than ethnic lines.
The expulsion and displacement of Muslims from those areas made them more
religiously homogeneous. Karpat (1990) explains how these migrations influenced
the identity of Muslim migrant groups. He argues that Muslim migrants in their
original homeland identified themselves as Muslims in terms of ‘social behaviour
and ritual’ (Karpat, 1990: 131) and that this identity took the form of a ‘passive
communal identity’ (ibid: 132). Migration, however, turned their identification with
Islam into a ‘dynamic political consciousness,’ (132) especially since the ‘unmixing of
people’ (Chatty, 2010: 88) was carried out on the basis of religion.
Muslim migration into the Ottoman Empire began shortly after the Ottoman
loss of Crimea in 1771. The Ottomans agreed to recognise Crimea as an independent
state under Russian control. The Russians, on the other hand, began to settle
Christians from the Ottoman Empire in Crimea, and in 1783 they annexed Crimea
(Karpat, 1990; McCarthy, 1995). As a result Crimean Tatars migrated to Ottoman
lands, for both religious and economic reasons (Karpat, 1990; McCarthy, 1995). The
number of people in the 18th century Crimean migrations is estimated at 100,000
(McCarthy, 1995).
22
Migration into the Ottoman Empire from Crimea intensified after a series of
wars with the Russians, in ‘1806-12 and 1829 (Russo-Ottoman war), especially after
the Crimean war of 1853-6, since the Muslims had supported the Ottomans and
allied the armies’ (Karpat, 1990: 132). Bulgarians revolting against the Ottomans
allied with the Russians to fight the Crimean Tatars becoming involved in many
battles against the Ottomans (McCarthy, 1995). The Crimean Tatars, and many other
groups including Circassians, were killed, expelled and forced to migrate from their
homelands. The example of Crimean Tatars is important, because in light of the
work of Karpat (1990), it shows how religion became the main differentiating
element between groups. Major waves of migration started taking place from the
Caucasus in the nineteenth century.
The 1829 Russo-Ottoman war was concluded through the Treaty of Edirne,
through which Russia annexed the islands close to the Danube River and parts of the
Caucasus, specifically the coastal areas adjacent to the Black Sea, where historic
Circassia was located, and the Ottomans acknowledged Greece as a state. The
Circassians and other tribes were unhappy with the result of the treaty, and
continued to fight the Russians without Ottoman support. A series of battles took
place between Caucasian Muslims and Russian armies, Circassians, fighting
alongside other groups, briefly occupied almost the entire area between the main
Caucasian range, the Kuban River, and the Black Sea (Henze, 1992). However,
Caucasian groups were defeated in 1864. During that period of fighting very few
Circassians left their homeland, and mass migrations began in the late 1860s.
Leader of anti-Russian resistance, Sheikh Shamil, ‘managed to meld together
followers from disparate tribes with a combination of Islamic revivalism and the
subjugation of aristocracies who opposed him’ (McCarthy, 1995: 33). Shamil was
captured by the Russians in 1857 (McCarthy, 1995; Chatty, 2010), and shortly after
his capture, exhausted, fighting tribes, including the Chechens, Daghestanis and
Circassians, were defeated. By 1864, the Caucasus was under total Russian control,
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and another treaty was concluded between the Russians and the Ottomans to
remove Muslim peoples from the areas occupied by the Russians. Between 1859 and
1864, Russians intensified their attacks against the Circassian people, aiming to
uproot them from their lands, as they wanted to take over the fertile Circassian areas
(McCarthy, 1995). Glyn Williams says,
‘The Russian army engaged in demographic warfare that
would today be considered mass ethnic cleansing. Well over a
million Circassians (the largest ethnic group living on the
northern Caucasian flank) were forced from their Caucasian
homelands between 1859 and 1864’ (Glyn Williams, 2000: 93).
‘Russia claimed to possess a superior Orthodox Christian
culture, and she regarded Islam as the inferior cultural system
of a people she had defeated and was ruling with an iron hand.
The Circassians... were looked upon as “primitive.” Russia
sought to “civilise” them’ (Karpat, 1985: 67).
The aim of the Russian ethnic cleansing of the Circassians, and other Muslim groups
in western and northern Caucasus, was to turn the ‘Caucasus into a Christian land,
loyal to their empire’ (McCarthy, 1995: 34). This ethnic cleansing has been described
by some scholars as genocide due to the number of deaths it caused (Henze, 1992;
McCarthy, 1995). It is important to note that not all Circassians were removed
during the same period of time; flows of migration took place in stages, and the
conditions of their resettlement were often as difficult as their migrations.
Ottomans and Russians had to cooperate in removing the Circassians from
their homelands. The majority of Circassians were sent by sea to Anatolia in
Tarabzon and Samsun on the Black Sea, others were taken to Bulgaria to Constanta
and Varna (Chatty, 2010; Karpat 1985). McCarthy (1995) notes that old men, women
and children were encouraged and forced to migrate, while able-bodied Circassian
men were kept as forced labourers. On the other hand, the conditions of the boats
Circassians were transferred in were very bad, and migrants suffered from disease.
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Circassian refugees were given no assistance or aid, McCarthy (1995: 36) estimates
that around 20-50 refugees died every day in Trabzon in 1863, in 1864, 500 died
every day, and in Samsun 50 were dying each day, and, by 1864, around 520,000
Muslims had been forced to migrate to the Ottoman Empire (Chatty, 2010). Karpat
(1985) explains how these migrations had adverse effects on population growth and
the ethnic composition of the Ottoman Empire, and also shows that Christians were
migrating from the Ottoman Empire to Russia. This exchange of populations led to
the creation of almost religiously homogeneous communities in the Russian
occupied lands. Although large numbers of Circassians were taken into Ottoman
lands, some remained in Circassia and further flows of migration took place in 1877-
1878 due to the Russian-Ottoman war.
It is estimated that between 1859 and 1879 around two million people were
forced to leave the Caucasus, and only 1.5 million survived due to the adverse
conditions of migration (Chatty, 2010). Migration from the Caucasus continued to
take place till the beginning of the twentieth century. Karpat (1985) estimates that
around half a million people left the Caucasus between 1881 and 1914. The Russian
government ordered that the Circassians should be settled ‘at considerable distance
from our frontiers and in all cases not closer than the line Erzincan, Tokat, Amasya,
and Samsun’ (Karpat, 1985: 69). The Russians wanted to keep the Circassians as far
away as possible from the lands they occupied, and the Ottoman collaborated with
them to remove the Circassians from their homeland. The Circassians were known
to be troublesome, because they fought the Bulgarians and this is why the Ottomans
happily collaborated in their removal.
At first, Circassians were welcomed by the Ottoman government in the
European provinces of the Empire. However, following several incidents where
Circassians attacked Bulgarians, when Bulgaria was still under Ottoman rule, and at
a time when Circassians were serving the Ottomans in suppressing Bulgarian
revolts, Circassians became less welcome. Eventually, Ottoman soldiers had to turn
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their fire against the Circassians to stop them attacking Christian Bulgarians, who
had, in turn, killed large numbers of Muslim Bulgarians, as a result of their war for
independence (McCarthy, 1995). This led the Ottomans to push the Circassian
Muslims further towards the ‘Musulman Asiatic provinces of the Ottoman Empire’
(Lewis, 1987: 96), in order to protect Christian Ottoman subjects. Circassians
expelled from Bulgaria took refuge in Thrace and Macedonia; however they had to
be transferred again to Anatolia and Greater Syria4 (Chatty, 2010). Resettlement of
Caucasian migrants was based on three main principles; the creation of a frontier,
resettling them in environmentally similar areas, and preventing any one group
from becoming a majority’ (ibid: 98-9). Resettlement policy towards Circassians was
to divide them into small groups and disperse their leaders (ibid).
The Ottoman Immigration Commission provided assistance to migrants, and
became responsible for resettlement of refugees (Lewis, 1987). Although the
Commission was created in 1860, there was some delay before the Ottoman Empire
was able to provide basic needs assistance to migrants (Lewis, 1987). Migrants
suffered from the very bad conditions of migration; disease, poverty, deprivation
and lack of assistance led to the death of hundreds of thousands of Muslim migrants.
In addition to the bad conditions of migration, Circassians were also faced with the
problem of the Ottoman slave trade. The Ottoman slave trade continued, even
during waves of migration, and many Circassians were subjected to slavery. The
Circassian migration into Ottoman lands brought with it a large group of
agricultural and domestic slaves (Toledano, 1982). As many Circassians were
transferred in boats, they were abused and trafficked by slave traders, and some
children were sold by their families because of poverty and need. Toledano (1982)
notes that due to the chaotic conditions, and the lack of organised transfer of the
Circassians in the early 1860s, ships’ captains used to enforce a transportation fee of
4 Greater Syria, or bilad al-sham is a southern Ottoman province, which consisted of what is now known as
Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, ‘Israel’, Jordan and parts of Iraq.
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one slave child per thirty persons on boats. The Ottoman government had to
intervene through the Immigration Commission to abolish this trend.
‘The hardship of immigrant families and kidnapping by
unscrupulous dealers meant that many children were enslaved
and separated from their families, where previously slave
families had been kept together. Attempts to rectify this were
made by the Ottoman government through the Immigration
Commission, even buying their freedom to reunite families in
cases of unlawful enslavement’ (Lewis, 2004: 132).
On the other hand, some families sold their daughters into the harems of the Ottoman
elite. ‘Circassian women often reached the harems of the urban upper-class of the
empire, not infrequently attaining positions of prestige and comfort as wives of
middle- and upper-level functionaries’ (Toledano, 1982: 8). However, it is important
to note here that Circassians used to sell their daughters to slave dealers even before
their migration, as many of them were poor agricultural families (Toledano, 1993).
There are also documented cases of the bad treatment of Circassian slaves in the
Ottoman Empire (ibid).
As previously mentioned, Circassian migrants were resettled in Eastern
Anatolia and Greater Syria, or bilad al-sham; however, the conditions of their
resettlement in those areas were unfavourable, especially due to the arrival of large
numbers of people, and the decreasing ability of the cities where they landed to
absorb them. Karpat (1979) estimates that around 25,000 Circassians came to
Southern Syria in 1878 and between 10,000 and 15,000 arrived in Aleppo in the same
year. Table (1.1), adapted from several sources, estimates the numbers of Circassians
arriving in Greater Syrian ports, and the destinations to which they were, or would
be, sent. Lewis (1987) provides estimates of the number of Circassian families settled
in Greater Syria between 1905 and 1906, which are presented in table (1.2).
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Table (1.1) Numbers of Circassians arriving in Greater Syria by year, port, and destination if
applicable
Year Port/City Numbers Destination if
Applicable
1878 Beirut 1000 Damascus
1878 Tripoli 2000 Homs
1878 Acre 1500 Nablus
1878 Intended to land in
Kavalla, diverted to
Cyprus
3000 Latakiyyah
1878 Tripoli 10,000 Hama
1882 Damascus via land
from Anatolia
100 families Sent to Jaulan
Heights
1900 Damascus 150 families Half to Qunaytrah
Half to Zarqa’
1905 Alexandretta 364 families, 1,454
individuals
Aleppo and Raqqah
Adapted from (Chatty, 2010; Lewis, 1987; Karpat, 1979; 1985)
Table (1.2) Estimates of numbers of Circassian Families in Syrian provinces (1905-1906)
Place Number of Families
Qunaytrah (Jaulan Hieghts) 1,949 families
Transjordan 2,250 families
Near Homs 670 families
Vilayet of Beirut 550 families
(Lewis, 1987).
The arrival of Circassians and other Muslim migrants in Anatolia and the ‘Arab’
areas of the Ottoman Empire changed the ethnic composition of those areas. As
Quataert (2000) puts it,
‘The migration acted like a centrifuge in Russia and the
Balkans, reducing previously more diverse populations to a
simpler one... The societies of the host regions, for their part,
became ethnically more complex and diverse while both the
originating and host societies became religiously more
homogeneous. Thus, the Balkans became more heavily
Christian than before (although Muslims remained in some
areas) while the Anatolian and Arab areas became more
Muslim’ (Quataert, 2000: 116).
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Conflict along religious lines created religious homogeneity and ethnic heterogeneity
on Ottoman land. The ‘Arab’ areas of the Ottoman Empire received ‘non-Arab’
Muslims, and the Balkans became more Christian.
The military skills of the Circassians also influenced where they were settled,
with the Ottomans settling them and granting them lands in the frontier districts of
Greater Syria, due to the Circassians’ ability to stand up to Bedouins and other locals
(Chatty, 2010; Lewis, 1987; Rogan, 1994). Many sources state that Circassians, upon
their arrival in bilad-al-sham, considered the lands to be Muslim holy lands.
‘Circassian immigrants arriving in the sultan’s lands in Syria
removed their shoes before walking on the holy soil of this…
‘White soil’ of the Ottoman Empire’ (Glyn Williams, 2000: 104).
Circassians were settled in Transjordan, which was part of Greater Syria, in Jerash in
1884, in villages of Amman in 1878, in Wadi al-Sir in 1880, in Na’ur in 1901, in Zarqa’
in 1902, in Sukhna and al-Rusayfa in 1902-4, and in Sweileh in 1906 (Rogan, 1994: 46;
Lewis, 1987; Shami, 1996: 307). Rogan (1994), explaining the importance of those
settlements, says,
‘These settlements in particular were of critical importance to
Ottoman expansion in Jordan. All were refugees from Russian
wars who were grateful Ottoman subjects with no loyalty
greater than that to their Sultan. They built sturdy villages,
which they inhabited year-round. As their livelihood was
bound to agriculture, they cultivated their lands extensively.
Outsiders to the local order, they resisted bedouin claims to a
share of their harvests and fought back when attacked’ (ibid:
46).
Thus, the Circassian presence in Transjordan allowed the Ottomans to maintain their
rule over the land, and their power over the ‘Arab’ Bedouin tribes. In following
section I review historical sources on Circassian settlement in Jordan, and the history
of Jordan under Ottoman rule.
29
1.4 Circassian Settlement in Jordan
As this account thus far has shown, the Circassians began to arrive in Jordan
when it was part of the Ottoman Empire. At that time, present-day Jordan, Palestine,
Syria, Lebanon and parts of Iraq were one administrative entity, called bilad-al-sham
or Greater Syria, under Ottoman rule (Doumani, 1992). The official language of the
Empire was Ottoman Turkish, Arabic was spoken in the Levant region, Arabia,
North Africa, Iraq and Kuwait and the whole Empire was unified by Islam. Jordan,
as well as the rest of Greater Syria, came under the Ottoman Empire’s nominal
authority in 1516 and this lasted until the mid-nineteenth century (Rogan, 1994).
Under Ottoman rule, the capital of Transjordan was al-Salt, which was equipped
‘with extensive administrative facilities by the Ottomans’ (Rogan, 1996: 92). After the
revolts in the Balkans and once the empire had lost parts of its European provinces,
it sought to ‘extend its rule in Arabia’ (Rogan, 1994: 33). Before this Jordan was left to
power struggling Bedouin tribes and some sedentary communities (Chatty, 2010;
Rogan, 1994). For a long time, Jordan had been regarded as a desert area. Johns
(1994), for example, says,
‘Until the middle of the twentieth century, European travellers
in Southern Transjordan interpreted the landscape through
which they rode as man-made desert dotted with abandoned
ruins of the biblical and classical civilisations… periods of
dense settlement and high population - Byzantine, Ayyubid -
Mamluk and modern - alternate with periods of sparse
settlement and low population - Umayyad-Abbasid, and late
Mamluk to Ottoman’ (Johns, 1994: 1-2).
However, to extend their rule over present-day Jordan, the Ottomans attempted to
change local realties, and did this by making use of a settlement policy, which took
the form of ‘the basing of a community in a particular site or village, and the award
of title to land’ (Rogan, 1994: 45). Rogan (1994) identifies three waves of settlement in
Jordan: the first included local peasants establishing new villages ‘for reasons of
30
economic gain or intercommunal strife’ (ibid: 45). The second wave is that of refugee
communities including Chechens and Circassians. The third wave came as a reaction
to the second wave, as Bedouin tribes started creating Bedouin plantation villages
‘immediately after the government awarded land grants to the Circassians in
Amman and Wadi al-Sir and to the Christians in Madaba’ (Rogan, 1994: 47). The
Ottomans regarded the nomadic tribes in the area as an obstruction to ‘regular
cultivation and direct administration’ (Rogan, 1994: 33).
The area of Transjordan witnessed extensive Ottoman construction of
government building and settlements in the period between 1840 and 1910 (ibid)5.
There were two types of land in Jordan, mahlul and mudawara; mudawara land refers
to the lands owned by the Ottoman Sultan, and the mahlul refers to pieces of land
‘repossessed from the cultivators for a variety of reasons, including to build the
Hijaz railroad and to settle Circassian and Chechen immigrants’ (Fischbach, 1994:
99). The first permanent settlement in Transjordan took place in 1878 in Amman, the
present-day capital of Jordan, and amongst the first settlers were the Circassians
(Chatty, 2010; Rogan, 1996; Shami, 1996). The Ottomans’ main concern in their
settlement policy was to protect agricultural lands from nomadic Bedouins in order
to be able to collect tax revenues. Settling Circassians in frontier districts given the
Ottomans’ belief in Circassians combat skills was a way of doing this.
Circassian settlements in Amman (1878) were the first settlements of those
which, later, became part of Jordan (Shami, 1996). The first Circassian group arriving
in Amman were the Shapsougs. Upon their arrival, Shapsougs took shelter in caves
and ruins around the Roman Amphitheatre in Amman, later they built permanent
houses and to this day there is an area in Amman called al-Shapsoug Street. The
second group to settle in Amman were Kabarday and Abzakh (1880-1892) (Shami,
1996). According to Ottoman documents, there were three quarters of Amman,
5 It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss fully all settlements that took place in Transjordan. However,
Rogan (1994) provides a detailed account of settlements and Ottoman policies in the area of Transjordan.
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Kabarday, Abzakh and Shapsoug (Hmoud, 1996). A third wave of Circassian Kabarday
arrived in Amman in 1902 (Lewis, 1987; Shami, 1996). By the early 1920s, Amman,
present-day Jordan’s capital, was described as a ‘Circassian village’ or ‘Circassian
town’ (Rogan, 1996; Shami, 1996; Mola, 2009). At that time, Amman was not yet the
capital of Transjordan, and al-Salt was expected to become the capital of the state of
Transjordan. During their time in Transjordan, when it was still part of the Ottoman
Empire, Circassians developed the area. For instance, they were the first to introduce
wheeled vehicles (Quataert, 2000; Rogan, 1994) and ‘their villages and fields were
soon interconnected by a road network that could accommodate their wicker carts’
(Rogan, 1994: 48). Lewis (1987) says that Circassians became involved in agriculture
and trade ten years after their arrival in Jordan.
Lewis (1987) suggests that the Circassians were hated by Bedouin tribes when
they first arrived into Jordan. One of the reasons they were hated was the fact that
Circassian settlers were exempt from paying taxes to the Ottoman Empire, because
of the 1858 Refugee Code established by the Ottoman Empire. In addition,
Circassians refused to pay tribute to the Bedouin tribes in the form of Khuwa.
Bedouin tribes imposed on peasants and other permanent settlers in Jordan a tax in
Khuwa money in return for protection. However, the Circassians were able to protect
themselves from the Bedouins. On the other hand, Circassians were associated with
the Ottomans and, due to their alignment with the Turkish Ottomans, and the fact
that cavalry regiments were often formed of Circassians and Chechens, the presence
of Circassians in present day Jordan was not welcomed by the Arabic-speaking
Bedouin tribes. Further, Circassians’ willingness to become part of the Ottoman
Army meant that many of the men wore Ottoman Army uniforms (Chatty, 2010).
Despite previous conflicts between Circassians and Bedouins, by the end of the
1890s ‘the Circassians of Amman had entered into alliances with the major Bedouin
tribe in the area, the Bani Sakhr’ (Chatty, 2010: 117). This alliance was based on
agreeing to support each other in cases of conflicts with others. However, this did
32
not mean that peace between Bedouins and Circassians was established forever, as
Circassians’ association with the Ottoman Empire was too strong.
In 1905, Mirza Wasfi Pasha, who was a brigadier in the Ottoman Army,
founded the Voluntary Circassian Cavalry, which aimed to maintain stability locally
and fight the Bedouin tribes. The Cavalry, which consisted of 1200 soldiers, also
served the Ottomans in suppressing the Druze’s revolts of 1909-10 (Chatty, 2010;
Jaimoukha, 2001). The Ottomans made further use of the Circassian Cavalry during
the First World War to protect the Hejaz railway, which connected Constantinople
and the Arabian provinces of the Ottoman Empire. The railway linked the Arabian
provinces of the empire with its capital in order to gain more control over the region
and for economic reasons. This railway came through Amman, and Circassians, in
addition to guarding the railway, also participated in its construction (Shami, 1996).
Setting up the railway brought an economic boom for the Circassians in Amman, as
firstly they were well-paid for working on the construction site, and secondly
Amman became an urban centre that attracted many merchants.
However, with the emergence of the Great Arab Revolt against Ottoman rule
in the Arabian provinces of the empire, the Circassians’ association with the
Ottomans was not helpful. The Ottomans were defeated and had to withdraw from
Transjordan in 1918, and the Caucasian minorities in Jordan found themselves in a
difficult position. As allies of the Turks, they were not welcome on ‘Arab’ occupied
lands, and there was an initial mistrust towards them (Le Mee, 2004; Rogan, 1996).
However, this did not last for long and shortly after the Ottomans’ defeat, this
mistrust was overcome. The following section sheds light on the transfer of rule
from the Ottomans to the Hashemites in Jordan and the relation between Circassians
and what is now the state of Jordan.
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1.5 Jordan: Post-Ottoman Rule
The ‘Arab’ Revolt against the Ottomans was led by Hussein bin Ali6 of the
Hashemite family from the Hejaz region of Saudi Arabia; he was the official leader
of the ‘Arab’ Revolt, aimed at creating a single unified ‘Arab’ state, through, as
historical sources cite, entering an alliance with ‘the British and the French’ against
the Ottoman Empire (Halliday, 2000b: 208). With the support of the British Empire
Army Forces, the ‘Arabs’, or as many argue, the British7, seized the Levant region8
and parts of the Arabian Peninsula. Thus, after deposing the Ottomans, the ‘Arab’
speaking region came under British and French mandate. Although the main
objective of the Hashemites, Hussein bin Ali and his sons, in defeating the Ottomans
had been to create a united ‘Arab’ state, colonisation did not allow for that. Rather,
the most suitable solution was to divide the Levant region into separate entities.
Faisal and Abdullah, Hussein bin Ali’s sons, carried on the struggle for the
independence of the ‘Arab’ states, ruled by their Hashemite father. However, the
colonial powers only allowed for the creation of separate states in the region under
their mandate; Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq and Palestine. Syria, under French
mandate, was granted to Faisal bin al-Hussein, who a few years later was expelled
by the French. His brother, Abdullah, on the other hand, threatened to wage war
against the French in Syria. However, the British, in an attempt to avoid problems
with their French allies, created a protectorate for Abdullah, which later announced
its independence under the name of the Emirate of Transjordan in 1923.
6 Hussein bin Ali had been appointed by the Ottomans the Sharif of Mecca in 1908 and he remained
so until he proclaimed himself king of the Hejaz region. However, his kingdom-hood did not last
long, as he was conquered by the Saud family in 1924, and he sought refuge in Cyprus.
7 History later revealed that British and French support of the ‘Arabs’ came in accordance with a
secret agreement between the British, the French, and Russia—the Sykes-Picot Agreement concluded
that: “the two colonial powers were to divide the ‘liberated’ ‘Arab’ territories among themselves
(114)” TIBI, B. 1997. Arab Nationalism: Between Islam and the Nation-State, New York, ST. Martins Press.
8 The Levant Region includes what is now known as Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Jordan, and the Palestinian
territories occupied by Israel.
Prior to the Emirate of Transjordan gaining independence, in 1920 the British
sent Captain Brunton from Palestine to Jordan to report on the political situation
there, as Transjordania was ‘a vague name for an undefined territory newly under
British mandate’ (Rogan, 199
from Jerusalem, it should be ruled from al
Jerusalem was the main road linking the East Bank of the Jordan River to the West
Bank (Figure 1.5 British Mandate of
a population of around 10,000 making it the largest populated area in Transjordan
(Rogan, 1996). Amman’s population, on the other hand, in the early 1920s, was
estimated between 3,000 and 5,000 and was char
mentioned previously (Shami, 1996). However, political influence shifted from al
Salt to Amman in the same year, when the British created a small reserve force that
was based in Amman (Rogan, 1996).
Figure (1.5) The British Mandate of Palestine and Transjordan Before 1948
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6: 92). Burton advised that if Transjordan is to be ruled
-Salt, as the road between al
Palestine and Transjordan). Further, al
acterised as a Circassian village, as
-Salt and
-Salt had
-
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The Circassian village, Amman, became an area of political activity under
British control in the early 1920s. In 1921, after meetings between the British and
Emir Abdullah, Britain agreed to grant Abdullah administration over Transjordan
for six months as a probation period. Abdullah arrived in Amman in March 1921.
He, however, did not have total administrative control, because Britain insisted that
major decisions would be made from Palestine (Rogan, 1996). At the beginning the
Emirate of Transjordan wholly depended on the British financially (Peak, 1958). In
November 1921, Philby was appointed as the Chief British Representative in
Amman, and his responsibility was to oversee the administration of Emir Abdullah
(Rogan, 1996). From December 1921, the administration was moved from al-Salt to
Amman, because of the central position of Amman as a capital, and the existence of a
military base in East Amman (Rogan, 1996).
Rogan (1996) documents, through looking at Philby’s diaries, that when the
administration was moved to Amman, there were still hostilities between the ‘Arabs’
and the Circassians, as well as general mistrust. Philby states in his diaries that
Mirza Pasha Wasfi, the founder of the Voluntary Circassian Cavalry serving the
Ottomans, ‘with deep emotion expressed the hope that Great Britain would always
maintain its attitude of protection of the strangers like themselves sojourning in the
land and not leave them to the tender mercies of the Arabs’ (Rogan, 1996: 97). By
1922, Amman had become the official capital of Transjordan, and almost half of the
population of Amman was Circassian except for some Greater Syrian merchants and
political refugees (Rogan, 1996; Alon, 2005). Shami (1996) writes about how the
making of Amman, the Circassian town, a capital city had impacted the identity of
Circassians living there, this is given special attention in the next chapter. Briefly,
‘with the rapid growth of the city of Amman, and the state apparatus, the
Circassians were on their way to becoming a numerical minority as more and more
Arabs were drawn to the newly established capital from different regions of Jordan
as well as from Syria and Palestine’ (Shami, 1996: 318).
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With the rapid expansion of Amman, Circassians felt the need to differentiate
themselves from others. Thus in 1932 the first ethnic association, the Circassian
Charity Association, was established with the support of Emir Abdullah. Shami
(1996: 318) says that the establishment of the association is related to Amman’s
expansion, ‘the integration of the Circassian neighbourhoods into the wider and
more complex urban fabric’, and to Circassians’ socio-economic position in Amman.
Circassians turned their allegiances from the Ottomans to the Emir Abdullah, and
started playing important roles in the building of Transjordan as an independent
state. For example, there were many Circassians in the Arab Legion and the
Transjordan Frontier Force (Bocco and Tell, 1994; Chatty, 2010). Thus they were ‘well
represented in the officer corps of the nation’ (Chatty, 2010: 119).
At the beginning of his reign, Emir Abdullah found some difficulties in
controlling the whole area of present-day Jordan, and the authority of the
Transjordanian state was limited to settled areas at the beginning (Bocco and Tell,
1994). Bringing the disparate Bedouin tribes under state control had been achieved
by the support of the British government through the British General John Glubb,
who succeeded in ‘harnessing the Bedouin to the purposes of the Mandatory regime’
(Bocco and Tell, 1994: 108).
It is also suggested that during his rule as the Emir of Transjordan, Abdullah I
(1921-1946) enhanced his position amongst the Bedouin tribes of Jordan through
strengthening his personal ties with them. Wroblewski (2008), for example,
documents that Abdullah I used to grant personal gifts from the property of the state
to community leaders as a way of befriending them. In addition to internal affairs,
the Emir of Transjordan was also busy with other issues relating to the country’s
stability. According to the website of King Hussein I, the previous ruler,
‘The period between the two world wars was one of
consolidation and institutionalization in Transjordan. Abdullah
sought to build political unity by melding the disparate
37
Bedouin tribes into a cohesive group capable of maintaining
Arab rule in the face of increasing Western encroachment.
Abdullah realized the need for a capable security force to
establish and ensure the integrity of the state in defence, law,
taxation, and other matters. Accordingly, he set up the fabled
Arab Legion as one cornerstone of the fledgling state’ (The
Royal Hashemite Court, 2001).
The extract above, taken from an official state source, attempts to emphasise that
Hashemite rule of Jordan is ‘Arab’, and as we can see there is no mention of the
Circassian community or any other non-Arabic speaking community. This suggests
a shift from being part of an Ottoman-state that defines itself as Islamic, Circassians
came under an ‘Arab’ promoted sense of identity. Although the Hashemites had
failed to create a unified ‘Arab’ state in the region, they still maintained that Jordan
was an ‘Arab’ state. Between 1921 and 1946, Transjordan remained under the control
of the British Mandate.
Several negotiations, and treaties with British authorities, led to the
declaration of total independence of Transjordan in 1946, and brought the British
Mandate over Transjordan to an end. In 1946, the Emirate of Transjordan was
announced as the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, named after the Hashemite family,
to which Abdullah I belonged, and he then became king of Jordan. Not long after the
birth of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, the British mandate of Palestine ended
and allowed the creation of ‘Israel’ on parts of Palestinian lands, the rest being taken
over by Transjordan. The creation of ‘Israel’ caused severe tensions in the region. At
that time Abdullah I proclaimed himself, as King of Jordan, to be responsible for
Palestine, which later came to be called the West Bank, because it was located on the
west bank of the Jordan river (Figure 1.6).
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In 1950, Abdullah annexed the green section of the third map from the left to
the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, except for the Gaza strip which was annexed to
Egypt, while all other Palestinian lands became part of the illegal Israeli occupation9.
Figure 1.6 Map of Occupied Palestine, Loss of Land
Circassians in Jordan were part of the building of the Hashemite Kingdom, and it is
largely assumed that they are integrated into Jordanian society, at least economically
and politically. For example, Abd-el-Jawad (2006) says,
‘Throughout their life in Jordan, many of them have occupied
important government positions at all levels, e.g. prime
ministers, ministers, deputies, army and police chiefs, and have
always seen themselves as co-founders of the country… they
have enjoyed full citizenship rights and duties’ (Abd-el-Jawad,
2006: 52).
9 As a Palestinian, who believes that the creation of the state of ‘Israel’ on Palestinian land is illegal, I
choose to use scare quotes, throughout the thesis, when referring to ‘Israel’.
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Kaya (2004) also claims that ‘the Circassian population in Jordan enjoys an
essentially privileged position, having long been closely connected to the Crown’
(Kaya, 2004: 224). Moreover, since Jordan has the only Circassian-language school in
the Middle East, many would believe that this reflects Circassians’ privileged
position in Jordan, compared to other neighbouring countries. Furthermore, as part
of Jordan’s electoral system, Circassians are allocated three seats out of 80 in the
Parliament (Reynolds and Elklit, 1997); the ethnic quota law responsible for this
allocation has not been applied to the Palestinians. In conclusion, the presence of
Circassians in Jordan predates Jordan becoming a constitutional state ruled by King
Abdullah I in 1928 under British rule. Circassians came to Jordan when it was part of
the Ottoman Empire and were part of the processes of building Jordan as an
independent nation-state.
Although the Palestinians are not the focus of this research, it is important to
provide a brief history of the Palestinians in Jordan, particularly since the idea of this
research developed from the contrast between the positions of the Circassians and
the Palestinians in Jordan. There is no census data that provides an accurate number
of Circassians present in Jordan. Some say that it is around 44,280 (Rannut, 2009) and
others say that it is 125,000 (Petra, 2008), out of a total population of 5,951,000 (The
World Bank, 2010). This suggests that Circassians constitute a maximum of two
percent of the total population in Jordan. Palestinians, in contrast, constitute a
numerical majority in Jordan. Nevertheless, it is assumed that Circassians are in a
better position than are Palestinians in the state of Jordan. The following section
provides a brief history of the Palestinian presence in Jordan, because of its
importance in shaping present day Jordan.
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1.6 The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Palestinians
Jordan received a great number of Palestinian refugees expelled from their
homes and lands during the Israeli Occupation in 1948. Between 1948, following the
declaration of the state of ‘Israel’, and 1951, all Palestinians, on the West and the East
banks of the Jordan River, were granted Jordanian citizenship. Massad (2001) argues
that Abdullah I attempted to erase the Palestinian identity and replace it with an
‘Arab’ Jordanian one. Tensions rose between the Palestinians and the proclaimed
king of Palestine and Jordan, until they reached their climax, with the assassination
of Abdullah I by a Palestinian in Al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem during Friday
prayers on July 20, 1951. The assassination supposedly took place because rumours
were spreading about Abdullah’s intentions to enter peace negotiations with ‘Israel’
and give up ‘Arab’ Palestinian lands.
Talal10 succeeded his father, Abdullah I, but he was removed from the throne,
and replaced by his sixteen year old son Hussein on August 11, 1952. For a long time
after Hussein’s succession to the throne, the Palestinian issue remained on Jordan’s
political agenda. Several ‘Arab’ countries neighbouring ‘Israel’ including Jordan
waged wars against the newly-established state of ‘Israel’, and received large flows
of Palestinian refugees as a result. However, Hussein I retained Jerusalem and the
West Bank, until he lost control over them during the Six Days War, in 1967. Hussein
assured the Palestinians remaining in Jordan that he would keep fighting on their
side, and would provide them with whatever support they needed. Between 1967
and 1974, several battles took place between Palestinian guerrillas, supported by
some members of the Jordanian Army, and the ‘Israeli’ Army in order to regain lost
Palestinian lands. Although the Palestinian guerrillas fought more often than the
Army of Jordan, King Hussein remained the sole political representative of the
Palestinian people, until 1974, following another upsurge of tension.
10 One of the very rarely mentioned kings has been Talal bin Abdullah, who only came to the throne in 1951,
and was forced to leave his position in 1952, as he was diagnosed with schizophrenia by the British, possibly as
a result of his ‘anti-British reputation’ (Satloff, 1994: 21).
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In 1970, clashes erupted between the guerrillas who, clustered together as one
group, came to be known as the Palestinian Liberation Organisation [PLO], and the
Jordanian Army. Black September became the name for the clashes that took place at
that time, when the PLO attempted to assassinate the King, and several hijacking
attempts took place, which threatened Jordan’s security and stability as a state. As a
way to protect his Kingdom, King Hussein declared martial law, and the PLO’s
headquarters and grassroots were attacked. The clashes led to the expulsion of all
Palestinian armed fighters from Jordan to Lebanon and the Palestinian population,
which remained in Jordan, were disarmed11. Following those events, when the King
of Jordan became aware that the majority of the inhabitants of Jordan were in fact
Palestinian, he exerted considerable effort to enhance the viability of the state by
trying to erase any Palestinian identity amongst the people and replace it with a
Jordanian one. The creation of a Jordanian national identity, as Massad (2001) calls it,
has not been easy, for the majority of Palestinians.
Palestinians who remained in the West Bank areas occupied by ‘Israel’
retained their Jordanian nationalities. However, the PLO requested that it be
recognised as the sole representative of the Palestinian people. In 1974, ‘Arab’
countries pressurised King Hussein into recognising the PLO as the sole and
legitimate representative of the Palestinians. Despite hesitancies in complying with
the ‘Arab’ countries’ wishes, King Hussein had no other option. And he remained
uncertain if this meant that the PLO had the right to represent the Palestinians living
on the East Bank. In 1988, negotiations took place between King Hussein and the
PLO, which resulted in dividing the Palestinians into two groups. Palestinians living
on the East Bank of the Jordan River were declared Jordanian by law, and were to be
represented by King Hussein, while Palestinians on the West Bank of the Jordan
River were to be represented by the PLO (Chapin Metz, 1989).
11 Tensions between Palestinians and Transjordanians continue today; however the intensity is much
less.
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The creation of a Jordanian national identity, however, remained a big issue
within Jordan. For example, Massad (2001) refers to the ‘battle of the accent,’ as one
way of reflecting the differences between Jordanians and Palestinians. In Jordan,
after the 1970 civil war, urban accents were used to identify Palestinians generally, in
distinction to the Bedouin accent, which was the accent of the tribes. The accent
became a marker of national identity, meaning that Jordanians are seen as those who
speak with a Bedouin accent. For that reason, urban Jordanians, including
Circassians began using the same accent as Bedouins. Palestinian men wanting to
assimilate and live in peace also began to use the same Bedouin accent (Massad,
2001). It is worth noting, though, that Palestinians whose original accents were urban
began to use Bedouin accents in the company of men, ‘particularly if these men were
Transjordanian’ (Massad, 2001: 251). The Bedouin accent became generally labelled
as masculine, opposed to urban accents associated with the Palestinians, which
became viewed as feminine. Accents thus became part of national identity, and they
became gendered as well, especially given that women are not often seen as
nationalistic (Massad, 2001).
The Palestinian issue and the invention of ‘Israel’ created many social,
economic and political changes in Jordan, many of them problematic for the creation
of a Jordanian nationalist state narrative. This intensified particularly with the Israeli
claim that Jordan should be an alternative homeland for the Palestinians, and that by
the dismantling of the state of Jordan, and the creation of a Palestine state over the
lands of Jordan, the ‘Arab-Israeli’ conflict would be resolved. As the sole legitimate
representative of the Palestinian people, Jordan’s economy greatly benefited from
‘Arab’ aid to the Palestinian people. However, following the recognition of the PLO,
Jordan lost a lot of its foreign funds, which were channelled instead to the PLO.
In the 1970s, Jordan began to suffer from very high unemployment, and yet
the labour force continued to grow, following the growing number of Palestinian
refugees. The resulting economic crisis did not last for long, but neither did the
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subsequent years of prosperity. Between the late 1970s and the early 1980s, demand
for skilled labourers by oil exporting countries increased, due to the increase in
prices and heavy demands for oil. In 1985, the proportion of Jordanian labourers
working in the Gulf, most of whom were Palestinians, amounted to around 60
percent of the Jordanian labour force (Wilson, 1991). This brought into Jordan,
through remittances sent to families, the largest proportion of its income.
Unfortunately, in 1991 many labourers were expelled from the Gulf countries
following the first Gulf War, which not only caused a loss of income to Jordan, but
also resulted in high unemployment in a country with scarce resources. Not long
after the Gulf War, Jordan’s two main concerns were the Oslo Peace Process12 and
the economy.
Economic adjustments and reform took place in Jordan, a year after the
announcement of the severance of all ties and attachments to the PLO and the
Palestinian territories in 1988. Hussein initiated adjustment and restructuring
processes in the economy, and in domestic and foreign politics, liberalisation and
democratisation (Ryan, 2002). The King kept working on economic reform, which
mainly depended on foreign aid, and privatisation. Hussein I ruled Jordan for more
than sixty four years, succeeded in preserving the monarchy, and survived several
military coups. However, he could not survive Non-Hodgkin's Lymphoma, and died
in 1999. During his illness, Hussein chose his son Abdullah to succeed him and the
son ascended to the throne in February 1999. Abdullah’s economic and political
policies were not much different from his father’s. But, rather than political stability,
he focused all his efforts on the economy and national cohesion (Milton-Edwards
and Hinchcliffe, 1999; Harrigan et al., 2006; Cunningham, 2002). It was Hussein’s
12 The Oslo Peace Accords, signed in 1993 between ‘Israel’ and the Palestinian Liberation Organisation
[PLO], stipulated that the PLO will have control over the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. The PLO,
which later came to be called the Palestinian Authority [PA], was granted pieces of land in the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip (See figure 1.7 first map from the right), and the Jordanian passports of
people residing in those areas were replaced by Palestinian passports. However, the conflict over
Jerusalem was left to be discussed later. Palestinians residing in Jerusalem kept their Jordanian
passports, and Jerusalem remained under ‘Israeli’ control.
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legacy that Jordan achieved political stability, and he established the Hashemite
family as the legitimate rulers of Jordan.
Thus, in spite of Jordan’s promotion of a ‘pan-Arabist’ nationalist narrative, it
seems that Palestinian and Jordanian identities are located in two contradictory
competing narratives. Whereas one might assume that in Jordan those who are
considered ‘Arabs’ are favoured over other groups, due to the state’s theoretical
adoption of a general ‘Pan-Arabist’ nationalist narrative, the contrast between ‘Arab’
Palestinians and Circassians suggests that the reality is more complex. Moreover,
looking solely at Circassians’ economic and political position in Jordan does not
reflect the complexity of their integration, especially as they ‘were not organised as a
cohesive political group’ (Chatty, 2010: 119), and those who attained good
governmental positions and appear to be fully integrated are actually individuals,
who are not necessarily representative of their group. However, Circassians
themselves often draw on the narrative of their participation in the building of the
state of Jordan, and particularly Amman to explain their integration (Shami, 1996).
In light of this, and the history of their incorporation in the state of Jordan, my
concern in what follows is with how Circassians explain their ethnicity and how they
make sense of being Jordanian when a ‘Pan-Arabist’ narrative is promoted by the
state of Jordan.
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Conclusion
In this chapter, I have attempted to provide the reader with an outline of the
history of Circassians in Jordan, during and post Ottoman rule. This has been of
particular importance because my research focuses on how Circassians define
themselves and what narratives they use in doing so. Circassians began to arrive in
the area that is now Jordan in 1878, before it was established as a state. Their arrival
was at a time when Jordan was under the rule of the Ottoman Empire, which
promoted itself as a pan-Islamic state. Since this thesis also looks at how Circassians
make sense of the nationalist narratives of the state of Jordan, it is important to
explore the shift that took place in how the region was defined. Under Ottoman rule,
it was part of a pan-Islamic state and now with the establishment of the state of
Jordan, this definition has changed to ‘pan-Arabism’, which at first stance seems
exclusive of the Circassians and other ‘non-Arab’ groups who reside in Jordan.
Shami (1996) in her research on Circassians argues that their narrative of
building Jordan ‘privileges the Ottoman period, (321)’ and that they have been an
indivisible part of the Jordanian people since the establishment of the state of Jordan,
particularly since they were living in the land of Jordan before the arrival of the
Hashemite Royal family. Despite the fact that the Circassians were associated with
the Ottomans, they were able to retain a good position and status within the
Hashemite established ‘Arab’ state of Jordan. Their position and status depended, to
a great extent, on their presence and residence in agricultural areas, and on their
well-established socioeconomic position as merchants in Amman under Ottoman
rule. Although there were few Circassians during the period of transition from
Ottoman to Hashemite rule, they were economically and politically powerful. The
economically powerful position of Circassians in Jordan pre-Transjordan certainly
granted them a good position within the newly established state. However, this does
not explain how they maintained this position in a state that was based on an
‘Arabist’ nationalist ideology.
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The contrast between the situation of Palestinians and Circassians in Jordan
appears to contradict Jordan’s theoretical promotion of a ‘Pan-Arabist’ nationalist
narrative. The conventional wisdom about the social acceptance and inclusion of
Circassians in Jordan shows that there is room for investigation as to whether this
social phenomenon, ‘pan-Arabism’, includes Circassians and how Circassians define
and identify with it, if they do. And, although it is largely agreed that Circassians are
socially accepted in the state of Jordan, no research has been done on the way
Circassians themselves interpret their relation to the state of Jordan; the way they
define themselves, as a diasporic community, in an ‘Arab’ state; and whether they
see themselves as integrated into Jordanian society. This research, therefore, focuses
on participants’ own interpretations of their position in Jordan, their views on their
ethnic narratives, and their reconstruction of state promoted nationalist ideologies.
It has to be mentioned, as well, that at the heart of this thesis lies a criticism of
the widespread assumption that Jordan, as a Middle Eastern state, is based on ‘Arab’
ethnonationalism, which is de facto exclusionary to ‘non-Arab’ minorities. The
following chapter is a review of the literature around ethnicity, nationalism,
diasporic communities, and state nationalism. It also explores the small amount of
literature on diasporic communities in the Middle East, and nationalist narratives of
the Middle Eastern state. It also clarifies how this research is based on the idea that
as ethnicity and nationalism are constructed, they are composed of narratives, and
those narratives are often, if not always, constructed and reconstructed depending
on the context. In other words, this research rejects categorising people into
ethnic/national groups according to predefined categories.
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Chapter Two
Literature Review
Introduction
‘In their reconstructions, individuals order experiences around
the repetition of specific experiential tropes, which then draw
on master narratives provided by the state… A narrative
analysis of state edicts and autobiographies brings the state and
everyday life into the same interpretive frame, allowing for a
dynamic, experience-based understanding of the ongoing
processes of differential nation-building and state legitimation’
(Borneman, 1992: 19).
This research looks at the narratives of nationalism promoted by the state of
Jordan and their reconstruction by Circassians in Jordan, in addition to Circassians’
narratives of ethnicity. It also explores the relationship of the Circassian community
to the state of Jordan. State narratives of nationalism are usually promoted through
state channels, and the channels this research focuses on are the ‘Jordan First’
campaign, and textbooks of civic and national education taught, as part of an
obligatory module, from the age of six till the age of 18, in all Jordanian public and
private schools. These narratives can become particularly problematic to diasporic
communities when they draw on primordial ethnic attachments. This is especially so
when states claim legitimacy through emphasising a tie ‘inferred from the feeling of
natural, almost spiritual affinity rather than from social interaction’ (Bacova, 1998:
32). However, since this research understands ethnicity and nationalism as
constructs, this chapter discusses how state narratives, including those drawn from
ethnic narratives, are reconstructed and reconfigured, by states and by people. The
Middle Eastern state, as discussed in this chapter, is proof of this reconstruction.
As explained in the previous chapter, the form of nationalism in Jordan
shifted from one based on Islam, which was a unifying element for the ethnically
diverse provinces of the Ottoman Empire, to one based on ‘Arabism’. Furthermore,
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with the Hashemites’ failure to establish an ‘Arab’ state, nationalism came to be
based on being Jordanian; ‘Arabism’ however was not dismissed or disregarded as
part of Jordanian nationalism. Chatty (2010: 32) says ‘As the doctrine of ethnic
exclusiveness and ethnic nationalism (other than ‘Arabness’) does not largely define
the Arab world, the image of a singular closed and primordial group, as defining the
state, does not emerge with such clarity’. Since there is no doctrine for ethnic
exclusiveness defining the ‘Arab’ world other than ‘Arabism’, I am looking at how
the state of Jordan promotes its nationalism, and to what extent ‘Arabness’ or
‘Arabism’ is part of the state’s construction of Jordanianism. I am interested in how
the state constructs nationalism ‘from above’. At the same time, I focus on how
Circassians (re)construct state narratives of Jordanianism and how they make sense
of the concept of ‘Arabism’, if it is part of Jordanianism, ‘from below’.
This focus also contributes to debates on identity and belonging and how they
relate to the Circassian community in Jordan. That the Circassians define themselves
as belonging to an ethnic group that is different from how the state of Jordan defines
the Jordanian nation implies that Circassians could be experiencing contradictory
identities and/or senses of belonging. In other words, the Circassians in Jordan, a
diasporic community, define themselves as an ethnic group (UNPO, 2008), and are
socially accepted in Jordan, which defines itself as an ‘Arab’ state. Their presence as
a ‘non-Arab’ ethnic group that is, presumably, fully incorporated into the nation in
Jordan questions the assumption that the Middle Eastern state is based on ethno-
nationalism and, as a result, is exclusionary towards ‘non-Arab’ minorities.
Therefore, in this thesis, I look at both nationalist narratives of Jordanianism and
ethnic narratives of the Circassians as a community in the state of Jordan in order to
understand how Circassians make sense of the contradiction between being
Circassian and Jordanian at the same time, and how they define themselves as
Circassian and Jordanian simultaneously. For that reason, I also look at the ethnic
narratives Circassians mobilise to define their ethnic group.
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Narratives of ethnicity can undergo reconstruction and reconfiguration. The
reconstruction and reconfiguration of these narratives render what it means to be of
a particular ethnicity fluid and changing. The conceptualisation of ethnicity, and of
ethnic boundaries, as (re)constructed and (re)configured is part of the
circumstantialist approach to ethnicity. This views ethnicity as a construct, and
ethnic grouping as a phenomenon which manifests itself in narratives and shared
collective memories, rather than natural affinities. This view is counter-posed to the
primordial approach to ethnicity, which is based on the belief that ethnicity is
ahistorical, and that groups exist ‘naturally,’ implying the unchanging nature of
ethnicity. It is important to note though, that ethnic groups can use both
circumstantialist and primordial narratives of ethnicity to draw the boundaries of
their group.
The following sections unpack concepts of ethnicity, nationalism,
ethnonationalism and state narratives. This chapter explains how state narratives
incorporate ideas of ethnicity and nationalism, by drawing on different bodies of
work and situating this research within the literature on ethnicity and nationalism as
well as the literature on Circassian identity and belonging in Jordan. Reviewing this
body of literature also clarifies the theoretical framework of the research. This
chapter shows how much of the literature on diasporic communities is Eurocentric,
or, in other words, focuses on diasporic groups from the Middle East living in the
West and overlooks diasporic communities living in the Middle East. The next
section discusses ethnicity.
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2.1 Ethnicity
‘A specific ethnic group is constructed by emphasising
homogeneity, unity, and timelessness and by disregarding
differences, smoothing over contradictions… A particular
culture is described in terms of an enduring set of
characteristics, behavioural traits, or beliefs, which members of
that ethnic group are expected to share’ (Murphy-Shigematsu,
2002: 4).
An ethnic group is constructed through manipulating themes of homogeneity
and unity, either through emphasising shared descent or culture (Fenton, 2010). This
process of social construction is achieved by using narratives, and those narratives
are changing; this means that the boundaries of ethnic groups are fluid and
changing. Ethnicity is, broadly speaking, a way of categorising, grouping, and/or
dividing people, based on similarities and/or differences, for various motives or
reasons. Glazer and Moynihan (1975) draw our attention to the fact that ethnicity,
and ethnic grouping can be used as a form of political mobilisation, as a source of
stratification, and as an organising principle. However, what does ethnicity consist
of? And what makes an ethnic group?
Theorists attempt to understand ethnicity by breaking it up into constituent
elements. Some of them argue that ethnic groups have shared ancestry, shared
cultural tradition and shared language (Cornell and Hartmann, 2007, Drury, 1994,
Jenkins, 2008, Song, 2003). At the same time, ‘claims to sharing descent and culture
are decidedly questionable’ (Fenton, 2010: 3). These elements are, therefore, social
constructs which themselves hold meanings and serve purposes that are important
(Eriksen, 1993, Fenton, 1999, Fenton, 2003, Hale, 2004, Song, 2003). Despite the fact
that the meanings of ethnicity are important and can influence social interaction, the
meanings themselves can change as elements of ethnicity are not static or
unchangeable (Eriksen, 1993). Moreover, the context and meaning of those elements
can be determinants of social relations and interactions (Eriksen, 1993, Fenton, 1999,
Rex, 1986, Song, 2003). In other words, ethnicity serves as a marker of difference,
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particularly in situations where the meanings it holds lead to social stratification.
Sutterluty (2006) gives examples of how the widespread belief that ‘members of an
ethnic group are blood relatives’ inflames prejudice against the Muslim Turks in
Germany (Sutterluty, 2005: 179). In this case the classification of Muslim Turks as
blood relatives marks them off from other groups, and is particularly problematic
because it means that they are inherently different from ‘others’, implying a
primordial tie between them. Fenton (2010) defines primordial ties as ‘those deriving
from birth into a particular family, community, religious or language group’ (Fenton,
2010: 86).
Although much of the academic debate attempts to move away from a
primordial discussion of ethnicity, this does not mean that people do not view
ethnicity in primordial terms. Kukutai (2004) gives us an example which shows the
way in which the government in New Zealand defines the Maori in both primordial
and circumstantialist way. The government tried to define the Maori people, the
indigenous people of New Zealand, in order to provide them with the right to vote
for Maori Parliamentary candidates. They set the following criteria to define the
Maori:
‘A common proper name; one or more elements of a common
culture which need not be specified, but may include religion,
customs or language; a unique community of interests, feelings
and actions; a shared sense of common origins or ancestry; a
common geographic origin’ (Kukutai, 2004: 91).
Identifying ethnicity in a primordial way allows for categorisation and grouping
(Brubaker, 2004), which can be problematic in the same way racial categorisation has
often led to bloodshed. Based on that, it is important to problematise the primordial
view of the term ethnicity, which sees it as natural and identifies it in terms of shared
blood and ancestry. In her work on the Mongol realisation of ethnic boundaries, Gil-
White (1999) reveals that most of her sample found the primordial perspective most
appealing when defining ethnicity (Gil-White, 1999). And, although Eller and
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Coughlan (1993) deem the view that ethnicity is natural and unchangeable to be
unsociological (Eller and Coughlan, 1993), it is very important to take into
consideration the view of ethnic actors. Gil-White states,
‘To insist that actors perceive co-ethnics as sharing biological
descent is to describe the manner in which individuals cognize
the ethnies they participate in. It does not say that new ethnic
groups cannot arise in place of old ones which disappear, nor is
it incompatible with this idea’ (Gil-White, 1999: 803).
Moreover, an understanding of ethnicity ‘from below’ would definitely help in
unpacking what ethnicity holds and means, and what narratives are used to define
the boundaries of a specific ethnic group. Looking at ethnicity ‘from below’ means
looking at how ethnic actors themselves view ethnicity. This does not necessarily
require a primordial position on behalf of the researcher; rather it means
acknowledging that social actors are not passive social objects, that they participate
in the construction of ethnicity, and that they have some power over their ethnic
choices. For instance, some literature talks about how ethnicity can be used as a
resource to gain advantage (Eders et al., 2002, Bagwell, 2008, Drury, 1994, Fenton,
2003). Bagwell (2008) explains how ethnic ties and ethnic networks brought
economic advantages for some of the Vietnamese diasporic community in the UK.
The manipulation of ethnic ties in this sense cannot be touched upon from above, as
ethnic actors themselves in such a case choose to be part of a community for
economic advantages. A contradictory example, where ethnic ties serve as a resource
to gain advantage, is provided by Keels (2008) who gives an example of how
Gautreaux mothers in the USA preferred to live in ‘white’ or mixed neighbourhoods,
rather than living in black-dominated neighbourhoods, because the living conditions
were much better. In doing so, Gautreaux mothers chose to move away from their
‘ethnic group’ to gain economic advantages (Keels, 2008). Another example of
economic advantages gained through membership of an ethnic group is what
Bubinas (2003) calls ethnic economies. She says,
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‘An ethnic economy consists of the ethnic self-employed and
their co-ethnic employees. Ethnic economies cater to the needs
of their ethnic group, service the general population, and sell
goods and services to other ethnic groups. An ethnic economy
can consist of one store or a spatial clustering of multiple
ethnic-owned businesses’ (Bubinas, 2003: 195-6).
Apart from economic advantage, ethnicity can also serve as a resource to gain
advantage in terms of political power. Membership of the Alawite sect in Syria, for
example, means access to political power, as the ruling al-Assad family in Syria
belongs to the Alawite religious sect (Lucas, 1994). Nonetheless, understanding
ethnicity as a resource does not explain why it exists in the first place.
Within the circumstantialist approach, many agree that ethnicity is a social
construct (Drury, 1994, Fenton, 2003, Jenkins, 2008, Karner, 2007). It is also agreed
that descent and ancestry are examples of ethnic markers (Cornell and Hartmann,
2007, Drury, 1994, Jenkins, 2008, Song, 2003, Gil-White, 1999). Moreover, ethnicity
has been largely viewed as a product of culture, which is human made and
constructed (Fenton, 1999). Ethnic groups use narratives of descent and ancestry to
define their boundaries, and their narratives construct descent and ancestry in
particular, sometimes intrinsic, ways. Barth (1969), for example, suggests that
ethnicity is constructed in situational terms. He argues that this construction
emerges through recognising differences between groups. Thus, situational ethnicity
‘derives from a specific group’s recognition that it needs to mark out a differentiated
self-identity to create social and physical boundaries’ (Chatty, 2010: 27). For
example, groups can draw on narratives of religion, culture, language, and
sometimes physical attributes to highlight the differences between them and other
groups, and this makes ethnicity situated vis-à-vis an ‘other’. The Circassians did
not establish ethnically-based associations or organisations when the land of
present-day Jordan was under Ottoman rule; the establishment of the Circassian
Charity Association only took place in 1932 when Amman was expanding with a
population influx from other places (Shami, 1996).
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Takei (1998) suggests that collective memory is a key element for an
understanding of ethnic identity. He argues that although people from the same
ethnic, religious, linguistic, or cultural groups may not necessarily be followers of
the culture of their group, adhere to the teachings of the shared religion, or be fluent
in the language of their ethnic group, they still share a collective memory (Takei,
1998). This collective memory, or even memories, is normally constructed in the
form of narratives which are transmitted through upbringing, documentation of
historical events, and myths of origin and descent. ‘Most ethnic groups do have a
myth of origin, a history of the group, chosen enemies, and stories of traumas’
(Mahanta, 2007: 127). In other words, ethnic groups have particular myths of origin
that differentiate them from ‘others’ and so these myths differentiate between ‘us’
and ‘them’. In this way, ethnicity is also situational, because it serves as a boundary
marker between groups, and like myths of origin and descent, ethnicity and ethnic
identity have other constituents.
Many have argued that shared religion, language, customs, history, and
memories constitute ethnicity, and pave the way for categorisation (Karner, 2007,
Gil-White, 1999, Hale, 2004, Cornell and Hartmann, 2007, Jenkins, 2008, Song, 2003).
However, I would prefer to regard those elements of ethnicity as narratives as well,
narratives that might prompt social action and interaction (Karner, 2007), narratives
that may lead to categorisation (Kukutai, 2004), and narratives that can lead to
discrimination (Bobo and Fox, 2003). They are still narratives subject to change and
context, and narratives that keep shifting (Fenton, 1999). Those narratives can in
some cases be created ‘from above,’ and they can also be produced and reproduced
‘from below’. They may be originally produced for rational purposes or gains, and
later come to hold sentimental meanings, through historical processes. Narratives
have never been static, and are always changing and influenced by context.
I am looking at elements of ethnicity as narratives, because I believe that
ethnic groups’ boundaries are fluid, and that this fluidity is due to the fact that the
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significance of those elements of ethnicity is changing. For example, the Circassians
in Jordan may identify themselves as an ethnic group, but what it means to be
Circassian may be changing, not because Circassians do not consider themselves as
Circassians but because the narratives of the group may change. Thus Shami (1996)
demonstrates how the identity of Circassians in Amman was influenced by the fact
that Amman, where many Circassians resided, became the capital of Jordan. As
Circassian migration to Jordan took place in stages, and not all of them arrived at the
same time, Circassians in Jordan developed different senses of identity (Shami,
1996). Shami (1996) explains how there was conflict between early and later
Circassian settlers and how the waves of migrants were known by different names.
For instance, the last wave was referred to as muhajirin by earlier settlers, which
means immigrants in Arabic. She explains that an Ammani Circassian identity
started to emerge in the 1930s, and Ammani Circassians were seen as superior to
non-Amman Circassians, especially the muhajirin, and that even their gender
practices became different. However, after Amman’s expansion, ‘the incorporation
of the muhajirin into the Ammani community’ took place for the ‘reproduction of
ethnic identity’ (Shami, 1996: 319). Shami’s work shows how ethnic identity is
influenced by time and space. She (1995: 80) emphasises ‘the constructed nature of
ethnic identification, its shifting nature and malleability to context’.
The narrative approach acknowledges the fluidity of ethnicity due to the
changing nature of narratives. It is my contention that Circassians in Jordan may
draw their ethnic boundaries through resorting to narratives which can change in
time and space. In spite of such change, they continue to consider themselves to be
an ethnic group. Dahinden (2008), based on a study of minorities in Switzerland,
argues that shifts in ethnic identities, through changing ethnic meanings, is feasible,
and can avoid ethnic conflicts. He says,
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‘Representations of collective ethnic identities are formed,
transformed, reformulated or shifted to other representations
of collective identities’ (Dahinden, 2008: 55).
Thus, ethnic narratives are (re)constructed, and (re)configured depending on
context. Shami (1995: 80) points out that studies ‘have rarely addressed how this
context is informed by the nationalist ideologies of the encompassing states’. In this
research I am looking at how ethnic identity, more specifically ethnic narratives of
the Circassian community are influenced by the nationalist ideology of the state of
Jordan. In relation to the construction of ethnicity and ethnic identity, she (2000) also
discusses how the ethnic identity of the Circassian community changed over time
and she draws attention to how the identity of the whole Circassian community in
Diaspora is influenced by their migration, showing that ethnicity is influenced by
context. Although her analysis does not discuss other contextual factors that might
have shaped the identity of the community, it provides a good platform for looking
at ethnicity in contextual terms. She draws on two texts: one narrates a journey of a
Circassian woman in 1993 from Turkey to her original homeland, and the other
narrates the journey of a Circassian woman from her homeland to Egypt in 1854. She
concludes that Circassian identity is in motion, due to the history of their Diaspora.
Shami’s work shows how ethnic identity changes over time because, as narratives,
elements of ethnicity are in continuous change. Most importantly, narratives cross
borders, borders do not contain them, they are in that sense transnational and not
confined within the defined boundaries of nation-states. It is important to note that
ethnic identity is not fixed but is changeable, and the meanings attached to ethnicity
can be transformed; ‘whether the transformation is the result of centre-periphery
interaction in a global system... or the result of physical distance and time spent
away from the mythical homeland, the result is the same: a culture affected and
somehow changed by new experiences and by the void and loss of contact with the
mother land’ (Chatty, 2010: 23).
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Identity, however, consists of more than ethnicity. In their theorisation,
Anthias and Yuval-Davis say that ethnicity provides ‘a sense of roots’ (Anthias and
Yuval-Davis, 1992: 6), but research needs to take into consideration the
intersectionality of social categories rather than focusing solely on ‘ethnicity’ (Prins,
2006). In her study of narratives of belonging, Prins (2006) argues that narratives of
belonging or rootedness are not exclusively based on belonging to an ethnic group.
She states that narratives of Dutch and Moluccan women were related to attachment
with ‘social class, family, forebears, a particular region or the landscape of one’s
childhood’ (Prins, 2006: 288). Therefore, viewing ethnicity as composed of narratives,
rather than as ‘a sense of roots’, makes it easier to understand how those narratives
may intersect with and/or incorporate other narratives of gender and class. This is
because we can have multiple belongings, such as attachment to social class, gender,
ethnicity, nationality, etc. The main forms of belonging I am looking at in this thesis
are belonging to a ‘nation’ and an ethnic group. As we hold multiple identities, I will
look at how Circassians make sense of the contradictory aspects of their identities.
For instance, belonging to Jordan, as an ‘Arab’ state, contradicts being a ‘non-Arab’.
And if the concept of ‘Arabism’ is based on narratives of descent then this would be
exclusionary for Circassians, so I am also looking at how Circassians interpret
‘Arabism’ and how they make sense of their contradictory belongings.
It is also very important to recognise that narratives of class and gender are
integral parts of ethnic narratives. Gender relations also serve as a ‘boundary
marker’ for ethnic groups (Handrahan, 2002: 46). Sexually, culturally, and physically
women are boundary markers for ethnic groups, and speaking of gender relations in
‘other’ ethnic groups or communities is frequently used as a marker of difference.
For example, the Western narrative of ‘Arab’ Muslim women in the Middle East
conveys women as secluded and mysterious (Waines, 1982). However, this narrative
is a construction and is a marker of difference, and is used to support the idea of the
superiority of Western civilisation in terms of gender relations. This is only one
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example of how gender relations serve as boundary markers. Benton (1998) explains
women’s roles in the reproduction of ethnic myths and legends, and clarifies why
people emphasise women’s role in the reproduction of ethnies (Benton, 1998).
Moreover, biologically defined ethnicities, ethnicities transmitted through blood and
descent, and the emphasis on a primordial sense of ethnicity has gender
implications. The social view of women as wives, mothers and ‘reproducers of their
collectivities’ (Charles and Hintjens, 1998: 8) necessitates and legitimates the control
of women’s sexuality. Due to the gender implications of ethnic narratives, and
because of the importance of gender narratives in setting ethnic boundaries, it is
integral to the study of ethnicity and nationalism to take into account the intersection
and the connection between these narratives. In addition to gender, age and class are
also important for the understanding of ethnic narratives, as such narratives may
differ according to these variables. In other words, ethnic narratives can be
reconfigured when they intersect with other forms of social grouping or
categorisation.
In conclusion, ethnicity, in this research, is conceptualised as a construct and
consequently the meanings it holds are changeable and can be reformulated. Since
ethnicity involves boundary drawing, ‘an ethnic minority... is a mechanism of
marginalisation, which can have profound effects on how a community creates and
maintains its social stability and cohesion’ (Chatty, 2010: 27). Understanding identity
and belonging, on the other hand, is not straightforward, especially as we have
multiple identities and belongings. This is particularly complex for diasporic
communities that identify themselves as ethnically different in the countries where
they reside. The Circassians view themselves as ethnically different, yet at the same
time they are part of the state of Jordan, as citizens, as their position in Jordan shows.
The state of Jordan, on the other hand, identifies itself as an ‘Arab’ state, which can
be exclusionary to the Circassians especially if ‘Arabism’ is viewed in ethnic terms. I
therefore look at the narratives the state of Jordan promotes to define its identity and
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how Circassians (re)construct those narratives to position themselves in relation to
the state’s definition.
Social actors exercise agency in reproducing and (re)constructing the
narratives of ethnicity and nationalism which they use to make sense of the
contradictions of their identities and belongings. Migration flows make it difficult for
diasporic communities to see themselves as members of and belonging to only one
group, or community. Moreover, belonging to a minority group is often linked to
ethnicity, and belonging to a nation-state can be understood in terms of national
identity and/or citizenship. Based on that conceptualisation, ethnic group identity is
often influenced by the discourses or narratives of the state which controls the place
where they reside. Shami states,
‘the historical experience of displacement and resettlement
provides powerful symbols that continue to inform
contemporary processes of identity formation and
perpetuation... displacement not only puts into question the
identity of the displaced group, but also the national discourse
of the host country’ (Shami, 1994: 8).
In this research I explore both the identity of the Circassians and the nationalist
narratives of the state of Jordan. I analyse the narratives of descent, culture, religion,
customs, and language, through which social groups, the Circassians in this case,
claim solidarity, as well as difference, based on ethnicity (Spickard and Burroughs,
2000). Furthermore, in the same way that ethnic communities construct, produce and
reproduce their narratives, states themselves produce and reproduce narratives of
their own to construct identities for themselves. However, states have stronger
platforms and more power than ethnic actors. States may use education, media, their
constitutions, and policies to create and recreate their narratives; the difference is
that state narratives are contained within the boundaries of the nation-state. Since
this study focuses on the relationship between the Circassian community and the
state of Jordan, it explores the narratives of the state, and the narratives of the
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Circassian community. In the following section, I review the literature on the
concept of nationalism, and the difference between the terms ethnicity and
nationalism. Later I move to the conceptualisation of the state in the Middle East,
with a particular focus on ways of producing and reproducing state narratives
through education and nationalist campaigns. Some literature is also drawn from
non-Middle Eastern states regarding the issue of promoting narratives of the nation.
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2.2 Conceptualisations of Nationalism
‘Like ethnic ideologies, nationalism stresses the cultural
similarity of its adherents and, by implication, it draws
boundaries vis-à-vis others, who thereby become outsiders’
(Eriksen, 2002: 7).
There is a considerable debate about the meaning of the term nationalism.
Like ethnicities, I argue that nationalisms are socially constructed and are based on
narratives, narratives of nationalism being similar to narratives of ethnicity.
However, there are differences between what nationalism and ethnicity mean.
Therefore, this section attempts to draw a distinction between ethnicity and
nationalism, or in other words, between narratives of ethnicity and nationalism. The
debate on the difference between ethnicity and nationalism has been blurred in a
way that makes it hard to draw the connection between the two. Eriksen (2002), for
example, argues that nationalisms are based on ethnicities but that not all ethnic
groups have nationalist movements. He links nationalism to claiming a state: ‘a
nationalist holds that political boundaries should be coterminous with cultural
boundaries, whereas many ethnic groups do not demand command over a state’
(Eriksen, 2002: 7). On ethnicity and nationalism, it has been said that,
‘There is no inherent difference (although sometimes there is a
difference in scale) between ethnic and national collectivities.
What is specific to the nationalist project and discourse is the
claim for a separate political representation for the collectivity.
This often -but not always- takes the form of a claim for a
separate state’ (Anthias and Yuval-Davis, 1992: 25).
Greenfeld (1992) also argues that ethnic nationalism makes the words nationality
and ethnicity synonyms, and that national identity has to do with the realisation of
possessing certain group characteristics, or elements of ethnicity. Like ethnicity, it is
problematic when elements and/or narratives of nationalism are perceived in
primordial, inborn, and inherited ways. Since the term nationalism is largely used in
relation to nation-states, ethnic nationalism ‘constructs minorities into assumed
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deviants from the ‘normal’, and excludes them from important power resources’
within the system of the state (Yuval-Davis, 1997: 11). This shows the strong relation
between ethnicity and nationalism; however, to be more specific instead of
considering all forms of nationalism as ethnic, I would rather use the terms
ethnonationalism to describe feelings of belonging to a nation based on ethnicity,
because there are other forms of nationalism as well.
McCrone (1998), for example, speaks of Scottish nationalism, drawing on
literature, he says that Scottishness is based on the idea of sharing a territory, rather
than an ethnicity, and for that reason Scottish nationalism has been ‘a late, and not
very convincing, developer (23)’. He uses the term civic nationalism to describe the
type of Scottish nationalism, and says that this concept is weak when compared to
nationalism based on ‘a community of blood’ (McCrone, 1998: 23). The example of
territorial Scottish nationalism shows that nationalism can exist on a non-ethnic
basis.
The term nation means people in English language, which makes nationalism
an ideology of peoplehood. Fox (1990) says,
‘Nationalist ideologies refer to the production and conceptions
of peoplehood. Sometimes the peoplehood conceived by a
particular nationalist ideology requires an independent state or
autonomous territory for its realisation’ (Fox, 1990: 3).
Smith explained five usages for the term nationalism,
‘(1) a process of formation, or growth, of nations; (2) a
sentiment or consciousness of belonging to the nation; (3) a
language and symbolism of the nation; (4) a social and political
movement on behalf of the nation; (5) a doctrine and/or
ideology of the nation, both general and particular’ (Smith,
2001: 5-6).
Smith’s set of usages indicates the various ways that the term has been used in
literature. Connor (1994), who uses the terms nationalism and ethnonationalism
63
interchangeably, defined nationalism as feelings of loyalty and attachment to a
group of people, to whom individuals believe that they are ancestrally related.
Despite the fact that he contends that nationalism, in its ‘pristine sense (xi)’, is based
on ethnicity, his contention is problematic, because loyalty to a state as a political
community is related to a great extent to concepts of nationalism and citizenship. It
is important to say that nations, when referred to in ethnic terms, are ‘defined in
terms of “communities of sentiment” that form the political basis on which state
authority rests’ (Barking and Cronin, 1994: 111). In political and social sciences great
attention has been given to the relationship between the state and nationalism, in its
civic and ethnic forms.
‘The central political institution of our age, the state, is also a
product of nationalism. Specifically, it is an implication of the
principle of popular sovereignty… it is only a form of
government, and this form is characteristically modern and
necessarily bureaucratic… the distinguishing characteristic of
the state became its impersonality’ (Greenfeld, 2006: 164).
There is no consensus on whether the state is the product of nationalism, or
nationalism is the product of the modern state order. Whereas Greenfeld believes
that the state is the product of nationalism, Gellner argues that nationalism emerges
when the existence of the state is ‘already very much taken for granted’ (Gellner,
1983: 4). It is important to keep in mind that nations do not necessarily exist before
nationalism, and nationalism does not necessarily exist before the existence of a
nation. This is because what it means to belong to a nation is constructed, and
nationalism can be (re)constructed and (re)configured. However, the main concern
of this thesis is state-nationalism, or in other words how states define who belongs to
the nation and who does not. By state-nationalism, I mean the ideologies states
promote and adopt to define the boundaries of the nations.
Some theorists of nationalism link the formation of nations to the creation of
the modern state system (Gellner, 1983, Hobsbawm, 1990, Anderson, 1991, Breuilly,
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1993, Billig, 1995). Those theorists claim that before the emergence of the nation-
state, nationalist discourses did not exist. For them, nationalism is a political
ideology that the ’elite’ attempt to promote in order to gain of political and
socioeconomic power. It means that rulers construct nationalism as a way to
legitimise their claims to sovereignty and political power. Speaking about Indian
nationalism, Chatterje says,
‘Nationalism is not the awakening of nations to self-
consciousness: it invents nations where they do not exist- but it
does need some pre-existing differentiating markers to work
on… the two crucial social groups which carry the struggle
forward are the proletariat and the intelligentsia. The
intellectuals will exchange second-class citizenship for a first-
class citizenship plus greater privileges based on rarity. The
proletarians will exchange hardships-with-snubs for possibly
greater hardships with national identification’ (Chatterje, 1986:
4).
Dobrescu (2003) also speaks of nationalism in Romania, and traces its creation to a
movement by ‘the younger offspring of the local ruling elites on their return from
their academic studies in Western Europe’ (Dobrescu, 2003: 396). Massad (2001) also
argues that a Jordanian national identity only emerged following a civil war with the
Palestinians in 1970 (Massad, 2001). Anderson (2001) adds that the state of Jordan
attempts to define a national identity through the Kingdom’s textbooks (Anderson,
2001), an idea which will be discussed in detail in chapter six.
However, what remains unanswered following this argument is what makes
up Palestinian or Kurdish nationalisms, which are not contained within a nation-
state. Both the Palestinians and the Kurds struggle to establish a state of their own,
yet their nationalism is not truly recognised by any political or sovereign body. In
his study of a Palestinian national identity, Khalidi (2010) argues that one of the
main problems facing Palestinians in their struggle is that
‘In spite of lip-service in favour of recognizing the existence of
the Palestinian people—there remains today the familiar
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undercurrent of dismissiveness of Palestinian identity and
Palestinian national claims as being less genuine, less deep-
rooted, and less valid than those of other peoples in the region’
(Khalidi, 2010: xxiii).
The Palestinians’, and the Kurds’, claims to a state of their own are good examples of
how nationalism can exist before the existence of the state. Many peoples who
consider themselves nations, are in fact stateless. However, it must be said that
Palestinian nationalism may reflect a reaction against the Israeli occupation and
dispossession of the Palestinians in 1948. The same can be said about Kurdish
nationalism, which was inflamed by the partition of the lands of Kurdistan between
Iran, Turkey, Iraq and Syria. Those examples show that nationalisms exist as a result
of nation-states. Yavuz (2001) emphasises this, by saying that nationalisms are
constructed by ‘identity entrepreneurs’ (Yavuz, 2001: 3). He says,
‘It is the modernizing nation-state which formed the Turkish
nation and nationalism… Since Kurdish nationalism in Turkey,
Iraq, and Iran evolved in response to modernizing nation-
states, it constantly stresses its ethnic 'difference', sometimes
even evoking racism to historicize itself’ (Yavuz, 2001: 3).
When nationalism is portrayed through narratives that focus on primordial forms of
attachment such as national sentiments for kinship, ancestry, and culture, it becomes
problematic for people who do not fit ‘ethnically’ within the paradigm of state-
ethnonationalism. However, the significance of those sentiments in our lives makes
them, although constructed, worthy of attention to understand the conflicts that
arise from the primordial conceptions of the nation and nationalism amongst people
themselves. On that point, Connor (1994), says that people have a psychological
need for ancestral attachment, and whether it is real or imagined, this tendency
exists (Connor, 1994). However, Connor also attempts to draw a distinction between
patriotism and nationalism- patriotism represents feeling towards the state, while
nationalism reflects feelings towards the people. By doing so, Connor’s conclusion
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has its resonance in developmental psychology, about humans’ love and belonging
needs.
Greenfeld (1992) disagrees with Connor by saying that people might have a
need to belong, but that this belonging does not necessarily have to do with
ethnicity, or nationalism; it might be related to class, religion, or even the family. In
that I agree with Greenfeld and Billig that this need ‘to belong’ does not necessarily
have to be to a nation. This desire for attachment in the pre-nation-state era
manifested itself through identifying with religious groups, or even within the
family unit, rather than the nation (Billig, 1995). Based on this argument, I would say
that the nation in its form and implications is a product of modernity. Other forms of
categorisations and concepts of otherness existed before that, but narratives of
history, culture, religion, or ethnicity are continuously used to justify the legitimacy
of nations as sovereign powers. In this, I am agreeing with Breuilly, who says that he
treats the nation,
‘as a modern political and ideological formation which
developed in close conjunction with the emergence of the
modern, territorial, sovereign and participatory state’ (Breuilly,
2001: 32).
In his definition of nationalism, Hobsbawm suggests that,
‘It holds that groups defined as ‘nations’ have the right to, and
therefore ought to, form territorial states of the kind that have
become standard since the French revolution’ (Hobsbawm,
1996: 256).
On the other hand, Banton (2004), in his example of the Québécois in Canada, says
that calling the Québécois a nation ‘is to lend authority to political claims. To
describe Québécois sentiment as nationalist is a step in the same direction’ (Banton,
2004: 809).
Hastings (1997) and Smith (1986) approach nationalism in primordialist
terms. Hastings talks about the construction of Englishness based on ethnicity,
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which later turned into a form of nationalism (Hastings, 1997). Smith, on the other
hand, argued that ethnicity was important in the pre-modern era, and that it also
became the basis of nationalism, because nations shared culture and language
(Smith, 1986). Smith also says,
‘The merit of the primordialist paradigm is that it draws our
attention to the long-term significance of popular attachments,
kinship and cultural bonds. The primordialist approach asks
why it is that so many people are prepared to risk their lives
defending their ‘kith and kin’ and ‘hearth and home.’ And why
millions are prepared to lay down their lives for their ‘nation’’
(Smith, 2000: 2).
Regardless of the scholarly approach to nationalism, ethnonationalism exists
as a phenomenon and some states define themselves in ethnonationalist terms. The
problem with ethnonationalism, when utilised by the state to define the nation, is
that it can be exclusionary to all other ethnic groups. Whereas ethnicity and
nationalism relate to issues of ‘belonging, community, identity and loyalty’ (Shami,
1995: 79), the term ethnicity is often used to refer to minority group cultures while
nationalism has been related to claiming a state. Furthermore, to define states as
ethnic is problematic because states are not mono-ethnic, and when states promote
mono-ethnic narratives they automatically exclude diasporic communities, who if
not adopting the narratives of state ethnonationalism are not seen as full citizens. No
nation nowadays can remain self-contained, in a world where it has become ‘almost
literally possible to have a foot in two countries’ (Basch et al., 1994: 23). Although, in
practice, some states promote their nationalist narratives in ethnic and primordial
terms, this does not mean that states are ethnically contained, and problematising
this phenomenon is important.
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2.3 The State: Power over Narratives?
‘Behind the appearance of thinking it, most of the writings
devoted to the state partake, more or less efficaciously and
directly, in the construction of the state, i.e., of its very
existence… social science itself has been part and parcel of this
work of construction of the representation of the state which
makes up part of the reality of the state itself’ (Bourdieu, 1999:
55).
Like several, if not all, other institutions, states are generally based on
constructed narratives; narratives of independence, narratives of state ideologies,
narratives of the nation, myths of foundation amongst others. As social scientists,
historians, and academics, we contribute to the narratives of the state; as Bourdieu
argues, the mere idea of social scientists’ theorisations of the state enforces the
existence of states, and contributes to their reality. Some say that states derive their
legitimacy from drawing on narratives of ethnicity and culture, whilst others
emphasise that they are territorial, or multi-ethnic or multi-cultural. As previously
explained, no society can remain self-contained, and a mono-ethnic state does not
exist in reality. Moreover, like narratives of ethnicity, narratives of state nationalism
can be (re)constructed and (re)configured. Although the state institution is
principally regarded as the legal representative of the nation, the confusion in
respect of what is the nation remains unresolved, because it changes with time. An
example of that is the state of Jordan. Jordan’s nation-state-ness is continuously
being (re)constructed and, within that process, ethnic minorities are also
(re)constructed (Massad, 2001, Anderson, 2001). More specifically, the Royal Family
in Jordan came to power after defeating the Ottoman Empire, by exploiting
narratives of ‘Arabism’, and of ‘Arab’ unity. When establishing a ‘Pan-Arab’ state
became impossible, the Hashemite Family resorted to different narratives of
nationalism to legitimise their claims to sovereignty. Owen (2004) discusses this
change in ‘Arab’ states’ nationalisms and says,
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‘Matters were somewhat more difficult in the Eastern part of
the Arab world, where the existing states still seemed
somewhat artificial entities to many of their own people, and
where most of the separate regimes had traditionally relied on
political appeals to Arabism to augment their own legitimacy…
One index of the shift towards a more localised set of symbols
and practices that linked particular Arabs to particular pieces
of land was the construction in capital cities like Amman of
tombs of local unknown soldiers. Another was increased
attention to the celebration of specific national days, few of
which had any symbolic pan-Arab component’ (Owen, 2004:
64).
This shift in the narratives promoted by ‘Arab’ states shows that belonging to a
nation is (re)constructed and (re)configured according to circumstances, and that
nationalism and nationhood are changing; this questions the idea of them being
primordially based. It also entails that as narratives of state nationalism can be
(re)constructed, who belongs and who does not belong to the nation can also be
(re)constructed. In other words, ethnic groups or minorities can be (re)constructed
depending on circumstances and political aims. This further emphasises the idea
that states are constitutive; they have the power to write the history of their nations,
and channel that history through available media. Anderson (2001) talks about how
the state of Jordan writes the nation through the Kingdom’s textbooks. Kumar (2006)
states,
‘The past of the nation is not simply deeper and longer than in
the case of other social groups; it is virtually constitutive. That
is why historians have been central to the task of establishing
claims for nationhood, and in the elaboration of nationalist
ideologies’ (Kumar, 2006: 7).
Stolcke argues that the modern state consists of a territory, a government, and a
people, however ‘circumscribing the ‘people’ proved to be the most controversial
issue’ (Stolcke, 1997: 61), for policy makers and social scientists. For that reason she
concludes that the importance of defining the people derives above all from the fact
that without a people, governing a territory ‘makes no sense’. But, who are the
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people according to textbooks of national and civic education in Jordan? I find it
particularly useful to separate the state institution ‘from both the nation and the civil
society’ (Yuval-Davis, 1997: 12). This is because an ethnonational state, whose
members share common territory, ancestry and history is particularly challenged by
labour migration, diasporic communities, and refugee flows, who might not share
the same ethnicity with the state where they end up residing. Soysal, for example,
mentions that well-defined boundaries of nation-states are obstacles to labour
migration;
‘Within the modern nation-state system, it has been relatively
easy to move capital around, whereas the free movement of
populations has been problematic. Nation-states with well-
defined boundaries and sovereignty rules present obstacles to
labour migration’ (Soysal, 1994: 14).
Smith (2002) states that the concept of an ethnic nation state where ‘one can be a
member of only one state and nation at a time’ (Smith, 2002: 199), is no longer viable.
Parekh (2000) argues that the fact that nation-states are not mono-ethnic challenges
primordial notions of nationhood, and could mean the end of the nation state. He
states,
‘no society can remain culturally self-contained and isolated…
the idea of national culture makes little sense, and the project of
cultural unification on which many past societies and all
modern states have relied for their stability and cohesion is no
longer viable today’ (Parekh, 2000: 8).
However, national and cultural unification projects do take place, one example being
the ‘Jordan First’ campaign. This, like many others around the world is based on
cultural unification and creating national unities. Some western countries claim to be
multi-cultural; however, multi-culturalism itself has almost become a new form of
nationalist ideology. Multiculturalism has become a source of pride for many
western states. It is beyond the scope of this research to define multi-culturalism; but
it is important to note that it has its problems (See Yuval-Davis 1997). This research,
71
in parts, is designed to explore how the state of Jordan promotes campaigns of
cultural unification, and to what extent it is succeeding. Therefore, this cannot be
done without looking at it as a political institution that promotes a specific
nationalist ideology, tailored to create national unity and to unify its disparate
subjects under the banner of Jordanianism. Therefore, an understanding of the state
as a political institution is important. Anthias and Yuval Davis (1989) define the state
as,
‘A body of institutions which are centrally organised around
the intentionality of control with a given apparatus of
enforcement (juridical and repressive) at its command and
basis… Different forms of the state will involve different
relationships between the control/coercion twin which is the
residing characteristic of the state’ (Anthias and Yuval-Davis,
1989: 5).
The state has the power to produce ideologies, and promote narratives, through
education and the media. This does not mean that state’s ideologies always prevail
though, because narratives are also produced on other social levels such as the
family (Yuval-Davis, 1997). Weber’s definition of the state is useful to understand
the nature of the state in the Middle East; he says that the state is,
‘a compulsory political organisation with continuous
operations… as its administrative staff successfully upholds the
claim to monopoly of legitimate use of physical force in the
enforcement of its order… the authority of its administrative
staff is claimed as binding within a territorial area and this
claim is upheld by force’ (Weber, 1978: 54-5).
However, one should acknowledge the people’s agency in bringing about
political change within the state system. The Middle East and North Africa contain
eight surviving monarchies, and for a long time the regimes in Egypt and Syria,
despite being republics, were quasi-monarchies and the presidency was inherited. In
2000, following Hafiz al-Asad’s death, his son Bashar automatically took over, and in
Egypt it was expected that Husni Mubarak’s son would follow. State rule in these
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republics has now (2011), however, been challenged by a “people’s revolution”, and
this in itself is proof of the collective power that the people have over and/or against
the state. Monarchies in ‘Arab’ states are based on the absolute rule of the monarchs,
and the kings have the final word in governance (Kostiner, 2000). And although the
concept of liberty is linked to the concept of law in Western society, and thus linked
to the state, in the Middle East the concept of liberty is largely viewed as ‘anti-
statal… the more extended the concept of the state, the narrower the scope for
freedom’ (Ayubi, 2006: 24).
Sharabi (1988) argues that the state in the Middle East is neopatriarchal. In
other words, he tries to say that rulers of the state themselves are patriarchs, who
have absolute power. He explains,
‘Between ruler and ruled, between father and child, there exist
only vertical relations: in both settings the paternal will is the
absolute will… significantly, the most advanced and functional
aspect of the neopatriarchal state… is its internal security
apparatus, the mukhabarat… in social practice ordinary citizens
not only are arbitrarily deprived of some of their basic rights
but are the virtual prisoners of the state, the objects of its
capricious and ever-presenting violence’ (Sharabi, 1988: 7).
Sharabi’s observations on the neopatriarchal nature of the state in the Middle East
consider the state as an institution which serves the interests of the ruling class.
When the Hashemite family failed to establish a ‘pan-Arab’ state, they changed their
narratives and strategies to legitimise their rule. They moved towards more localised
narratives to monopolise power, to mobilise the people on the territory, and to
distinguish themselves from other ‘Arabs’ (Owen, 2004). However, important
questions remain to be answered: how does the state of Jordan define who belongs
to the nation and who does not? Is the Jordanian nation defined in terms of
ethnicity? Do state narratives consider Circassians to be part of the ‘nation’? How do
Circassians themselves define themselves and (re)construct state narratives of
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Jordanian nationalism? And what are the gender implications of a neopatriarchal
state?
Defining the nation in primordial terms also places women in a
disadvantaged position, particularly in the ‘Arab’ world, where women are largely
perceived as wives, mothers and sisters, responsible for the reproduction of ethnic
identity (Charles and Hintjens, 1998). In ‘Arab’ states, the family unit is the main
block of society (Moghadam, 1993), and for that reason preserving the patriarchal
family unit and maintaining control over women by confining them to the private
sphere is seen as necessary to preserve ‘Arab’ culture. Moreover, the state is seen as
an extension of the patriarchal family unit (Sharabi, 1988). For example, kings or
rulers are portrayed as the ‘fathers’ of the communities they rule, as heads of
societies, and the nations are portrayed as their families. Like in patriarchal families,
the king or president has absolute power over his community, and the nation should
respect, fear and follow the ruler. The use of the patriarchal family metaphorically to
describe rulers’ relation to citizens enforces the paradigm of the patriarchal family
and vice versa, the preservation of the patriarchal family reinforces the power of the
rulers. Furthermore, within the patriarchal domestic sphere, women are expected to
reproduce narratives of the nation.
Women have been largely excluded from studies of nationalism, and
feminists have pointed out this absence. Some explain this exclusion by referring to
the confinement of women to the private sphere and their marginalisation in public.
The public/private dichotomy, in addition to implying that nationalism and
nationalist narratives are produced by elites or states or intellectuals, excludes
women by default from the nationalism debate. However, as Yuval-Davis (1998: 2)
states ‘it is women- and not (just?) the bureaucracy and the intelligentsia- who
reproduce nations, biologically, culturally, and symbolically’. Yuval-Davis is right in
her argument that women reproduce nations, but at the same time although women
are part of the myths of origin of nations, they are largely excluded from myths and
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narratives of foundation (Benton, 1998). Thus the ethnonational narratives of the
nation in monarchical states in the ‘Arab’ world are problematic for both women and
ethnic minorities. They may have exclusionary effects on both minorities and
women in terms of access to state resources, and they may imply that women and
minorities are second class citizens. For instance, in many countries in the ‘Arab’
Middle East, women do not transfer their citizenship to their children, although they
are members of the community, and supposedly part of the nation. Thus, women’s
position challenges the whole concept of citizenship in the Middle East. Martinello,
for example, theorised that ‘the individual enjoys the rights associated with
citizenship because she or he belongs to a political community defined as a nation-
the nation-state’ (Martinello, 2002: 117). The concept of citizenship is very much
linked to the concept of nation. In other words, if states define belonging in
ethnonational and gendered terms, some citizens might feel excluded from the
‘nation’. Others, in contrast, might attempt to include themselves by (re)constructing
what the nation is in their own terms. Chatty’s work on the Circassians revealed that
‘identity and ethnic affiliation’ are self-defined and fluid. Thus ‘a Circassian one
moment can perceive himself as Jordanian, Palestinian, Syrian or Turkish’ (Chatty,
2010: 126). My focus, however, is on whether state promoted narratives of
nationalism exclude or make Circassians feel excluded, particularly in light of the
promotion of a ‘Pan-Arabist’ nationalist ideology. Chatty (2010) explains that for
many Circassians being Circassian and Jordanian are not contradictory; but if being
Jordanian is linked to being an ‘Arab’, then how do Circassians create a harmony of
those contradictions?
It is worth noting here that access to a full citizenship is contextualised, and
there are several factors, which render many unable to attain full citizenship
(Pierson, 2004). Those factors range from state policies such as those in the Middle
East (Joseph, 1996a), to gender roles within familial contexts, and their relation to
access to full rights of citizenship (Walby, 1997, Baines, 1996, O'Connor, 1998, Lister,
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1990, Orloff, 1993, McDaniel, 2002). In Jordan, the exclusion of women from enjoying
full rights of citizenship is due to the fact that national identity is seen to be
transferred through the fathers, rather than the mothers. Children are born into the
family of the father, hold the father’s name, and kinship is identified through
patrilineality (Barakat, 1993), and this marginalises women in nationalist narratives.
Several scholars in their theorisations of citizenship conclude that belonging
to a state has its roots in territorial and historical bonds, and that this involves
reciprocal rights and obligations between the state and its nationals (Anderson, 1991,
Brubaker, 1989, Castles and Davidson, 2000, Hobsbawm, 1992, Jacobson, 1996, Piper,
1998). However, and at the same time, labour migration and other forms of
migration challenge a concept of citizenship based on common history and/or
territory. This is because, as Cohen puts it,
‘The nation-state is often too large and too amorphous to be the
object of intimate affection… Bonds of language, religion,
culture and a sense of a common history and perhaps common
fate impregnate a transnational relationship and give to it an
affective, intimate quality that formal citizenship or even long
settlement frequently lacks’ (Cohen, 1996: 517-18).
Habermas also shares Cohen’s view on the formal relationship between the
citizen and the state. He explains that ‘the nation of citizens does not derive its
identity from common ethnic and cultural properties, but rather from the praxis of
citizens who actively exercise their civil rights’ (Habermas, 1994: 23). Most
Palestinians in Jordan have Jordanian citizenship but at the same time they are
underrepresented in the public sector, and are discriminated against. Therefore, if
belonging to a state is based on citizenship, and if citizenship promotes equality why
are Palestinians in Jordan disadvantaged? And why are women in the Middle East
not treated as equal to men, even in legislation? Young (1990) argues that group
differences are neither natural, nor real, ‘they are made and constantly remade in
social interactions’ (Young, 1990: 133). Young explains that even when states try to
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apply anti-discrimination policies, this is not necessarily reflected in society or
during social interaction. For example, Young might explain this by claiming that,
even if women were granted equal rights by the states in the Middle East (and they
are not), this would not necessarily mean that the society would accept it and apply
it per se, because gendered and ethnic ideologies also exist ‘from below,’ which
influence the position of women and ethnic minorities in the society. His argument is
that the people, and not necessarily the state, shape social relations.
On the other hand, if state agencies, and/or rulers, define their citizens in
ethnic terms, such a definition can exclude diasporic communities who consider
themselves ethnic minorities. Van Gunsteren, for example, explains citizenship
through membership of a ‘historical community, its past and its future’ (Van
Gunsteren, 1988: 736). However, diasporic communities all over the world cannot
share a past that is gone, but can share in the future of a particular community. In
that I also agree with Cohen, who explained that the relationship between the citizen
and the state is formal, and does not necessarily reflect bonds of religion, language
and culture (Cohen, 1996).
This sort of membership, Cohen (1996) explains, also allows room for
diasporic communities to be members of their respective states, and at the same time
bond with people who share their religion, language, culture, or ethnicity. Although
legally, as citizens, members of diasporic communities are supposed to hold equal
rights, they are often exposed to racism, xenophobia, and most recently a newly
acknowledged form of phobia, Islamophobia. Werbner for example states,
‘In existing beyond the nation-state with its fixed boundaries
and clearly defined categories of inclusion and exclusion, of
participatory rights and duties, citizenship and loyalty,
Diasporas as scattered, uncontained and uncontainable,
minorities have historically been the target of racialised and
xenophobic nationalist imaginings’ (Werbner, 2002: 121).
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The case of Circassians in Jordan is different from the Palestinians and there is a
conventional wisdom that the Circassians are more accepted in Jordan. Although
one would assume that as a diasporic community the Circassian minority in Jordan
may also be disadvantaged, because they do not ‘fit’ within the state’s definition of
the nation, nations and nationalisms are constantly reconstructed, and within the
process of reconstructing nationalist narratives, the Circassian community might
have come to be included within this definition. Also, it is important to recognise
people’s agency in relation to including themselves in state promoted narratives
about the nation. Thus, Circassian integration might be related to their ‘emphasis on
the importance of community solidarity, good citizenship, and political awareness’
(Chatty, 2010: 129). To expand on the concept of diaspora, and diasporic
communities, the following section discusses the position of diasporic communities,
and the difference between diasporic communities who have a recognised ‘original’
homeland and those who do not. The next section is designed to explain how and to
what extent the Circassian community in Jordan fits within the diaspora paradigm.
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2.4 Diasporic Communities
‘Its new currencies in globalist discourse confound the once
(presumed to be) clearly demarcated parameters of geography,
national identity, and belonging… Diaspora can perhaps be
seen as a naming of the other which has historically referred to
displaced communities of people who have been dislocated
from their native homeland through movements of migration,
immigration, or exile‘ (Evans Braziel and Mannur, 2003: 1).
To start with the terminology, diaspora refers to displaced, relocated, or
dislocated communities belonging to a collectivity, ethnic or national, in places other
than their ‘original’ homeland (Evans Braziel and Mannur, 2003). Diasporic
communities may, or may not, want to preserve their ‘original’ national or ethnic
identities in states where they reside. Taylor (1994: 63) suggests that for those
communities the ‘centre’ of their identity is ‘elsewhere’, or in other words, beyond
the boundaries of a primordial state-nationalism and affiliation (Cornell and
Hartmann, 2007). However, I suggest that we have multiple identities, thus to say
that the centre of one’s identity is elsewhere is inaccurate. In other words, our
identities are not only influenced by our ethnicity, or ethnic affiliation, but also by
the context and the place where we reside. Therefore, I disagree with the assumption
that diasporic communities de facto identify with their ‘original’ homeland, or the
homeland of their ‘ancestors’, particularly because identities are subjective and the
many contextual factors influencing them lead us to have multiple identities that can
transcend primordial notions of ethnicity and nationalism.
Looking at diasporas in primordial terms implies that diasporic communities
have their own ethnicities, which are inherently incompatible with the nationalism
of the state where they reside (Triandafyllidou, 2006). In our world nowadays, mass
communication and the internet have made it possible for diasporic communities to
preserve their ties with their original homeland and, at the same time, live in a
different context (Yuval-Davis, 1997); this preservation involves a process of
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constructing social discourses which transcend national boundaries (Basch et al.,
1994). However, access to this type of mass communication only became available in
the second half of the twentieth century. Therefore, recently emerging diasporic
communities are more likely to remain in contact with their original homelands than
diasporas which appeared before that time.
The Circassian diaspora originates in the nineteenth century, at a time there
was no wide access to communication technologies. Therefore, one may assume that
the ethnic narratives of Circassians in Jordan have developed, in the context of their
lengthy stay in Jordan. I have already established that ethnic narratives are
constructed and (re)constructed depending on time and space, thus this research
looks at ethnic narratives of the Circassian community in Jordan, during the period
of fieldwork. Although it is widely assumed that diasporic communities challenge
the paradigm of states which base their nationalist narratives on notions of
primordial ties, such as kinship relations, culture, language, and narratives of the
past, this does not necessarily have to apply to the Circassian community in Jordan,
particularly since they came to Jordan before it existed as a state. Nonetheless, the
assumption that diasporic communities challenge the concept of the nation-state is
based on the idea that diasporic communities have their own ethnic narrative, and if
states are ethnonational then diasporic communities are automatically excluded
from the ‘nation’, and consequently from belonging to the political community of the
state where they reside. Literature on the Circassian community in diaspora is
scarce, as is literature on diasporic communities in the Middle East generally. In her
study on the well-off Armenian Diaspora in Lebanon and Syria, Migliorino (2008)
looks at ‘how the Armenian refugee community has struggled to find… its
‘permanent’ space as a distinct cultural community in the Arab East’(Migliorino,
2008: 2). She suggests that what started at the beginning as nationalism in exile
became later a form of diasporic transnationalism. Comparing the experiences of
Armenians in Lebanon and in Syria, Migliorino suggests that, whereas in the state of
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Lebanon the Armenians are more visible as a community (because the state is based
on sectarian power-sharing), in Syria where the state denies the relevance of ethnic
minorities, they are not a marginalised community either. She says,
‘Since President Hafiz Al-Asad seized power in 1970, the
Syrian regime has developed a complex and ambiguous model
of relations between the state and ethno-cultural groups. While
officially denying their relevance, the regime has continued to
use ethnic and sub-ethnic allegiances as a strategic power
resource. This context has created for the Armenians (as for
other social groups) some protected spaces where the
community could continue to preserve… its diversity’
(Migliorino, 2008: 4).
Perhaps, King Abdullah I granted Circassians good governmental positions and
privileged them over others to use them as a strategic power resource. However,
that does not mean that they were provided with the space to preserve their
diversity. The difference between the examples of the Armenian community and the
Circassian community is that the former preserved its language and even built
churches, while very few Circassians in Jordan speak Circassian. Research on
Circassian language maintenance showed that 72 percent of students of the only
Circassian school in Jordan used Arabic at home; 6.5 percent used only Circassian,
and 15 percent used Circassian as a second language (Rannut, 2010). Of course the
history of the Armenian and the Circassian diasporas is totally different, and this
dates back to the millet system that existed during Ottoman times. As mentioned in
the previous chapter, at a certain point the Christians, including Armenians, in the
Ottoman Empire became more privileged than the Muslims, including Circassians
(McCarthy, 2001). Another difference between the Armenians and the Circassians
that should be taken into account is that the Armenian community are
internationally recognised as a diaspora, the genocide practised against them is
internationally recognised, and on maps of the modern world there is a country
called Armenia, which makes the preservation of transnational ties with the
homeland more feasible and possible.
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Redeker Hepner (2009) draws our attention to how Eritrean diasporic
communities, although in exile, lead nationalist movements in Eritrea (Redeker
Hepner, 2009). She reflects on the transnational nature of these Eritrean sentiments.
For the Eritrean diaspora, an Eritrean state is pretty much taken for granted, and
their national sentiments are towards reforming and liberating the state. Butler-
Smith (2009) also draws our attention to an actualisation of a new form of self-
consciousness and status amongst the Jewish diaspora in the United States,
following the establishment of a Jewish state in 1948 on Palestinian lands (Butler-
Smith, 2009). She speaks about a ‘transition (160)’ and a change from Jews being
‘associated only by virtue of a shared universal faith—Judaism represented only a
religion, not a nationality or a people’ (Butler-Smith, 2009: 166), to a people and a
nation. Kostantaras (2008) in his study of diasporic literary texts argued that
‘national revival movements from early modern times to the present have often
drawn intense support from those dwelling outside the nation’ (Kostantaras, 2008:
700-1). In her study of the Somali diaspora, Kleist (2008) also suggests that diasporic
communities, or diasporas act ‘as agents of developments in their countries of origin’
(Kleist, 2008: 1128). In an ethnographic study of the Jewish migration from rural
Morocco to ‘Israel,’ Boum (2010) explains that one of the reasons why migration took
place was because of the failure of the newly emerged Moroccan nationalism in the
early 1960s to accommodate the Jews; however, before the establishment of the state
of ‘Israel,’ the Jewish population in Morocco did not face such a problem. She further
argues that the creation of the state of ‘Israel’ led to the emergence of transnational
sentiments amongst the Jewish community in Morocco (Boum, 2010). This, however,
does not mean that those diasporic communities whose original homeland is not
recognised as a state do not have the same sort of sentiments as other diasporic
communities. An example of that would be the Palestinian diaspora. Mavroudi
(2007) argues that the Palestinian diasporic community in Athens construct their
own sense of belonging to Palestine, through narratives, and memories they transfer
over generations (Mavroudi, 2007). Despite the fact that they cannot refer to a
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Palestinian territory on maps of the modern world, narratives are transmitted from
generation to generation, about ‘the ancestral villages and the material houses their
family once occupied’ (Mavroudi, 2007: 398). In real life, most of those material
houses were destroyed and replaced with Jewish settlements, which means that they
no longer exist. Yet, those imagined narratives remain significant, and the fact that
they are constructed and (re)constructed does not make Palestinian nationalist
feelings less important or legitimate.
I agree with Croucher (2003) who argues that despite the fact that the concept
of the nation is ambiguous, and fluid, particularly when a state is non-existent, it is
very important, and integral to the lives of those ‘fighting for a state of their own’
(Croucher, 2003: 17). A famous Palestinian saying reflects the strength of nationalism
amongst Palestinians even without the existence of the state: ‘every person is born in
a homeland, except the Palestinians, their homeland is born in their hearts’.
‘The term ‘diaspora’ remains in a sense problematic when
applied to the Palestinian case. Yet Palestinians in exile do
constitute a diaspora community... there is a Palestinian
transnational community/nation… Although both politically
and individually the attachment to a glorified homeland
remains exceedingly strong, there is also a tale to be told of
transnationalism and globalism’ (Lindholm Schulz and
Hammer, 2003: 227).
It is very important here to draw a distinction between feelings of nationalism
amongst diasporic communities which already have a territorial state, and those
who struggle to establish one of their own. Therefore, I would say that the
sentiments of diasporic communities vary according to the place where they reside,
and also according to time, as they depend greatly on changes in the political sphere
of their native territories. For example, the Kurds in Iraq, Iran and Syria, are not a
diasporic community; however, they have ethnic narratives that are different from
those prevalent in their respective states. This shows that it is not only ethnic
narratives of diasporic communities that can contradict the idea of the ethnonational
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state, but also native inhabitants of lands are not always satisfied with their states’
ethnic narratives and may construct a counter-narrative of identity and belonging.
Yet again, identities and belongings are fluid and self-defined and we can have
multiple identities and belongings. It is the contradictions between different
identities that I am looking at.
‘For even people remaining in familiar and ancestral places
find the nature of their relation to place ineluctably changed,
and the illusion of a natural and essential connection between
the place and the culture broken. "Englishness," for instance, in
contemporary, internationalized England is just as complicated
and nearly as deterritorialized a notion as Palestinian-ness or
Armenian-ness’ (Gupta and Ferguson, 1992: 10).
The term diaspora is helpful in emphasising that ethnicities and nationalisms
have become largely deterritorialised and not restricted by political boundaries. This
has also pushed and paved the way for
‘A certain shift in national ideologies in many western
countries and multi-culturalism has become a hegemonic
ideology which… has eased somewhat the pressures on
immigrants to assimilate’ (Yuval-Davis, 1997: 18).
Thus, when states attempt to define their nations based on a primordial notion of
ethnicity, or when states use narratives of ethnic nationalism, they are attempting to
territorialise something that may no longer be territorialised.
Using the term diaspora to describe communities that identify themselves as
ethnic groups overlooks the importance of space and time in (re)constructing and
(re)configuring ethnic narratives of communities and may obscure the existence of
different and varying narratives of the same ethnicities. This is because the term
diaspora implies that diasporic communities are homogenous regardless of gender,
class, place of diaspora, and the context (Anthias, 1998). Hart (2002) discusses
nationalism amongst Palestinian children in camps in Jordan. He describes how
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‘the ideas which young people express about themselves as
members of the community of the mukhayyam (camp) indicate a
creative and generationally specific engagement with a wide
range of discourses and practices not confined to Palestinian
nationalism alone’ (Hart, 2002: 37).
Unlike the sample of Palestinians in Athens research by Mavroudi (2007) and
discussed earlier in this section, Palestinian refugees in Jordan have Jordanian
citizenship, and live in a Palestinian camp community, which they consider a
Palestinian space. Their ideas suggest that narratives of ethnicity are affected and
influenced by the context, and are always in processes of reconstruction. Chatty
(2010) explains that the refugee status of Palestinians gives them ‘a sense of
marginality and exclusion’. She adds that Palestinian refugees ‘have found the
medium to express their cultural coherence and their social reality’ (Chatty, 2010:
229-230) through education and that ‘there is a physical reinforcement of
‘Palestinianness’ in the places they occupy’ (ibid: 230). This suggests that narratives
of identity and belonging are influenced by time and space, which reflects their
contextual nature. Anthias (1998) states,
‘If there is an ethnicity in the diaspora (and there clearly is),
then like all ethnicities it formulates itself in relational and
contextual terms; different narratives around identity and
culture come into play to pursue particular political projects’
(Anthias, 1998: 569).
The diaspora paradigm succeeds in understanding transnational movements
and the role technologies have in preserving the ties between diasporic communities,
and their place of origin (Robertson, 1992). Anthias (1998) mentions that one of the
main problems of the diaspora paradigm is that it assumes a natural bond between
diasporic communities and their original homeland, and this also creates a problem
of understanding the intersectionality of class, gender and ethnic relations, which
constitute narratives on their own. Therefore, to consider a particular group a
diasporic community, one must take into consideration that the ethnic narratives
85
and/or ethnic boundaries of diasporic groups are highly contextualised, and that
they can also be configured by class, gender, and socio-political situation in the
original homeland and in the country of residence. This is particularly important to
highlight in this research, because each Middle Eastern state is different, and what
might influence narratives of ethnicity of Circassians in Jordan may be different from
what influences Circassian narratives of ethnicity elsewhere in the world. In
addition, state narratives of nationalism can also be (re)constructed; this means that
the assumption that all minority groups are de facto excluded from state narratives
because they identify with their countries of origin is in fact not accurate. This is
because each state is different, and the narratives of the state can also change over
time, as discussed in the next section.
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2.5 Narrating and (Re) Narrating the Nation
‘The Middle East, like many other regions of the world, is
heterogeneous and comprises of numerous ethnic, national,
religious and linguistic societies, groups and sects. Much of the
troubles facing this region revolve around the treatment or
mistreatment of its minority population. Most of the post-
Ottoman states are yet to evolve a national identity that would
encompass and reflect their multi-ethnic social composition’
(Kumaraswamy, 2003: 244).
Although I agree with Kumaraswamy in his contention that much of the
trouble facing the Middle East is related to inter-group conflict, this does not
necessarily imply mistreatment of minority populations. It is, therefore, important to
clarify here that the western concepts of majorities and minorities do not apply to the
Middle East (Kedouri, 1983). This is well illustrated by the cases of Circassians in
Jordan and Armenians in Syria and Lebanon who are considered to be integrated,
especially politically and economically. Kedouri (1983) explains that the terms
minority/majority are western terms, and that the form of classification used during
Ottoman times was the millet system, previously explained. He adds that after the
fall of the Ottoman Empire ‘”national minorities” came into existence’ (Kedouri,
1983: 280). Thus, like ethnicities and nationalisms, minorities are constructed and
(re)constructed. Under the millet system, the Circassians were not seen as a minority
but instead were seen as part of a religiously defined group, the Islamic ummah. With
the emergence of ‘Pan-Arabism’, Circassians were once again seen as Circassians.
This demonstrates the importance of context in the defining of minorities.
In the Middle East, many states resort to ethnonational narratives to define
the nation, and since ethnicity is constructed and (re)constructed, those narratives
can be reformulated to include or exclude people at different times. The story of the
development of nation-states in the Middle East might reveal more than just
people’s desire for self-determination to challenge colonialism. The complex nature
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of the Middle East derives above all from its history. A history of united Islamic
lands, a history of colonialism, and a history of new states struggling to achieve
forms of nationalisms, either inclusive of all their ethnic minorities or simply
denying the relevance of ethnic minorities, all contribute to our understanding of the
current status of Middle Eastern states. There is a huge body of research on the
identities of Middle Eastern states themselves, but very few focus on how nationals
of those countries make sense of, (re)construct and (re)configure state narratives, and
how people (re)narrate the nation ‘from below’; this shows little acknowledgement
of people’s agency. Several commentators talk about and criticise the mere existence
of Middle Eastern states, because they view them as lacking legitimacy and not
encompassing minorities (Anderson, 2002, Anderson, 2001, Halliday, 2000b,
Kumaraswamy, 2003, Massad, 2001), but they forget that all Middle Eastern states
are modern products of colonisation, and this has prompted states to seek a way to
legitimise their sovereignty by constructing narratives of nationalism. Although
Massad (2001), for example, wrote on what being a Jordanian or a Palestinian is, he
fails to recognise the fact that states in the Middle East were created before the
promotion of state nationalist narratives amongst the people took place
(Kumaraswamy, 2006). This however does not mean that the Circassian, the
Palestinian or the Jordanian people are products of state narratives, rather it means
that what is meant by a Palestinian or a Jordanian is continuously changing and
being (re)constructed. Although individual ‘Arab’ states started resorting to
localised narratives of nationalism after failing to achieve a ‘pan-Arab’ state, most of
those states also define themselves as ‘Arab’, but what it means to be an ‘Arab’ can
also be (re)constructed to accommodate and include ‘others’.
Moreover, those studies fail to look at the role of Islam in shaping state
nationalist narratives. For example, Ali (2003) states that ‘in a world without nations
or nationalisms, the Islamic identity came close to being a universal ‘nationality’’
(Ali, 2003: 62). Ali’s argument presumes some kind of unity between all Muslim
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communities, who are heterogeneous and are of different ethnic origins. Roy (2002)
also emphasises that Muslims, regardless of their ethnic culture, share a common
religious culture. Asad (1993), on the other hand, argues that ‘there cannot be a
universal definition of religion,’ because such a definition is the outcome of
‘discursive processes’ (Asad, 1993: 29). However, a valid argument here would be
that the predominance of Islam in the politics of states with Muslim majorities led
many scholars to wonder whether the paradigm of the nation-state is viable in the
Middle East or not (Zubaida, 2001). Zubaida (2001) states that,
‘The nation state has been a ‘compulsory’ model at
independence of former colonies and dependencies, partly for
lack of any other respectable models of statehood… various
brands of nationalism have held sway during and after
independence in most Third World countries, and those of the
Middle East have been no exception’ (Zubaida, 2001: 121).
Scholars such as Zubaida (2001) and Aburaiya (2009) base their arguments on
studies of state policies in the Middle East, rather than the narratives of the people
living on those territorial lands. Many states struggled in that sense to portray an
image that is in accordance with the ‘compulsory model’ of the nation-state to
emphasize their legitimacy. On the state of Iraq, Zubaida (2002: 214) said that the
creation of a nation that is ‘territorial, economic, and social reality,’ followed the
creation of a state, which used totalitarianism to guarantee the survival of its
sovereignty. Those studies do not explore the ways people, of different ethnicities;
make sense of and (re)construct narratives of the state. Most of the studies of
nationalism in the Middle East focused on narratives of the state, and exclude how
people make sense of and (re)construct those narratives (Aburaiya, 2009, Asad, 1993,
Austin, 2003, Coury, 2005, Hagopian, 2009, Kurzman, 2007, Munson, 2003,
Steunebrink, 2008, Zubaida, 2001, Zubaida, 2002).
Promoting narratives of the nation-state in order to create a sense of
nationalism amongst citizens is a global phenomenon, not only in the Middle East.
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Zhao (2000) talks about China’s struggle to create a form of state nationalism, after
being criticised for not fitting into the modern world order of nation-states. In the
early 1990s, the state led an educational campaign which ‘called for maintaining a
‘consciousness of suffering’’ (Zhao, 2000: 18-9). Also, he mentions that the state
added patriotic education to high school and colleges’ curricula, highlighting the
achievements of the Chinese people. Another study of Taiwan and China also notes
that both states used their control over higher education ‘to propagate official beliefs
to students for citizenship’ (Law, 1995: 349).
There are also several methods governments use in order to promote a sense
of nationalism and national unity amongst their populations. As Whitmeyer (2002)
puts it,
‘They have control over public education… and within public
education things happen like the suppression of unofficial
languages. Governments may organize nationalist
organizations of adults and of children. They declare
nationalist holidays and commemorations, and organize
nationalist parades and celebrations. Increasingly important as
technology of mass communication has improved,
governments often control the mass media, such as
newspapers, radio, and television, either directly or indirectly.
They can thus control information concerning nations and their
deeds, or even exhort people to nationalistic action’
(Whitmeyer, 2002: 327).
The use of education in promoting state nationalist ideologies is common in the
world, under the banner of citizenship education, civic education, or even social
education, or covertly in history or geography, sports, etc. The state of Jordan uses
national and civic education curricula in schools. Textbooks of civic and national
education in Jordan are also part of a strategy to promote state narratives of
nationalism, and because such channels are important, I have chosen to look at the
narratives the state of Jordan promotes, and the way people consume those
narratives.
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As states create and promote narratives, those narratives can be resisted, and
this resistance might prompt reactions amongst people who feel excluded. An
example of contesting state nationalism provided by the indigenous movements in
Bolivia, which called for reform in the political system in Bolivia in order to
recognise their rights and culture (Yashar, 1998). Following those movements, which
emerged in several countries in Latin America, ‘Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Paraguay and Peru adopted or modified constitutions to recognise the
multiethnic, multicultural nature of their societies’ (Van Cott, 2000: 207). Speaking of
Bolivian state national identity, ‘national identity did not include indigenous
populations nor their rights. What emerged were states, formed by Europeanised
mestizos, preoccupied with building one homogenised nation and one population’
(Arocena, 2008: 11-12). This shows that states are constantly trying to define their
nations following the building of the state, and this is not confined to ‘Arab’ Middle
Eastern states.
States’ narratives of the nation are continuously reconstructed and changing,
which makes the boundaries of nationhood fluid, and not fixed. The same applies to
ethnic narrative of minority groups, as they are highly contextualised and vary
according to time and space. On the one hand, one must acknowledge the role
people play in (re)narrating the nation, because through an understanding of their
narrations of state nationalist narratives, we can develop an understanding of the
relation between diasporic communities, such as the Circassians and the states
where they enjoy citizenship, and how Diasporas define themselves within nation-
state boundaries. On the other hand, although states, generally, own powerful
means to channel their narratives of nationalism, some of those narratives can be
rejected and resisted by those who do not feel included in them.
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Conclusion
Very little has been said about diasporic communities in the Middle East, and
research on the Circassians in Jordan is scarce. Although there is a conventional
wisdom that the Circassians are integrated into Jordanian society, there is no
research that shows whether Circassians themselves feel this way or not. This study
looks at the ethnic narratives of the Circassian community in Jordan. However, an
exploration of ethnic narratives should take into account the idea that ethnicities are
(re)constructed and (re)configured, or, in other words, that narratives of ethnicity are
contextualised, and this makes ethnic boundaries fluid. At the same time, state-
promoted nationalist narratives are also (re)constructed and (re)configured; this is
clear from the example of modern Middle Eastern states. So, within those
(re)constructions and (re)configurations what it means to be part of the nation can
also be (re)narrated in various ways. For that reason, I suggest a move from
regarding ethnic and diasporic communities as ‘deviants from the “normal”’ (Yuval-
Davis, 1997: 11), to looking at how those (re)constructions take place.
This suggestion goes hand in hand with the idea that minorities can also be
(re)constructed and that what it means to be part of a minority can also change. For
instance, the Circassians, as a group, have been constructed and (re)constructed as
their history shows. When they were under Ottoman rule the millet system governed
inter-group relations, and their position changed, from refugees suffering from the
hardship of their flight, to settlers, to land owners and to a relatively advantaged
and ‘dominant’ minority, politically and economically. Yet, this does not necessarily
mean that they are integrated socially, or that their position will remain the same in
the future. Furthermore, since we have multiple identities and belongings, it is
important to recognise that ethnicities and nationalisms can be (re)configured and
explore how Circassian narratives of ethnicity might have been influenced by their
presence in Jordan and how they make sense of the state’s nationalist ideology. The
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case of Circassians represents a significant case study that can demonstrate how
ethnicities have been constructed in Jordan.
The literature around nationalism, on the other hand, tends to look more at
the nationalist narratives of the state, rather than focusing on how those narratives
are received by people; this research attempts to address this by looking at
narratives of the state ‘from above’ and ‘from below’ at the same time. The state of
Jordan uses education and nationalist campaigns to promote state nationalist
narratives; however, state narratives can be resisted and rejected. Looking at how the
Circassian community makes sense of state narratives will help us identify whether
the state of Jordan is successful in delivering those narratives to all those living in
Jordan, and can also identify any potential conflicts between the Circassians and the
state of Jordan. It will also contribute to an understanding of whether Circassians
feel excluded or included in those narratives, and will show whether there is any
resistance on the part of Circassians to those narratives. This also takes into account
the fact that people, and not only states, exercise agency and participate in the
narration and (re)narration of the nation, despite states’ ownership of powerful
resources that facilitate the promotion of such narratives.
Within the process of narrating the nation, women, as part of the nation in the
Middle East, are marginalised from many narratives of the state, as well as
narratives of ethnicity. Women are regarded as reproducers of the nation and as
wives and mothers, as responsible for rearing the next generation to ensure the
persistence of the nation. This justifies the exclusion of women from the public
sphere, and limits their roles to the private. It may also lead to control over women’s
sexuality, in order to guarantee the nation’s survival. ‘Arab’ states are champions in
this field, and the exclusion of women from the public sphere is facilitated by law
(El-Azhary Sonbol, 2003). A comprehensive understanding of ethnic narratives
should take into account gender differences, because gender relations are often used
as markers of ethnic boundaries. Generational differences are also important,
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because ethnic narratives depend on time and space, and may differ according to
age. The next chapter explains the research approach, that is to say the methods used
to answer the research questions, and it tells the story of the research.
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Chapter Three
Methodologies
Introduction
‘You go and do your field work, and however you come back
you’re going to be different than you were before you
underwent the ritual. So the researcher is the focal point of
awareness. Research is interpreted as a personal journey of
discovery possibly leading to transformation’ (Brew, 2003: 7).
This thesis is based on practical research, a fieldwork journey, a process of
transformation of the research, and the researcher. As my interest in the Circassian
community grew because of personal experiences of discrimination as a Palestinian
in Jordan, this research has been a journey of self discovery, which influenced the
research, and shaped its methodologies. The research process has been guided by
the following research questions,
 What are the ethnic narratives mobilised by the Circassians in Jordan? Do
those narratives differ depending on age and gender?
 What are the nationalist narratives and ideologies the state of Jordan
promotes through ‘Jordan First’ and textbooks of national and civic
education?
 How do research participants make sense of and reconstruct state narratives?
 What is the relationship between the state of Jordan and its Circassian
community? Is the conventional wisdom relating to their integration
accurate?
To answer the research questions, I adopted a flexible methodological approach.
This is because this research relies heavily on the narratives research participants use
to define their ethnicity, and on their reconstruction of state narratives of
nationalism. I initially intended to use qualitative data collection techniques, to give
research participants voice, to unpack the ethnic narratives they see as important, to
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understand their reconstruction of the state nationalist narratives, and to find out
whether they believe that they are integrated into Jordanian society. I also wanted to
use qualitative data collection methods in order to identify the differences between
the ethnic narratives of older and younger generations of the Circassian community.
However, due to fieldwork difficulties related to access, this had to change. Instead
of depending mainly on interviews, I carried out 13 interviews with members of the
Circassian community, and administered 62 questionnaires. I also kept fieldnotes
which I later realised was a form of ‘unplanned ethnography’. In order to identify
state nationalist narratives I analysed materials provided in books of national and
civic education used in schools from the first to the twelfth grade, the ‘Jordan First’
nationalist campaign document, and the official websites of King Abdullah II and
King Hussein.
This chapter explains how my methodological approach is well-suited to
answer the research questions, and how quantitative and qualitative data collection
techniques were designed to make sure that I was able to identify ethnic and
nationalist narratives. I begin with an explanation of the general methodological
approach of the research. I explore how and why this research made use of feminist
methodologies, and of the concept of narratives to provide an understanding of the
narratives of the Circassian community. I then move towards explaining how and
why I see ethnicity and nationalism as constructions that are not based on
primordial, or ‘real’, basis of categorisation. The chapter also discusses how, as a
Palestinian in Jordan, I was faced with difficulties in the field, ranging from
obtaining a residence permit to feeling uncomfortable during the interviews. The
political sensitivity of the topic and my vulnerable position in the field undoubtedly
influenced the research process. This chapter also includes a discussion of the ethical
considerations of this research and my insider/outsider status in Jordan, as a
Palestinian Jordanian.
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3.1 Methodology: Feminism and Narratives
‘Feminist methodology is specifically concerned with how, or
whether, knowledge produced about social life can be
connected with the social realities of women… Feminist
methodology is informed by feminist epistemology; in
particular, who can be agents of knowledge, what can be
known and how knowledge is validated, and the relationship
between knowing and being (ontology)’ (Landman, 2006: 430).
Methodology is about linking theory to practice in social research. It is, as
Harding (1987) puts it, ‘a theory and analysis of how research does or should
proceed; it includes accounts of how the general structure of theory finds its
application in particular scientific disciplines’ (Harding, 1987: 3). Stanley and Wise
(1993) urged for a feminist sociology that does not only focus on women and their
experiences but also on men and their behaviours (Stanley and Wise, 1993). I suggest
that gender relations, and women’s experiences, are integral to all areas of studies,
especially in relation to ethnicity and nationalism, because gender, ethnicity and
nationalism intersect, and looking at this intersection is important for understanding
narratives of ethnicity and nationalism. The application of feminist methodologies
can provide ‘an inclusion of women not as a special case deviating from the norm,
but as one of many different groups in an open and heterogeneous universe’
(Duncan, 1996: 3); this is how feminist methodologies are applied in this research.
In the initial research design I had planned to interview both men and women
and to include a gender analysis of the data. However, in the field I began to realise
that I should not only look at gender differences. I began to develop a feminist
consciousness, and became more aware of how gender relations are used as ethnic
and national boundary markers. This research includes an evaluation of the ‘Jordan
First’ nationalist campaign and books of national and civic education, and as I began
analysing these documents in the field, I started to notice that in these documents
there is particular emphasis on gender roles. Books of national and civic education
include sections about the role of men and women in society, and about the family
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unit as the basis of the ‘Arab’ society. In addition, I started to notice that
interviewees often referred to gender relations as group identity markers. Moreover,
my daily exposure to gendered narratives of nationalism in the media, in the
workplace, and with friends, made me aware of the importance of gender in popular
representations of nationalism, and the importance of looking at the intersecting
narratives of gender and nationalism. Therefore, the adoption of a flexible
methodological approach helped me to develop a well-suited theoretical framework
for the research that is informed by the research questions and the nature of the
research. This also allowed me to develop a suitable methodology determined
according to the topic under inquiry (Blaxter et al., 2006, Bryman, 2004, Crotty, 1998,
Patton, 2002).
The analysis process also revealed that narratives of gender are as central as
narratives of ethnicity, and nationalism to this research. Riessman (1993) for example
refers to a ‘click moment (vi)’ between her and the interview transcripts she
attempted to analyse, when she realised the importance of narratives (Riessman,
1993). As explained in the previous chapter, where I suggest the use of narratives to
explore elements of ethnicity and nationalism, there are also gender narratives. I
found that gender narratives, as well as ethnic narratives, are apparent throughout
the interview transcripts, and the questions yielded lots of narratives. Riessman
(2004) states,
‘As nations and governments construct preferred narratives
about history, so do social movements, organisations,
scientists, other professionals, ethnic/racial groups, and
individuals in stories of experience’ (Riessman, 2004: 705).
I believe that this research is a feminist research because it does not focus on
‘introducing another meta-narrative, one based on woman, women, or feminist
standpoint epistemology’ (Zalewski, 2000: 62), but suggests moving away from
viewing ‘women’ as a category deviating from the ‘male’ norm. This is to argue for a
move away from viewing women as the oppressed, and men and other actors as
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oppressors, and towards considering gender relations as systems that are situated
socially and changing, and that they can be (re)constructed and (re)configured like
ethnicities and nationalisms. ‘Men, women, boys, and girls are located within
systems where expectations around roles and responsibilities are sites of struggle
and definition’ (Trinder, 2000: 50); however, there are also other intersecting and
interlocking systems that shape social actors’ life experiences as well, such as
ethnicity. Moreover, studies of ethnicity and nationalism have often ignored how
narratives of ethnicity are gendered, and narratives of gender are ethnicised.
Therefore, the use of a feminist approach in this study is not only suitable for
understanding and analysing the interview transcripts, but is also essential to
expand the literature on ethnicity and nationalism in the Middle East, which often
tends to disregard gendered narratives of ethnicity, and the ethnicised narratives of
gender.
This research can also be situated as a narrative account of the research
participants (re)constructions of ethnicity and nationalism.
‘The concept of narrative has been central to the feminist
critique of objectivist accounts of individualisation which are
regarded not only as determinist, but also as tacitly
reproducing a masculinist view of the world. Narrative
becomes a central analytical tool for feminism because a cluster
of issues associated with gender and sexuality are regarded as
particularly amenable to narration’ (McNay, 1999: 318).
Finally, I am identifying and analysing narratives because of my belief that ‘social
life itself is storied’ (Somers, 1994: 614), and by highlighting the narrative accounts of
research participants, I am also emphasising that ethnicity and nationalism are
subjective, and that the research participants are agents contributing to those
narrations.
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3.2 Research Construction
‘Although internally diverse, ranging from reflexive feminism
and social psychoanalysis to post-modernism, post-
structuralism or post-Marxism, these new approaches share a
common theoretical ground which is aimed at challenging
universalism, positivism and the totalising objective of
‘conventional’ sociology’ (Malešević, 2004: 143).  
This research looks at ethnic narratives of the Circassian community, how the
research participants reconstruct state nationalist narratives, and whether they
believe themselves to be integrated into Jordanian society. This means that it
constitutes a narrative of its participants’ subjective interpretations. Recognising this,
my methodological approach is shaped by my belief that social actors can be both
subjects and objects in the social world, they can be agents of change, and they may
become subject to change. Throughout the course of research design, planning and
during fieldwork, I have adopted a social constructionist ontological stance that
recognises social entities, or social phenomena such as culture, as socially
constructed, and that social actors play a role in this construction (Bryman, 2004).
This anti-positivist epistemological orientation is also relevant, as it looks at
the meanings people, men and women, give to ethnicity and nationalism, and the
influence of ethnicity and nationalism on their lives. Holstein and Gubrium (2005)
state,
‘The interpretive practice engages both the hows and whats of
social reality; it is centred in both how people methodically
construct their experiences and their worlds, and in the
configurations of meaning and institutional life that inform and
shape their reality-constituting activity’ (Holstein and
Gubrium, 2005: 484).
Additionally, my rejection of the positivist paradigm stems above all from the
fact that positivism looks at knowledge as ‘abstract, objective and absolute’
(Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2009: 30). I see this as particularly problematic for this
research, because I view ethnicity, and nationalism as constructs; however this does
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not deny their existence, it rather views them as ‘situated, indexical’ (Stanley and
Wise, 1993: 8) and changing. Adopting a view of ethnicity and nationalism as
socially constructed is to suggest that those concepts are not fixed, and that the
views of social actors matter most in their (re)construction. In other words, to view
ethnicity and nationalism as fixed social realities denies social actors their ‘emotions,
rational thought, motives, personality traits, intentions, memory… all these
constituents of the self become historically contingent constructions of culture’
(Gergen, 1994: 70) and one might slip into the trap of generalisation, by not
recognising differences between social actors themselves. In this, I share the belief
that social identity is constructed, not fixed, and changes in time and space through
interactions and negotiations (Hall, 2000, Giddens, 1991, Gergen, 1994). Moreover,
this is to emphasise that my concern is with how social actors make sense of such
concepts, i.e. to understand them ‘from below’.
It is important to recognise that sociologists themselves contribute to the
production of those constructions, and the knowledge produced in this research is
constructed and is very much influenced by my views of the social world. Although
I do not belong to the Circassian community, I belong to another group in Jordan,
the Palestinians, and my belonging certainly situates me within the context of the
research and influences my ways of looking at the Jordanian nationalist campaign
and the books of national and civic education. For example, I must recognise that
those documents made me feel excluded from Jordanian society; however, this does
not mean that they make the research participants feel the same way. I could not
simply be a ‘disinterested scientist’ (Guba and Lincoln, 2008: 261). Therefore, it is
very important for the validity of the research to also acknowledge the influence of
my own conceptions and experiences as triggers for this research. In social science
research, researchers almost always have opinions and views, which are likely to be
expressed, presented in, and even influence the research approach, and its reporting
(Blaxter et al., 2006).
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For example, before fieldwork, like most people in Jordan, my perception was
that the Circassians were integrated into Jordanian society. However I chose to find
out whether they see themselves as integrated or not. I also had assumptions about
who the Circassians are, and that they are not ‘Arabs’. Therefore, my realisation that
those assumptions are constructions, prompted me to abandon those assumptions,
by speaking about the ‘Arabs’, the ‘Circassians’, ‘native Jordanians’, and
‘Palestinians’ from the perspective of the research participants and exploring their
own definition of these groups. For example, the word ‘Arab’ was used by
interviewees to refer to either those who speak Arabic, or the majority population in
Jordan. Native Jordanian was used to describe anyone who belongs to one of the
Bedouin tribes, who were nomadic on the lands of Jordan before its establishment as
a state. And the word Palestinians was used to describe people originating from the
West Bank of the Jordan River, and residing in Jordan.
Critical reflections on oneself, as a researcher and a participant in the field,
enable the reader and the researcher to understand the phenomenon under study
more clearly. Reinharz (1997) states,
‘Unless the researcher (and subsequent reader) knows what the
researcher’s attributes mean to the people being studied, the
researcher (and reader) cannot understand the phenomenon
being studied… then fieldwork reports will combine a full
discussion of what the researcher became in the field with how
the field revealed itself to the researcher. Field research will then
strike a balance between self and other in its reporting and will
also report the process of change’ (Reinharz, 1997: 4).
For example, my encounters during fieldwork, with the state of Jordan and research
participants, altered the way I perceive myself and my identity. Although I went into
fieldwork with a researcher’s identity, I personally went through a process of
transformation. Because reflexivity and reporting on issues that face the researcher
in the field are important for the understanding of the research, the following
sections explore how I, as a researcher, went through a process of transformation.
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Reflexivity is important to provide the reader with better understanding of
the research and the researcher, as a producer of knowledge, as someone who co-
constructs it. This emphasises that I am critical of the positivist view that there is
only one reality- the reality of the researcher, and that I am by no means assuming
that there is one truth, and one reality. On positivists’ rejection of reflexivity, Stanley
and Wise (1993) state,
‘It suggests that researchers can objectively find out this real
reality- they can stand back from, remove themselves from
emotional involvement in, what they study. It depicts social
science as the search for social laws in order to predict and so
control behaviour’ (Stanley and Wise, 1993: 117).
Harding (1993) argues that ‘strong objectivity’ can be achieved through a
systematic examination of all social values affecting the research project. This
reflexive approach has been an integral part of this research. Social values, fieldwork
events, and ‘researcher identity’ have greatly influenced the scope of this research.
These accounts give ‘a lively insight’ into research, because personal accounts are
sociologically and politically important (Roberts, 1981). The following section is a
personal account of my vulnerability in the field as a researcher, and the issues that
came up during fieldwork that have influenced the research process.
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3.3 Vulnerability in the Field
‘Social science is becoming more aware of the importance of
researcher safety and well-being… although risk in the field is
a frightening experience for the researcher, it does on many
occasions enrich our understandings of the research site and
enables us to think and write about social life as insiders’ (Lee-
Treweek and Linkogle, 2000: 2).
One of the most important aspects of empirical research is fieldwork, where
events, problems, and emotions arise. It is very important to acknowledge fieldwork
events, which sometimes may disrupt the original design of the research, because
those events may ‘testify to the existence of an actual situation’ (Pettigrew, 1981: 63).
Despite the fact that I have a Jordanian passport, I am originally a Palestinian, and
my legal status in Jordan is precarious. One of the main issues that faced me during
fieldwork was how to carry out the research, especially because the topic under
inquiry is politically sensitive. This political sensitivity forced me to be reflexive.
For Palestinians, speaking about Jordanian nationalism is a taboo in Jordan
because it is always assumed that Palestinians are against Jordanian nationalism. As
I have previously mentioned in chapter one, the Palestinians constitute more than 70
per cent of the Jordanian population. The history of the Palestinian presence in
Jordan reinforces the view that Palestinians are very critical about the whole
existence of Jordan as a state, and this is perceived as threatening for the existence of
the state of Jordan. This conception was first formed when some Israeli officials said
that Jordan should become an alternative homeland for the Palestinians, and some
members of the PLO [Palestinian Liberation Organisation] suggested that Jordan
lacks ‘the principal foundations of statehood’(Al O'ran, 2009: 70), claiming that
Jordan has always been part of historic Palestine. The tensions intensified after the
PLO’s attempt to overthrow the Jordanian monarchy in the 1970s (See chapter one).
For these reasons, Palestinians expressing dissatisfaction with or criticism of the state
of Jordan are often persecuted and could face death sentences.
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Knowing that, and hearing about cases of Jordanians of Palestinian origins
being persecuted, threatened with death and seeking asylum in Western countries, I
had to be very careful in relation to the way I presented the research, and gathered
the data in the field. The first political problem I faced during fieldwork was
obtaining a residence permit. As a Palestinian Jerusalemite, I was interrogated at the
borders about the reasons behind my stay, and when I explained that I will be there
for research purposes, I was granted one month residence permit, which I had to
renew in Jordan, after obtaining a security permit for my research. Before the end of
the first month, I went to the Palestinian Division of the Ministry of Internal Affairs,
where residence renewals are issued. I was granted a permit to stay for one more
month, during which time I had to obtain permission to conduct the research from
the internal security services, the mukhabarat, the ‘intelligence’.
Fear of the intelligence services, particularly because of my topic,
overwhelmed me. I tried to bargain for more than one month, without visiting the
intelligence headquarters, and I was granted another permit after explaining that my
research is about the Circassian people, who are very loyal to the monarchy, and that
my research will draw attention to the ‘generosity’ of the Jordanian people and
government towards the Circassian people. This ‘white lie’ allowed me two more
months, during which I had to obtain a paper from the Circassian Charitable
Association in Amman saying that I was working under their supervision. Despite
the fact that I have a Jordanian passport, and I am internationally recognised as a
Jordanian, I was also told that I had no right to stay there, without proving my
affiliation, and work with the Circassian Charitable Association. The reasons given
by the Ministry of Internal Affairs were that my passport does not allow me to stay,
work, and live in Jordan without justification, because I am a Palestinian
Jerusalemite. During that same period, I contacted a Circassian friend of mine, who
offered help and managed to set up a meeting for me with the chair of the Circassian
Charitable Association in Amman. The Circassian Charitable Association is the
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biggest Circassian organisation in Jordan, and has around seven branches in cities all
over the Kingdom. I thought that it would provide a perfect access point to the
Circassian community, as it holds names, numbers, and addresses of Circassians.
Bursting with excitement, I went to the meeting, explained my research to the chair,
who was, at that time, very interested and satisfied with the aims of the research.
To formalise my stay in Jordan, as requested by the Ministry of Internal
Affairs, I had asked the chair of the organisation to provide me with a consent paper
explaining that I am conducting my research in collaboration with the organisation.
In return, he asked me to provide him with a formal letter on headed paper asking
the charitable association to provide me with access. Unfortunately, a couple of days
later, I tried to call the association several times, and called the chairman on his
personal number, but he did not answer my calls. After several attempts and calls,
the chairman of the association called back and said that the association refused to
provide me with a consent paper and with access to the community as a whole. They
said that their refusal was based on the fact that I was a researcher at the University
of Warwick, and in 2007 a researcher from the same university accessed the
community through the association by lying to them about the nature of his
research. They thought that the university itself had some hidden agenda, and that a
conspiracy theory was being woven against Circassians in Jordan. Phillips’ research
was a comparative study of Circassians and gypsies, and for Circassians it is very
offensive to compare them to a marginalised group. Phillips (2008) managed to get
away with the data needed for his research, and mentioned in his thesis that in the
final months of his fieldwork the Circassians refused to grant him access, and that he
received several threats from community leaders because of a comparison that is
‘insulting and potentially dangerous to their standing in Jordan’ (Phillips, 2008: 145).
Phillips (2008) mentioned in his thesis that the Circassians spread the word in the
community about his thesis, and at that time, I feared that they would do the same in
my case.
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During this time, I embarked on an analysis of the official documents of the
‘Jordan First’ campaign, books of national education and other official documents.
Those revealed that Jerusalemites who have Jordanian passports can de jure stay in
Jordan as they please. However, my vulnerability in Jordan does not relate to my
legal status; it is mainly based on my Palestinian origin. I found out that legally the
ministry of internal affairs has no right to question my presence in Jordan, and all
the problems they created for me were not legally sanctioned. I believe that such
incidents are very important to mention because they provide a very useful insight
into my precarious position in the field. Those incidents also show how the personal
is political, not only in terms of gender, but also in relation to origin, ethnicity, and
gender. Additionally, ‘all aspects of the political are necessarily and inevitably
reflected within the personal’ (Stanley and Wise, 1993: 86). Moreover, such incidents
influenced the way I view Jordan. Jordan, the country which claims to be the bearer
of ‘Pan-Arabism’, is known for its mistreatment of ‘Arab’ Palestinians. This not only
influenced my view of Jordan, but it also made me critical of the whole claim of the
existence of a ‘Pan-Arab’ nation. It also influenced the way I perceive my identity; I
specifically started feeling less of an ‘Arab’ or a Jordanian and more of a Palestinian.
This is because I felt I was not treated as a Jordanian citizen and I was more of a
second class citizen. Those feelings intensified throughout my encounters with the
state of Jordan during fieldwork. It has been important to account for those personal
experiences and changes in my identity as a researcher, because they make sense in
political terms and they can partly explain why I believe that Palestinians are
disadvantaged in Jordan. If many Palestinians face the same issues with the state of
Jordan, then they are less likely to feel Jordanian and more like to feel Palestinian.
Another incident took place in the field, when I had to obtain security
clearance from the Jordanian intelligence apparatus so as to be able to work at the
US embassy in Jordan. I went to the intelligence services headquarter in Amman,
where I filled in an application form, entered after being searched, approached a
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counter, and handed an officer the application together with other documents. He
asked me to be seated and, as a good citizen, I did. The officer made several phone
calls, after which he called my name. He said: ’Nour, you are Palestinian’. I said:
‘yes, originally Palestinian, but I have a Jordanian passport’. He asked me if I had a
work permit, I said no, and then he said that I will have to get one. I did not know
what to say, but suddenly I felt that I was being stripped of my basic rights, and so I
said: ’No, I do not need one. I am a Jordanian citizen. The constitution of Jordan
guarantees my rights as a citizen, I deserve equal treatment, unless you want to
undermine the authority of deceased King Hussein on the date of his death’. I do not
know how I said this, but I knew that King Hussein wanted to maintain Jordan’s
sovereignty over Jerusalem, and so residents of Jerusalem are recognised as
Jordanians internationally and, supposedly, nationally. My words did not have an
impact on the man, he instead started saying you are Palestinian, you are
Palestinian, and I continued saying no I am Jordanian. In the end, I decided to leave
empty handed with no clearance, and with a completed application form. It occurred
to me that such difficulties are being systematically imposed on the Palestinians, and
that it is not a matter of law; it appeared to be indirect deterrence measures against
the Palestinians in Jordan. Subsequently, I decided to resort to a friend who has
connections in the Jordanian intelligence services; he managed to get the permit for
me, and I was able to start working.
Being reflexive here and shedding light on my position as a Palestinian
researcher in Jordan is very important. First of all, this shows that despite the fact
that narratives of ethnicity and nationalism are constructed and (re)constructed by
social actors, this does not deny the existence of social power ‘from above’ that can
reinforce narratives of ethnicity. In other words, even if I wanted to perceive myself
as a Jordanian, discrimination against Palestinians and stripping from them their
rights as Jordanians made me feel less of a Jordanian and more of a Palestinian.
Secondly, my personal journey of discovery during fieldwork is very important for
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this research particularly because it deals with narratives. Thirdly, although the state
of Jordan emphasises its adoption of a ‘pan-Arabist’ nationalist ideology in
textbooks of national and civic education and despite the fact that the ‘Jordan First’
campaign is designed to promote a form of nationalism that is inclusive to all
citizens, my perception of my national identity has been influenced by my
experiences in Jordan and by how I am perceived by others as a Palestinian. In that I
am saying that the neopatriarchal state of Jordan has power over my experiences
that in return influence my own narratives; this supports the idea that narratives are
shaped by experiences and can be indicators of integration and this is why I am
looking at Circassians’ narratives of ethnicity and nationalism.
Finally, my experience as a Palestinian is not only personal, because it reveals
patterns of the treatment of Palestinians in Jordan. For example, I have also heard
stories about people who hold the same legal status as myself, and who were
illegally deported back to Jerusalem. This made me aware of the fact that I was in a
vulnerable position in the field, and that I should be careful in the way I ask my
interview questions. To preserve my safety and protect myself, I had to play with the
words, and manoeuvre around the aims of my research avoiding political ‘taboos’
that undermine the monarchy. For Palestinians, simply speaking about nationalism
and statehood in Jordan is a taboo, let alone evaluating nationalist campaigns, and
books of national education. I had originally intended to conduct interviews with
members of the Circassian community from different age groups, and analyse the
‘Jordan First’ campaign as well as books of national and civic education used in
schools. Although the latter proved to be possible due to the easy access to such
documents online and books being easy to obtain from schools in Jordan, the former
proved to be impossible to achieve, and this prompted me to change my methods
and find other ways to access the community.
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3.4 Access Points, Sample, Sampling Limitations
After several failed attempts to access the community through formal access
points, and after several refusals by members of the Circassian community to be
interviewed, I decided to change my research design. I shifted from relying on
interviews for data collection to distributing a questionnaire, because it would allow
me more access to the community, because people might be more sceptical about
recorded interviews. The questionnaires seemed a good idea as they would support
the data provided in potential interviews. Before working in the US embassy, I had
worked in a translation agency with a Circassian lady, who had shown an interest in
my research. The Circassian lady, Thuraya, to whom I told the story of my research,
agreed to be interviewed. However, and despite her close contact with the Circassian
community, she did not offer to introduce me to others for interviewing purposes.
And when I asked her if she would be willing to at least distribute some
questionnaires she avoided answering. With time, the relation between Thuraya and
I developed into a friendship in the workplace. I worked three days a week, for a
minimum of six hours a day. My encounters with this lady allowed me to develop
my research diary. Listening to her talk gave me an insight into the dynamics of her
life as a Circassian working woman. I listened for hours to her accounts of
fascination with Circassian culture and traditions, and how influential her
community is in Jordan.
During this time I designed a questionnaire, and decided to ask Thuraya to
check it, to see whether it would be appropriate to distribute within the Circassian
community and whether it contained anything that would be considered
unacceptable to them. The questionnaire included questions about the extent to
which they were satisfied with the government, and the meaning of the flag of
Jordan. Thuraya told me that it should be easy to distribute, and that I would not be
crossing any line with either the government or the Circassian community.
However, she did not offer to distribute it, which made me suspect its feasibility. I
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was also concerned because of my vulnerable position as a Palestinian without any
legal standing in Jordan; I decided to consult some of my family members and
Palestinian friends in Jordan.
Shockingly, their feedback was not very good. I was told that it would be
dangerous to distribute such a questionnaire on anyone in Jordan, particularly
Circassians. My extended family advised me that many Circassians work with the
intelligence apparatus, and they might start to question the underlying motive for
such research, and criticise how it would undermine the authoritarian nature of the
monarchy in Jordan. I could not comprehend these conflicting reactions to the
questionnaire, and in an attempt to defend the feasibility of my questionnaire, I told
them that a Circassian friend of mine said that it was fine. I was shocked by their
answer, they said: ‘You have to be careful; this friend of yours might herself be
working with the intelligence’.
Some of them even exclaimed ‘why are you studying the Circassians?’ Others
added ‘you choose the most closed community in Jordan, and the most stubborn
people in Jordan. You are making your life hard’. To add to my confusion, some of
my friends said that the Circassians do not like the Palestinians, and for that reason
it might be even harder for me to access the community. To that I responded that
during my first encounter with the Chair of the Circassian association, he
emphasised that Circassians do not dislike the Palestinians, and that this assumption
is not true. Although I did not believe that most Circassians work with the
underground ‘intelligence’ services, and I did not believe that they do not like
Palestinians, I was still in a very vulnerable position, particularly since my residence
permit had expired, and I had decided to stay without renewing it. I started
developing a new questionnaire, one that was in the form of indirect questions
assessing how Circassians make sense of their identities in Jordan. The questions are
discussed in another section in this chapter. After designing the second
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questionnaire, I was already employed in the US embassy, and that facilitated my
access because US embassy employees are held with high regard and respect.
After starting to work at the US embassy, I noticed that most Jordanians held
US embassy employees in high regard. My work provided me with status and
privilege. First, it revealed an idealisation of ‘American’ and ‘Western’ lifestyles.
Second, it gave people the impression that I was not frowned upon by the
government, and that I was someone they could trust, particularly since security
clearances are a precondition for working with the US embassy in Jordan. The
idealisation of ‘American’ and ‘Western’ lifestyles came across very strongly, in
people expressing their desire to live the American lifestyle they heard existed
within the premises of the US embassy, and the illusion that the Americans pay well.
I felt a change in my status. The fact that I am affiliated to a Western university was
not enough for people to trust me as a researcher, but working in the US embassy
was. It gave me legal immunity, as US embassy employees are protected by the
‘Americans’, and legally should not be interrogated, imprisoned or threatened by the
intelligence services. This changed status gave me the confidence to carry on with
the study, and I admittedly used my work with the US embassy as an umbrella of
protection.
One day I paid the translation agency, where I used to work, a visit, to finalise
some papers, and meet Thuraya for coffee and an interview. Following the
interview, Thuraya received a visit from her nephew, who is a young active member
of the Circassian community. After being introduced as a researcher and a US
embassy employee by Thuraya, the young man, Qasim, happily offered to introduce
me to his friends and young family members, for interviews, and also offered to
distribute many of the questionnaires himself. Interviewing older generations
seemed hard, as Qasim told me that old Circassian men do not talk much, and that
young people nowadays are more interested than their parents in making the world
aware of their existence. For him, helping in the research was a win-win situation;
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he thought that research on Circassians would help make people more aware of the
Circassians, but he also figured that this could be a step forward to make the world
recognise the 19th century genocide against Circassians.
Snowballing was used as a sampling technique for the questionnaire and the
interviews. For the questionnaire, I asked some friends, including Qasim, to
distribute the questionnaire to people they knew, who considered themselves
Circassians. And, I conducted interviews whenever possible. One access point for
the questionnaire was through a young lady I used to work with at the US embassy,
whose mother was Circassian. She offered to distribute the questionnaire through
the Circassian charitable association in Sweileh, because she knew the chair. She
asked me to provide her with 50 copies, but she returned only 14 completed
questionnaires. It seemed that asking the Circassians about their views on
nationalism was a sensitive topic. Five of the interviewees filled in questionnaires
before the interviews, and before the interviews I used to provide a one hour
introduction to the research, its aims and its goal. I felt I had to justify my questions,
and provide them with details about research confidentiality, and the use of
pseudonyms to conceal their identities, as they had requested. This lengthy
procedure took place because of the political sensitivity of the topic, and because
people tend to be critical of Palestinians who speak about Jordanian nationalism.
Most of the interviews took place in a flat I shared with a friend, with the
presence of my flat mate, who was responsible for the entertaining of Qasim in the
living room, while I interviewed his friends in the kitchen. Qasim served as a
gatekeeper to the respondents. He used to call whenever he found someone willing
to participate and bring them over, reassuring them that I was someone they could
trust. His role was very important, and I believe that without his participation, as a
gatekeeper for his contacts, ‘there can be no research’ (Cree et al., 2002: 50). Not only
that, but also Qasim played a major role in demonstrating my credibility to
participants (Emmel et al., 2007). For example, he used to come into the kitchen and
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make coffee during the interview in order to show the interviewees that he knew me
well, and that I am a credible, trusted friend, an ‘Arab’, who has Circassian traits in
terms of openness and acceptance of their culture and traditions. Most interviewees
said that they did not always feel comfortable around ‘Arabs’ because of their
‘sexism’ and ‘closed-mindedness’. The fact that I was receiving them in my home,
the house of two young women living alone, and away from family, made them feel
that I led more of a ‘Western’ life style, which they see similar to theirs. In addition
to that, and to gain their trust, Qasim always introduced me as a researcher and a US
embassy employee. For instance, I had learnt from the interviews that Circassians
view themselves as more open than ‘Arabs’, in terms of mixing the sexes. And, for
them, particularly young men, the fact that Qasim became a close friend, reflected
that I was not a ‘traditional Arab’, and made their view of me as ‘other’ less salient. It
is important to note that not all the interviews were conducted through Qasim. I also
relied on two other friends who had Circassian friends, but seven of the interviewees
were contacted through Qasim. Two interviews took place online, with Circassian
friends with whom I had lost touch for a long time; I got back in touch with them
through internet social networking sites such as Facebook. Many older men and
women refused to participate in the research. Five men over the age of 51 completed
the questionnaire, and only one woman in this age group. Luckily I managed to
conduct an interview with one 77 year old man. One of the limitations of this study
is that access to older generations of the Circassian community was not easy, and it
is difficult to compare age groups according to the questionnaire sample I have.
Moreover, seven of the 13 interviewees were men, five of whom were below 25.
Further, one of the women interviewees did not consider herself to be a Circassian,
but I chose to interview her because her mother identified herself as Circassian.
Tables (3.1) to (3.10) provide a description of the interviews and the questionnaire
samples. I was only able to conduct 13 interviews, but 62 questionnaires were
completed. These allowed me more access to the community and to different age
groups. The fact that some agreed to participate in the research in spite of the
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Circassian Charitable Association’s refusal suggests that Circassians in Jordan are
not a monolithic community.
Table (3.1) Male Interviewees Sample Description
Interviewee Age
Marital
Status
Residential
Status Education
Household
Income
Employment
Status
Languages
Spoken at
Home
Tariq 22 Single Owned BA 500 Student
Arabic/
English.
Circassian
occasionally
Atef 39 Married Owned
High
School 500
Private
Sector
Employee
Arabic/
Circassian
Khairi 77 Married Owned 4th grade 500
Elementary
school Arabic
Husam 23 Single Owned BA
More than
2500 Student
Arabic/
Circassian
occasionally
Adel 22 Single Rented BA 1500 Student
Arabic/
English
Asad 22 Single Owned BA
More than
2000 Student
Mostly
Circassian
Qasim 22 Single Owned BA
More than
2500
Student/
Freelance
work Arabic
Most interviewees and questionnaire respondents had Arabic as their first language
at home (Tables 3.1, 3.2, 3.9 and 3.10), and very few of both samples spoke
Circassian. Moreover, 10 out of 13 interviewees lived in owned houses, and the
majority of questionnaire respondents also owned their houses, which can indicate
that their financial situation is relatively good. Whereas there were limitations in
terms of the age ranges of interviewees and respondents, men are also
overrepresented in the sample. Most interviewees were single and young, while the
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questionnaire sample included married, single and divorced respondents (Table 3.3).
There were limitations within the interview sampling, due to access problems;
however, the questionnaires covered a wider variety of people. Moreover, there
were several ethical considerations that I had to take into account during fieldwork,
and those same considerations restricted me in terms of the type of questions I could
ask in the context of Jordan, and in terms of what is appropriate and what is not.
Table (3.2) Female Interviewees Sample Description
Interviewee Age
Marital
Status
Residential
Status Education
Household
Income
Employment
Status
Languages
Spoken at
Home
Nuha 22 Single Owned BSc
More than
2500
Student/
Freelance
work
Arabic/
English and
Little
Circassian
Muna 22 Single Rented
Vocational
Training
Less than
500
Private
Sector
Employee
Arabic
Rana 36 Married
Owned/
245 Meters
Diplomat 500 Housewife Arabic
Thuraya 38 Married
Rented/
120 Meters
BA 1000
Private
Sector
Employee
Arabic/
English—
Occasionally
Circassian
Norma 22 Single
Owned/350
Meters
BA
More than
1500
Unemployed Arabic
Hiba 28 Single
Owned/
350 Meters
Diploma
Less than
1000
Unemployed Arabic
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Table (3.3) Questionnaire Sample Description/ Marital Status
Men= 36 Women= 26
58 % 42 %
Men’s Marital Status Women’s Marital Status
Status Number Percentage Status Number Percentage
Divorced 0 0 Divorced 1 4 %
Single 18 50% Single 10 38 %
Married 18 50% Married 15 58 %
Widowed 0 0 Widowed 0 0
Total 36 100% Total 26 100 %
Table (3.4) Questionnaire Sample Description/ Age Groups
Men’s Percentages by Age Women’s Percentages by Age
Age Range Number Percentage Age Range Number Percentage
19- 24 10 28 % 19- 24 5 19 %
25- 30 11 31 % 25- 30 9 35 %
31- 40 7 19 % 31- 40 4 15 %
41- 50 3 8 % 41- 50 7 27 %
Above 51 5 14 % Above 51 1 4 %
Total 36 100% Total 26 100%
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Table (3.5) Questionnaire Sample Description/ Educational Attainment
Men’s Educational Attainment Women’s Educational Attainment
Number Percentage Number Percentage
Elementary,
Primary,
Preparatory= 4
4 11 %
Elementary,
Primary,
Preparatory= 0
0 0
High School
Certificate= 8
8 22 %
High School
Certificate= 5
5 19 %
College= 7 7 19 % College= 5 5 19 %
University
Degree= 14
14 40 %
University
Degree= 11
11 43 %
Postgraduate
degree= 3
3 8 %
Postgraduate
Degree= 5
5 19 %
Vocational
Training= 0
0 0
Vocational
Training= 0
0 0
Total 36 100 % Total 26 100 %
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Table (3.6) Questionnaire Sample Description/ Employment
Men’s Employment Women’s Employment
Number Percentage Number Percentage
Independent
Worker
2 6 %
Independent
Worker
1 4 %
Private Sector
Employee
16 45 %
Private Sector
Employee
2 8 %
Public Sector
Employee
7 19 %
Public Sector
Employee
9 35 %
Unemployed 4 11 % Unemployed 10 37 %
Student 4 11 % Student 3 12 %
Retired 3 8 % Housewife 1 4 %
Total 36 100% Total 26 100%
Table (3.7) Questionnaire Sample Description/ Household Income
Men’s Percentages by Household Income Women’s Percentages by Household Income
Income Number Percentage Income Number Percentage
Not Specified 1 3 % Not Specified 1 4 %
Less than 500 JDs 10 28 % Less than 500 JDs 2 8 %
500- 1000 JDs 18 49 % 500- 1000 JDs 15 57 %
1000- 2500 JDs 2 6 % 1000- 2500 JDs 5 19 %
Above 2500 JDs 5 14 % Above 2500 JDs 3 12 %
Total 36 100% Total 26 100%
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Table (3.8) Questionnaire Sample Description/ Residential Status
Male Respondents According to Residential
Status
Female Respondents According to Residential
Status
Status Number Percentage Status Number Percentage
Rented 7 19% Rented 3 12%
Privately Owned 29 81% Privately Owned 23 88%
Total 36 100% Total 26 100%
Table (3.9) Questionnaire Sample Description/ First Language at home
Men by Main Language Spoken at Home Women by Main Language Spoken at Home
Language Number Percentage Language Number Percentage
Arabic 28 78% Arabic 21 81%
Circassian 7 19% Circassian 5 19%
English 1 3% English 0 0
Total 36 100% Total 26 100%
Table (3.10) Questionnaire Sample Description/ Second Language at home
Men by Secondary Language Spoken at Home
Women by Secondary Language Spoken at
Home
Language Number Percentage Language Number Percentage
Arabic 8 22% Arabic 5 19%
Circassian 13 36% Circassian 5 19%
English 4 11% English 3 12%
None 11 31% None 13 50%
Total 36 100% Total 26 100%
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3.5 Ethical Considerations: Insider/Outsider Problematic
‘Relational ethics makes consideration of interactions within a
social network the focus of ethical thought… this type of ethic
looks at the pattern of human relationships and asks what kind
of response is appropriate in the context of these relations’
(Reece and Siegal, 1986: 30).
The ethical considerations of this research depended to a great extent on the
cultural context of my fieldwork. Morality and ethics are not universal, and are very
specific to cultures, and human relations. In addition to the BSA ethical
considerations guiding social research, which I abided by, there were also some
other cultural aspects that I had to take account of throughout my interactions with
the Circassian community. My position as an insider in Jordan allowed me better
understanding of the dynamics of everyday life, and ethics in terms of approaching
people. For example, my attempt to access the community through the Circassian
Association was so I could obtain the consent of community leaders. This choice was
based on the fact that due to the interconnected, tribal and collective nature of
Jordanian society, it is important to show respect for the community’s leaders and
elders. I also made this choice based on my understanding of Circassian culture,
which emphasises respect for older people. Since accessing the community through
the association was unsuccessful, I had to resort to other techniques, but this refusal
gave me the impression that community leaders may fear that the position of the
Circassians could be jeopardised if people conducted politically sensitive research on
their position in Jordan. Another example of cultural-ethical consideration was that
because most interviews took place in my home, I had to be culturally sensitive by
showing hospitality, generosity and interest in the interviewees as human beings,
not only as research participants. For example, tea, coffee and cakes were provided
each time an interview took place, in addition to showing hospitality by asking them
to stay longer after the interview to chat and have some drinks. Interviews lasted for
two hours.
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Moreover, due to the political sensitivity of the subject of nationalism in
Jordan, I made sure that interviewees and participants were informed of the details
of the research and its aims, prior to the interviews commencing, in addition to
assuring their anonymity and telling them that anything said during the interview
would only be used for research purposes. Choosing to use pseudonyms avoided
causing harm to the participants in any way or form. Also, being introduced as a
researcher and employee of the US embassy helped in terms of gaining their trust,
but I had to clarify that this research had nothing to do with the US Department of
State, and that it was for a degree I was undertaking. The questionnaires also
included a consent form written in Arabic, which also explained the research, and
that was signed by respondents (Appendix A: Questionnaire Consent paper)
(Appendix B: Interviews Consent Paper).
My insider/outsider status was sometimes problematic during the interview
process. Many interviewees felt the urge to criticise the ‘Arabs’ but my ‘Palestinian
Arab’ origin initially stopped them; I had to react in a way that would make them
feel comfortable to speak. For example in one of the interviews the following
conversation took place,
Nuha: You know how the Arabs are… I am sorry, but…
Nour: It is alright, I understand…
Nuha: You must know how conservative, and sexist they are…
Nour: Well, I can assure you I am not judging you on what you say; I would like to hear more about
your opinion…
Nuha: You know I do not mean to say that you are like Arabs, you are educated and open-minded…
I…
Nour: Do not worry, I am also sceptical about Arab culture myself, so you can say whatever you
want.
Nuha: They do not treat women with respect and they are closed minded. I had an Arab boyfriend,
who was very controlling. Then after having a Circassian boyfriend I noticed that we are different.
I also heard comments about ‘colour’ because many of my interviewees believed that
Circassians were ‘white’ Europeans. Some interviewees told me that I do not have
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the typical ‘Arab’ skin colour. Several made comments about the disloyalty of
Palestinians towards Jordan, and how Palestinians are usually not grateful for being
allowed to stay in Jordan. Many of the comments made me uncomfortable as a
Palestinian outsider, but throughout the interviewing process, I tried to show
tolerance and understanding of what they were saying. My insider understanding of
Jordanian culture and everyday life allowed me to be culturally sensitive. However,
my outsider status as a non-Circassian was a drawback at the beginning of an
interview, but once I showed an interest in what they were revealing they felt more
comfortable.
It is important to note here that interviewees mentioned that their
participation in this research had influenced their perception of their identities, and
made them think how contradictory their identities are. This is because in everyday
life social actors do not necessarily address or talk about identity issues, nationalism
and/or ethnicity. The encounter certainly influenced their views of the social world
especially that they had to reflect on their experiences and their narrations of both
being Circassian and being Jordanian at the same time. The interviews, as part of
fieldwork, have greatly influenced and informed the way I perceive my belonging to
an imagined ‘Arab’ nation and made me more aware of how flexible and fluid
identities are. I felt that the encounter with the interviewees prompted me to reflect
on my own identity and to look at their views reflexively and in a non-judgemental
way.
In addition to this, my position in Jordan, as someone belonging to an
‘oppressed’ community, forced me to be more reflexive in my approach, particularly
because the research included an analysis of the ‘Jordan First’ nationalist campaign
as represented in official documents, textbooks of civic and national education, and
the official website of King Abdullah II, and King Hussein I. Data on the state of
Jordan did not only come from these documents, as in the field I began to take
fieldnotes; in this way ethnographic data became another resource for the research. I
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provide a detailed account of the use of ethnography in this research in a later
section. Here I want to draw the reader’s attention to the fact that ethnographic data
provided a means by which I could be personally reflexive, as Finlay and Gough
comment,
‘We want to move beyond definitions of personal reflexivity as
mere reflection on subjective thoughts and feelings experienced
during the research process. Personal reflexivity also
encompasses situating the researcher and his/her knowledge-
making practices within relevant contexts, whether
interpersonal, institutional or cultural’ (Finlay and Gough,
2003: 37).
Several data collection methods were employed in this research, including both
qualitative and quantitative data collection techniques. The methods, however, were
not only limited to interviews and questionnaires, as during fieldwork I discovered
that I was also relying on the ethnographic data displayed in the research diary that I
kept during my stay in Jordan. I call this type of ethnography ‘unplanned
ethnography,’ which took place just by the merit of being there. In the following, I
explain how interviews, questionnaires, and unplanned ethnography were used in
this research, and their benefits to this particular research.
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3.6 Data Collection Methods
‘Science certainly needs structure and logic, but it also needs
unremitting injections of creativity… What is important… is
that all researchers work towards reflexive awareness and
informed choice… methodological design is about informed
decision-making that involves weighing up pros and cons, and
deciding what is best given your specific context’ (O'Leary,
2004: 87).
The data collection methods of this research were chosen to suit what was
best in the context of Jordan, and in terms of accessing the community. I combined
both qualitative and quantitative research methods in order to collect data that
would answer my research questions. Despite the tendency towards linking feminist
research to qualitative methods of social inquiry, feminist researchers have also used
quantitative methods of surveys and statistical analysis in their work (Maynard,
2004). Harding (2004) claims that the distinctive feature of feminist research is the
use of women’s experiences ‘as a significant indicator of ‘reality’’ (Harding, 2004:
460). Her claim does not only limit feminist research to women, but also limits the
choice of methods feminists should adopt. However, I would argue that adopting a
feminist perspective does not limit one’s choice of methods, on the contrary some
feminists argue for the use of both qualitative and quantitative data collection
techniques (Jayaratne and Stewart, 1991). Stanley and Wise (1983) state,
‘The idea that there is only ‘one road’ to the feminist
revolution, and only one type of ‘truly feminist’ research is as
limiting and as offensive as male-biased accounts of research
that have gone before’ (Stanley and Wise, 1983: 26).
Despite the fact that this research at the beginning was supposed to employ
qualitative research methods, as previously explained, this changed; adapting to
change is generally what many have to do when starting fieldwork (Burgess, 1984,
Bryman, 2004). This research therefore made use of triangulation in combining
qualitative and quantitative data collection techniques.
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This type of triangulation has been called a mixed methods approach, which
entails the combination of the qualitative and quantitative methods in the data
collection process (Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998). Another type of triangulation is
known as mixed models, which combines two approaches throughout the research
process, ‘such as conceptualisation, data collection, data analysis, and inference’
(Tashakkori and Teddlie, 1998: x). The quantitative approach had been utilised in
this research only in relation to the mixed method approach, and not the mixed
model, because it made use of quantitative and qualitative data collection
techniques, but it was not a mixed model of conceptualisation.
Whereas many have argued for the use of both qualitative and quantitative,
techniques, this encouragement is not based on the idea that using both enhances
validity (Fielding and Fielding, 1986, Flick, 1992). There are several reasons, and
ways of using qualitative/quantitative triangulation in social research. Qualitative
methods can be used to help develop quantitative measures, and can be used to help
interpret quantitative findings, quantitative methods can also be used to interpret
qualitative findings, and both can be used parallel to each others to produce results
(Steckler et al., 1992). Steckler et al (1992) developed models that explain the ways
qualitative and quantitative methods can be combined in research. Within their
models, I place this research somewhere between the second and the fourth model
(See figure 3.1 for Steckler et al. model). A different model of triangulation has been
developed to fit within the data collection methods I have designed. The core of this
model rests on the use of qualitative data to explain quantitative data, and the use of
both qualitative and quantitative data to obtain results (See Figure 3.2). Initially, I
conducted an analysis of the ‘Jordan First’ nationalist campaign and books of
national and civic education, then questionnaires and interviewees were designed in
order to investigate how research participants interpret the content of state
promoted narratives.
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Figure 3.1 Triangulation Models (Steckler et al., 1992: 5)
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Figure 3.2 Triangulation Model used for this research
I used questionnaires and interviews, in this research, but the questionnaire
itself was designed to provide both qualitative and quantitative data, within the
questionnaire there were parts where respondents were asked to elaborate on their
answers. The interviews, on the other hand, were semi-structured interviews, and
provided qualitative data that contribute to understanding the results of the
quantitative part of the questionnaire. I found this model of triangulation
particularly useful, for three reasons; first it provided the research with richness in
terms of the methods used, because the questionnaire gave me access to more
participants from the Circassian community. Second, this approach was
exceptionally helpful for ‘facilitation’ of the research, and quantitative and
qualitative methods in this context were ‘complementary’ to each other
(Hammersley, 1996). Finally, ‘by combining multiple methods it is possible to elicit
new insights into the causes of and consequences of beliefs and behaviours’ (Axinn
and Pearce, 2006: 1). It also adds ‘rigor, breadth, complexity, richness, and depth to
an inquiry’ (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005: 5). The following subsections explain the data
collection and analysis methods for this research.
(3) Results(2)Qualitative Data(Interviews and
Questionnaires)
(1) Qualitative
Method (Analysis
of State
Narratives)
(2) Quantitative
Method/ Data
(Questionnaires)
informed by
analysis
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3.6.1 Semi-Structured Interviews
‘In situations where you won’t get more than one chance to
interview someone, semi-structured interviewing is best. It has
much of the freewheeling quality of unstructured interviewing,
and requires all the same skills, but semi-structured
interviewing is based on the use of an interview guide’
(Bernard, 2000: 191).
Because of access problems explained earlier, I only had the chance to
interview research participants once. And, for that reason, I chose a semi-structured
interviewing technique, where I had an interview guide with a list of questions.
Bernard (2000) argues that using semi-structured interviewing means that there are
questions that should be answered in a particular order. I did not, however, follow
the same order in all interviews, and the use of semi-structured interviews also gave
me flexibility, when I needed to probe the interviewees on their responses.
The interview guide included questions about the participants’ socioeconomic
backgrounds and position in the household, in addition to questions relating the
meanings of ethnicity and nationalism in their lives, and as concepts. The interview
guide was mainly designed to make sure that the responses covered as much of the
research theme as possible. Many of the questions were open-ended, and
respondents were asked several times during the interview if they had anything they
wanted to add to their answers (See Appendix C). Although semi-structured
interviews are generally formal, before the interview, the interviewees were
regularly offered something to drink, and sweets during their visit, which is a
tradition of showing generosity and hospitality, and which happens to be an ‘Arab’
and a ‘Circassian’ tradition.
Fontana and Frey (2005) explain that the interview is a conversation, and
mention that what makes a feminist approach interviewing different is the feminist
interviewing ethic, which is based on attempting to create a shared coequal status
between the interviewer and the interviewee (Fontana and Frey, 2005). In an attempt
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to bridge the differences between me and the interviewees, I always highlighted the
fact that I was not a Jordanian, and that I shared a same minority status with them.
Moreover, I often alluded to the fact that despite being an ‘Arab’ myself, I did not
feel that I belong to the ‘Arab’ nation, and that I found myself in contradiction with
my ‘own roots’. This was often responded to with a sense of relief, because most of
them said that they did not understand ‘Arab’ ways.
During the interview, it was very important that I stripped myself of any
sense of ‘Arab’ nationalism and belonging, in order to gain the interviewees’ trust, so
that they could express freely their conceptions of Pan-‘Arabism’. Fortunately, that
was achievable, especially as I am very critical of the whole concept of ‘Arabism’
myself. I had to emphasise that I was not an ‘Arab’ nationalist, and that this reflected
my detachment from ‘Arabs’. I also had to show an understanding of their
stereotypes of ‘Arabs’, whilst also concealing any criticisms, so as not to appear
judgemental, and so that they felt they could speak their minds (Davies, 1999, Axinn
and Pearce, 2006). Although some of their remarks were racist towards ‘Arabs’,
which is something I do not agree with, I felt that I had to hide my feelings of
discomfort.
All interviews were tape-recorded, on two digital tape recorders, the main
one was connected to a computer set, and the other was switched on as a backup, in
case something went wrong. Some argue that tape-recorders might prompt
interviewees to censor their speech (Gobo, 2008). In order to counter this I used some
techniques to make the interviewees feel more comfortable about what they were
saying. At the beginning of each interview, I reemphasised the confidentiality of the
interviews, and confirmed that no one would listen to the interviews except for
myself. I also said that it was their right, if at any point they wished, to stop the
recording, to do so. This, however, never happened, and soon after the first few
questions, I felt that the recorders became more and more invisible for them. I found
that using tape-recorders has more pros than cons. For instance, it would have been
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impossible to take notes of all the answers during the interview, and ‘data
interpretation and analysis involve making sense out of what people have said,
looking for patterns, putting together what is said in one place with what is said in
another place, and integrating what different people have said’ (Patton, 2002: 380).
Interviews were also conducted in Arabic language, and with two exceptions, two
interviewees found it easier to express themselves in English, so two were conducted
in half Arabic/half English. As a professional in the field of translation, I have
transcribed/translated all of the interviews, and of course translation has its
implications in social research. Therefore, it is important to acknowledge that in
translation the translator influences the text, which also means that I co-construct the
research with participants. I have used a translation style that looks into the
meanings of words; rather than simply translating them literally, which is a
translation style I have learnt through experience. This approach to translation
shapes the text to make more sense. Literal translation has been a criticism of most
Arabic translators (Darwish, 2004), and for that reason I avoided it.
Interviewees were asked to sign a consent form. Although the paper said that
their identities would be concealed, and that pseudonyms would be used, most of
them said that they did not mind the use of their real names. Nevertheless,
throughout the thesis, I am using pseudonyms. The interviews, particularly the
open-ended questions, provided me with more depth for the research. Additionally,
‘some open-ended questions are used because they are more flexible and allow
respondents to supply more depth’ (Cargan, 2007: 94). The open-ended questions
allowed me to understand the meanings respondents gave to ethnicity and
nationalism. Flexibility in my interview guide was also very important. The
interview guide only served as a point of reference to make sure that I covered the
questions I wanted to; it was more of a checklist. However, I did not stick to the
order of the questions; instead I attempted to make each interview more of a
conversation. For example, answers to specific questions led to other questions, in
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the form of a mutual conversation; rather than a question-answer relation. During
the interview, I took notes of interviewees’ reactions to specific questions, and their
body language, in addition to the ways they avoided answering certain questions.
Interviewees often mentioned that they enjoyed the interview, because it made them
think; however, I am not sure whether that was part of ‘their culture of politeness
and respect’ or not.
Interviews were used to obtain data that could not have been obtained
otherwise. They not only brought up daily life experiences, but also peoples’ views
on the concepts of ethnicity and nationalism, and self-definition in an ‘Arab’ context,
which many of them do not bring up in their daily conversations. Moreover, it gave
them the chance to voice pride in culture, which is for them something they cannot
do every day. Therefore, I believe that the interviews gave the interviewees the
chance to voice their feelings, emotions, and interpretations of their social world.
And, because the questions were mostly open-ended, they allowed me to get
‘focused qualitative’ data, as they ‘combine the flexibility of the unstructured, open-
ended interview with the directionality and agenda of the survey instrument’
(Schensul et al., 1999: 149).
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3.6.2 Questionnaires
‘The goal of using carefully constructed open-ended
questionnaires is the same as interviews: to get inside the heads
of participants to understand their perspectives… major
advantage of questionnaires over interviews are that data can
be collected from larger numbers of participants, participants
are all responding to exactly the same questions in the same
order, and data collection takes less time’ (McGee-Brown, 1995:
202-3).
The use of a self-completion questionnaire has been crucial to this research,
mainly because of the access problems I experienced during fieldwork, as explained
earlier. The questionnaire allowed me to access greater numbers of participants, and
it also enriched the research methods. Although it has been argued that surveys and
questionnaires are not compatible with anti-positivism, I would disagree,
particularly because this greatly depends on the nature of the questions asked and
how they are designed. Bryman (2004) says that questionnaires that explore
behaviour and attitudes are interpretive in nature, and allow participants to state
their view of the social world as they see it. The questionnaire was designed to
‘report on attitudes as well as behaviours’ (Reinharz, 1992: 84). Moreover,
questionnaires can also include open-ended questions that would allow the
participants to state their interpretations of the world (Appendix D).
In this research, questionnaires have been used to complement and deepen
the data provided through the interviews, and also to obtain data on a larger scale
than what could have been achieved through the interviews. The questionnaire was
divided into four main sections, each section dealing with particular aspects of
respondents’ lives and views. The questionnaire was accompanied by a covering
letter, stating the aim of the research, how the data would be used, confidentiality,
and providing spaces for the participants to write their names, phone numbers, and
signature on agreeing to participate. The questionnaires were distributed through
contacts, and unfortunately, I did not have the chance to be present during the
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distribution process. My contacts distributed the questionnaires, and also brought
them back to me; however, I had to validate that the questionnaires had been filled
by real people, and so I called the numbers that were provided on the
questionnaires, and asked if they were filled in by them. I disregarded
questionnaires that were filled with no contact numbers, and no names, and many of
them had been returned with no numbers or names or even signatures. I have been
told that this is because of the sensitivity of the topic, and people are generally
hesitant to talk about such things. Luckily, I was able to validate 62 of the returned
questionnaires, and I rejected 20.
The questionnaire was designed to gain more access to the community. It had
very similar questions to the interviews, but in the form of a questionnaire. The first
section of the questionnaire contained questions about personal information, such as
age, gender, income, family members, etc. (See Appendix D for questionnaire). The
second section was based on a thorough analysis of the ‘Jordan First’ nationalist
campaign, and books of national and civic education used in schools. It contained
questions about knowledge of the Jordan First campaign, of historical personalities
who are given particular importance in the books of national and civic education,
and on their definition of the state of Jordan which also appears in the school books.
The third section contained questions on self-identification; on emotions, and
feelings, which flag best represents them in certain contexts, and their definition of
their origin. The final section was based on their attitudes towards concepts such as
ethnicity, homeland, language, and culture. Under each question, space was
provided for elaboration, but I noticed that only questions relating to origin were
elaborated on. Before distributing the questionnaire, I piloted it with three
Circassians I know, and who have been included in the sample, to make sure that it
was understandable, and to ask their opinion about the sensitivity of the questions.
Based on their responses, I redesigned the questionnaire twice, so that the final
version was understandable, and culturally, as well as politically, sensitive.
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Moreover, I was very careful in the choice of language in the questionnaire, as
they were administered in Arabic. This choice was based on the fact that a very
limited number of the Circassians in Jordan nowadays speak Circassian and Arabic
is the language taught in all schools. English was not considered because the
questionnaire aimed to gather data from as many Circassians as possible and older
people are generally less likely to speak English. English proficiency is known to be
high amongst middle-class Jordanians, rather than people from working class
backgrounds. Additionally, since classical Arabic can be very complicated, I used
simple wording that would be comprehendible by people who have minimal
literacy.
Despite the efforts put into the questionnaire design, I also heard comments
from respondents about it being politically sensitive, and that people were hesitant
to answer the questions, because they feared that their participation might cause
them trouble. The political troubles people were referring to had to do with feeling
that it was a way to measure their loyalty towards Jordan, and that their answers
might be interpreted in a way which would be frowned upon by the government
and the monarchy. Many of them mentioned that they only completed the
questionnaire because they trusted the gatekeeper. Such comments were recorded in
my research diary, which provided rich material, and is drawn upon in this research.
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3.6.3 Unplanned Ethnography
‘The reality, however, is that ethnographic work is not always
orderly. It involves serendipity, creativity, being in the right
place at the right or wrong time, a lot of hard work, and old-
fashioned luck… as well the unplanned, sometimes chaotic,
and always intriguing character of ethnographic research’
(Fetterman, 2010: 2).
Unplanned ethnography has been used by some scholars, leading to the
production of books on topics that were written ‘like unintentional pregnancy’
(Stacey, 1998: 27). Other studies also emerge from fieldwork through unplanned
ethnographic encounters, or ‘unplanned elements of… field experience’ (Bradburd,
1998: xiii). Gratton and Jones (2004) also argue, in the context of sports, that in
ethnography, data collection is often unstructured and unplanned, due to the
flexibility of the methodology (Gratton and Jones, 2004). What I am calling
unplanned ethnography is based on a ‘series of unplanned ethnographic encounters
which simply happen en route to the focal encounters intended to take place’
(Tomaselli, 2005: 8).
At the beginning of fieldwork, I had not intended to use ethnography.
However, throughout my prolonged stay in Jordan, I found myself being exposed to
narratives of Jordanian nationalism on a daily basis. And since narratives of
Jordanian nationalism are a focus of this research, fieldwork turned into the study of
the field. Not only that, but throughout my presence in Jordan, I met Circassians at
work, on social occasions, and on the streets. This, in addition to other events I
experienced while in the field, prompted me to start writing a research diary based
on my observations of a daily life that I had for long a time taken for granted, but
which became important after I had developed a sociological imagination.
‘The sociological imagination enables its possessor to
understand the larger historical scene in terms of its meaning
for the inner life and the external career of a variety of
individuals… it enables him [sic] to take into account how
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individuals, in the welter of their daily experience, often
become falsely conscious of their social positions’ (Wright
Mills, 1959: 5).
By unplanned ethnography, I do not mean auto-ethnography, which switches
the focus to the researcher as the subject of the research, and provides data in the
form of an autobiographical narrative (Hesse-Biber and Leavy, 2006). Instead, I am
suggesting an approach to fieldwork, which acknowledges that fieldwork is
‘personal, emotional, and identity work’ (Coffey, 1999: 1). It is an approach which
takes into account the events researchers face during fieldwork, including
difficulties, and feelings of exclusion, or inclusion, because in those events one can
find data and answers to research questions.
Ethnography is very useful in terms of providing better understanding and
greater insight through the research, it is also important for feminist researchers as it
gives voice.
‘‘Giving voice’ was a mantra that was frequently evoked and
ethnography was perfectly poised to provide the mechanism
for doing so. Ethnography provided an excellent methodology
for feminists, with its emphasis on experience and the words,
voice and lives of the participants enabling… a ‘view from
below’’ (Skeggs, 2001: 430).
The main feminist concerns around ethnography revolve around ‘the relationship
between the knower and the known’ (Sanger, 2003: 30). Feminist methodologies are
based on a rejection of the principle of ‘value-neutrality,’ and involve ‘a commitment
to reflexivity’ (Roseneil, 1993: 180). This commitment is about rejecting dichotomies
of the knower and the known, the researcher and the researched, and the subject and
the object. It is about rejecting the exploitation of research participants (Roseneil,
1993), acknowledging our biases (Wolf, 1992), and avoiding the objectification of an
‘other’ through resorting to dialogic methods (Sanger, 2003, Wolf, 1992). Dialogic
methods have been suggested by feminists because they give voice (Sanger, 2003); I
would also argue that methods of interaction give voice and great insight.
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Giving voice is one of the aims of this research, as it focuses on how people
give meaning to and make sense of ethnicity and nationalism. For that reason, using
an ethnographic approach throughout my encounters with the Circassians depended
on dialogic methods of interaction, rather than observing and interpreting
interaction. The terms ethnographic interaction and encounters are more
comprehensive than dialogic methods, because through ethnography ‘we begin the
ethnographic dialogue, the complex interactions and exchanges’ (Bruner, 1997: 272).
Dialogue is also a form of interaction. This is because not only dialogue, but also
interactions matter. Interaction might again pose the question of observing
behaviours of ‘others’; however, in my defence I would say that one can find a
balance between giving voice to people, as subjects of the research, and the
observation of interactions. Nonetheless, my own interactions and exchanges within
the state of Jordan are not based on dialogic methods of observation. In other words,
I use both dialogic and observational interaction methods in this research. The
dialogic methods of ethnography were used to give Circassians voice, and the non-
dialogic observational methods were used to represent my own interactions and
encounters with narratives imposed by the state of Jordan, through books of national
and civic education, in addition to the ‘Jordan First’ campaign.
‘Hence, conversations and interviews are often
indistinguishable from other forms of interaction and dialogue
in field research settings. In literate societies the ethnographer
may well draw on textual materials as sources of information
and insight into how actors and institutions represent
themselves and others’ (Atkinson et al., 2001: 5).
I recorded ethnographic data from the field in a research diary. This research diary
was written in word documents, following any event, conversation, or relevant
encounter in the field. The research diary, however, is not raw material, which only
documents data from the field (Coffey, 1999); it contains a form of analysis as one
tends to reflect on one’s own experiences in the field. The research diary in that sense
was a ‘thinking place for me to write and reflect through the resistances, challenges
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and problems that arose’ (Burke, 2002: 50). It included some form of preliminary
analysis of ethnographic encounters, and not only narratives of events. Therefore,
analysis had also taken place whilst in the field, and not only afterwards. But that
sort of preliminary analysis also left room for reinterpretation and reflections, when
reread and rewritten in a different context.
Wolf (1992) gives a very good example of how field notes and research diaries
can be read differently depending on the context. In her book A Thrice-Told Tale, she
draws attention to the fact that the writing of field stories depends to a great extent
on the writing context, and the audience. Delamont (2002) also uses the dichotomy
of home and away, home to refer to the academic community, and away to refer to
fieldwork. I have found that a very useful guide in terms of my reinterpretation of
field notes, especially as my stay in Jordan had been an intense and an emotional
one. The rereading allowed me to explore more how the field experience had been
very stressful. Delamont (2002) states,
‘In the fieldnotes one is angry, incompetent, racist, sexist, lazy,
purblind, bigoted, naïve, frustrated, rude, tired, bored, scared
and all the other things that cannot be allowed either to show
to the respondents or to appear in the final, polished accounts
of the work… Once the research is over, the notes are a
concrete symbol of the work done, and very precious. They are
an emblem not only of work done, but also of sacrifices made,
risks taken and hardships endured’ (Delamont, 2002: 66).
The analysis was a critical stage for the research, and the writing of the research. The
following section will discuss the data analysis techniques used in this research.
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3.7 Research Analysis
‘At the analysis stage, triangulation can also be done by
scrutinising the data. When a developing idea has emerged
from coding the fieldnotes, the researcher can turn to the files
of official documents and the transcripts of the formal
interviews and so on to see if there are other data that bear on
the same issue’ (Delamont, 2002: 181).
This thesis involved several analytical techniques, ranging from document analysis
to analysing interviews, questionnaires and field notes. In the following sections, I
explain the conduct of the analysis, and how it has been undertaken for each type of
data.
3.7.1 Document Analysis
In order to identify how the state of Jordan defines itself, as a state, and how
the nation is defined, I relied on documentary analysis of books of national and civic
education, the Jordan First document, and the websites of Jordan’s current and
earlier kings. In those documents, the focus was on how Jordan is portrayed, and
how the nation is defined. The documents are official public documents, issued by
the state. National and Civic Education is a compulsory module taught in schools
from the first to the twelfth grade. The textbooks of this module are taught all over
the kingdom, following the same curriculum, and passing the module is crucial for
students to be able to pass their high school exams. Accessing documents and books
was not problematic, as they are available to the public, and are in the first place
aimed at the people of Jordan. However, despite the fact that the nationalist
campaign ‘Jordan First’ is greatly promoted at street level in Jordan, on the
Jordanian national TV, in newspapers, and banners in the street, I found out that
there is only one official public document, explaining what the campaign is about.
For that reason, I relied on the websites of King Hussein and King Abdullah II to get
further information on the campaign. I chose these particular documents because
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they include discussions of nationalism, the nation and the future vision for Jordan. I
focused on them particularly because they represent an overt way of promoting
nationalism. They ‘supposedly’ explain what being a ‘Jordanian’ means. The
promotion of the campaign at street levels, on TV, in newspapers, and in banners in
the streets was part of my ‘unplanned ethnography’, as notes about them and my
feelings towards them were taken during the course of fieldwork, and reinterpreted
later at the analysis stage.
The analysis of these documents combined two methods of analysis, content
analysis and hermeneutics. Content analysis is largely considered a quantitative
method of analysis, through which qualitative text is quantified and analysed
systematically (Bryman, 2004, McNabb, 2004). The straightforward nature of the
texts analysed made content analysis very useful. The first stage of documents
analysis was based on finding predetermined categories broadly including the state
of Jordan, and the nation. I intentionally used broad predetermined categories in
order to limit the amount of data provided in the texts to those that were relevant for
the research. For example, in the textbooks on national and civic education there are
several units, which discuss technology and science, which were not relevant to the
research. Therefore, using broad predetermined analytic categories helped me to
minimise time and effort, and instead of analysing the whole books, the analysis
became more focused on issues related to the state and the nation. ‘Summarising
content analysis seeks to reduce the material in such a way that the essential contents
are preserved, but a manageable short text is produced’ (Marying, 2004: 268). The
resulting subtexts were entered into NVivo, software for organising qualitative data,
and another stage of analysis took place. The resulting texts from books of national
and civic education had to be translated into English, while the other documents
were available in English.
The second stage of document analysis combined both qualitative content
analysis and hermeneutic analysis. Qualitative content analysis ‘comprises a
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searching-out of underlying themes in the materials being analysed’ (Bryman, 2004:
392). The themes emerging from the qualitative stage of content analysis were also
coded in NVivo. The application of qualitative content analysis aided the research in
terms of gaining a greater insight than that provided though quantitative content
analysis. However, I must say that without the application of quantitative content
analysis, the analysis of the documents would have taken a really long time. Also, I
employed hermeneutic analysis simultaneously with the qualitative content
analysis, because of its focus on the meaning of the text through considering the
intent of the author. Hermeneutic analysis, as McNabb (2004) states,
‘requires the analyst to (1) decipher the meaning of the text
through the eyes and intent of the writer or creator of the text
or artefact, (2) according to the time frame existing at the time
of the writing, and (3) considering the political and cultural
environmental influences existing at the time of the creation of
the text or artefact’ (McNabb, 2004: 464).
The hermeneutic analysis accompanied the qualitative content analysis, as the
themes were crosschecked against their original sources, the year and historic
context in which they were produced, in addition to the language used in the written
text. This sort of ‘combined-methods analysis’ helped in contextualising and
situating the data, in addition to systematically analysing it. It is also advised to
combine content analysis with hermeneutic analysis to complement each other, and
to avoid de-contextualising and isolating data (McNabb, 2004). Document analysis
took place in the field, at the time of designing the questionnaire and the interview
schedule, in order to evaluate the successful delivery of the messages channelled
through these documents. For other data sets, such as those arising from
questionnaire survey and the interviews different types of analysis were employed.
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3.7.2 Analysis of the Interviews
‘Methods exist that can make the interview analysis more
amenable… they can be used to organise the interviews texts,
to condense the meanings into forms that can be presented in a
relatively short space, and to work out implicit meanings of
what was said’ (Kvale, 1996: 187).
Narrative analysis was used for the analysis of the interviews. Narrative
analysis does not necessarily mean the application of the narrative approach during
the data collection period, or in other words, only collecting narratives. One can
apply narrative analysis to text gathered in ‘a conventional way for conventional
purposes’ (Bryman, 2004: 413). The approach to narrative analysis employed in this
research focused on thematic and structural analysis. Thematic analysis focused on
the content and themes emerging from the transcribed interviews, and structural
analysis focused on the way stories were told. I did not use NVivo for the coding
and analysis of the interviews, because I felt that NVivo could lead to a
quantification of the data provided through the interviews and thus the narratives
would lose their meanings. For that reason, I used ‘old’ analysis techniques, coding
the transcripts by using coloured sticky notes, and on paper. I found that ‘old-
fashioned’ analysis easier to handle, particularly since I wanted to keep the
meanings of the interviews in context and in accordance with the way they were
said, thematic and structural. Moreover, emerging themes from the analysis were
later supported by the questionnaire results. And, the interview analysis also
provided some explanation for the questionnaire results at the same time. This is
where triangulation of analysis methods took place, and questionnaire data were
scrutinised by returning to the interviews and vice versa. In the following section, I
explain questionnaire analysis.
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3.7.3 Questionnaire Analysis
Luckily, from the 62 questionnaires I have there were no missing data, which
made the analysis of quantitative data easier, and simpler. I used a simple form of
bivariate analysis based on contingency tables, and univariate analysis based on
frequency tables and diagrams. SPSS was very helpful in producing the tables, and
the diagrams for the analysis. However, the quantitative analysis was checked
against and supported by the qualitative data. The overall sample of the
questionnaire constituted 62 participants, the preliminary stage of quantitative
analysis was based on univariate analysis, which consisted of frequency tables, and
diagrams. In order to explore the answers more fully, I then did a bivariate analysis,
exploring two variables at the same time. In other words, this type of analysis is
based on dividing the sample into subgroups, and exploring the frequency of the
answers for each subgroup, to examine if there is a relationship between the answer
and the variable chosen to create the subgroup. The following tables show the
differences between univariate (Table 3.11), and bivariate analysis (Table 3.12) of
quantitative data.
Table 3.11 Being Circassian Constitutes a Great Part of My Identity
Answer N Percent
Strongly Agree 40 64%
Agree 20 32%
Neither Agree or Disagree 1 2%
Disagree 0 0
Strongly Disagree 1 2%
Total 62 100
In the previous table the sample n=62, and the variable I am exploring here is only
the frequency of answers to the question to what extent do you agree or disagree
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with the statement being Circassian constitute a great part of my identity? This form
of quantitative data analysis is useful at the first stage of the analysis because it
examines ‘the distribution of cases of only one variable’ (Babbie and Benaquisto,
2009: 415).
Table 3.12 Contingency Table showing the relationship between gender and importance of being
Circassian
Answer Gender
Male Female
No. % No %
Strongly Agree 23 64% 17 65%
Agree 12 33% 8 31%
Neither Agree or
Disagree 1 3% 0 0
Disagree 0 0 0 0
Strongly Disagree 0 0 1 4%
Total 36 100 26 100
For a more complex form of analysis, bivariate analysis gives more insight
into the relationships between two variables. It means ‘searching for evidence that
the variation in one variable coincides with variation in another variable’ (Bryman,
2004: 230). However, I would argue that, on its own, this form of analysis might
show a relationship between variables, but an explanation for this relationship
cannot be provided from quantitative data alone. In that way, triangulation of
analysis methods has been an integral part of the analysis of the interviews and
questionnaires.
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Conclusion
Since this research is an exploration of the narratives of ethnicity used by
research participants in defining themselves as Circassians, narratives of nationalism
promoted by the state, and their (re)construction by research participants, the
concept of narrative is central to it, and the link between the concept of narrative and
feminism has been important to clarify. The concept of narrative recognises social
actors’ contribution to the (re)construction and (re)configuration of ethnicity,
nationalism and gender, and also provides room for the realisation that such
narratives can intersect to shape our social world, and depend on context, time and
space. Using the concept of narrative allows us ‘to transcend the fixity of the identity
concept as it is often used in current approaches to social agency’ (Somers, 1994:
621), and this is very useful in understanding gender.
Furthermore, because understanding the meanings people give to ethnicity
and nationalism is important for this research, interviews were used to do this by
giving voice to participants. The questionnaires were used to support the interviews,
and vice versa. Although the questionnaire provided me with access to larger age
ranges, it is still one of the limitations of this study that I only interviewed one
member of the older generations of the Circassian community. I also used
unplanned ethnographic data that were collected through the prolonged stay in the
field. This data provided more insight into and understanding of life in Jordan, and
the narratives the state of Jordan attempts to promote. This form of ethnography did
not in any way view Circassians as others, and they were not observed as such. On
the contrary, the use of dialogic ethnographic techniques helped to explore what
they said, rather than observing what they did. Participant observation, in this form
of ethnography, was employed in relation to the narratives Jordan promotes. Such
data were collected as unplanned events in fieldwork occurred, and were relevant to
the research process and to complement data from other sources.
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During the research process I also had to be reflexive, and part of that
reflexivity involved an attempt to provide an account of my position in the field, and
the difficulties I faced in Jordan. This reflexive part of the chapter is meant to
provide a better idea about the context of the research. As an ‘Arab’ Palestinian, I
was perceived in certain ways by government employees, and my standing in
Jordan was precarious. This form of reflexivity fits well within the feminist
paradigm, as I believe that acknowledging subjectivity may in some cases strengthen
the objectivity of the research (Harding, 1993). Moreover, these experiences are
themselves part of my construction of ‘reality’, and the reality of the field. Moreover,
in an attempt to overcome my own biases, I also employ the terms ‘Arab’, ‘native
Jordanian’ and ‘Circassian’ from the perspective of research participants and not my
own.
However, as sociologists we contribute to constructing and (re)constructing
knowledge and part of our subjectivity is often our interest in specific areas of
research. My approach to this research has been to start from the research
participants’ view points, understanding, (re)construction and (re)configuration of
ethnic narratives, and state nationalist narratives. This research was designed to give
voice to research participants, and to give them a chance to contribute to those
(re)constructions. The next chapter starts with reviewing the ethnic narratives of the
Circassian research participants from their own view point and understanding. It
provides an account of what interviewees believe make them Circassian. It shows
that those ethnic narratives are contextualised and are often highlighted in reference
to the ‘other’, which was most of the time the ‘Arab’. It also explores how those
narratives are often tailored to fit within the context of Jordan. It is an account of
research participants’ (re)construction of their own ethnic narratives.
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Chapter Four
Narratives of Ethnicity
Introduction
‘So fluid and shifting is the process of ethnic identity… that
attention should be directed to people’s own definitions of
ethnicity, in contrast to attempts by sociologists to fit people
into predefined ethnic groups’ (Marsh and Keating, 2006: 325).
As I argue that elements of ethnicity are based on the narratives that people
use to define their ethnic group, this chapter examines the ways in which research
participants conceptualise their ethnicities. It is an attempt to answer the questions
‘what are the ethnic narratives of the Circassians in Jordan?’ and ‘do those narratives
differ depending on age and gender?’ The concern of this chapter is not how we can
classify people into ethnic groups; rather it is how people define themselves in terms
of ethnic affiliation. In the second and the third chapters, I have established a critique
of primordial views of ethnicities, as fixed and non-changing, and as a means of
categorisation. This chapter builds on my argument by showing that people have
different conceptualisations of the ‘ethnic group’ and those conceptualisations
represent their categorisations of themselves and the ‘other’. As narratives are
contextualised and influenced by time and space, this chapter explores the extent to
which the ethnic narratives of the interviewees are influenced by the context of
Jordan. The narratives have been identified from the interview data, and some of the
questionnaire data will be used for elaboration. This chapter reviews narratives of
ethnicity, the narratives interviewees used in reference to their ethnic identity, what
constructs it, and the components of categorisations they use to identify themselves
as ‘different’. Sarup (1996) identified two components of narratives—a story and a
discourse. He states,
’Each narrative has two parts: a story (histoire) and a discourse
(discourse). The story is the content, or chain of events. The
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story is the ‘what’ in a narrative, the discourse is the ‘how’’
(Sarup, 1996: 17).
However, the use of narrative in this research will build on identifying ethnic
narratives, rather than discourses, within the stories. This is because I believe that
individuals make choices, while they draw from stories and myths of ethnic origin,
they at the same time choose the narratives they want to derive from these stories. It
is important to note that,
’A people’s conception of itself and its relationship to
coterritorial, contiguous, and geographically distant peoples
influences the interpretation and transmission of ethnic myths,
as well as the shape of society and its aspirations for the future’
(Wexler, 1996: 1).
Ethnic narratives depend to a great extent on drawing on past events, stories, or
histories which are also, as we have seen in chapter two, influenced by the context in
which people find themselves. The narratives of Circassians living in Jordan are
greatly influenced by their context, and that means that they have narratives that
might be different from non-diasporic Circassian communities in the Caucasus
region. Indeed it became clear during the interviews that the ethnic narratives
interviewees used were influenced by their living in Jordan. So although some have
argued that what brings the Circassian peoples together as an ethnic group is the
Nart Sagas (Gay, 2005), the narratives that emerged in interviews and questionnaires
include no mention of the Nart Sagas. The main narratives that emerged were highly
contextual, and at the same time were based on two types of narratives; narratives
that are viewed as changing, and narratives that are viewed as non-changing. This
chapter explores the narratives of respondents, who define themselves as
Circassians, in Jordan. Some of those narratives draw on views of ethnicity as
primordial, or non-changing, from the view of research participants, as explored in
section one. There are other narratives, however, that view ethnicity as changing, as
explained in section two.
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4.1 Drawing on Myths of Origin
’Different generations may use different combinations of
ancestral origin myths and may have different ways in which
victimization fits into the narratives of community life and
different ways of understanding their roles as diaspora’
(Satzewich, 2002: 220).
Despite the fact that myths of origin are often constructed, and based on
transmitted narratives, interviews revealed that people see them as ‘real’, and as a
constituent of their ethnicity. This view reflects a tendency to highlight the
importance of the ethnic narratives, through which a group defines itself, in spite of
the fact that narratives are changing. However, one must draw attention to the fact
that myths of origin may differ across time and space. Respondents defined
themselves as Circassians, originating from the Caucasus. The term Circassian is
largely used to refer to the Adyghe people, inhabitants of Circassia, including
Cherkes, Shapsugs and Kabardin. However, more accurately, the term has been used
to refer to all people from the North Caucasus, including Adyghe tribes originating
from Circassia. This group of people referred to as Circassians speak different
languages (Kumakhov et al., 1996). Some historians preferred to call them dialects,
’The Circassian dialects were all mutually intelligible,
especially those grouped under the heading Adyghe, which
came to be used by almost all Circassians as a common name
not only for their language but for themselves as a people and
for their country’ (Henze, 1996: 69).
Most Circassian groups in Jordan, nowadays, refer to themselves as Adyghes,
in spite of the fact that there are other Circassian groups in Jordan, such as the
Abazins13. ’Abkhaz groups, also called Abkhazin, who originate from the lands
13 Adyghes and Abazins have their own flags, (See figures (1.1) and (1.2).)
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neighbouring the Kabardian region in the North Caucasus, define themselves as
Circassian and are also defined by the Adygei-speaking population as such’ (Kaya,
2005: 131), although they do not speak the Adyghe language.
All groups which define themselves as Circassians do not share language but
they share Nart Sagas, which are a collection of stories on the origins of those tribes
(Colarusso, 2002). This collection of tales or narratives is said to constitute the main
narrative on the origin of all those tribes. Colarusso for example (2002) states,
’In peace, the peoples were organized into a number of tribes,
each with its own language or dialect. In war, they united and
behaved like a conventional state’ (Colarusso, 2002: 2).
The Nart Sagas are a series of tales and legends told in many narrative forms; ‘the
stories narrate the origins and adventures of the Narts, the people of the Caucasian
heroic age’ (Gay, 2005: 238). Many argue that the Nart Sagas are the most important
constituent of Circassian culture. Hewitt (1999) says that sharing the same
constituents of culture allows most North Caucasian groups to think of themselves
as one nation, particularly since it is argued that the different languages they speak
are derived from the same proto-language (Hewitt, 1999).
Nevertheless, I would argue that diasporic Circassians have different myths
of origin, which do not draw from the Nart Sagas tales, but rather draw their ethnic
narratives from the story of their Diaspora. They base their narratives in relation to
‘others’, who did not share the same diasporic history with them. The stories they
heard from their parents are not the stories of the Nart Sagas, their stories are
narratives of genocide and forced migration. And the ethnic narratives they draw
from are highly contextualised. For example, in reference to what makes up their
ethnicity, most of them either explained it in relation to the ‘other’ ‘Arab’, or in
reference to the stories they heard about their flight.
’The forced migrations and the genocide-- these events mean a
lot to me. Imagine a people, who were forced to leave their
lands, imagine people who were killed to preserve the
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bloodlines. For me they mean survival, freedom, and
insistence. The wars happened, and are over, and they
constitute part of the emotional side of my personality, the
story of where I come from’ (Qasim, 22, Male).
Whenever asked about origin, interviewees talked about the history of their diaspora
and flight, as what represents their origins, as shown in the quote hereinabove.
Norma (22, female) also stated,
’I know our ancestors went through a lot to leave, to save their
lives in order to arrive to Jordan, and that for me represents the
story of my origin, and where I come from’ (Norma, 22,
female).
This suggests that narratives of ethnicity are contextualised, and whereas
Circassians elsewhere might use the Nart Sagas tales to draw myths of their origins,
Circassians in Jordan might draw their myths of origin from the history of their
diaspora. Interviewees identified three main components of ethnicity, which they see
as ‘never’ changing, and those are drawn from their diasporic position. Interviewees
often claimed that their family names will ‘never’ change and they will always have
foreign names, in comparison to ‘Arab’ Jordanian family names. The fact that they
view family names as an important constituent of their ethnic groups, shows that the
distinctiveness of their family names in Jordan may represent an important ethnic
identity marker. The second component of ‘non-changing’ ethnic narratives is roots
and origin, which are based on the history of their diaspora. The idea of roots and
origin are also deeply rooted in ‘biology’. This is to say that Circassian respondents
see their distinctiveness in terms of bloodlines, genes and colour.
Asked whether ‘the preservation of ‘genes, and bloodlines’ is more of a moral
duty’, some seemed to agree, while others did not. Nonetheless, given that those
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narratives are viewed as non-changing, this showed that interviewees tended to
racialise the differences between them and the ‘other’, as ’racialisation refers to the
process of differentiating people and stabilising these differences, as well as
legitimating power relations based on these racialised differences’ (Keskinen et al.,
2009: 4). The following will provide explanations and an in-depth review of how
those ethnic group identity markers are, although racialised, contextualised, and are
based on transmitted narratives, passed on from one generation to another.
Although the stories interviewees presented were not identical, they all referred to
different variations of the history of their diaspora.
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4.1.1 Family Names
’Generally, what makes people Circassians is their family
names not more, and not appearances or racial attributes,
because there are high-levels of intermarriage now. However,
there exists a stereotype that all Circassians are white, and
blonde, and so on. But, generally, what makes someone
Circassian is the family name and those who know the family
name could tell whether someone is Circassian or not’ (Husam,
23, male).
Husam’s statement about family names is based on the fact that Circassians in
Jordan carry hereditary surnames, given through the fathers, and not the mothers,
that they see as having been passed down for thousands of years. Circassian family
names represent the clan from which the family originates. Each Circassian family
name in Jordan has a significant meaning in Adygei language. The pronunciation of
the names is totally different from Arabic language, and in Jordan they are written in
Arabic letter, but still the words do not originate from Arabic—making Circassian
family names significantly different from those who have Arabic family names.
Despite the fact that family names may change under various conditions,
interviewees referred to their family names as part of their ethnic identity, and as a
part that will never change. One interviewee put it,
’In our lives, myself, my children, and their children, we will
never feel that we are Arabs… because they would never carry
the family name of a native Jordanian family, they will never
be part of those—there is history, there are names and there are
family names’ (Thuraya, 38, female).
By native Jordanians, Thuraya explained that she meant the people descending from
the Bedouin tribes, which were nomadic on the land of Jordan before the
establishment of the state, and whose family names originate from Arabic language.
Ironically, the Circassians were also present prior to the establishment of the
Jordanian state, but they neither regard themselves, nor are regarded by others, as
native Jordanians. However, the importance of family names to interviewees is
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determined by the context of Jordan. There are several factors that influence this
ethnic narrative that are related to the interviewees’ views of themselves in
comparison to the ‘other’, or as the ‘other’. Therefore, drawing on the family name as
a marker of ethnicity is deeply rooted in the tribal nature of Jordanian society, which
emphasises the importance of the family name. In other words, it is important to
highlight that what distinguished Circassian family names in Jordan from other
family names, is the fact they are not ‘Arab’ names.
In Jordan, surnames are given by birth, and ‘the use of tribal names as family
names’ is not only common, but is often a way of categorisation (Alon, 2007: 157). In
Jordan, family names allow one to tell where a person is from, and may even help in
determining the neighbourhood from which an individual may originate. Instead of
asking ‘where do you come from?,’ people in the Middle East, particularly in Jordan
and the occupied Palestinian territories, commonly ask ‘what is your family name?’
When asked about a family name, an individual is directly placed within a certain
group, and may even be classified according to the socioeconomic status of that
group. For Circassians in Jordan, the concept of the family name is more significant
than it is for Circassians in Turkey, due to the tribal nature of Jordanian society and
the associated use of family names (Shami, 1998).
The tribal nature of Jordanian society makes the issue of family names a
significant marker of Circassian group identity. However, this does not only apply to
the society, as the state is not innocent of reinforcing such a concept either. For
example, Rana said:
’In the records of the department of Civil Affairs, they
document that I am Circassian, according to my family name,
but on the ID they only write ‘Jordanian.’ Nonetheless, I am
registered as Circassian in their records’ (Rana, 36, female).
For Sharabi (1988), this emphasis on the importance of family names and tribes by
states in the Middle East represents neopatriarchy, and he states,
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’Tribalism is a basic characteristic, without which it is
impossible to account for the specific nature of Arab
neopatriarchy… the essence of tribal practice is expressed in
the individual’s identification with the tribe’ (Sharabi, 1988: 28-
9).
Barakat (1993: 39) also argues that many ‘Arab’ nation-states ‘use tribalism to
advance their causes’ and that they derive their sovereignty from tribalism. Massad
(2001) argues that tribalism represents a great part of Jordan’s national identity, and
the monarchy denounces any attempt to criticise tribalism. Additionally, the
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is named after the Hashemite family, the so-called
descendents of the prophet, which makes the narrative of the family name even
more powerful amongst Circassians in Jordan.
It is very important to note here that family names are given by fathers in
Jordan, and the patrilineal kinship system means that ethnicity is transferred
through the father’s side of the family. One carries a father’s surname, the name of
the tribe the father belongs to, unless he/she were born to unknown fathers. So
Circassian women married to ‘Arab’ men cannot by law pass on their family names
or their ethnicity to their children. Hiba, born to a Circassian mother and a
Palestinian father said,
’I am not Circassian, even if it is nice to have a mother from
Circassian origin; she has a Circassian family name, but I do
not. This is how these things are, we follow our fathers. It is not
the mother who decides. I have an Arabic Palestinian family
name, and I cannot say that I am Circassian, even if I have
Circassian blood in my veins’ (Hiba, 28, female).
This does not only show that women do not have the right to transmit their names,
and thus part of their ethnic narratives to their children, but also that the state’s
reinforcement of tribalism forces and maintains the patrilineal tribal structure as part
of its nationalist narrative and ideology; this is discussed in chapter five.
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Moreover, the fact that all tribal family names in Jordan come from Arabic
language makes Circassian family names unique and different in the Jordanian
context. This makes the Circassians a distinct group, which does not share the
traditional form of family names in Jordan. However, this is also dependent upon
the context in which Circassians are placed. In other words, for interviewees family
names are inherited and exist but their significance depends on the context. Whereas
Jordan’s tribal system influences how such self-representations are received,
interviewees themselves find pride in their heritage through family names, and use
it as a way to identify with each other and to define themselves as Circassians. For
example, Asad says,
’Family names and their preservation are very important. We
live in tribal societies; your family name represents who you
are, and where you come from. Here in Jordan, we want to
keep our family names, because of their significance. We carry
Circassian family names and we are proud of them’ (Asad, 22,
male).
However, this form of group representation does not show the extent to
which members of that group have a sense of belonging towards it. For example,
some interviewees explained that their family names are different from ‘Arab’
names, and so ‘Arabs’ would tell that they are not ’Arabs’, regardless of how
Circassian they feel. One interviewee said
’For me, what makes me Circassian does not necessarily mean
that I am 100 per cent Circassian. But basically, my family
name shows that I am Circassian’ (Muna, 22, female).
She adds,
’I believe that belonging is measured depending on practices,
and so many may think that I am not very Circassian as others
might be. But, for me, I belong to the Circassian community
because of my family name’ (Muna, 22, female).
For interviewees, family names represent the ‘obvious’ difference between them and
‘Arabs’ during their interactions.
Holding different family names, in the case of Circassians, allows other
people to view them as ‘different,’ and highlights their position as ‘non-Arabs’. On
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the one hand, family names can override the disappearance of the ethnic identity of
the Circassian community in Jordan. On the other hand, between Circassians
themselves being Circassian means much more than holding a family name; it is the
set of cultural practices and the extent to which they value them, as part of what they
expressed to be ‘changing’ markers of their identity.
Although interviewees showed pride in their family names, they also
reported incidents they went through because of their family names. An example of
such incidents was when one of the interviewees was stopped by police for an ID
check, and while these ID checks should not take more than five minutes, he was
held for almost 15 minutes, because the policeman was trying to figure out where his
family name originates from, as it does not represent any Jordanian city or tribe. He
expressed his feelings by saying,
’This incident made me realise that I am different, I hold a
different family name and it made me want to tell people more
about the existence of Circassian people, their origins. I want
the world to become aware of our existence’ (Qasim, 22, Male).
Family names hold history, and this history makes Circassians in Jordan
different from ‘Arabs’, and any other. All interviewees stressed the importance and
significance of family names in terms of identifying them as a group, and as
individuals who are members of that group. Moreover, they also stressed this
concept’s impact on determining their roots and origins, as behind each family name
there is history. However, this history remains [his] story, as family names are
inherited through fathers, rather than mothers. Nonetheless, the role of mothers in
transmitting narratives of ethnicity is very important. Muna (22, Female) said that
she does not feel that she is very Circassian because her mother is Palestinian, and
they never had Circassian upbringing. When speaking about family names, most
interviewees said that they carry Circassian names they inherited from their fathers
or grandfathers, not mothers or grandmothers. One interviewee answered, when
asked what makes you a Circassian,
158
’What makes me a Circassian is my culture and traditions, my
behaviours, my name, my father’s name, my family name, my
culture and my history, all of those make me Circassian. I can
prove that I am a Circassian by the names I hold; my father’s
name is Nart, my grandfather’s name is Hasawa, my other
grandfather’s name is Qway, and my family name is Abida.
Those names cannot be anything but Circassian… you cannot
find Arab names like that’ (Tariq, 22, male).
The emphasis on family names by interviewees is understandable in the
context of the Middle East. The emphasis on the family name as part of the ethnic
narratives is related to the fact that Circassians have ‘non-Arab’ Circassian names
and that the concept of the family name and tracing roots through patrilineality is
important in Jordan. Family names seemed the major way research participants
distinguished themselves from others. They are, for them, the most ‘obvious’ way to
prove their roots and origins, which also appear to be viewed as a ‘non-changing’
part of their ethnic narratives. The following section examines the importance of
roots and origin for respondents.
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4.1.2 Roots and Origin
’I am proud that I originate from the Caucasus; that I am Circassian. I
am very proud. It is impossible for me to say that I am not Circassian
and give up my Circassian identity. This is impossible. Excuse me for
saying this, but those who have no roots do not deserve to live.
Origin, for me, is very important, and we should be proud of it and
even brag about it’ (Asad, 22, male).
Asad and many other interviewees emphasised the importance of their
Circassian roots and origin. As previously explained, family names help Circassians
identify their roots and origins. A few questions remain, such as ‘what makes
notions of origins and roots important?’, ‘what makes them significant and worth
preserving?’, and ‘what do those narratives of origin include?’ To answer these
questions this section relies on data from the interviews and the questionnaires.
When asked to state to what extent they agree or disagree that origin does not reflect
their identities, questionnaire respondents were more likely to disagree (69.4%). The
figures show that origin is important to Circassians, but less important for women
than men, as table (4.1) shows. This suggests that the issue of origin is an important
part of the identity of the group. Only 13 percent agreed, and the remaining 18
percent neither agreed nor disagreed (Table 4.1). Questionnaire data also showed
that origin seemed to be more important for men, as men were more likely than
women to disagree with the statement that their origin does not reflect their
identities. The gender gap in these answers reflects that men and women do not
share the same view when it comes to origin being part of their identities (Table 4.1).
Table (4.1) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement: ‘My origin does not reflect
my identity’
Answer
Men Women Total
Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages
Strongly Agree 1 2.8% 1 3.8% 2 3.2%
Agree 3 8.3% 3 11.5% 6 9.7%
Neither Agree or
Disagree 5 13.9% 6 23.1% 11
17.7%
Disagree 11 30.6% 9 34.6% 20 32.3%
Strongly Disagree 16 44.4% 7 27% 23 37.1%
Total 36 100% 26 100% 62 100%
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Interviews showed that women were more likely to emphasise the changing
narratives of their ethnicity, rather than what is seen as non-changing. For example,
Norma (22, female), Nuha (22, female) and Thuraya (38, female) emphasised the fact
that although they may not transfer their family names to their children they will be
transmitting culture and traditions. On the other hand, Muna (22, female), whose
mother is not Circassian, emphasised the importance of family name, because she
felt herself to be Circassian even though she did not practise culture and tradition,
particularly since she said that she did not have Circassian upbringing at home. But
she also emphasised the importance of the transmission of culture, although her
mother did not do this, because her mother is Palestinian. In chapter five, I explain
how women are not seen as transmitters of family names and origin, and how their
role in transmitting the ethnic narratives is mainly dependent on transmitting
culture through upbringing.
Table (4.2) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement: ‘my origin does not reflect
my identity’ By Age Groups
Percentages of
Answers by Age
Range
19-24 25-30 31-40 41-50 Above 51
Perce
ntage
s
Nu
mbe
rs
Perce
ntage
s
Nu
mbe
rs
Perce
ntage
s
Nu
mbe
rs
Perce
ntage
s
Nu
mbe
rs
Perce
ntage
s
Nu
mbe
rs
Strongly Agree 7%
1
5%
1
0%
0
0%
0
0%
0
Agree 7%
1
5%
1
0%
0
30%
3
17%
1
Neither Agree or
Disagree 0%
0
40%
8
27%
3
0%
0
0%
0
Disagree 33%
5
20%
4
37%
4
50%
5
33%
2
Strongly Disagree 53%
8
30%
6
36%
4
20%
2
50%
3
Total 100% 15 100% 20 100% 11 100% 10 100% 6
Further, answers to the question to what extent they agree or disagree that origin
does not reflect their identities, there were also generational differences, as the age
range between 25-30 were the least likely to disagree (Table 4.2). However, the
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gender gap remains more significant, as fewer women than men believed that their
origin reflects their identities.
All questionnaire respondents and interviewees identified themselves as
having Circassian origins, originating from the North Caucasus. In the ‘Arab’
Jordanian context, some identified themselves as simultaneously from Jordanian,
Muslim or ‘Arab’ origins. When asked if they consider themselves of ‘Arab’ origins
only 17.7 percent of respondents agreed, and the majority of them were women.
Table (4.3) Do you consider yourself of an Arab Origin by Gender
Answer
Men Women Total
Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages
Yes 4 11.2% 7 26.9% 11 17.7%
No 32 88.8% 19 73.1% 51 82.3%
Total 36 100% 26 100% 62 100%
This group of respondents justified their answers by saying that ‘Arabic language is
universal, and being an ‘Arab’ is about speaking the language. For example, it had
been said ‘I have been speaking Arabic, the language of the Quran, since I was
young, and I was born in an Arab country,’ ’We would be proud to belong to the
language of the Quran’, and ’I speak Arabic language, and I live in an Arab country’.
Another interviewee said ‘I consider myself of a Jordanian origin, and of an Arab
origin, because ‘he who speaks Arabic is an Arab’ (Rana, 36, female). This shows that
this group of respondents chose to conceptualise the concept of ‘Arabism’ as non-
primordial, and to view it as something acquired through speaking the language.
Historically, this has been a criticism of the ‘Pan-Arabist’ nationalist ideology, it has
been said,
’A first difficulty of the Arab Movement was to say who the
Arabs were. Being a manufactured people, their name had
been changing in sense slowly year by year. Once it meant an
Arabian. There was a country called Arabia; but this was
nothing to the point. There was a language called Arabic and in
it lay the test’ (Lawrence, 1935: 14).
162
This could also show that the tendency to view the concept of an ‘Arab’ as non-
primordial and related to language is due to the fact that Jordan defines itself as an
‘Arab’ country, and a big number of questionnaire respondents consider themselves
Jordanian by origin, because historically the Circassians were on the land of Jordan
before its establishment as a nation-state. Of the total questionnaire respondents, 62.9
percent say that they are of Jordanian origin, while 37.1 percent do not believe so.
The answers between men and women varied remarkably, as 66.7percent of the men
and only 57.7 percent of the women believe that they are from Jordanian origins
(Table 4.4). In that sense, men have stronger feelings towards originating from
Jordan.
Table (4.4) Do you consider yourself of a Jordanian Origin by Gender
Answer
Men Women Total
Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages
Yes 24 66.7% 15 57.7% 39 62.9%
No 12 33.3% 11 42.3% 23 37.1%
Total 36 100% 26 100% 62 100%
Those who believe that they are of Jordanian origins elaborated on their
answers. Examples of such answers would be ‘I lived on Jordanian lands, and so did
my father and grandfather,’ ‘I do not have any homeland other than Jordan,’ ‘I was
born in Jordan, and I do not know my original country- Circassia,’ ‘I was born in
Jordan, and all I have on this earth is in Jordan,’ ‘The presence of Circassians in
Jordan for more than 163 years confirms that their belonging is Jordanian,’ and ‘I live
in Jordan, and I speak Arabic’. During interviews, respondents attempted to show
that they can be considered of Jordanian origins because they have been there for
long, and because they do not see being of Jordanian origin as contradictory to their
Caucasian roots. Although most of them believe that they are not of ‘Arab’ origins,
they choose to ignore that Jordan’s supranational identity is ‘Pan-Arabism’. A 77
year old interviewee chose to answer in poetry;
’We Circassians are the foundations of this country;
It is well-known where we came from.
Our ancestors migrated from their homeland,
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But with the power of faith we formed it [referring to Jordan].
What do you understand from this? We are the founders of
Jordan. We are generally, the oldest people who inhabited
Jordan. A nearby neighbour is better than a far away brother. I
am Jordanian, of a Jordanian origin; I belong to Jordan and not
to any other place’ (Khairi, 77, Male).
The same interviewee said ‘I am of foreign Muslim origins, which are not
Arab’. Amongst the 62.9 percent of respondents who believe that they are of
Jordanian origins, 74.4 percent do not consider themselves of Arabic origins, while
25.6 percent do (Table 4.5). Elaborating on their answers, the majority of the
questionnaire respondents, who answered that they consider themselves to be of
Jordanian origins, answered that they do not consider themselves to be of an ‘Arab’
origin, and elaborated by saying ’No, because my ethnicity says otherwise,’ ’My
blood is Circassian,’ ’No, because my grandfather came to Jordan, and he does not
belong to the Arabs in the first place,’ ’The way I look, my language, and traditions
make me not an Arab,’ ’I am simply not of an Arabic origin, why would I consider
myself an Arab, while I belong to different ethnic origins. I am a Circassian-
Jordanian, not an Arab-Jordanian,’ ’My origin is Circassian from the Caucasus in
Russia,’ and ’I am Jordanian, but not an Arab’.
Table (4.5) Do you consider yourself of Jordanian origin/ Do you consider yourself of An ‘Arab’
Origin n= 62
62.9% of n Yes I consider myself of a Jordanian Origin
Do You Consider yourself of an ‘Arab’
Origin? N1= 39 Numbers Percentages of N1
Yes 10 25.6%
No 29 74.4%
Total 39 100%
37.1% of n No I do not consider myself of a Jordanian Origin
Do You Consider yourself of an ‘Arab’
Origin? N2= 23 Numbers Percentages of N2
Yes 0 0%
No 23 100%
Total 23 100%
The discourse of roots, history, and origins appeared several times during the
interviews, and particularly in the part of the questionnaire that required elaboration
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from respondents. The desire to show that they are Jordanians by origin occurred in
the interviews, and all interviewees emphasised that their forefathers contributed to
the establishment of Jordan. Four interviewees mentioned that in Amman, the
capital of Jordan, before the ‘Arab’ revolt people used to speak Circassian, and that
many of the streets in Amman have Circassian names.
Conversely, being Jordanian does not undermine their history, on the
contrary they see it as a positive product helping them to live in peace in Jordan.
One interviewee puts it;
’I consider myself 100 percent Jordanian firstly because of
citizenship rights and duties, and because of the period of time
I lived here… but as for my original root I consider myself
Caucasian, because those who turn their back on their history,
the future will turn its back on them… As a Circassian, my
history has an influence on my personality, but at the same
time, I live in Jordan and this has its influence on me… I try to
merge our Caucasian history and roots with what is required to
be able to live here’ (Adel, 22, male).
Interviewees who did not believe that they are of Jordanian origin, on the other
hand, were those who linked Jordan to the concept of ‘Pan-Arabism’. They believe
that because Jordan is an ‘Arab’ country, they cannot be of Jordanian origin, and
they tended to agree with the concept of ‘Arabism’ based on primordial notions of
ethnicity, upon which the Jordanian nationalist ideology was based.
In answer to the question ‘what makes you a Circassian?’, many interviewees
talked about their roots, and how they originally come from the North Caucasus. For
example, one interviewee said ‘in principle, my roots; my father and mother, make
me Circassian… I can never be part of the well-known original Jordanian families,
but I am Jordanian, although my family name is not’ (Husam, 23, male).
Questionnaire respondents said ‘Circassians are not Arabs, and they are one of the
greatest nations with great glories in the world, they are a white Caucasian race’.
Emphasising that Circassians are not ‘Arabs’, one interviewee said ‘I consider myself
Jordanian, but I would have a problem if people classified me as an ‘Arab’. For me,
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when someone asks me I say that I do not have Arabic roots, I have a Jordanian
nationality’ (Nuha, 22, female). Six interviewees expressed that they feel confused,
and this confusion in terms of their definition to being both a Circassian and a non-
’Arab’ Jordanian, as Jordan is an ‘Arab’ state, as many of them explained. This
confusion is explored fully in chapter seven, a Harmony of Contradictions.
One interviewee stated ‘when I think about being of Jordanian origin the
answer would seem invalid’ (Qasim, 22, male), this is because of the common view
that Jordan is an ‘Arab’ country, as he, Norma (22, female), Nuha (22, female), and
Husam (23, male) explained. However, research participants seemed more
comfortable to consider themselves of Muslim origin, rather than Jordanian or
‘Arab’. Around 74 percent of respondents consider themselves of Muslim origins
(Table 4.6). The rest who do not consider themselves of Muslim origins said that this
was because they believe that prior to Islam they had their own religions, stating
‘Islam spread among Circassians in the late seventeenth century, and the religion at
that time was Christianity, but I am a Muslim and my forefathers were Muslims as
well’. However, of those who do not believe that they come from Muslim origins,
only 11 percent believe that they are of Jordanian origin, while the rest believe that
they are neither from ‘Arab’ nor Jordanian origins. It is important to clarify here that
the use of the word ‘origin’ to refer to religious affiliation is due to the fact that they
derive this particular ethnic narrative from the story of their diaspora. Because,
historically, Circassians were forced to migrate and to leave the Caucasus for
religious reasons, religion constitutes a great part of their ethnic identification.
Table (4.6) Do you consider yourself of a Muslim Origin by Gender
Answer
Men Women Total
Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages
Yes 27 75% 19 73.1% 46 74.2%
No 9 25% 7 26.9% 16 25.8%
Total 36 100% 26 100% 62 100%
All interviewees thought that it is more comfortable in a Jordanian context to
think about them coming from Muslim origins. This was explained by saying that
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Islam is the religion of their fathers and grandfathers, which makes them Muslims
by origin. Others elaborated on this by saying that ’Islam does not differentiate
between races’. Other interviewees, on the other hand, turned to their history,
explaining that the fact that adopting Islam was the main reason behind the flight of
Circassians from their homeland obliges them to belong to Islam more than anything
else. One questionnaire respondent said that if he does not say that he is of Muslim
origin, then this means that his ’forefathers’ sacrifice would be gone in the wind’.
Responding to the statement ‘being Muslim constitutes a great part of my identity’,
72.6 percent of respondents agreed to the statement, with no gender or age
differences. On the other hand, 69.5 percent of respondents agreed to the statement
‘being Jordanian constitutes a great part of my identity,’ and there were no gender or
age differences on this question either. While the numbers seem close, it is important
to note that respondents were more likely to strongly agree to the first statement, as
48.4 percent strongly agreed to the first statement ‘being Muslim constitutes a great
part of my identity,’ compared to 32.3 percent strongly agreeing on that being
Jordanian constitutes a great part of their identities (Tables 4.7 & 4.8).
Table (4.7) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement: ‘Being Muslim constitutes
a great part of my identity’
Answer
Men Women Total
Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages
Strongly Agree 17 47.2% 13 50% 30 48.4
Agree 8 22.3% 7 27% 15 24.2%
Neither Agree
or Disagree 3 8.3% 2 7.7% 5 8.1%
Disagree 4 11.1% 3 11.5% 7 11.2%
Strongly
Disagree 4 11.1% 1 3.8% 5 8.1%
Total 36 100% 26 100% 62 100%
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Table (4.8) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement: ‘Being Jordanian
constitutes a great part of my identity’
Answer
Men Women Total
Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages
Strongly Agree 11 30.6% 9 34.6% 20 32.3%
Agree 14 38.9% 9 34.6% 23 37.2%
Neither Agree
or Disagree 8
22.1%
7
27%
15
24.2%
Disagree 2 5.6% 0 0% 2 3.2%
Strongly
Disagree 1
2.8%
1
3.8%
2
3.2%
Total 36 100% 26 100% 62 100%
On the issue of identifying themselves as Muslims, nine interviewees
mentioned that Islam does not differentiate between the races, and therefore
identifying themselves as Muslims seems more ‘comprehensive’. For example,
Qasim (22, Male) said ’I consider myself of Muslim origin, rather than ‘Arab’ or
Jordanian origins, because, generally, the concept of origin in Islam does not take
into account ethnic or racial origins. Islam says that no racial or ethnic group is
superior in relation to others, and we are all the same’. The 77 year old man
explained Circassians’ relation with Islam saying,
’Since we embraced Islam, we believed in God, and this is a
faith that runs in our blood. Faith has been running in our
blood since our ancestors embraced Islam… most of the
foreigners, who embraced Islam; understand Islam more than
Arabs themselves… Our Islamic religion does not differentiate
between a black and a white person, but nowadays they try to
discriminate. The prophet (peace be upon him) says: those who
adopt my good steps are to be rewarded, and those who follow
my good steps are to be rewarded. When Circassians came to
this country, they brought with them good Islamic sunnah,
following the prophet’s good steps. When someone dies, the
Imam used to walk up 99 steps until he reaches the ‘top of the
mosque,’ to remind people of God, and inform people about
the death. Each one who heard the reminder used to stop until
he [the Imam] finished his speech. Then, the people used to
start asking who died, and they were to be informed by the
Imam, after the speech. They stopped doing that, they stopped
to it everywhere in Amman, Na’ur, Sweileh… they stopped
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that everywhere. Arabs never did that… Circassians brought
this with them to this country’ (Khairi, 77, Male).
On the other hand, other interviewees did not see themselves as practising
Muslims; however, they still believed that Islam constitutes a great part of their
history and the history of their ancestors. The emphasis on the attachment to Islam
appears to be separated from practising the religion as a tradition; it rather shows
that Islam is part of a non-changing history that is deeply rooted in the story of their
diaspora. Norma stated,
’I am much attached to Islam, because a religious unity is
sublime; it is flawless. But at the same time, I do not practise it
like other people do. This may be because I look at religion
differently. So, I consider myself of Muslim origin, and that
will never change. It will always be part of my history’ (Norma,
22, female).
And Tariq said:
’I consider myself of Muslim origin for sure, because we had a
cause. The Circassians were forced out of their lands because
they were Muslims. And I am not only following the religion of
my ancestors, but religion is deeply rooted in our history. I
cannot waste this history just like that’ (Tariq, 22, Male).
All Circassian interviewees and respondents believe that their roots come
from the Caucasus, but at the same time, they see themselves as one of the original
people of Jordan. Some of them, although few, consider themselves ‘Arabs’ because
of the importance of Arabic language, as it embodies the idea of citizenship and
belonging, and because it is much more inclusive than ideas of roots and origins.
However, a majority believe that they have Muslim origins, and that Islam is deeply
rooted in diasporic history. Ethnic narratives, all derived from the history of their
diaspora, also include the ‘biological’ ideas about their origins. Respondents referred
to differences between them and the ‘Arabs’, in terms of ‘blood, genes, and colour’,
and those are also related to the history of their diaspora in Jordan.
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4.1.3 Race: Colour, Blood and Genes
’Five to six men died in a battle to defend a woman, or a child,
who would keep the Circassian bloodlines through his
descendents. I would want to transfer these bloodlines in order
to preserve our identity first and foremost. I want my children
in the future to know that there are people who died for them
to be here, as a part of a dream Circassians wanted to achieve
at that time’(Qasim, 22, Male).
In spite of the fact that the same interviewee said that he prefers to call
himself a Muslim, rather than anything else, because Islam does not differentiate
between the ‘races’ as many respondents and interviewees stated, he, and many
others, want to preserve their Circassian bloodlines. For many Circassians,
preserving bloodlines means a lot because they see that their ancestors’ sacrifice,
leaving their homelands, was in order to keep their bloodlines. Another interviewee
talking about her feelings towards historical Circassia said that she sees it as ‘a place
that represents my blood, as the blood that runs in my veins’ (Thuraya, 38, Female).
Moreover, preserving bloodlines, for research participants, seems very important to
preserve the identity of the whole group. I have noticed a tendency towards
emphasising their ethnic belonging through reference to their blood, and genes.
Therefore, nine interviewees out of 13 expressed their desire to guarantee their
group survival, and would prefer to preserve their bloodlines, and genetic traits, to
be able to place them in the future under a certain category of people—‘the white
race.’ One questionnaire respondent said ’My origin and where I come from is the
Caucasus, and the white race.’ Those who mentioned blood, race, and genes as part
of the ethnic narratives that distinguish them as a group, explained that their
ancestors went through forced migration and fought the Russians to preserve their
bloodlines. They saw it as a moral duty towards their ancestry to keep the
bloodlines.
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Moreover, what makes the issue of blood and race more apparent in
Circassian identities is the fair skin most of them have, as they explained. This places
some Circassians in a difficult position when they are told that they do not look like
‘Arabs’, or when they are asked if they were Circassians because of the way they
look. Some Circassian interviewees emphasised on the issue of colour as being a
marker of group identity, while others believe that it is mainly a stereotype. For
example, one interviewee said,
’I would say that my origins are from North Caucasia, which is
part of the former Soviet Union. I would say that this is why…
I look more of a European than an Arab. I do not say that
unless I was told that I do not look like an Arab, and people ask
such questions’ (Thuraya, 38, Female).
Thuraya believes that she looks more European than ‘Arab’, and for her that
distinguishes her from ‘Arabs’. She further explained that she believed that she is
more ‘white’ than the ‘Arabs’, because of her origin. On the other hand, one
interviewee, who described himself as a ‘dark’ Circassian, said the idea ’that all
Circassians have white skin is merely a stereotype’ (Asad, 22, Male).
It must be noted that ‘whiteness’, ‘genes’, and ‘bloodlines’ are generally
recurring themes in sociological debates on racism. Many interviewees seemed to
realise that, and, as a way of defending themselves from being accused as racist,
some stated that they might mention cultural differences as a reason to refuse to
marry a non-Circassian. One interviewee stated,
’I prefer to preserve my bloodlines… I am not racist; I might be
racist when it comes to choosing my partner… But let’s face it
what makes me a Circassian is blood and genetics’ (Nuha, 22,
Female).
Although notions of blood, genes, and colour appeared several times in the
interviews, one interviewee of mixed parentage and who had a non-Circassian
mother chose to say that her family name made her Circassian. For example, an
interviewee whose mother is Palestinian said
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’Although, I also have Palestinian blood in my veins, my
mother is Palestinian; I still feel that I am primarily seen
Circassian… But, my family name mainly reflects that I am
Circassian’ (Muna, 22, Female).
Another interviewee, whose mother is Circassian and father is Palestinian, expressed
that she does not feel that she is Circassian in any way; she said ‘I may have
Circassian blood in my veins but I am Palestinian’ (Hiba, 28, female). This also
shows that women’s role in the transmission of ethnic identity is obscured, and
reflects that the narrative about how ethnicity is transmitted through fathers gives
no role to women. And, in spite of women’s roles as reproducers, the narrative of
origin obscures mothers’ transmission of ethnic identity, particularly in terms of
transmitting the narratives that are seen as non-changing, which include family
names, roots and origin.
On the other hand, others believe that it is important to preserve one’s race,
just for their desire to preserve their roots. During interviews, this was justified by
telling stories about the massacres and the genocide their forefathers went through
to arrive to Jordan, and their respect to the sacrifice of their forefathers who migrated
to preserve the ‘race.’ Tariq said,
’It is good to be exposed to other people and cultures, but at the
same time one has to preserve their race and culture.
Circassians believe that if they avoided intermarriage they
would be able to preserve themselves… because they want to
preserve their roots. By avoiding intermarriage, Circassians
also avoid cultural clashes. This is because we have very strict
traditions, which determine all of those things’ (Tariq, 22,
male).
Tariq and his family, as he explained, are totally against intermarriage. However, by
generalising that all Circassians avoid intermarriage, he is merely trying to defend
his position. Some interviewees were of mixed parentages and as previously shown
the narrative of origin and blood excludes mothers, and children of mixed
parentages are expected to consider themselves part of their fathers’ ethnic group.
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Some interviewees also expressed that they believe that their race keeps them away
from being ’Arabs’, as one had said,
’we are foreigners, even if we remained for 500 years, we will
remain pure Circassians, because we belong to a different
race—the white race… if you perform DNA testing after one
million years you will find that I am from there’ (Asad, 22,
male).
Although Tariq and Asad believe that they belong to a group of people that is
distinct from others because of blood, genes, and race, it is still important to
highlight that their views are constructed. In other words, this emphasis on race,
colour, blood and genes is always in comparison to the ‘other’. Therefore, it is
important to note that what is considered as ‘non-changing’ elements of ethnicity, as
research participants explained, in fact find their significance only in reference to the
‘other’. Furthermore, the above excerpt from Asad’s interview contradicts another
excerpt from the same interview. At one point he says that he considers himself to be
a ‘dark’ Circassian, and that the idea of Circassians being white is a stereotype, at
another point when he is asked what makes him Circassian he says that he belongs
to the ‘white race’ and genetic testing would prove that after millions of years.
Moreover, eight interviewees14 believe that some attitudes and behaviours are
carried through blood, believing that Circassians carry certain characteristics relating
to their attitudes through genes. For example, ’the nature of Circassian blood makes
them violent and warriors—the whole nation was warriors,’ ’The Circassians are
loyal by nature… It is impossible that a Circassian would betray,’ because of their
blood and roots. Although, in fact, those are acquired traits, some still believe that
they are given by virtue of birth, which makes them ‘non-changing’ for interviewees.
This reflects a tendency to racialise ethnic narratives, for participants to be able to
distinguish themselves as superiors in relation to others, and to stabilise those
differences.
14 Aya (22, female), Muna (22, female), Tariq (22, male), Thuraya (38, female), Qasim (22, male), Asad
(22, male), Norma (22, female), Husam (23, male).
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It is also important to note that interviewees shed light on a set of ethics they
carry through Circassian upbringing, and that their culture is also part of the ethnic
identity of the group. For example, many of them believe that Circassian culture
imposes certain rules such as respecting the elderly through which many non-
Circassians can tell that they are Circassians. This is also in reference to the ‘other’
and in the context of Jordan. Therefore, the significance of narratives of ethnicity, the
stories and the narratives developed from those stories, depend to a great extent on
the context. By drawing on social constructs and viewing them as ‘non-changing’
and ‘fixed’, research participants emphasise their ethnic narratives. Family names,
origin and blood, were viewed as the most important narratives of their ethnicities,
and as non-changing markers of the identity of their group, because they are, for
them, based on permanent differences. They also emphasised other aspects of their
ethnicity, which they saw as changing, such as culture, language, upbringing and
heritage. Despite the fact that language, for example, is real and actual, research
participants viewed it as changing, and the fact that they do not speak Circassian
any more does not mean that they are not Circassian, because they carry Circassian
family names, Circassian blood, and they have Circassian origins, as Jordanians and
Muslims. Moreover, the ‘non-changing’ narratives of ethnicity make women
unimportant and incidental in the transmission of ethnicity; women do not give their
children their names in Jordan, as tracing descent is through patrilineality. It is
always the story of the father and the grandfather, and this was emphasised by both
men and women interviewees. However, as for the ‘changing’ narratives of
ethnicity the role of women is excluded from some and emphasised in others. The
following section examines the ‘changing’ ethnic narratives research participants
used to explain their ethnicity, and will also show how women are included in some
of the narratives and excluded from others.
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4.2 Changing Ethnic Narratives
’I can say that I am Circassian either on the basis of my roots, or
on the basis of preserving my culture and traditions. I can call
anyone who follows Circassian culture a Circassian, because
there are many groups, which are not Circassian by origin, but
are called Circassian because of their shared culture and
traditions, and because they lived with the Circassians in
Caucasia’ (Adel, 22, Male).
Adel distinguished between two types of ethnic narratives, one that is based
on roots, and one that is based on culture and tradition. His explanation of what
being a Circassian means sheds light on the fact that the narrative of roots and origin
can be seen more of a marker of group identity, as Circassian culture and traditions
can be followed by non-Circassians. Whereas blood, genes, roots, and family names
were viewed as non-changing elements of ethnicity for research participants, other
narratives of ethnicity were viewed as changing, and that can be followed by non-
Circassians as well. For that reason, the emphasis on the non-changing aspects as
markers of group identity has been greater in reference to the other. Culture,
upbringing, and language are also narratives of ethnicity. In spite of the emphasis on
the importance of those aspects for research participants, they expressed that the
Circassians are losing those ethnic identity markers, because they are not as ‘fixed’ as
the other ‘non-changing’ ethnic narratives.
For example, individual group members may choose not to transfer their
culture and traditions to their children, and the same applies to language as well as
upbringing. Family names, origins and blood, however, are viewed as ascribed
involuntarily. As we have already seen, in the context of the Middle East,
particularly Jordan, where family names, blood and origins are given particular
importance for categorisation, through family names one can determine another’s
origin, and this can serve as a way of group identity marker. On the other hand,
even if raised on adhering to cultural values, or encouraged to learn the language,
some group-members may choose to go against their upbringing. Such Circassian
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group identity markers do not suffice to define an individual as a member of a group
in the context of Jordan. Non-Circassians themselves may also notice such
differences in attitudes and behaviours, but those do not suffice to classify one as
Circassian in a tribal society. For example, an Arabic idiom, said about someone
strictly straightforward, is ‘he has a mind of a Circassian.’ However, not everyone
agrees that those who act like Circassians are Circassians, if they do not carry a
Circassian family name. For example, Norma said,
’I know many people who have Circassian mothers and Arab
fathers, and although they are Arabs by origin and family
names, they have more Circassian upbringing than those who
are from Circassian fathers, and Arab mothers. Still, Circassians
are those who have Circassian family names’ (Norma, 22,
female).
Preserving culture, traditions, heritage, and even language, are used as
indicators determining how good of a Circassian a group member is. They are intra-
group signifiers of who is a ‘real Circassian,’ and who is not. On the other hand,
some interviewees believed that those same signifiers might hinder the acceptance of
Circassians by non-Circassians, and might also influence intergroup relations. For
example, Circassian interviewees stressed the importance of being punctual when
having a scheduled meeting; this was seen as part of Circassian culture in contrast to
‘Arab’ culture. Others, on the other hand, made it clear that the way they deal with
Circassians is different from the way they deal with ‘Arabs’. For example, one
interviewee mentioned that he cannot be himself with non-Circassians, because that
would cause fear and apprehension, and said;
’I believe that when I deal with people according to my
[Circassian] ethics, I feel that people fear this sort of behaviour.
Because people think that I have some conspiracy. I rarely deal
with a non-Circassian informally. Because I am an alien to non-
Circassians, I am a stranger… they do not know who
Circassians are’ (Qasim, 22, Male).
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In his construction of his ‘ethics’ and ‘culture,’ Qasim is also constructing the ‘other,’
and although he sees culture and traditions as important, he also believes that they
can be a cause of difference and disagreement, despite the emphasis on the
importance of preserving them, as part of maintaining his Circassian origins.
Around 89 percent of questionnaire respondents agreed with the statement ‘it is
important for me to preserve my Circassian culture’, while eight percent neither
agreed nor disagreed, and three percent disagreed (Tables 4.9 & 4.10). However,
answers to this question show gender differences. Men seemed more likely to agree
that it is important for them to preserve their Circassian culture, yet all interviewees
and questionnaire respondents emphasised the importance of their culture and
traditions. Questionnaire data on the same question showed that there are almost no
generational differences.
The importance of culture, as an element of ethnic narratives, seems
significant, however at the same time, interviewees emphasised the changing nature
of culture, traditions, and language and the loss of those narratives, especially in the
context of Jordan. The next section explores aspects of ethnicity that interviewees see
as changing and sometimes disappearing, and it also shows how those narratives of
ethnicity include women, because of their role in upbringing.
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Table (4.9) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement: ‘It is important for me to
preserve my Circassian culture’ By Age
Percentages of
Answers by Age
Range
19-24 25-30 31-40 41-50 Above 51
Perce
ntage
s
Nu
mbe
rs
Perce
ntage
s
Nu
mbe
rs
Perce
ntage
s
Nu
mbe
rs
Perce
ntage
s
Nu
mbe
rs
Perce
ntage
s
Nu
mbe
rs
Strongly Agree
66% 10 75% 15 64% 7 30% 3 67% 4
Agree
27% 4 10% 2 27% 3 50% 5 33% 2
Neither Agree or
Disagree
0% 0 15% 3 9% 1 10% 1 0% 0
Disagree
7% 1 0% 0 0% 0 10% 1 0% 0
Strongly Disagree
0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0 0% 0
Total 100% 15 100% 20 100% 11 100% 10 100% 6
Table (4.10) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement : ‘It is important for me to
preserve my Circassian culture’
Answer
Men Women Total
Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages
Strongly Agree 26 72.2% 13 50% 39 62.9%
Agree 7 19.4% 9 34.7% 16 25.8%
Neither Agree
or Disagree 2 5.6% 3 11.5% 5 8.1%
Disagree 1 2.8% 1 3.8% 2 3.2%
Strongly
Disagree 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
Total 36 100% 26 100% 62 100%
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4.2.1 Importance of Culture
’We are a nation at a certain point of time that tried to attain a
level of perfection. So, I believe that it came from there. We
always try to be perfect, and we try to do things perfectly. And
we worry a lot about wrongdoing. We always try to do things
better than anyone else. For example, I, myself, always try to
do things in a very unique and distinguished way, even if it is
homework. Even if there is only one way to do homework, I try
to be distinguished with making it neat, or print in a nice way.
I try to make myself distinguished, as part of my Circassian
culture’ (Qasim, 22, Male).
Circassian culture in the above quotation is used as a way to emphasise the
distinction and uniqueness of Circassians as the ethnic group Qasim belongs to. As
previously mentioned around 89 percent of questionnaire respondents agreed that it
is important for them to preserve their Circassian culture. Moreover, some explained
that preserving culture is a moral duty they have to fulfil. For example, Tariq said,
’I consider history a responsibility, and we have to preserve
this history, and culture, and deliver them to coming
generations… I feel that it is my duty. It is a duty I like’ (Tariq,
22, Male).
Although culture and traditions may serve as markers of Circassian identity,
the loss of culture and tradition means that they are changeable and impermanent,
as explained in section 4.2. Culture is viewed as a narrative of ethnicity which makes
interviewees different from other groups, and many of the interviewees explained
their culture in comparison to ‘Arab’ culture, and how their culture is dissimilar to
the ‘Arabs’. Moreover, for many Circassians preserving their culture is seen as part
of the preservation of their roots, because culture represents roots, and marks them
as different from ‘others.’ In spite of all of the difficulties they face in terms of
preserving their culture in Jordan, Circassians still feel that it is a duty they have to
fulfil. For example, one interviewee said,
179
’Culture and traditions are being dismantled in all societies. No
one preserved their culture. We were conquered by
urbanisation and democratisation, which abolished our culture
and traditions… It is important for me to preserve my
Circassian culture. As long as I am Circassian, I have to
preserve my culture’ (Khairi, 77, Male).
On the other hand, all interviewees seemed very proud of their culture, and
as I have previously mentioned, they see it as a marker of group identity, and as a
way to distinguish themselves from the ‘other’. One interviewee exclaimed;
’I know a lot of young people, men and women, who do not
care much about being Circassian… They do not feel that they
are Arabs; their blood and upbringing, their culture and
traditions are not Arabic. When non-Circassians listen to
Circassian music they do not feel the same as I do. You cannot
enjoy Circassian dance the way I enjoy it. You would not
understand its moves; you might see it as ugly. You can never
forget your roots; you can never forget them (Thuraya, 38,
Female).
This excerpt from Thuraya’s interview shows that Thuraya attempts to use aspects
of culture such as dances, songs and upbringing as a way of creating a distinction
between her, as a Circassian, and non-Circassians. Although Circassian dances and
songs can be learnt by Circassians and non-Circassians, she assumes that non-
Circassians cannot identify with them or understand them. Whereas Thuraya may
enjoy Circassian music and Circassian dances, other Circassians and non-Circassians
may not. Most of my research participants enjoyed Circassian songs and dances
though. Asked to state to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the statement ‘I
like Circassian songs,’ 87.1 percent of the questionnaire respondents agreed, only
around five percent disagreed, and around eight percent neither agreed nor
disagreed (Table 4.11). On the statement ‘I do not like Circassian dances,’ 85.5
percent of respondents disagreed, eight percent neither agreed nor disagreed, and
only six percent agreed (Table 4.12), with no generational or gender differences in
the answers to both questions.
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Table (4.11) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement: ‘I like Circassian songs’
Answer
Men Women Total
Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages
Strongly Agree 22 61.1% 13 50% 35 56.5%
Agree 9 25% 10 38.5% 19 30.6%
Neither Agree or
Disagree 3 8.3% 2 7.7% 5 8.1%
Disagree 1 2.8% 1 3.8% 2 3.2%
Strongly Disagree 1 2.8% 0 0% 1 1.6%
Total 36 100% 26 100% 62 100%
Table (4.12) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement: ‘I do not like Circassian
dances’
Answer
Men Women Total
Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages
Strongly Agree 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
Agree 2 5.6% 2 7.7% 4 6.4%
Neither Agree or
Disagree
3 8.3% 2 7.7% 5 8.1%
Disagree 9 25% 6 23.1% 15 24.2%
Strongly Disagree 22 61.1% 16 61.5% 38 61.3%
Total 36 100% 26 100% 62 100%
Although the number of those who do not like Circassian dances and songs is
small, there are still some Circassians who do not like them but who still identify
themselves as Circassians. Furthermore, to the question ‘which flag represents your
ethnic group?, all respondents chose the Adyghe flag— the Circassian flag.
Identification with the Adyghe flag, as representing their ethnic group, shows that
although all respondents identify themselves ethnically as Circassians, their liking or
disliking of Circassian dances and songs, which is part of their culture, is not
necessarily linked to their identification as Circassians. Moreover, 96.8 percent of
questionnaire respondents believe that being Circassian constitutes a large part of
their identities (Table 4.13), compared to 85.5 and 87 percent who like Circassian
dances and songs respectively. Therefore, this shows that around ten percent of
respondents believe that being Circassian constitutes a large part of their identities,
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but still do not like their songs and dances. This could also be because they do not
like any songs and dances.
Table (4.13) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement: ‘Being Circassian
constitutes a great part of my identity’
Answer
Men Women Total
Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages
Strongly Agree 23 63.9% 17 65.4% 40 64.5%
Agree 12 33.3% 8 30.8% 20 32.3%
Neither Agree
or Disagree 1 2.8% 0 0% 1 1.6%
Disagree 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
Strongly
Disagree 0 0% 1 3.8% 1 1.6%
Total 36 100% 26 100% 62 100%
Also, many interviewees stressed the importance of preserving culture. For
example, one said,
’In school, we were taught that our history, culture and
traditions are the most important things in our lives, because if
they vanish, we will feel lost. This is how we were taught at
school’ (Tariq, 22, Male).
Tariq was taught in a Circassian school in Jordan. It is important to note though, that
in Jordanian schools special emphasis is given to Arabic culture and the importance
of preserving it, as discussed in chapter six.
It became clear that when interviewees could not relate to cultural ethnic
narratives, they resorted to the concept of roots and origin. For example, one
interviewee, when asked about Circassian culture stated,
’In our family we are not maintaining culture and traditions,
but we keep our Circassian identity because it reflects our
origin’ (Muna, 22, Female).
Muna mentioned that her mother is Palestinian, and for that reason their upbringing
at home was not Circassian. She said that she does not see a difference between
Circassian culture and ‘Arab’ culture, and added,
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’I sometimes feel that I am a bad Circassian, I have a Circassian
family name; my origin is Circassian, but I was not raised on
Circassian values or culture’ (Muna, 22, female).
In such a case, what only distinguishes her from ‘others’ is her family name. This can
show that due to her mixed parentage Muna sees herself as different from other
Circassians who practise Circassian culture and traditions, but at the same time she
considers that the main elements that make her Circassian are her family name and
her roots. Despite acknowledging that culture is an important part of ethnic identity,
in its absence, Muna resorts to the importance of the family name for ethnic identity.
But, what makes Circassian culture different for some?, and in what ways is
Circassian culture different?
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4.2.2 Culture: Difference and Disagreement
‘What makes me as a human being a Circassian is the fact that
we have culture and traditions. We have culture and traditions,
we preserved although we left our lands, and that made our
lives more comfortable. And, we believe that our traditions
facilitated our interaction within the group and with others’
(Adel, 22, Male).
Many interviewees explained that, in addition to the difference in terms of
race, roots, and origins between them and the ‘Arabs’, they consider anyone who
does not accept or understand their culture a ‘stranger’ (Asad, 22, Male).
Furthermore, differences related to cultural aspects for Circassians can be perceived
through Circassians lifestyle and interaction. Cultural aspects, including songs,
dances, and costumes, are seen as a way of representing themselves to others. In
Jordan, for example, many know Circassians for their dance, as one interviewee put
it ’People here, frankly, do not know anything about us except for the dances, music,
and cuisine, and that is it’ (Asad, 22, Male). Another interviewee added that people
may even not recognise their dances. She said;
’I wish one day people would see Circassian costumes and say
‘wow! These are Circassians.’ Not like when I went to the
States to dance there, people were saying: ‘where do these
come from? Are they from space?’ Scottish, Irish, Palestinian,
and Jewish, costumes are at least known. I hope we reach a
stage when people recognise at least our music. This is the
dream I believe of every Circassian’ (Thuraya, 38, Female).
In Jordan, Circassians have the right to organise concerts, and parties, in which they
perform their dances to spread awareness about their culture. Circassian dances,
songs, and cuisine, are different from those of ‘Arab’ Jordanians. Some ‘Arab’
Jordanian tribes may prefer not to see Circassian dances because they are mixed,
where men and women dance together. However, concerts still take place and those
who wish to attend can do so, and those who do not can simply turn down the
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invitation. Mixing between the sexes is heavily criticised by ‘Arabs’ in Jordan,
including Palestinians and ‘Arab’ Jordanians, and is seen as a violation of religious
doctrines. Almost all interviewees defended the Circassian position in terms of
mixing between the sexes, by saying that ‘Arabs’ refusal to mix between the sexes is
cultural and not based on religion. They also explained that they cannot behave
according to their culture, when it comes to that issue, in front of ‘Arabs’. One
interviewee explained;
‘We have to avoid talking about openness in front of ‘Arabs’.
This is how we have been raised. So, I feel the cultural
differences when it comes to such incidents, if I say something
about how my family operates and the Arabs show how
shocked they are’ (Nuha, 22, Female).
Gender relations were brought up in almost every interview as a significant
difference between Circassians and ‘Arabs’. When referring to differences, gender
relations are often brought up as a point of disagreement and difference. This is
given special attention in chapter five. It is still very important to speak here about
upbringing and to examine how interviewees reflected on their upbringing as
different, and as a distinctive narrative of their ethnicity. All interviewees mentioned
that their mothers were the ones who took care of their upbringing. Again, although
interviewees talked about upbringing as an important narrative of being Circassian,
they also supported it with the patrilineal kinship attachment to the Circassian
group. Hiba, whose father is Palestinian and mother is Circassian said,
’I cannot say that I am Circassian, I follow my father. My
mother brought us up, and my father was away most of the
time. But, I am still Palestinian, and I can never be a Circassian’
(Hiba, 28, female).
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4.2.3 Upbringing—Adyghe: Perfect Man Theory
Most interviewees found it hard to describe specific differences between them
and the ‘Arabs’, in terms of culture, however, they attempted to emphasise that they
are different. Whenever they found it hard, they referred to differences in terms of
gender relations, which were explained by saying that they had different
upbringing. One interviewee said that he has a very close friend, and that he is
friends with his sister as well, adding that he even enters their house without
knocking; however, he cannot reveal that this is how close he is with the family
because ‘Arabs’ would start judging. He said ‘this is the problem with the ‘Arab’
world in general… they would start thinking that I am sexually involved with his
sister… and the guy would appear as not masculine, and criticised’ (Asad, 22, Male).
He added that this is how he was brought up, and that his culture disallows him to
betray trust or be disloyal to people he knows.
Other interviewees mentioned that they had different upbringing, because
they were brought up on certain values. All interviewees mentioned the values of
loyalty and honesty that Circassians pride themselves on. All interviewees who
identified themselves as Circassians talked about loyalty and honesty, and the
importance of such traits, which make them respected. These differences are always
referred to in masculine terms. Shami (1993) also emphasises this; she notes that
through fieldwork she noticed that loyalty, honesty and courage were mentioned to
describe how Circassian men are different, and as a group identity marker. For
example, one interviewee said,
’Betrayal in Circassian culture is prohibited, it is inappropriate
and unacceptable. We do not betray. But our loyalty comes
from our love. And not to betray is part of the perfect man
theory. However, if I did not love you, and I did not betray
you, I would not be as loyal to you as I would be if I loved you’
(Qasim, 22, Male).
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According to some male interviewees, they are brought up on the perfect man
theory, the Adyghe. The Adyghe, for many of them, means attempting to reach a
level of perfection in everything they do in life. It is about adopting a perfect
lifestyle, through honesty, loyalty, courage, and good behaviours. The whole idea of
the perfect ‘man’ theory excludes women, and all women interviewees mentioned
that it means nothing to them, and that they do not believe that it is true. For
example, Nuha said,
’The idea of the ‘Adyghe’ does not mean anything to me. I do
not see myself as a perfect person, and I do not see anyone as
perfect. I think that we try to attain a certain level of perfection
through our upbringing, and we are asked to be… through the
way we deal with others, ethics, and educational attainment,
and all of those things’ (Nuha, 22, Female).
Another male interviewee said,
‘The Adyghe, as a concept, means to me the perfect man, who
is courageous, generous, and many other virtues and values.
This is how we were brought up and raised. I try to make this
concept part of my lifestyle, because this is about the culture of
my ancestors’ (Husam, 23, Male).
Four interviewees explained that they also see this perfect man theory as a
way of maintaining a good image for the Circassians as a group in general, and a
positive image for the individual as well. Therefore, preserving a good image and
leaving good impression is part of one’s moral duty towards the group. Many
choose to give up individual choices for the sake of the group’s image and
reputation. As one interviewee put it,
‘Being part of a minority in Jordan is hard. For example, if I
gave a bad impression about myself, people would start seeing
all the Circassian community badly. So, I have to be conscious
and aware of my behaviour at all times, and not to misbehave
in order to avoid giving a bad impression about my
community. I face difficulties in preserving my identity as a
Circassian in Jordan. But if I had been one of those who
remained there, and who had not been forced to migrate,
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preserving my identity would have been easier’ (Qasim, 22,
Male).
Whereas courage, loyalty and honesty constitute good behaviour for men in
terms of a good image, for women it is different. Nuha (22, female) explained that,
before she went to university, her father advised her to stay away from ‘Arab’
Jordanian men, because they would not understand how Circassians are open, and
would accordingly judge her. For women, the image they have to present is more
about not mingling with non-Circassian men, and that is given particular attention
in chapter five.
Moreover, many interviewees talked about how strict their culture is in terms
of not being allowed to make mistakes, particularly with elders. For many
interviewees who are proud of this sort of upbringing and behaviour, it may be
considered a marker of group identity. This sort of behaviour, respecting elders, is
highly praised in Islam. Therefore, all Circassian interviewees mentioned it, during
interviews, as a positive group identity marker. For example, they said that they
have to stand up when an elder enters a room, they are not allowed to look elders in
the eyes, or to sit with elders with their legs crossed. Some interviewees mentioned
incidents during which they were recognised as Circassians. One example of that is
an interviewee who said,
’For me, honestly, for example, I see how my friend deals with
his father. My friend was once talking to his father in a way; I
thought that his father would hit him afterwards. I was
shocked that his father started laughing. I was shocked…
Honestly, an incident that happened with me was when I
befriended a guy of Turkish origin, and he invited me to his
place. We were sitting and his father entered, I unconsciously
stood up for him, then I greeted him. He then said: Are you
Circassian? I said yes, I am Circassian. The next day, my friend
said: “after you left, my father said: See my son how
Circassians behave? Did you see how he stood up as I got into
the room, and he did not sit down until I left the room? This is
how Circassians are.” I believe that through our behaviours
and ethics we make our identity respected’ (Qasim, 22, Male).
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It is important to say here that he was talking about an ‘Arab’ friend. Therefore,
respect for the elderly, for many interviewees, was seen as specifically Circassian.
In addition to respecting the elderly, Circassians see that respecting women is
part of their culture, as they all explained. Interviewees, men and women,
mentioned that respecting women, for Circassians, is as important as respecting
elders, and this makes them different when compared to the ‘Arabs’. All male
interviewees said that they are not allowed to curse in the presence of a girl, they
have to stand up when a girl enters, and they do not look at girls like ‘sex-objects’.
This is explored more fully in chapter five. During interviews, and through dealing
with Circassians, this seemed to be a very important part of their culture. As a
female researcher, I was comfortable interviewing male Circassians unaccompanied.
The emphasis on culture and tradition as an important part of Circassian
ethnicity has often been accompanied by expressing regret for losing the language
and heritage. Some expressed their inability to practise their old pre-diasporic
traditions and Adyghe language in Jordan. The cultural narrative is very important,
however, and the loss of many parts of their narratives make it part of the stories
they hear about their group. The following section explores how interviewees
expressed this loss of traditions, and language, and how they relate it to the inability
to practise them in Jordan.
189
4.2.4 Loss of Traditions and Language
‘There are so many things we cannot do because no one would
understand. We would be seen as alien. We are losing big parts
of our traditions. Traditions are very important, but they are
changing. And, this is the case with everyone. I do not know
much about the history of Circassians, except for stories of
genocide, but I am Circassian’ (Husam, 23, male).
Another aspect of Circassian culture is the history of the nation, the myths,
the stories, and some other traditions such as those related to marriage and death.
Traditions related to marriage, for example, may have previously been possible
Jordan, but nowadays Circassians do not practise such traditions as often as before,
and maybe the whole tradition has stopped. Traditionally, Circassians get married
through elopement. However, this Circassian tradition with regard to marriage was
practised long time ago in Jordan, but all interviewees mentioned that it does not
happen nowadays. Many interviewees indicated that elopement is one of their
traditions without showing pride in it. It was made clear that the society around
them, ‘Arabs’ and non-Circassians, would not understand such a tradition. One
interviewee put it,
‘In our traditional weddings, for example, we kidnap the
groom’s mother following elopement. If I go and tell a native
Jordanian friend of mine, he would bring a gun, and follow me
to kill the kidnappers. He would not understand that it is a
tradition. I believe that we are a closed community. We are a
closed community when it comes to matters others would not
understand. People here would not understand that elopement
is not forbidden in Islam, because when a girl elopes she stays
at the groom’s place, and the groom leaves her with his female
relatives, until they conduct an Islamic marriage’ (Asad, 22,
Male).
Many may give up such a tradition, because it does not go along with the traditions
and culture of the majority. For example, a 77 year old interviewee expressed his
sadness caused by the loss of authenticity in culture. He said,
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’In weddings now, you cannot tell whose wedding it is.
Weddings nowadays are not known whether they are for
Circassians, Armenians, or gypsies. We are left with no
heritage… No group preserved their culture. Arabs,
Circassians, and Christians, none of them preserved their
culture and tradition. The moment Arabs gave up their tents,
they forgot their traditions. They started embracing foreign
cultures that are not related to God’s word. This applies to
everyone in Jordan, I cannot say about people outside Jordan.
This is reality. No wedding ceremony, whether Arab or
Circassian or whomever, is really enjoyable nowadays. All of
them are celebrating their weddings in hotels, clubs and halls.
They transferred the joy to places where it would be forgotten.
They exert a lot of expenses that are not necessary’ (Khairi, 77,
Male).
This change in cultural practices is seen as threatening for the identity and
existence of the group, as five interviewees expressed. For example, Thuraya stated,
’I am against abandoning the cultural heritage we inherited
from our ancestors. The fact that we are losing parts of this
heritage makes me fear that the Circassians will not be
recognised, and they might lose their identity as a group. I do
not want my children to lose this heritage’ (Thuraya, 38,
female).
Another element of identity markers would be the acquaintance of
Circassians with their history. Interviewees were asked if they knew anything about
their history prior to their flight to Jordan. Most interviewees showed a low level of
acquaintance with their history, learning only stories about diaspora itself. However,
many of them mentioned the name ‘Nart,’ as a Circassian hero, but none of them
recognised that the Nart Sagas are about Circassian myths of origins. All
interviewees said that their unfamiliarity with their pre-diasporic history represents
a loss of an important part of their ethnicity. Some explained that this loss is also due
to the loss of the language, and not knowing the Adyghe language because most of
their pre-diasporic history is written in Adyghe. Many interviewees explained that
they do not know Circassian language, and that is why they cannot be closely in
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touch with their written heritage, and history. They also emphasised that language is
a very important aspect of their ethnicity. One interviewee said,
’If we lose the language, we will lose a lot of things after it,
such as culture and traditions and civilisation. Those will
gradually vanish. So, we must preserve the language’ (Tariq,
22, Male).
Language, for a linguistic minority, would serve as a great identity marker.
Nonetheless, very few questionnaire respondents and interviewees said that their
main language at home is Circassian, 79.5 percent of the questionnaire respondents
speak mainly Arabic at home, and only 19 percent of the questionnaire respondents
speak Circassian as the main language at home. Interestingly though, 66.1 percent of
respondents agree that speaking Circassian constitutes an important part of their
identities, with only 13 percent disagreeing; there were no gender or generational
gaps in the responses (Table 4.14).
Table (4.14) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement: ‘Speaking Circassian
language constitutes a great part of my identity’?
Answer
Men Women Total
Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages
Strongly
Agree 15 41.7% 11 42.3% 26 41.9%
Agree 9 25% 6 23.1% 15 24.2%
Neither Agree
or Disagree 8 22.2% 5 19.2% 13 20.9%
Disagree 4 11.1% 2 7.7% 6 9.8%
Strongly
Disagree 0 0% 2 7.7% 2 3.2%
Total 36 100% 26 100% 62 100%
On the other hand, on the statement ’it is not important for me to teach my
children Circassian,’ 59.7 percent of respondents disagreed, 17.7 percent agreed, and
22.6 percent neither agreed nor disagreed. However, men were more likely to
disagree with the statement ’it is not important for me to teach my children
Circassian language’ (Table 4.15). On the statement ’speaking Arabic constitutes a
great part of my identity,’ 64.5 percent of respondents agreed, 9.7 percent disagreed,
and 25.8 percent neither agreed nor disagreed (Table 4.16).
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Table (4.15) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement: ‘It is not important for me
to teach my children Circassian language’?
Answer
Men Women Total
Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages
Strongly
Agree 0 0% 2 7.7% 2 3.2%
Agree 4 11.1% 5 19.2% 9 14.5%
Neither Agree
or Disagree 9 25% 5 19.2% 14 22.6%
Disagree 4 11.1% 6 23.1% 10 16.2%
Strongly
Disagree 19 52.8% 8 30.8% 27 43.5%
Total 36 100% 26 100% 62 100%
Table (4.16) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement: ‘Speaking Arabic
constitutes a great part of my identity’?
Answer
Men Women Total
Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages
Strongly Agree 7 19.5% 11 42.3% 18 29%
Agree 16 44.4% 6 23.1% 22 35.5%
Neither Agree
or Disagree 9 25% 7 27% 16 25.8%
Disagree 4 11.1% 2 7.7% 6 9.7%
Strongly
Disagree
0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
Total 36 100% 26 100% 62 100%
Interviewees seemed very aware of the importance of language for the
preservation of the identity of the group. However, all expressed that it is very hard
to speak the language and practise it in an ‘Arab’ environment, where the main
language of communication is Arabic, and where all schools either teach in Arabic or
in English. The emphasis on the importance of language for the sake of preserving
the culture and the identity of the group was evident throughout the interviews.
Some respondents blamed their families for not teaching them, others blamed
themselves, and others blamed the environment they are living in. Some blame was
laid on the environment under the pretext of having to use Arabic more often than
Circassian, because ‘my friends are Arabs,’ ’everyone around me speaks Arabic,’
’Circassian language is not used even amongst Circassians,’ ’we are taught in ‘Arabic
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at schools,’ ’although it is important to preserve one’s language, Adyghe language is
not widely used.’
Regret, throughout the interviews, seemed to be a great feeling prevalent
amongst Circassian interviewees, and many of them expressed that it is ’wrong,’ ’a
mistake,’ ’sad,’ and ’regrettable’ that Circassian language is being lost. This evident
regret was also accompanied with passion, and a desire to restore the language
amongst the community. There have been several attempts lately to restore
Circassian language. In 2006, young people belonging to the Circassian community
in Jordan launched a satellite TV channel that shows Adyghe language lessons, and
that airs all of its programs in Circassian language. Moreover, 2008 witnessed the
First Circassian Language Conference held in Amman. The theme of the conference
was ‘the restoration of its use amongst Circassians in Diaspora’. The latest activities
concerning language amongst the Circassian communities in Diaspora reflect their
desire to preserve the language because of its importance in terms of preserving the
cultural identity of the group. One interviewee stated,
‘Circassian language was taken for granted… Preserving a
language is very important—language is an identity… Just
recently, people started to become aware of the importance of
reinforcing and strengthening, and spreading awareness about
the importance of the language, and its relation to cultural
heritage. This sort of awareness started just recently, because
the youth and the young generations are now suffering’
(Thuraya, 38, Female).
However, the same interviewee later said ‘my language does not reflect my identity. It is
way of communication mainly’. This shows that she meant that language does not
reflect her identity as an individual, and that it rather has a symbolic resonance for
the group. She said,
’I wish we could reach a stage when all of our children speak
Circassian, because I do not want to see the language
disappear. Language is more important than music and dances;
language is the identity of any civilisation’ (Thuraya, 38,
female).
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Many interviewees associated language with emotions, and sentiments that connect
them to their original homeland, as one interviewee said,
’Speaking Circassian is very, very important, because this
represents the emotional side of me. In the end, I am part of
this spinning wheel, which is Jordan—I am part of it. But these
are the simple things, the symbolic things, and the emotional
things, which connect me to my country of origin, to the
suffering of my ancestors. I do not like to lose these things, and
I would love to transfer them to my children in the future’
(Qasim, 22, Male).
Others, on the other hand, believe that preserving their identities as Circassians
imposes on them the need to preserve and restore the language, and many saw it as
a duty which was hard to fulfil, others believe that the language itself is hard to
learn. Nonetheless, all stressed the importance of preserving it. For example, Tariq,
who just recently started to learn Circassian, when talking about preserving his
Circassian identity, said,
’I believe that it is not an easy duty to fulfil. The first burden
that would face me through fulfilling this duty is language. For
example, I am trying to study the language, there are some
people now who teach it, but in the future those people may
not always be there. If we lose the language, we will lose a lot
of things after it, such as culture and traditions and civilisation.
Those will gradually vanish. So, we must preserve the
language’ (Tariq, 22, Male).
Muna, for example, expressed her desire to learn Circassian saying ‘I would love to
learn Circassian, because it would reflect my Circassian origin. But no one uses it. It
is a difficult language’ (Muna, 22, Female).
Language, culture and traditions, for research participants, are very important
parts of their ethnic narratives. However, the emphasis on their importance is
always accompanied by feelings of regret and sadness, because all interviewees and
most research participants believe that great parts of those narratives are being lost.
They also expressed their desire to preserve those ethnic narratives, and to be able to
practise their culture, traditions, and language, which are ethnic narratives that
remain existent, rather than practised.
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Conclusion
This chapter has shown how narratives of ethnicity, although racialised, are
contextualised, and situated. It examined research participants’ conceptualisation of
the narratives of their ethnicity, and identified two main narratives of ethnicity-
narratives of origin and narratives of culture, the former as non-changing and based
on racial differences, and the latter as changing. The narratives interviewees referred
to were relational most of the time, or in other words they were in comparison to the
other ‘Arab’. For example, despite the fact that historically myths of origin of the
Circassian people in North Caucasia are presented in the form of tales and stories
called the Nart Sagas, none of the interviewees identified them; they only said that
‘Nart’ is the name of a Circassian hero. However, when asked about origin
Circassians speak of the history of their Diaspora, forced migration and genocide,
and they speak about the history of their settlement in Jordan.
Moreover, interviewees tended to emphasise that family names do not
change, and that each name has it history, because they have been the same for
thousands of years. The focus on family names can be explained in the context of
Jordan, particularly because of the patrilineal nature of tribal ‘Arab’ kinship system,
which constitutes a big part of Jordan’s nationalist ideology as a state. The strength
of this system may greatly influence the desire of minority groups to adapt to
tribalism (Shami, 1998). Added to that, the fact that Circassian family names are
different, because they do not come from the Arabic language, underlines
Circassians’ particular ethnicity. The concept of family names may not have that
much significance in the region of the north Caucasus, because they all originate
from the same language. Therefore, I would conclude that the emphasis on
particular components of ethnicity is related to the concept of the ‘other’, because
they are always emphasised in comparison to the ‘other’. Interviewees expressed
that family names prove their ethnicity, and origin.
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Additionally, the patrilineal kinship system also has its implications for
women, as it excludes them from passing on their ethnic narratives to their children.
Women are not allowed to pass down their names unless the children are from
unknown fathers. To add to this, origin, blood, roots, and genes were also seen to be
transmitted from the father, and not the mother, and they are also related to the
history of their diaspora and settlement in Jordan. For example, some emphasised
that they have Circassian blood and genes, and that makes them Circassian. One
interviewee who has a Palestinian mother was the only one to say that she is
Circassian only because of her family name and blood, although she also has
Palestinian ‘blood in her veins’. Some interviewees believed that Circassians, by
virtue of birth, carry traits such as loyalty, honesty and courage, which reflects to a
great extent a racialisation of their ethnic narratives. One can also argue that this
focus on ‘blood, genes, and race’ is a way for interviewees to distinguish themselves
in relation to others. The chapter also discussed other aspect of Circassian ethnicity,
interviewees viewed as very important but which are getting lost and are changing.
They expressed regret and sadness for the loss of their traditions and language.
However, family names, origin and blood remained at the forefront of their
narratives of ethnicity. Their conceptualisations of ethnicity seemed to give great
importance to culture, heritage, and language, but the fact that they are not familiar
with, and do not practice them makes it hard for these Circassians to distinguish
themselves from the ‘other’ by virtue of culture. The use of narratives to identify
ethnicity shows that those narratives can be (re)constructed and (re)configured
according to time and space. Moreover, most of those ethnic narratives are gendered,
and gender narratives are often used as ethnic boundary markers. Thus, narratives
of gender intersect with narratives of ethnicity, by expressing that gender relations
in the Circassian community are different from those in ‘Arab’ society. And, some
ethnic narratives also seemed to devalue women’s role in preserving ethnic
narratives. The following chapter is dedicated to gendered narratives, and narratives
of gender in details.
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Chapter Five
Gendering Ethnicity, Ethnicising Gender
Introduction
This chapter argues that narratives of gender relations can be ethnicised, and
narratives of ethnicity can be gendered. In other words, I argue that ethnic actors
define their ethnic group boundaries through resorting to narratives of gender,
which they see as different, in relation to the ‘other’. Saying that ethnicity is
gendered suggests that men and women occupy different places in ethnic narratives.
In spite of women’s contribution in (re)constructing and (re)configuring ethnic
narratives and their reproduction role, women do not transfer their family names to
their children, and ethnicity in the Middle East is mostly transmitted through the
fathers. The previous chapter argues that ethnic narratives are contextualised,
situated, and almost always used in reference to the ‘other’, as a way to distinguish
themselves from the majority in Jordan. This chapter argues that the use of gender
narratives as a way to define boundaries of the ethnic group is also contextual and
always in comparison to the other ‘Arab’.
Throughout the previous chapter, it has been established that gender analysis
of the questionnaire and the interviews in relation to ethnic narratives of the
Circassians shows that gender relations are part of the ethnic narratives, and that
ethnic narratives are gendered. This chapter deals in more detail with the gendered
part of ethnic narratives, and the ethnicised nature of gender relations. This chapter
shows how gender and ethnicity intersect, in many and various ways. Gender and
ethnicity intersect to form
‘Ideologies, stereotypes and practices employed to underline
the specificity of an ethnic group, signal its superiority… Ideas
of shared ethnicity mean that members of a group take pains to
signal through appearance and conduct their closeness to one
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another while at the same time stressing their difference from
others’ (Wilson and Frederiksen, 1995: 4).
This intersection of gender and ethnicity creates a gendering of ethnicity, and
an ethnicisation of gender relations. More specifically, the ethnicisation of gender
means the use, by ethnic actors within their ethnic group, of gender relations as
group identity markers, and to describe the distinctiveness of their ethnic group, in
relation to the ‘other’. Such narratives of gender relations are utilised as narratives of
ethnicity, in contrast to the ‘other’, and in this case in contrast to the ‘Arabs’. As
mentioned in chapter Three, interviewees used the term ‘Arab’ to describe the
majority group in Jordan. When speaking of gender relations as group identity
markers, interviewees always compared themselves against ‘Arabs’. Therefore, this
chapter shows how interviewees contrasted themselves against ‘Arabs’, and how
they often used stereotypes of gender relations to stress the superiority and
difference of their culture. By emphasising negativities in the other, interviewees
(re)constructed their ethnic narratives in terms of gender relations. Although the
following sections might seem to be about ‘Arab’ people, this is a reflection of how
interviewees (re)constructed their ethnic narratives around how the ‘Arabs’ act,
rather than how they themselves act.
On the other hand, gendering ethnicity, as well as nationalism, means that
ethnic narratives can be gendered in various ways. For example, many of the ethnic
narratives men and women used to define their ethnic group excluded women as
ethnic actors, such as in the concept of the family name, which is based on the
patrilineal kinship system. This chapter discusses how women are excluded from
some narratives of ethnicity and included in others, how this exclusion is related to
assigning women to the private sphere and excluding them from public interactions
with the ‘other’, and how their inclusion in specific narratives related to their
domestic roles. It also illustrates how this gendering of ethnicity and ethnicisation of
gender has implications for women.
199
5.1 Ethnicising Gender
‘Ideas of authenticity are defined in terms of fixed gender roles
and heterosexual norms… the prioritisation of irreducible
gender differences- that also signal irreducible heterosexual
complementarity- acts as a display of cultural continuity’
(Fortier, 2000: 168).
Fortier (2000) found that gender roles, ideas of authenticity, and heterosexual
norms are often used to define the boundaries of the Italian community outside Italy;
my interviewees often placed gender relations at the forefront of ethnic narratives as
well. They often used gender relations to refer to intergroup differences, and the
maintenance of group identity was often linked to the maintenance of specific forms
of gender relations. Interviewees’ ethnicisation of gender relations in that sense is
problematic and has its implications. Those implications vary from imposing control
over women’s sexuality (Charles and Hintjens, 1998) to emphasising authenticity
and difference (Fortier, 2000). Gender relations can serve as identity markers for
collectivities. Gender is central to the understanding of how groups construct
narratives of ethnicity (Morgen, 1989), particularly when gender relations are placed
at the forefront of intergroup differences. Gender relations have been used to draw
clear distinctions between groups, and in some cases maintain intergroup
boundaries. It is important to note, though, that distinctions based on gender
relations may not always be true or factual, and many examples are based on social
stereotypes of the ‘other’. An example would be how the Euro-androcentric
perspective portrayed Muslim women in the Middle East generally as ‘secluded,
mysterious, erotic’ (Hale, 1989: 247). This portrayal of Muslim women can be treated
as a social stereotype, and such portrayals do not always reflect reality. Rather, they
are usually based on subjectively interpreted observed behaviours. Muslim women
were seen as ‘secluded, mysterious, erotic’, because, as Waines (1982: 643) puts it,
they were seen ‘through a veil darkly’. Waines (1982) further argues that such
perceptions of Muslim women changed over time, but ‘entrenched stereotypes
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lingered on’ (ibid: 643). These examples show us how stereotyping of gender
relations determines the mode of intergroup, as well as intra-group, interactions.
Social stereotyping has been defined as ‘the process of ascribing
characteristics to people on the basis of their group membership’ (Oakes et al., 1994:
1). Social psychologists attempting to explain social stereotypes disagreed on the
degree to which social stereotypes reflect reality. For instance, Sherif (1967)
rationalised stereotyping through considering it a consequence of intergroup
relations. Katz and Schanck (1938), on the other hand, linked stereotyping to
prejudice, and argued that it reflects unreasonably ascribed characteristics to people
according to group membership, rather than to factual experiences. Whether
stereotypes relate to reality or are mere unreasonable fictions, their effect on
intergroup relations is indisputable. Given that, Circassians’ use of stereotypes of the
‘Arabs’ in terms of gender relations helps them to identify the boundaries of their
ethnic group. And, at the same time, it helps them to differentiate themselves from
the ‘Arabs’.
Seteny Shami, a Circassian anthropologist herself, was the first to say that
Circassians, when asked about differences between their culture and ‘Arab’ culture,
answer always ‘in terms of gender’ (Shami, 1993: 148). This shows us the centrality of
gender relations to the identity of Circassians in Diaspora. Shami (1993) adds that
‘gender is a marker of difference that explains and maintains… ethnic boundaries, or
indeed boundaries between various kinds of social groups’ (ibid: 149). She further
gives examples of ideas of Circassian group identity based on gender relations.
These emerged clearly in the interviews I conducted, during which references to
kinship systems, marriage, and the way Circassian men treat women were often
used to emphasise the uniqueness and distinctiveness of their ethnic group.
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5.1.1 Marriage and Kinship
‘Understanding the nature of marriage is essential for
understanding any kinship system... kinship and marriage
organise productive and reproductive relationships… the
organisation of marriage and of the relationships built around
it should provide explanations to the organisation of gender
relationships’ (Shahd, 2004: 13).
Throughout the research, interviewees often referred to differences between
them and the ‘Arabs’ in terms of marriage and kinship. Conceptions of marriage and
kinship are linked together, and they are part of the ethnic narratives. One of the
main narratives interviewees referred to as a marker of difference between them and
the ‘Arabs’, in terms of differences based on intra-group relations, is the practice of
first cousin marriages. Despite the fact that not all ‘Arabs’ practise first cousin
marriages, or familial endogamy, it has been argued that
‘the Middle Eastern form of familial endogamy, which is the
marriage between a man and his father’s brother’s daughter (bint
‘amm in Arabic), or a father’s brother’s daughter (FBD) marriage, is
extremely rare outside the Middle East’ (Khlat, 1997: 63).
First cousin marriages, which has been called familial endogamy in social
anthropology, was brought up by interviewees as an ‘Arab’ practice they do not
share, and do not agree with. Interviewees brought familial endogamy up in the
context of highlighting the difference between them and the ‘Arabs’, and also in
terms of explaining the narratives of their ethnicity. Shami (1993) also refers to
familial endogamy as a central aspect of ‘Arab’ culture, versus the Circassian
‘exogamous orientation’ (ibid: 149). However, her exogamy/endogamy dichotomy is
somewhat misleading. This is because, the term endogamy refers to marriage within
one’s own tribe or group, and exogamy is the opposite. However, to say that
endogamy is prevalent amongst the ‘Arabs’ and not Circassians is misleading
because that would imply that Circassians prefer to marry ‘Arabs’, while ‘Arabs’
prefer to marry ‘Arabs’ in the Jordanian context, although she meant the opposite.
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For that reason, it is important to clarify here that ‘Arab’ endogamy is familial
endogamy and not based on ‘Arabism’ as an ethnicity. Familial ‘Arab’ endogamy is
about preferring first cousin marriages, and to say that cousins are potential
marriage partners. On the other hand, many research participants expressed that
they would not marry a non-Circassian, which shows an inclination towards same
group endogamy. All of the married interviewees are married to Circassians, except
for the 77 year-old man, whose first wife was Circassian, but after her death he
married a Syrian. Questionnaire data shows that of the total questionnaire
respondents, 50 percent do mind intermarriage, and 41.9 percent do not mind
marrying non-Circassians. The responses revealed a slight difference between male
and female respondents. Around 52.8 percent of male respondents stated that they
would mind marrying a non-Circassian, and the percentage of female respondents
was slightly lower at 46.2 (Table 5.1). Whereas only six percent of male respondents
neither agreed nor disagreed, this accounted for 12 percent of female respondents.
Interestingly, the largest proportion of those who disagreed with marrying non-
Circassians was between the ages of 25 and 40, as 66.5 percent of that age range
disagreed, constituting 63.5 percent of the total respondents who disagreed, which
shows generational differences (Table 5.2). Therefore, although Circassians do not
practise familial endogamy, there is a tendency among research participants towards
group endogamy.
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Table (5.1) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement: ‘I do not mind marrying a
non-Circassian’?
Answer
Men Women Total
Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages
Strongly Agree 8 22.2% 2 7.7% 10 16.1%
Agree 7 19.4% 9 34.6% 16 25.8%
Neither Agree or
Disagree
2 5.6% 3 11.5% 5 8.1%
Disagree 7 19.4% 5 19.2% 12 19.4%
Strongly
Disagree
12 33.4% 7 27% 19 30.6%
Total 36 100% 26 100% 62 100%
Table (5.2) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement: ‘I do not mind marrying a
non-Circassian’? By Age
Percentages of Answers for each Age Range 19-24 25-30 31-40 41-50 Above 51
Strongly Agree 13% 5% 18% 20% 49%
Agree 34% 20% 9% 50% 17%
Neither Agree or Disagree 13% 15% 0% 0% 0%
Disagree 13% 15% 37% 20% 17%
Strongly Disagree 27% 45% 36% 10% 17%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Interviewees also reflected on the ‘Arab’ practice of first cousin marriages as
different from their culture, and used it to show the superiority of their group, by
saying that first cousin marriages are ‘disgusting’, or ‘strange’, because ‘cousins are
like brothers and sisters’ (Thuraya 38, female, Nuha 22, female, Qasim 22, male,
Asad, 22, male, Norma 22, female). Not accepting first cousin marriages reflects the
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kinship system of the Circassian society, as the cousin is treated like a brother or
sister. For example, Nuha said,
‘I have a male-cousin, who is close to my age, and we were
raised together, and we have been to the same school and to
the same class, and so on. He studies in the US, so when he
comes from the US, I go to sleep over at their place. But no one
understands that we can sleep in the same room, without
anything wrong happening’ (Nuha, 22, female).
Nuha’s reference to this particular example was meant to emphasise the strict kin
relation between her and her male cousin. In spite of the fact that Nuha did not see
any reaction from me except for a nod of understanding, she felt she needed to
further justify her relation with her cousin. She added that ‘Arabic’ Jordanian people
would not understand that they sleep in the same room without anything happening
between them. By saying ‘without anything wrong happening,’ she meant to explain
that there is no sexual contact between her and her cousin. Interviewees also
explained that for ‘Arabs’, female-male cousins relations should be kept under close
scrutiny, i.e. the kin relationship between male and female cousins does not amount
to prohibiting marriage. It is worth noting, at this point, that Islam itself does not
prohibit first-cousin marriage. However, and since sexual contact prior to marriage
is prohibited in Islam, and cousins are potential marriage partners, for ‘Arabs’ a very
close relation between male and female cousins could lead to undesired prohibited
sexual encounters. For that reason, Nuha believes that ‘Arabs ‘would not understand
that the close relation with her cousin would never entail sexual encounters, because
the close kin relations in her community make her cousin more like a brother. In
terms of kin relations, within the Circassian community, according to interviewees,
the extended family is very important, and the prohibition of first cousin marriages
was linked by interviewees to the fact that cousins are raised to be very close like
siblings. During fieldwork, I witnessed an interesting conversation between a
Palestinian woman and a Circassian woman, which made me realise that there are
differences in terms of practices between both communities. The conversation was
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inflamed when the Palestinian woman stated that she would love if her 11 year-old
son married her four year-old niece in the future. The Circassian woman could not
but say ‘how could you think about such a thing? This is disgusting! They are like
siblings!’ The conversation went on and on, and reached a point where the
Circassian woman explained that she raises her daughter the way she was raised, on
the belief that her cousins are like her siblings, and added that she even let them
sleep in the same bed. She, unequivocally, said: ‘When you raise them up on that
belief nothing wrong would ever happen. First cousin marriages and sexual
encounters could never take place in a Circassian family.’
A few hours later, when the Circassian woman left the room, the Palestinian
woman said: ‘Can you believe this? It is even haram15 in Islam to raise your children
in that way. I do not know, but this is too much openness… you cannot control what
might happen between them.’ She added that since Islam allows marriage between
first cousins, cousins from different sexes should not be spending time together
alone after a certain age. It is interesting how the Palestinian woman justified first
cousin marriage through Islam, although it is a cultural, rather than an Islamic
practice. Moreover, although interviewees talked about the ‘Arabs’ practice of first
cousin marriages, it is not only practised by ‘Arabs’. It has been shown that,
‘Preferred parallel cousin marriage and endogamy are in fact
ubiquitous throughout the Middle East and found among various
groups, such as Turks, Persians, Kurds, Christians, Jews, as well as
Arabs…’ (Keyser, 1974: 297).
Although first cousin marriages still happen in the ‘Arab’ Middle East, it has shifted
from being a preferred form of marriage. It has been said that the main motives of
tribal and familial endogamy was to keep women’s inheritance within the same
family (Baer, 1998). With processes of modernisation and urbanisation, the tribal and
familial motive of endogamy began to shrink.
15 Haram means forbidden, or prohibited, in Islam.
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However, seven interviewees referred to the ‘Arabs’ acceptance of first cousin
marriages, when talking about cultural difference. This reference was made when
research participants attempted to emphasise the difference of their culture, and to
prove that they have a specific ethnic identity. On another occasion, the same
woman, who defended Circassians’ non-acceptance of first cousin marriages,
mentioned a saying by the prophet meant to encourage exogamy amongst Muslims,
in order to avoid genetic disorders. The woman did not make this up, as it is
documented in Islamic books of the prophet’s sayings. Moreover, this point of
cultural difference is more likely to lead Circassian women towards a defensive
stance, rather than their male counterparts, because, for women, defending cousins’
relations is part of defending their honour, and women especially are expected to
preserve the honour of the family. This is due to the disproportionate condemnation
of women’s extramarital sexual activities, compared to that of men’s.
The condemnation of women’s extramarital sexual activities is not only an
‘Arab’ practice, as a woman’s sexual behaviour is greatly linked to the discourse of
family honour, and that does not only exist amongst ‘Arabs’. On the one hand,
[male] Circassians refer to the respect, freedom, and status granted to women by
their culture. It is important to note that most references to ‘respect’ were made by
male interviewees, while female interviewees referred to ‘openness’ as part of their
culture. The difference between men’s and women’s responses in those terms may
mean that women do not feel the respect that their male-counterparts claim to be
giving them. The openness women referred to is related to having mixed-sex parties,
being allowed to have male friends, and the non-existence of segregation between
women and their male relatives. On the other hand, this openness, according to
them, cannot be practised according to their culture all the time, because ‘the Arabs
do not know’ (Nuha, 22, female), and the ‘Arabs would not understand’ (Qasim, 22,
male). And, because the ‘Arabs’ would not understand, Circassian men interfere in
the lives of their sisters, daughters, or female cousins. This is as claimed to avoid
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Arabs’ anticipated criticisms. Shami (1993) explains this as an attempt by fathers
and brothers to ‘limit and control behaviour’, using the excuse of Arabs’ disapproval
of ‘the relative freedom of mobility for unmarried women, and the lack of sexual
segregation’ (ibid: 155).
Female Circassian interviewees revealed that their fathers, husbands,
brothers, or the eldest patriarchs in the household, would interfere in their lives
when it came to wearing revealing clothes, behaviours, and freedom of movement.
They nonetheless add that this sort of intervention is justified, because they want to
avoid ‘Arabs’ criticism, ‘closed-mindedness,’ and intolerance towards women’s
freedom. One woman interviewee revealed that her brother used to beat her,
because she used to talk to women whom he used to see as immoral. She explained
that her brother’s beating lasted for years, until she called the police, and that her
mother never tried to stop him. She stated,
‘You cannot imagine the pain I was in; it was very painful. He
used to accuse me of being immoral and marring the honour of
the family, because I had friends who were different. He kept
saying that the Arabs would label me as immoral, and that he
is beating me for my own benefit, and for the family’s honour.
One day, I could not tolerate it anymore. I called the police, and
he stopped the beating’ (Norma, 22, female).
She explained that her brother used the ‘Arabs’ as an excuse to interfere in her life
and control her. This shows that the social stereotypes about the ‘Arabs’, in these
terms, had been used to maintain the status quo of Circassians gender relations,
giving men control over women’s lives. However, it shows that they do not live up
to a supposed culture which emphasises women’s respect, and freedom. This
example also shows that the preservation of the well-respected image amongst the
community depends to a great extent on the preservation of gender relations, which
leads to control over women’s lives, and sexuality. One interviewee said that her
father asked her to stay away from ‘closed-minded Bedouins,’ and watch out for
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men at university. She added ‘he did not want me to enter a society which does not
understand my openness’ (Nuha, 22, female). Thuraya, for example, is a married
woman who lives alone with her children, because her husband was pursuing his
studies abroad. She explained that once a Circassian woman gets married she
becomes part of her husband’s family, and she explained that her parents in-law
interfere in her life, despite the fact that she is financially independent, and she is the
one who provides for the household. She said,
‘Our community is very strict. My in-laws believe that they
have the right to interfere in our lives because, once a woman is
married, she becomes part of her husband’s family’ (Thuraya,
38, female).
The repeated usage of the term ‘openness’ to describe gender-relations in the
Circassian community makes one wonder what sort of openness interviewees are
referring to, given most of women interviewees explained that their male family
members interfere in their lives. This sort of questioning becomes more salient when
Circassians say that they have to abide by the strict ruling of their culture.
Elaboration on the term openness revealed that, again in opposition to ‘Arabs’, for
Circassians, it means their tendency towards non-sexually segregated gatherings,
parties, and social events. This leads us to another form of identity marker related to
gender-relations. Gender relations outside familial contexts, in schools, at the
university, and at work, do constitute another point of difference. The relation
between an ‘Arab’ man and a Circassian woman, or a Circassian man and an ‘Arab’
woman, starting from collegiality and extending to friendship, may reflect to a
certain extent differences between both communities. In the first place, it is
important to explain how each community views such relations, and how modes of
interaction differ between both communities.
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5.1.2 Control vs. Respect
‘Another displaced expression of cultural superiority… was
gender relations… many cross-cultural comparisons use
gender relations as a gauge of cultural hierarchy’ (Lie, 2000: 80).
Another aspect interviewees often referred to in order to mark differences
between them and the ‘Arabs’ is the difference between the treatment of women in
‘Arab’ culture and in Circassian culture. Whereas the previous section explored how
gender is ethnicised in familial contexts, this section explores how interviewees
referred to friendship outside familial contexts. One interviewee summed it up as
follows;
‘I am sorry to say this, but for us it is normal to have female
friends. I can meet my female friend’s father, mother and
brothers. I mean, I can even go to her place. It is a normal thing
because we view such relations as either mere friendship or for
marriage. Unfortunately, the Arabic society here views female-
male relations in two narrow dimensions. Male-female
relations for the Arabs can either be sexual or for marriage.
They do not understand the notion of friendship. You either
marry a girl, or no relation should exist because it would mean
sexual involvement’ (Asad, 22 years old, male).
Asad spoke about how he sees friendship between men and women, as a Circassian,
and how the ‘Arabs’ see such relations, from his perspective. This was used by Asad
as an ethnic narrative, in answer to the question what makes you Circassian, and is
in reference to the ‘other’, in the context of Jordan. Interviewees often used
stereotypes of the ‘Arabs’ to mark the differences more clearly, and frequently used
generalisations such as ‘this is the problem of the Arabic society as a whole’ (Asad,
22 years old, male). Men manage the behaviour of female relatives through
controlling their dress, as well as their relations with non-related males, has been
regarded as an important aspect of ‘Arab’ masculinity (Ajrouch, 2004). This does not
mean that this perceived difference between the Circassians and the ‘Arabs’ is ‘real’,
particularly since many women interviewees explained that their male relatives
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interfere in their lives. The example of the interviewee, Norma, who faced violence
from her brother shows that controlling women and placing restrictions on them is
not only an ‘Arab’ behaviour, it is merely a narrative of gender relations, mostly
used by Circassian men, in order to differentiate themselves, and thus present their
culture as superior, as more ‘open’, ‘open-minded’ and ‘respectful towards women’.
Control over women’s lives exists in the Circassian community as well, and control
and restrictions, which are often related to closing the door in the face of any
daughters’ potential sexual activity, are meant ‘to enhance their worth’ (Ajrouch,
2004: 384). The justification of this behaviour is also linked to the concept of honour,
woman’s honour and her family’s, and a woman’s worth has a lot to do with the
preservation of her honour. This is further emphasised by old sayings and proverbs.
Norma said, ‘you know why he used to do it, don’t you? You know the Arabic
saying ‘a girl is like a glass block, once broken it never mends’, he was worried that I
will do something wrong and lose my virginity’ (Norma, 22, female).
Several Arabic sayings emphasise that women should not be involved with
non-related men in any sort of relation. Furthermore, reference to virginity is evident
in the previously mentioned saying, which places high importance, and probably the
greatest proportion of importance, on a woman’s hymen, as it serves as a proof of
virginity for ‘Arabs’. Accordingly, male interviewees, in addition to one woman
interviewee, said that Arabic culture subjects women to control, and places
restrictions on them. Although several pieces of research show that many ‘Arab’
men would not get married to women they have had premarital sex with, and that
they look at them with disdain, this did not seem to be any different amongst
Circassian interviewees (Ajrouch, 2004). Privileging men over women, and giving
them more sexual freedom, is seen as an Islamic practice, but in fact, Islam limits
sexual freedom for both men and women in the same way. Male Circassian
interviewees made use of the stereotypes of ‘Arabs’ oppression towards women to
highlight the differences that relate to gender relations in their culture. Several
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excerpts from the interviews show men insisting that they treat women with respect.
Asked what makes him Circassian, one interviewee answered;
‘For example, it is the relation of guys and girls. I do not
remember that I ever cursed in front of a girl, because it is very
inappropriate. I do not remember ever that a girl walked in and
I did not stand up out of respect’ (Qasim, 22, male).
Other young men also mentioned that respecting women is part of their culture and
upbringing. On the part of Circassian women, who deal with ‘Arab’ men at work, in
schools, supermarkets and universities, reference had been made to ‘Arabs’ non-
understanding attitude towards women’s freedom. Nuha mentioned that she has to
be careful in the presence of ‘Arab’ men.
‘I feel differences for example, when I invite a male friend over,
they think twice before coming…. When I deal with an Arab, I
have to be careful. When I deal with a Circassian guy, I feel that
the minute he realises that I am Circassian it is different; you
feel a spark’ (Nuha, 22, female).
Nuha later explained that she was in a relationship with an ‘Arab’ man, who tried to
control her, and she mentioned that she had to lie to him about where she went, and
whom she saw. An older female interviewee said that she feels more comfortable
with non-Muslim ‘Arab’ men, and feels that they have better levels of understanding
in spite of their different religions. She added,
‘Christian Arabs are not like Muslim Arabs; they are used to
gatherings where there are mixing of the sexes… I am a
Muslim, but Muslim Arabs see Islam differently. They impose
sex-segregation although it is not part of the real Islam, which
we Circassians practice’ (Thuraya, 38, female).
Thuraya also explained that drinking alcohol is normal for Circassians, and that they
do not see it as contradictory to Islam, in contrast to Muslim ‘Arabs’, so she said ‘of
course I prefer to befriend people who drink, because otherwise, I will feel out place
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with Muslim ‘Arabs’ in gatherings or when we go out’. Norma (22, female), who
experienced domestic violence, said,
‘Men are the same anywhere, it does not matter… Now, after
becoming strong and standing against my brother, I do not care
anymore… I do not need to pretend. My boyfriend now is an
Arab Palestinian, and I do not see any difference between us in
terms of culture. He is understanding and loving’ (Norma, 22,
female).
Norma added ‘but I know that my boyfriend is different from other ‘Arabs’, he is
more open-minded, unlike his family’. Shami’s research, conducted between 1979
and 1981, revealed that ‘Arab’ men do not receive invitations to attend Circassian
wedding parties, because ‘Arabs are not used to parties where there is a mixing of
the sexes, and where women dance’ (Shami, 1993: 150).
The ‘Arab’ Middle East has in fact witnessed a decline in sex-segregation
during the past few decades (Moghadam, 2003). In spite of social change, social
stereotypes of the Arabic society as a strictly sexually segregated society have
lingered on. And, while sex-segregation remains an important aspect in the lives of
some families in Jordan, it is no longer the norm. Nonetheless, reference to gender
relations amongst ‘Arabs’, by Circassian interviewees, especially men, always
alluded to negative aspects of Arabic culture, showing the distinctiveness and the
superiority of Circassian culture—a culture that respects women, vis-à-vis Arabic
culture that strengthens control over women.
Interviewees also levelled criticism at the fact that ‘Arab’ masculinity largely
depends on controlling the lives of female relatives, through not allowing them to
befriend non-related males. One interviewee referred to personal experience, which
involved criticism from the Arabic society of his childhood friend and his
behaviours,
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‘I have a childhood friend, we are neighbours, we went to the
same school and university, and we were raised up together.
For example, his mother and sister call me when they need
something. I do not knock on the door when I entre their place,
as if it is my own house. For example, late at night I go to pick
up his sister, and give her a ride home. This is normal; there is
nothing wrong between us… the problem is when some people
see us, they start gossiping and talking. They would say: “look!
He is obviously trying to hit on his friend’s sister.” And, they
would even say: “how does her brother accept that? He must
be girren!”… There is nothing wrong between us’ (Asad, 22,
male).
Asad fears accusations of having sexual intentions towards his friend’s sister,
and his friend fears being accused of being a girren. The colloquial Arabic word
girren, particularly used in Jordan and the Palestinian territories, is normally
employed to degrade men. It is used to refer to men who are not seen as masculine,
because they do not show interest in maintaining their female relatives’ honour. The
word is considered very offensive, as it implies that a man lacks masculinity, and
thus deserves no respect, due to a loss of his honour. This could be either because he
is weak and cannot prevent it, due to an underestimation or negligence of his
honour, or because he prostitutes his female relatives. It is important to explain that
honour, in this particular context, is an exclusively masculine attribute, which
directly places women under the guardianship, and even ownership of men. For a
man to be called girren, actual loss of honour, i.e. fornication involving any of his
female relatives, is not necessary. A man might be so-called if extramarital sexual
conduct on behalf of any of his female relatives was even only assumed (Stewart,
1994).
For Asad, the way people may interpret his behaviour with his friend and his
sister is not acceptable for him, because he sees that there is no loss of honour, i.e.
there is no extramarital sexual conduct going on between them. This shows that for
him, honour is a value he has to respect; it further implies that sexual contact should
not take place between them, and, in that particular case, he acts as a protector of his
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friend’s honour, by picking up his sister when she needs a lift late at night. He adds:
‘my friend trusts me over his honour, and I would never betray his trust’. Honour,
with regard to female relatives, also seems to constitute part of the Circassian
mentality, in the same way it does for ‘Arabs’. However, throughout the interviews,
interviewees tended to explain that the lack of sex segregation in their culture does
not necessarily involve loss of honour. The only difference in that way is that while
the ‘Arabs’, according to interviewees, assume a loss of honour when there is no sex
segregation, because fornication might take place in such situations, for
interviewees, lack of sex-segregation does not mean that extramarital sexual contact
is inevitable, and so does not mean a loss of honour.
Male interviewees’ emphasis on the issue of trusting their female relatives
also made it clear that, for Circassian men, maintenance of honour, through limiting
the sexual activities of female relatives, is important. Additionally, all female
interviewees, except Norma, mentioned that their families trust them, and are sure
that they would not betray this trust, by wrong doing, and bringing shame on them,
which also shows that a woman is part of her family’s honour. It seemed that all
women interviewees had a level of understanding and awareness that any
extramarital sexual activity on their part would have repercussions for their families’
honour. However, they also mentioned that ‘Arab’ families are different to
Circassian families in those terms, because ‘Arab’ women are more oppressed and
abide by strict sexual segregation rules. This emphasis on the oppression of ‘Arab’
women by interviewees is mainly explained in reference to sex-segregation. On the
other hand, interviewees also mentioned that they have to abide by very strict rules
of their culture that are different, but they do not include sex segregation. Sex
segregation in ‘Arab’ culture, generally, was contrasted with the strict rules of age-
group segregation in Circassian culture (Shami, 1993).
Nuha believes that it is easier for an ‘Arab’ girl to join a Circassian
community, than a Circassian girl to join an ‘Arab’ community. She added,
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‘I imagine that Circassian guys deal with their sisters
differently. If a Circassian guy finds out that his sister has a
boyfriend, he would not go mad. But if this happens with an
Arab guy, he would start feeling that he is not masculine if he
lets it be. I think it is easier for an Arab woman to become part
of a Circassian family, than for a Circassian woman to become
part of an Arab family. Women in Arab families are more
oppressed, so an Arab woman will find Circassian men easier
to deal with’ (Nuha, 22, female).
It is evident that gender relations are part of the interviewees’ ethnic
narratives, they are often used to emphasise differences, and define the identity of
their group. Gender relations are also ethnicised, because they mark intergroup
differences, and in the case of research participants criticising gender relations
amongst the ‘Arabs’ seems more like a way to emphasise the superiority of their
culture, by expressing disgust with first-cousin marriages and dissatisfaction with
‘Arabs’ control over women. This section also showed that most of those narratives
with regard to gender relations are constructed, and that those narratives are always
used in comparison to the other ‘Arabs’. Interviewees spoke about differences in
terms of gender relations inside and outside familial contexts; they attempted to
emphasise that Circassian culture has respect for women as one of its values, and
Circassian women are allowed more freedom than ‘Arab’ women. However, those
references were gendered as men were more likely to emphasise that point. This
ethnicisation of gender has also been accompanied with gendering ethnic narratives.
In other words, some ethnic narratives are emphasised in ways that overshadow
women’s role in transmitting ethnicity.
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5.2 Gendering Ethnicity
‘Ethnic identity, dissected by gender, demands a “reading of
the silences”… While understanding the unspoken is a crucial
aspect of any investigation, capturing the silence is particularly
important to feminist research, as it is women’s voices that
have been most often dormant’ (Handrahan, 2002: 39).
Literature on the production and reproduction of ethnic, and national
narratives, largely obscures the role of women in transmitting nationalism, ethnicity,
and culture (Yuval-Davis, 1997). Ethnicising gender and viewing gender relations as
part of ethnic narratives has its implications on women, because the preservation of
traditional gender relations becomes part of the preservation of the ethnic
boundaries of the group. Ethnic narratives are also gendered, and discussions of the
ethnicisation of gender must be accompanied by discussions of gendering ethnicity
to provide a better understanding of how ethnic narratives can influence women’s
lives. On the other hand, by using stereotypes of the ‘Arabs’ and by ethnicising
gender relations, Circassian men find an excuse to control the lives of their female
counterparts, and the emphasis on the importance of gender relations as
distinguishing parts of ethnicity is often used by Circassian men to define ethnic
boundaries and highlight their cultural superiority compared to the ‘Arabs’. This
section focuses on women’s role in transmitting ethnic narratives, and explores how
women are overshadowed by the ‘Arab’ and Circassian patrilineal kinship system,
in addition to the state of Jordan itself, which marginalise women’s important roles
in the reproduction of the group.
Shami (1993) mentions that older Circassian men blame younger generations
for the loss of their culture, while younger men blame women for that loss. She adds
that women are accused of not being nationalistic because, according to men,
Circassian women do not teach their children the language, and more Circassian
women than men married ‘Arabs’. Shami uses the word ‘nationalistic’ here to refer
to ethnic affiliation, and she means that women are not as passionate about ethnicity
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as are their male counterparts. Statistically, it is very hard to compare the number of
women and men who are married to ‘Arabs’ or other non-Circassians. From the
interview sample, as I have mentioned before, all the married interviewees were
married to Circassians, except for the 77 year-old man. However, questionnaire
respondents and interviewees were asked if they preferred to marry non-
Circassians. For many interviewees, gender-relation differences between cultures
suffice as a reason to avoid intermarriage with the ‘Arabs’. This was also justified by
saying that, due to differences clashes might arise in cases of intermarriage. ‘By
avoiding intermarriage, Circassians also avoid cultural clashes, because we have
very strict traditions, which determine all of those things’ (Tariq, 22, male). There is
not much difference in the numbers of men and women Circassians rejecting
intermarriage. On the other hand, when asked to what extent they agree or disagree
with the following statement ‘My homeland is Circassia’, 65.4 percent of women
respondents agreed, compared to 52.8 percent of male respondents. Interestingly,
27.8 percent of men disagreed compared to only 15.4 percent of women, and no
woman strongly disagreed (Table 5.3). This shows that women are more likely to
view Circassia as their homeland.
Table (5.3) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement: ‘My Homeland is
Circassia’?
Answer
Men Women Total
Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages
Strongly Agree 15 41.7% 7 26.9% 22 35.5%
Agree 4 11.1% 10 38.5% 14 22.6%
Neither Agree or
Disagree
7 19.4% 5 19.2% 12 19.4%
Disagree 9 25% 4 15.4% 13 20.9%
Strongly Disagree 1 2.8% 0 0% 1 1.6%
Total 36 100% 26 100% 62 100%
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I suggest that this difference is linked to the gendering of ethnic narratives; by
this I mean that (re)constructions of ethnicities differ between men and women, due
to socio-cultural reasons. For example, questionnaire data also revealed that women
respondents were more likely to believe that their identities were shaped at home,
rather than at school, when compared to their male counterparts. Almost 69.3
percent of women respondents disagreed that their identities were shaped at school,
compared to 41.6 percent of male respondents (Table 5.4). And, 88.5 percent of
female respondents believe that their identities were shaped at home, compared to
77.8 of men (Table 5.5). This difference may be a result of women’s confinement to
the private sphere.
Table (5.4) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement: ‘My identity and sense of
belonging were shaped in school’?
Answer
Men Women Total
Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages
Strongly Agree 5 14% 1 3.8% 6 9.7%
Agree 7 19.4% 4 15.4% 11 17.7%
Neither Agree
or Disagree
9 25% 3 11.5% 12 19.4%
Disagree 7 19.4% 10 38.5% 17 27.4%
Strongly
Disagree
8 22.2% 8 30.8% 16 25.8%
Total 36 100% 26 100% 62 100%
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Table (5.5) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement: ‘My identity and sense of
belonging were shaped at home’?
Answer
Men Women Total
Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages
Strongly Agree 18 50% 13 50% 31 50%
Agree 10 27.8% 10 38.5% 20 32.3%
Neither Agree
or Disagree
4 11.1% 3 11.5% 7 11.3%
Disagree 4 11.1% 0 0% 4 6.4%
Strongly
Disagree
0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
Total 36 100% 26 100% 62 100%
Additionally, women were more likely to agree that preserving their identity
as Circassians is hard. On the question ‘to what extent do you agree or disagree with
the statement ‘preserving my identity as a Circassian is hard’, 58.3 percent of men
disagreed, compared to 42.3 percent of women (Table 5.6). Female respondents, in
response to the statement ‘my origin does not reflect my identity’, showed a variant
position, different to that of their male counterparts, as 23.1 percent of women
neither agreed nor disagreed, compared to 13.9 percent of men respondents. On the
other hand, men were more likely to strongly disagree with the statement, as 44.4
percent of them disagreed compared to 27 percent of women strongly disagreeing
(See table 4.1 on page 134).
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Table (5.6) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement: ‘Preserving my identity as a
Circassian is hard’?
Answer
Men Women Total
Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages
Strongly Agree 3 8.3% 3 11.5% 6 9.7%
Agree 8 22.2% 8 30.8% 16 25.8%
Neither Agree or
Disagree
4 11.1% 4 15.4% 8 12.9%
Disagree 12 33.3% 9 34.6% 21 33.9%
Strongly
Disagree
9 25% 2 7.7% 11 17.7%
Total 36 100% 26 100% 62 100%
Men, also, appeared more enthusiastic towards considering themselves of Jordanian
origin; around 66.7 percent of the men, and 57.7 percent of the women, believed that
they are of Jordanian origin (Table 4.4 on page 137). Those differences indicate that
women find the preservation of their identity, as Circassians, harder than men and
that men are more enthusiastic towards belonging to Jordan than women. These
differences can be accounted for by exploring the gendered narratives of ethnicity.
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5.2.1 ‘Bearers of Collectivities:’ Titanic Roles, Gigantic Responsibilities
‘A mother is a grand school,
If well reared, you establish entire nations’ (Arab Poet Ahmad
Shawqi)
‘A girl must not leave her house more than twice: on the day of
her marriage, on the day of her death’ (Arabic proverb).
In the 1950s, groups of Circassian women started establishing organisations
serving as venues for the community to meet and network. In the seventies, a group
of married Circassian women founded a mixed sex school for Circassians (Shami,
1993), run by the ladies branch of the Circassians Charity Association. The school is
the only school in Jordan that teaches Circassian language. The establishment of the
school and several other organisations reflect only part of Circassian women’s roles
in the preservation of their ethnic identity—the public aspect. Domestically,
however, their roles, and the expectations of their society, are tremendous, as
women are first to be blamed if a loss of their culture, or language, is seemingly
taking place.
Domestically, Circassian mothers are not only responsible for bearing the
children, rearing them, and household chores; they are also responsible for
transmitting their culture and language down through generations. This was
mentioned by all interviewees, who also stated that the role of their fathers was not
as integral in the preservation of their culture as that of their mothers. Many
mentioned that their fathers’ roles inside the household are limited, and they
mentioned a lack of communication and sort of formal relationships with their
fathers. When elaborating on the sort of relationships they have with their fathers,
ten of the interviewees mentioned that this is part of respecting the elderly imposed
on them by a culture, which has strict age-group segregation, particularly between a
father and his children.
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Therefore, Circassian mothers take full responsibility for bringing up the
children, which includes teaching them language and culture. Perhaps it is due to
the realisation that mothers play such an important role in transmitting culture to
future generations, that Circassian men are more likely to disagree with
intermarriage. Thuraya said,
‘I am responsible for two children, I am a full-time mother.
And, I also have to provide for the household, because my
husband decided to carry on with his studies. He keeps
insisting that I should teach my children Circassian, but this
does not work. It would not work because I cannot do all of
these things on my own, and then ask me to teach them
Circassian language. I also have to help them with their
homework, there is no time for other things. The most I can do
is to keep telling them that they are Circassian, and tell them
bedtime stories about our people, and that is it’ (Thuraya, 38,
female).
One interviewee, whose mother is Palestinian, stated that,
‘My father did not have much impact, but he always tells us
that we are of Circassian origin. But he never imposed
Circassian culture and traditions. Sometimes, he tries to tell us
stories, when he remembers his past, but this rarely happens.
He never asked us to learn Circassian language… Many of my
Circassian relatives go spend time in Circassian associations
but I do not. This is because my mother is not Circassian.
Mothers are the basis of the home. And, the father might have a
little impact, but his impact is not as great as that of mothers.
Those who have Circassian mothers maintain their traditions
more than those who are from non-Circassian mothers. Their
cuisine is also different—Circassian’ (Muna, 22, female).
Another interviewee, (Nuha, 22, female), whose maternal grandmother is
Palestinian, explained that she does not speak Circassian, because her mother’s
mother did not speak the language, so her own mother could not speak it, nor teach
it to them. She added that her father speaks Circassian, but he never thought about
223
teaching it to his children. Interviewees who have Circassian mothers appeared
more likely to at least understand the language and emphasise the importance of
their culture (Qasim 22, male, Thuraya, 38 female, Husam 23, male, Asad 22, male,
Norma 22 female, Rana 36 female, Khairi 77 male, Tariq 22 male, Atef, 39 male) . This
shows that the role of mothers is not only limited to the bearing of the children, but
is also responsible for transmitting practices and traditions through upbringing. This
also shows that men and women have different roles in this transmission. While
women’s roles at home is seen as very important, through raising children,
upbringing, and teaching language, men are given the privilege of giving their
children their surnames.
Women are the bearers of the culture, the language, and transmitters of ethnic
narratives at home. Qasim (22, male) explained that his grandmother from his
mother’s side is the one who encouraged him to speak Circassian language; he
added that he practices Circassian with his mother at home. Tariq said,
‘Both of my parents were very insistent on me learning
Circassian. But the mother always does more than the father, in
that sense. Because, for my father, he is a military man, and he
has this traditional Circassian mentality, so he does not talk to
us much. For example, if he sees me watching a Circassian
channel or reading a Circassian book, he mainly commends it,
and that is it. But my mother keeps insisting, and she speaks
much more, and she directs me towards people who teach
Circassian, and she does more. So, my mother has a bigger role
than my father in preserving my identity’ (Tariq, 22, male).
However, the fact that a woman loses her family name after marriage makes it
hard for Circassian women to transfer their ethnic identity to their children. Hiba
(28, female) for example, born to a Circassian mother and a Palestinian father said
she feels that she is Palestinian because her family name is Arabic and, in her words,
‘children follow their father’. This emphasises the importance of family names as
part of ethnic narratives, and shows that, for Hiba for instance, having her father’s
family name makes her non-Circassian, and implies that family names are salient as
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part of ethnic narratives. Hiba, however, mentioned that her mother uses Circassian
recipes to cook, and she also expressed that she hears a lot about Circassian history
and culture. On the other hand, Muna, who has a Circassian family name and a non-
Circassian mother, feels that she lacks understanding of Circassian culture. Muna, a
22 year-old female whose father is Circassian and mother is Palestinian, feared
throughout the interview that she might not be giving the ‘right’ interview answers
she is supposed to give, in order to represent her Circassian community. She kept
saying that she was not sure if she was representing her community ‘correctly’ in her
answers and, in spite of many reassurances that I was interested in hearing her
views, she worried that she is was not helping me to attain an understanding of
Circassian culture. Several interviewees emphasised that their mothers play a major
role in reinforcing their Circassian identities, more so than their fathers. Husam (23,
male) said that his mother encouraged him more than his father to learn the
language; he even expressed his mother’s insistence by saying ‘my mother has a
very traditional Circassian mentality, but my father does not’. He also mentioned
that his married sister tries to teach her children Circassian language, and that his
family communicate with each other in Circassian because of his mother’s
encouragement. Asad stated,
‘My mother used to encourage us to stick to our culture, and to
speak the language. You know how mothers are the ones to
stay at home with children. In our home, the father is
intemperate and strict, you see what I mean? So, she also acts
as a mediator between us and the father. And, she is the first
one to teach us how to speak. When you are young, you spend
most of your time with your mother. The father goes out to
work outside the household, and he does a lot of things. He
started talking to us when we got older, and became mature’
(Asad, 22, male).
Thuraya (38, female) and Atef (39, male) said that their mothers played major roles
in the preservation of their identity. Atef explained that he speaks Circassian
language, but with a Kabardian dialect, very well. He added that his mother is a
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Kabardin, while the rest of the family speaks the Jadough, and that is why he speaks
and understands the Kabardian dialect more. This example shows that the role of his
mother in preserving language is stronger, but he holds his father’s family name.
Thuraya mentioned that she always communicates with her mother in Circassian,
and that her mother even refuses to answer them when they try to communicate in
Arabic. While fathers give names, mothers are responsible for the upbringing, and
teaching their children the language.
It was apparent in the interviews that, in addition to their roles as mothers
and carers, Circassian women are also expected to be bearers of the culture and
expected to transmit ethnic narratives to their children. Moreover, the roles
mentioned by interviewees only partly reflect what Circassian women are
domestically doing in terms of the preservation of their culture, traditions, and
language. It is also worth noting here that all mentioned a lack of communication
with fathers due to their strict cultural age-segregation rules. However, this
segregation does not apply to the mother, meaning that women and children are
placed in the same position, in spite of the age difference between them. Whereas
women are responsible for the transmission of ethnic narratives privately, publicly
they face burdens as well. For example, Norma said,
‘You know how it is here… When you misbehave it is like the
whole community misbehaved. My brother used to beat me
because he suspected that I was misbehaving in front of people.
You have to behave well, be your best in front of people,
because you represent the whole family, community, society,
and maybe the whole country’ (Norma, 22, female).
Nuha (22, female) also said ‘I feel that I represent the Circassian community, so I
have to watch it all the time’. Publicly, Circassian women must act as representatives
for their communities; they carry out the same duties men carry out in those terms,
and women after marriage, like in any authoritarian society (Waylen, 1994), are
supposed to prioritise the domestic.
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Women, before and after marriage, hold their family names, represent their
families’ honour, and are supposed to behave in order to reflect their upbringing.
However, after marriage, whether married to Circassians or ‘Arabs’, their role
becomes more and more tied to the domestic. Interviewees were asked what
ethnicity they would consider their children to have if they marry non-Circassians.
All men unequivocally answered that their children would be Circassian, and
women said that their children would not be considered Circassians. Men explained
that if their sisters married non-Circassians, their children would not be considered
Circassians, as children are named after their fathers. Despite the fact that all
interviewees expressed that mothers are the basis of the home, and that mothers
were the ones who reinforced their ethnic identity, women’s roles were
overshadowed by the emphasis on the ethnic narrative which family names
prioritises due to the patrilineal nature of Arabic as well as Circassian society, and as
previously explained, the name represents origin, and a narrative of ethnicity
interviewees viewed as non-changing, unlike culture and language.
Yuval-Davis (1997) argues that an understanding of national ideologies must
include both an understanding of the public and the private spheres of societies. The
Circassian women’s role inside the household was given greater importance than
her role outside the household, by male interviewees. And, when talking about the
achievements of Circassians in Jordan, it is always in reference to the men, who are
‘loyal,’ ‘strong,’ ‘warriors,’ etc, by both men and women. It is important to note here
that when talking about achievements in the public domain of the state of Jordan,
the reference to men seems to be justified, because the state of Jordan is patriarchal
and women are to a great extent excluded from the public sphere and women are
written out of history. Although it is women who have raised these men and taught
them their culture, they are nonetheless given a marginal status, by simply saying
that children follow the fathers. However, this was seen by many interviewees as
‘natural’, and as part of the ‘norm’. In terms of women’s roles, social norms, between
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the Arabic and the Circassian community do not seem to be very different. Whereas,
in fact, women are the transmitters of Circassian cultural narratives in the
household, the men dominate the public sphere, obscuring the role of women in
terms of the preservation of ethnicity. For example, Tariq said,
‘If I marry a non-Circassian, my children will be according to
religion Circassian. Because kids follow their father’s name and
family name. If my sister marries a non-Circassian, her children
will follow their father. But…. No, no they follow their father…
but you cannot simply… there is a known proverb that says:
‘the mother does the upbringing.’ The mother is the one who
raises the children. So, if a mother is Circassian, she might raise
her children the way she had been raised. But, they will follow
their father; children will carry the father’s name’ (Tariq, 22,
male).
A Circassian woman is expected to raise her children, be responsible of the
upbringing, teach them the culture, and the language, in addition to household
chores, yet she is a woman who cannot transmit a name and the name carries more
weight for Circassians.
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5.2.2 ‘I am Circassian like My Father:’ Patrilineal Structures
‘The most common pattern of unilineal descent is patrilineal
descent- a system of tracing descent through the father’s side of
the family… In nations such as India, where boys are seen as
permanent patrilineal family members but girls are seen as
only temporary family members, girls tend to be more
expendable than boys’ (Kendall, 2008: 492).
In the previous chapter, the notion of family name, and its importance in the
‘Arab’ Middle East and for Circassians, has been extensively discussed. It has been
explained that the concept of family name is a very important part of Circassians
ethnic narratives, in the context of Jordan, as their names do not originate from
Arabic, and are inherited, meaning that their roots can be traced through family
names. However, those names are acquired from the father’s side, and the mother
does not have any recognition, when individuals define themselves according to
their family name. Those who come from Circassian mothers and non-Circassian
fathers are not considered by society and the state, and do not consider themselves
Circassian.
Interviewees mentioned that those who come from non-Circassian fathers are
not Circassian, because people follow their fathers’ group affiliation. For example,
Qasim (22, male) said ‘my aunt is married to a non-Circassian and her children are
definitely not Circassians’. This shows that to be Circassian, for all interviewees,
depends mainly on patrilineal conceptions of descent. This, in addition to the fact
that interviewees expressed the view that family names do not change, sheds
emphasis on the father’s role as a transmitter of a sort of ‘fixed’ ethnic narrative,
according to interviewees’ accounts. The structures that force women into this
marginal position, in terms of the preservation of group identity, can be broken into
three dimensions: ‘Arab’ or Circassian culture, religion, and state-imposed-policies.
Culture, religion and state-imposed policies provide the basis for
patrilineages to find the grounds to prosper and sustain in the Middle East
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(Moghadam, 2003), and this was evident as the patrilineal family structure is seen as
unchangeable by interviewees. Differences based on gender-relations are utilised by
Circassian interviewees to facilitate drawing their own ethnic boundaries, and
showing the superiority of their culture. Interviewees, however, rarely referred to
similarities between them and the ‘Arabs’, other than those related to sharing a land,
civil rights and religion. Aspects of culture and traditions in common to both
communities were normally ignored, as interviewees were seeking elements of
group distinctiveness. Those similarities between both cultures are somehow taken
for granted, and not seen as significant, because people see them as changeable.
Family names are considered part of an unchangeable cultural heritage for men.
However, for women, in both the ‘Arab’ and the Circassian cultures, it is changeable.
Therefore, more women questionnaire respondents agreed with the statement ‘my
origin does not reflect my identity’. This is because women in the patrilineal kinship
system are often seen as temporary members of their family, because they become
part of the husband’s family after marriage (Kendall, 2008), even if origin does
matter for them. It has been established that ‘In the Arab context descent through the
male line determines one’s primary identity throughout one’s life’ (Joseph, 1996b:
15). However, this changes for women after marriage, because keeping and
transferring family names is impossible. Interviewees explained that this is the
norm, and that it is not strange; it is part of both cultures, ‘Arab’ and Circassian.
Also, interviewees said that religion emphasises that children follow their fathers’
name not their mothers. It should be noted, though, that despite the fact that
interviewees with non-Circassian mothers feel that they are inadequately Circassian,
they still insist that they are Circassians, because of their father’s family names.
Moreover, interviewees also referred to state policies as part of the structures
that do not allow women to transmit their identity to their children. Atef (39, male)
said ‘a woman cannot give children a family name by law. Jordan does not allow
women to pass citizenship to their children if married to a foreigner… I believe that
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this is the right way to do it. I am Circassian like my father’. The Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan is signatory to the CEDAW16 Convention, unfortunately it is one
of the states which has reservations on Articles 9.2, 16(1-c-d-g), and 15.4, which are
related to nationality, marriage and family relations, and freedom of movement.
Law in Jordan states clearly that a woman cannot pass citizenship to her children
and husband, and the state retains the right to withhold citizenship rights for
women who are married to non-Jordanian nationals.
Such practices and associated narratives do not only marginalise the role a
Circassian woman plays in transmitting ethnicity, but also places her in a precarious
status. As a Circassian and a woman, Circassian women’s identity is more fluid than
men Circassians, because women lose their family names after marriage. This,
additionally, seems to add to the hardship Circassian women face in terms of the
preservation of their precarious identity, and for that reason women find it harder to
transmit ethnicity. It might be because the state of Jordan excludes women from
transferring their citizenship and family names to their children, that Circassian
women believe they belong to Circassia more than Jordan. And, it is for that reason
that they still believe in the ‘dream homeland’ (Nuha, 22, female; Muna, 22, female;
Thuraya 38, female; and Rana 36, female). Thuraya (38, female) said ‘Circassia is my
dream homeland, I do not know it but it is in my heart! I can never be a pure
Jordanian. I carry my father’s Circassian family name, and my children carry their
father’s Circassian family name’.
16 Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women
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Conclusion
As some of the ethnic narratives the interviewees (re)constructed to define
their ethnicity included gender relations within the Circassian community, this has
its implications on women, such as imposing control over women in the name of
protecting family honour. For example, the fact that Circassian women constitute a
great part of their families’ honour, and that gender relations are used as ethnic
identity markers, legitimises men’s control of Circassian women. Further, Circassian
women are expected to preserve their families’ honour throughout their contacts,
and behaviour outside the house. And this also amplifies women’s duties, as they
are expected to represent their community outside the house. Therefore, control over
women, women’s clothing and women’s sexuality by their male relatives is practised
in many cases using the excuses that the ‘Arabs would not understand’ their
‘openness’. Although many of the ways in which gender relations were used by
interviewees to (re)construct their ethnicities might not be based on ‘real’ differences
between them and the ‘Arabs’, their use was relational and always compared to the
other. Despite this use of gender relations in the Circassian community as ethnic
narratives, and markers of group identity, the prevention of women from
transferring family names, which are an important part of ethnic narratives, is a
Circassian, as well as ‘Arab’ practice, and one which is also reinforced by the state of
Jordan.
The patrilineal kinship system overshadows the role women play in
preserving the identity of their group. In addition to the domestic household chores,
Circassian women are expected to be responsible for the upbringing, transmitting
the culture, teaching the language and representing their community publicly.
Moreover, the strict age-group segregation in Circassian culture applies to fathers,
but not to mothers, placing women and children in the same category. Regardless of
all the responsibilities and roles shouldered by Circassian women, by law and by
culture, they are not allowed to transfer their family names, nor even their
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citizenship. They are there to serve a duty, and fulfil the expectations of their male
relatives and of the wider Circassian community.
The patrilineal social system of kinship marginalises women, and obscures
the tremendous roles they undertake throughout their lives. This could explain why
the majority of women believed that preserving their identities as Circassians is
hard. Also, when the state itself does not provide equal rights to men and women,
women, whether Circassian or ‘Arab’, would undoubtedly feel excluded from the
public sphere, and thus would not have the same degree of belonging to the ‘nation’
as men. This could explain why women Circassian respondents were less likely to
believe that they are of Jordanian origin, and were more likely to believe in their
‘dream homeland’, Circassia. The role the state plays in marginalising women, and
confining them to the private sphere, is briefly explored in the next chapter on the
state of Jordan and its national narratives. The following chapter discusses textbooks
of national and civic education, in addition to the Jordan First campaign. The chapter
focuses on the narratives the state of Jordan promotes in relation to its nationalism. It
also explores how research participants feel about those narratives, and how they
(re)construct them in their own words and views. The next chapter attempts to
answer two questions. Firstly, what are the nationalist narratives and ideologies the
state of Jordan promotes through ‘Jordan First’ and textbooks of national and civic
education? And secondly, how do research participants make sense of and
reconstruct state narratives?
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Chapter Six
State Narratives under Scrutiny
Introduction
As one of the aims of this thesis is to explore the relationship between the
state of Jordan and the Circassian community in terms of narratives of nationalism
and ethnicity, this chapter looks at the nationalist narratives promoted by the state of
Jordan, through the perception of research participants. In the previous chapters, I
identified the narratives research participants use to define their ethnicity, and the
gendered aspects of those narratives. This chapter identifies narratives of
nationalism promoted by the state of Jordan, and shows how those narratives are
gendered, and how gender relations constitute part of those narratives. In addition
to that, it identifies how the narratives themselves are (re)constructed and
(re)configured by research participants to place themselves in the country. This
chapter is based on the data provided in textbooks of national and civic education,
and the Jordan First nationalist campaign official documents, which constitute the
platform through which the state of Jordan promotes and defines its nationalism.
Interviews and questionnaires are used to demonstrate how research participants
(re)construct narratives of state nationalism.
Like the ethnic narratives of the Circassian community, the narratives of state
nationalism in Jordan are often used to emphasise primordial ties to a ‘nation’, and
in this case it has often been the ‘Arab’ nation. On the one hand, interviewees’ use of
narratives is often in relation to the other ‘Arab’. On the other hand, narratives
promoted by the state of Jordan focus on the distinctiveness of the ‘Arab’ nation.
Also, many of the ethnic narratives identified by research participants are related to
gender relations, and gender relations, when compared to the ‘Arabs’, seemed to
serve Circassian research participants an opportunity to emphasise the boundaries
of their group. The state of Jordan also resorts to gender relations as part of its
234
nationalist narratives, and describes the ‘Arab’ nation in terms of gender relations.
State nationalist narratives in many cases have exclusionary effects on women in
general, and on Circassians in particular. There is a contradiction between the
narratives the interviewees used to define their ethnicity, and the narratives the state
of Jordan uses to define its nation. However, meanings of the nation are often
(re)constructed and (re)configured, and although the state of Jordan might define its
nation as ‘Arab’, people contribute to the (re)construction and (re)configuration of
the nation as well. For that reason, the understanding of the Jordanian state
nationalist narratives should be accompanied by an exploration of how people
themselves, and in the case of this research, the Circassian research participants,
make sense of those narratives and how they (re)define them. Therefore, this chapter
explores the official national identity of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and the
(re)construction of research participants to the nationalist narratives promoted ‘from
above’, through civic and national education curriculum, the ‘Jordan First’ national
campaign, and the official webpage of King Abdullah II and King Hussein of Jordan.
The following sections identify two main forms of narratives of nationalism
promoted and utilised by the state of Jordan. The narratives are about Jordanianism,
what it means to be a Jordanian, and the official definition of the state and its
citizens. The very meaning of Jordanianism is constructed of two main ideologies,
‘pan-Arabism’, and pan-Islamism, it is gendered, and gender constitutes part of the
narrative itself, as will be explained later. The other part of the narratives relates to
symbols of the state- the Hashemites and the land, which also symbolise pan-
Islamism and ‘pan-Arabism’. Because state narratives are also contextualised and
relational, so what might be promoted in Jordan, might not be promoted to the
international community. It is important to clarify that the narratives identified in
this chapter are promoted on street level, to the people of Jordan.
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6.1 Deconstructing Jordanianism
‘Nationalism is simultaneously both ideological and utopic
narrative. All nationalism. It seeks to contain the present as it
constructs a legitimating past… a crucial part of negotiating
nationalism, literally and figuratively, is located in a critical
understanding of the complexity of this narrative process and
in the construction, deconstruction, and reconstruction of
(perhaps only parts of?) the dominant national narrative’
(Layoun, 1999: 94).
As boundaries of nations are generally fluid, nationalist narratives of the state
are often (re)constructed. The promotion of state narratives can take place through
media, education, and also through things like street banners. During my stay in
Jordan, and through exposure to TV advertisements, banners on the streets, and the
analysis of the textbooks of national and civic education, I have identified two main
narratives the state of Jordan attempts to promote as the official state identity. Those
narratives relate to ‘Pan-Arabism’, and Pan-Islamism, emphasising the former, and
overlooking the latter. The ‘Pan-Arabist’ narrative focuses on ethnicising ‘Arabism’,
with stress on the culture, ranging from gender relations in and outside the
household to respecting elders, and emphasising the importance of kith and kin.
Understanding ‘Arabism’ and Islamism as national narratives depends to a
great extent on understanding the development of those narratives.
‘Jordan is an indivisible part of the Arab and Islamic nation.
Hence, its national identity is Arab just as Islam is the faith of
the nation, the fountainhead of its civilisation and the source of
values which govern its conduct’(The Jordanian National
Charter, 1990) (Original English).
For a very long period of time, Jordan remained under the rule of the
Ottoman Empire, until the Great Arab Revolt in 1916. Jordan went through several
transformations, starting from naming the area, to modernisation and reform
processes. Following the fall of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, Jordan came under
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British rule, along with the occupied Palestinian territories; they constituted the
British mandate of Palestine. In 1923, Britain granted Abdullah I nominal
governance over the area under the name of the Emirate of Transjordan. He
remained the Emir of Transjordan under British mandate until 1946, and later
became King of Transjordan, which encompassed the territories of the West Bank,
Gaza, Israel, and Jordan. In 1949, following the 1948 Arab-Israeli war, Abdullah
became king of what is now known as the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, deriving
its name from the ruling Hashemite dynasty, originating from the Hejaz region in
Saudi Arabia (Anderson, 2001, Simon, 1974). It has been argued that the Hashemites,
‘Constructed a reality they wanted the new Jordanian citizens
to accept, namely the legitimacy of Hashemite rule and the
state boundaries drawn by the British colonizers. The purpose
was to envision a Jordanian “imagined community” radiating
out from and dependent upon the Hashemite kings’
(Anderson, 2001: 5).
Textbooks of national and civic education clarify the Hashemites’ position, and the
basis of their ideologies. They also show that being Jordanian to a great extent
depends on loyalty towards the Hashemites, as the founders of the state, and its
national narratives. The Hashemites promote narratives about themselves as the
‘founding fathers’ of Jordan and ‘Pan-Arabism’ as the ethnicity of the people of
Jordan.
However, one may wonder how a family from the Hejaz region was able to
rule an area they had no previous linkages with. Several authors explain this
through identifying the social structures the Hashemites tend to promote and
enforce upon the population of Jordan. Anderson (2001), for example, does this by
providing an analysis of Jordanian textbooks, and an unpacking of the Hashemites’
nationalist ideology. It has been concluded, on several occasions, that the
Hashemites make use of ‘Pan-Arabism’ and Islamic laws to create Jordanian
nationalism that is relevant to that area (Anderson, 2001, Anderson, 2002, Massad,
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2001). Many of these studies identify what the Hashemites promote to legitimise
their sovereignty, but what they do not pay attention to, however, is the way in
which what they promote is (re)constructed by social actors.
Jordan, like many other nation-states in the Middle East, uses both Pan-
‘Arabism’ and territorial nationalism as its official nationalist identity. For example,
the official name of Egypt is the Arab Republic of Egypt, and Syria’s official name is
the Syrian Arab Republic.17 It has been noted that nation-states in the Middle East
have a dual character, one that is based on ‘Arabism’, on the one hand, and
territorial nationalism on the other. In Arabic, ‘Pan-Arabism’ is Pan-nationalism,
referred to, as Qawmeyah, and the other is territorial nationalism, referred to as
wataneyah (Anderson, 2002). Qawmeyah, derived from the word Qawm meaning the
people in Arabic, includes all ‘Arabs’ scattered around the Middle East. Wataneyah,
on the other hand, derived from the word watan meaning the homeland, refers to the
territory of the homeland, rather than the people. Therefore, Jordanianism is about a
form of wataneyah and, at the same time, ‘Pan-Arabism’ and Pan-Islamism are part of
the nationalist narratives promoted by the state of Jordan. Although much of the
focus of those narratives is on ‘Pan-Arabism’, the Hashemites also claimed the
throne in Jordan through promoting the fact that they are the legitimate descendents
of the prophet, which gives them legitimacy to rule (Appendix F, Hashemite Family
Tree). Due to the history of Islam in the region, and the fact that Islam had been used
for long during the Ottoman Empire, and before, as a form of nationalist identity to
unify diverse ethnic groups and nations, Pan-Islamism remains part and parcel of
how the people define themselves, within their territories, and some parts of the
‘Arab’ World18 still consider it an ideology of unification. The narrative of ‘Arabism’
is also gendered and gender relations are used as markers of state official identity, as
explained in the following sections.
17 In 1958, Syrian and Egyptian officials merged Syria and Egypt, under the name of the United Arab
Republic, headed by Jamal Abdel Nasser. However, this unity failed in 1961.
18 The Arab World refers to Arabic speaking countries
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6.1.1 Pan-Nationalism: Jordan’s ‘Pan-Arabist’ Qawmeyah
‘It is associated with our deep conviction that the survival of
this (Arab) nation, and its resurgence, as well as the
assumption of its rightful place among other nations, is closely
linked to its comprehensive unity. For the Arab nation to be
capable of contributing and taking the initiative rather than
being at the receiving end of events, and to participate rather
than react, it should be acting as one, deserving of its national
heritage, and its proud glories, through the resumption of
constructive contribution and participation in the progress of
humanity as one cohesive nation’ (Original English).
King Hussein’s Address on the Eve of the General Elections
Amman
October 7, 1989 (The Royal Hashemite Court, 2001)
In 1916, the Hashemite Sheriff Hussein bin Ali started the Great Arab Revolt
against Ottoman rule over the area of the Middle East. The basis of the revolt was to
secure the area’s independence from the Ottoman Turks, aiming at creating a single
unified ‘Arab’ state, through, as historical sources cite, entering an alliance with ‘the
British and the French’ (Halliday, 2000b: 208). By 1918, the ‘Arabs’, led by the
Hashemites, succeeded in overthrowing the Ottomans, hoping to achieve their
dream of a united ‘Arab’ state. Unfortunately, their conquest had been taken by the
British, who were supposed to only help the ‘Arabs’, and not take possession of their
territories. The British and the French allies granted the Hashemites nominal rule
over selected areas in the Middle East. Later in its history, British and French
withdrawal from the Middle East led to the creation of separate ‘Arab’ states.
However, at that time, ‘Pan-Arabism’ came as a form of nationalism to replace
another Pan-nationalist ideology, Pan-Islamism. ‘Pan-Arabism’ is a form of cultural
nationalism that celebrates ‘Arab nationalism,’ and the origins of ‘Arabs’, despite the
presence of ‘non-Arabs’ in the Middle East such as the Kurds and Circassians.
The fall of the Ottoman Empire resembles the fall of the Holy Roman Empire,
which came ‘as a reaction to centralised international authority. Its establishment,
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which many writers date from the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, constituted a
rejection of the universalist pretensions of the Holy Roman Empire… to defend the
sovereignty and independence of separate states’ (Nau and Lester, 1985: 44).
However, in the case of the Ottoman Empire, the challenge had been the creation of
a different form of separate states—states based on the notion of ‘Arabism’. In 1952,
the term ‘Arab’ appeared for the first time in the Jordanian constitution, as a way of
‘defining the state’s supranational identity’ (Massad, 2001: 40). At the same time, the
constitution set definitions of the state’s cultural, religious, and linguistic identities;
‘the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is an independent Arab state… Islam is the state
religion and Arabic its official language’ (ibid: 40). Although, the main official
narratives about the identity of the state are ‘Pan-Arabism’, and Islamism, they are
always used in reference to the Hashemites and their achievements. For example,
books of national and civic education to a great extent portray the Great Arab Revolt,
as the greatest legacy of the Hashemites, and a point of pride for the Jordanian
nation. At the same time, they also portray the Hashemites as ‘the fathers’ and the
protectors of ‘Arab’ identity (Twelfth grade textbooks, taught to 18 year old
students). There is no unit, in the books of national and civic education, which
explains the concepts ‘Pan-Arabism’ and Islamism as the official state identity;
however, the terms are frequently used as part and parcel of ‘the Hashemite
ideology’ (Twelfth grade textbooks, taught to 18 years old). Further, in textbooks the
term ‘Arab’ is often used to refer to the people of Jordan, who allegedly attained
independence from the Ottomans through the Great Arab Revolt led by the
Hashemite Sheriff Hussein. Additionally, the most confusing part of the nationalist
narratives identified in the ‘Jordan First’ nationalist campaign and books of national
and civic education is that all the narratives about the state’s official identity revolve
around the Hashemites. They explicitly suggest that the Hashemite family is the
major pillar of the state, not the people or the land, and implicitly suggest that they
are the basis of ‘Pan-Arabism’. For example, in the first grade at the age of six,
students are expected to read and memorise this paragraph,
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‘The Hashemite family led the Arab nation, and established the
Arab glory since the days of the old Arab tribe Quraish. The
Arab tribe Quraish was a very well respected and a powerful
tribe in the Arabian peninsula. The Hashemites service of the
holy sites in Mecca and Madina lasted for centuries and history
tells of the Hashemites and of their state building, as well as
their endeavours to achieve Arab independence, sovereignty
and dignity’ (Original Arabic) (First grade textbook taught to
students aged six).
In the educational scheme of second grade national and civic education in
Jordan under the Homeland theme, pupils (aged seven) are expected to name the
leader of the Great Arab Revolt, and recognise his picture, highlight and value the
role of Sharif Hussein, memorise the slogan of the Great Arab Revolt and follow it,
draw in colours the flag of the Great Arab Revolt, and compare it to the flag of
Jordan. For the fourth grade Homeland theme, pupils (aged nine) are expected to
recognise the importance of Jordan’s belonging to its Arabic nation, become aware
that borders between ‘Arab’ countries are fictitious, be aware of the importance of
‘Arab’ cooperation and autonomy, and identify Jordan’s role in supporting its ‘Arab
brothers’. In the fifth grade under the theme National Security and International
Peace, students (aged ten) are supposed to be acquainted with Jordan’s regional
‘Arab’ role in peacekeeping. In the sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth grades
under the theme Jordan’s Cultural History, pupils (aged 11, 12, 13, 14 and 15) are
expected to clarify the importance of Arab-Islamic role in shaping the cultural
character of the region and value it, and value ‘Arab’ and Muslim civilisation’s
contribution to human civilisation. In the twelfth grade, students (aged 18) are
taught, under a theme called the Hashemites (position and ideologies), reasons, aims
and results of the Great Arab Revolt, and the value and the significance of the
Hashemites’ role in the modern ‘Arab’ Renaissance (See Appendix E for units
details).
Despite the fact that throughout history the dream of a united ‘Arab’ state has
been impossible to fulfil, students in Jordanian schools are taught that borders
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between ‘Arab’ countries are fictitious because all ‘Arabs’ belong to one nation,
under which umbrella they are divided into separate states according to the land
they occupy. Each ‘Arab’ state in the Middle East embraces the notion of ‘Pan-
Arabism’ in reference to the nation, and the official name of each country refers to
the territory it is occupying. ‘Pan-Arabism’ refers to the ‘Arab’ people, while
territorial nationalism, such as Jordanianism refers to the territory on which Jordan
had been established. ‘Arabism’ and Islamism are often used to describe the cultural
character of the people, the cultural heritage, the language, as well as authenticity.
For example, students are taught the importance of kith and kin, and gender
relations in ‘Arab’ societies.
In chapter five, gendered ethnic narratives and ethnicised gender narratives
of the Circassian community were identified. In textbooks of national and civic
education narratives of gender relations are also ethnicised, and narratives of
ethnicity are also gendered. In other words, state promoted nationalist narratives are
based on ethnicity, i.e. the ‘Arab’ nation is constructed as an ethnic group. Thus, the
view that ‘Arabism’ is an ethnicity makes the official nationalist identity of the state
ethnonational, and that has gender implications. In other words, like the case with
the narratives of ethnicity the research participants used, narratives of ‘Arabism’
‘from above’ reinforce the idea that women’s role is bringing up the children,
teaching them cultural practice, etc. Also, to distinguish the ‘Arab’ nation from
others, the rights and duties of women in Islam, which is seen as part of the ‘Arab’
tradition, are discussed and contrasted with women’s rights according to
international conferences and decrees. This shows that narratives of nationalism are
constructed and contextualised like ethnic narratives, and are used in relation to the
other, and to distinguish one ‘nation’ from another, or to define one state from
‘others’. Gender relations, and specifically the preservation of the family unit, are
given particular attention in textbooks of national and civic education. The units
relating to the family are under the heading ‘family and town’. First, second, third,
fourth, seventh, eighth, ninth, and eleventh grade students, aged six, seven, eight,
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nine, 12, 14, 15 and 17, learn about the importance of the family and the town, in
terms of social relations, roles and responsibilities of family members, importance of
ties with neighbourhood members, and ‘authenticity’. Those themes are always
portrayed as part of the ‘Arab’ culture, and Islamic traditions, ‘which constitute the
basis of Jordanian society’ (Fourth grade).
Those themes help in reinforcing gender hierarchy and a gender division of
labour, of women being carers and men being breadwinners for their households.
For example, first grade students are taught to differentiate between the role of their
fathers and mothers within the household; fathers as heads of the household and
breadwinners, and mothers as carers. This reinforces the gender hierarchy and the
ascribed gender roles within the family unit, attributed to ‘Arab’ culture, amongst
students. And, this also emphasises the importance of the family unit as the main
base of social organisation in Jordanian society. The family unit is often used as a
narrative to distinguish the Arabic society from others, and this is emphasised in
textbooks of national and civic education. However, the arguments develop as
students go on to later grades, to include women’s rights inside the family.
This is all put in the context of nationalist narrative, and a marker of
‘authenticity’ of Jordanian society. The preservation of gender hierarchy and the
family unit, as part of Arabic culture, are talked about as if they are necessary to
preserve Jordanian society itself. For example, students are taught the difference
between the nuclear family and the extended family, and they learn that
interconnectivity with their extended families is very important for their wellbeing.
The use of gender as a narrative of nationalism has its implications for women, and
at the same time seen as a fundamental component of nationalism in ‘Arab’
countries. Most importantly, the insistence on preserving the family unit through
promoting it as a national narrative places women under certain rules, and roles,
that are seen as vital for the survival of the whole society. Barakat (1993), for
example, says,
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‘The Arab family may be described as the basic unit of
production and the centre of Arab social organisation and
socioeconomic activities. It… [is] a patriarchal, pyramidally
hierarchical (particularly with respect to sex and age)…’ (ibid:
97).
He goes on to explain that this view of the family unit makes family members
responsible for each other’s behaviour, and this makes control over women and
children justified on the level of society and the state, because men’s ascribed roles as
heads of households give them power and control over women. Sharabi (1988)
explains why the family unit is very important for rulers in ‘Arab’ states. He says,
‘The nation as family, a metaphor very dear to Arab rulers-
revolutionary, conservative, and semi-tribal alike - is the trans-
ideological model of authority common to all neopatriarchal
regimes, regardless of ideology or socioeconomic system… the
same authoritarian vertical relations existed everywhere,
preventing genuine social integration and keeping the majority
of the population outside the mainstream of social and political
life’ (Sharabi, 1988: 132-3).
The preservation of hierarchal relations within the family unit helps to reinforce
hierarchal relations in the public sphere, with rulers at the top of the pyramids, thus
excluding the majority of the population.
Using gender relations as a narrative promoted by the state to define the
boundaries of its nation serves the state of Jordan in promoting a form of
nationalism that is based on Arabic culture. The exclusion of women from the public
sphere, as part of the family unit narrative, is also supported by laws that strengthen
patriarchal structures in the society, such as civil status laws (El-Azhary Sonbol,
2003). Further, the patrilineal kinship system of the ‘Arab’ society, as explained in
chapter five, is also given particular attention in textbooks of national and civic
education, as part of Arabic culture, and as a marker of nationalism. The texts bring
up the patrilineal kinship system by shedding light on the importance of the
extended family in individuals’ lives, as part of Arabic culture and ‘authenticity’. In
the seventh grade, students, aged 11, read, ‘the family is the basic unit of society…
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the preservation of the authentic form of the family is important for preserving
authentic Arab and Islamic traditions’ (seventh grade, students aged 11).
Textbooks of national and civic education serve as a platform to define what
is meant by ‘Arabism’, and the reference to Arabic culture, the importance of kith
and kin, contribute to making the narrative of ‘Arabism’ an ethnic one. However, the
ways people reconstruct those narratives are different. As previously mentioned,
students are expected to identify the picture of Sharif Hussein, the leader of the
Great Arab Revolt, amongst other ‘Arab’ figures. In an attempt to evaluate the extent
to which these books are able to deliver their message to ‘non-Arab’ Circassians,
questionnaire respondents were asked to choose a name for the picture of the
following personalities; Abdelqader al-Husaini, who is a Palestinian activist, King
Abdullah I, and King Hussein bin Talal. Surprisingly, only 3.2 percent of the total
respondents got the wrong name for the Palestinian activist, Abdelqader al-Husaini,
while 21 percent and 19.3 percent of them responded incorrectly for the pictures of
King Abdullah I, and King Hussein bin Talal respectively (Tables 6.1, 6.2 & 6.3).
Table (6.1) Who is in the following picture ‘picture of Abdelqader al-Husaini’?
Numbers Percentages
Right Answer 43 69.4%
Wrong Answer 2 3.2%
Don’t Know 17 27.4%
Total 62 100%
Table (6.2) Who is in the following picture (picture of King Abdullah I)
Numbers Percentages
Right Answer 42 67.7%
Wrong Answer 13 21%
Don’t Know 7 11.3%
Total 62 100%
Table (6.3) Who is in the following picture (picture of King Hussain bin Talal)
Numbers Percentages
Right Answer 43 69.4%
Wrong Answer 12 19.3%
Don’t Know 7 11.3%
Total 62 100%
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Additionally, questionnaire respondents were asked to choose the flag, from
the flags of Jordan, of the Adyghe (the flag of the Circassian people), and of the
Great Arab Revolt, that represented their Qawmeyah (a term used to refer to
nationalism in relation to the people or an ethnic group); none of them chose the flag
of the Great Arab Revolt, and the majority of respondents chose the Adyghe flag
(Table 6.4). Circassian respondents are evidently more likely to choose the Adyghe
flag to represent their people. This is because the concept of ‘Arabism’ is based on
ethnicity, and most research participants did not identify with it. However, on the
question of which flag represents your Wataneyah (a term used to refer to
nationalism in relation to a territory), the majority chose the flag of Jordan, while
none chose the flag of the Great Arab Revolt (Table 6.5).
Table (6.4) Which of the following flags represents your Qawmeyah?
Answer
Men Women Total
Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages
Flag of Jordan 5 13.9% 5 19.2% 10 16.1%
Adyghe Flag 27 75% 21 80.8% 48 77.4%
Flag of the Great
Arab Revolt
0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
Flag of Jordan and
the Adyghe Flag
4 11.1% 0 0% 4 6.5%
Total 36 100% 26 100% 62 100%
Table (6.5) Which of the following flags represents your Wataneyah?
Answer
Men Women Total
Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages
Flag of Jordan 22 61.1% 18 69.2% 40 64.5%
Adyghe Flag 10 27.8% 6 23.1% 16 25.8%
Flag of the Great
Arab Revolt 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
Flag of Jordan and
the Adyghe Flag
4 11.1% 2 7.7% 6 9.7%
Total 36 100% 26 100% 62 100%
In feedback to the questionnaire, many respondents expressed that they did not
recognise the flag of the Great Arab Revolt, and many said they had not seen it
246
before, although students are expected to recognise it from early stages in their
school life. Moreover, respondents were also asked which flag represented their
homeland. While no one chose the flag of the Great Arab Revolt, and respondents
were divided between the Adyghe (flag of the Circassian people) and the Jordanian
flags (Table 6.6).
Table (6.6) Which of the following flags represents your homeland?
Answer
Men Women Total
Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages
Flag of Jordan 19 52.8% 12 46.2% 31 50%
Adyghe Flag 16 44.4% 13 50% 29 46.8%
Flag of the Great
Arab Revolt 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
Flag of Jordan and
the Adyghe Flag 1 2.8% 1 3.8% 2 3.2%
Total 36 100% 26 100% 62 100%
When asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the statement ‘the Arab
world is my Homeland’, respondents were more likely to disagree; 48.4 percent of
them disagreed and 29 percent of them neither agreed nor disagreed (Table 6.7).
However, women were more likely to agree with the statement, 34.6 percent
compared with 13.9 percent of men. This reflects different views between male and
female Circassian respondents.
Table (6.7) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement: ‘the Arab world is my
homeland’?
Answer
Men Women Total
Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages
Strongly Agree 0 0% 5 19.2% 5 8.1%
Agree 5 13.9% 4 15.4% 9 14.5%
Neither Agree or
Disagree 13 36.1% 5 19.2% 18 29%
Disagree 10 27.8% 7 27% 17 27.4%
Strongly Disagree 8 22.2% 5 19.2% 13 21%
Total 36 100% 26 100% 62 100%
Although a great part of the national and civic education schemes in Jordan
depends on promoting a ‘Pan-Arabist’ nationalist narrative to students, this seems to
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have failed among the ‘non-Arab’ Circassian research participants, who do not
consider themselves part of the Qawm, the nation. As citizens of Jordan, Circassians
do not consider themselves part of the ‘Arab’ nation, although ‘Pan-Arabism’ is the
state’s supranational identity. Around 93.6 percent of respondents agreed to the
statement Jordan is an ‘Arab’ country, and none of them disagreed (Table 6.8). This
shows that respondents recognise Jordan as an ‘Arab’ country, and ‘Pan-Arabism’ as
the state’s pan-national identity. However, at the same time respondents did not
associate themselves with the flag of the Great Arab Revolt, to represent their
Qawmeyah, and that could be due to the fact that ‘Arabism’ is ethnically based, and
the word Qawmeyah is associated with an ethnically related nation, hence why most
respondents chose the Circassian Adyghe flag to represent their Qawmeyah.
Table (6.8) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement: ‘Jordan is an Arab
country’?
Answer
Men Women Total
Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages
Strongly Agree 21 58.4% 14 53.8% 35 56.5%
Agree 12 33.3% 11 42.3% 23 37.1%
Neither Agree or
Disagree 3 8.3% 1 3.9% 4 6.4%
Disagree 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
Strongly Disagree 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
Total 36 100% 26 100% 62 100%
Interviews provided more elaboration on respondents’ attitudes towards ‘pan-
Arabism’, the ‘Arabs’, and the Great Arab Revolt. The greatest proportion of
interviewees referred to the Great Arab Revolt as a change in history which does not
involve them, as they do not consider themselves ‘Arabs’. For example, Nuha stated,
‘I consider myself Jordanian, but I have a problem if I am seen
as an Arab. For me, when someone asks me, I say that I do not
have Arabic roots, I have a Jordanian nationality, and I belong
to Jordan; it is my home... The Great Arab Revolt does not
concern me much, as a person. But, ok fine; they got their
independence and everything, but good for them’ (Nuha, 22,
female).
It is very important to note here that books of national and civic education,
when explaining the impact of the Great Arab Revolt, mention that it provided the
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basis for nation-state building in the whole of the ‘Arab’ World, implying that Jordan
itself is a product of the Revolt. However, when asked if the Revolt triggers any
feelings or emotions for them, all interviewees made it clear that it does not concern
them, it does not trigger any emotions in them, and that it did not have an impact on
them as Circassians. Eight interviewees mentioned that it had been a double edged
sword for the ‘Arabs’, as it also allowed the British to colonise the land the ‘Arabs’
liberated from the Ottomans. Others mentioned that it is a Revolt, which was based
on demanding freedom and rights, and for that reason they respect it but they do not
have any emotions towards it. Moreover, two interviewees mentioned that
Circassians played a role in the Great Arab Revolt, and supported the Hashemites in
defeating the Turks. However, they mentioned different motives their ancestors had;
‘The Arab revolt is not part of my history; it is called the great
Arab Revolt [with emphasis on Arab]. It is part of the history of
the Watan I am living in, but this is not my history. The
Circassians took part in the Arab revolt, but it was not that big
of a role. They were there at that time, they did not do it for the
Arabs; they mainly did it because throughout history the Turks
betrayed Circassians’ (Tariq, 22, male).
Another interviewee also expressed,
‘The great Arab revolt is like any other revolt. It does not
trigger any feelings for me. I respect any revolt if it is based on
demanding rights, freedom, ending occupation and injustice. It
is like any other revolt, and the world has seen many other
revolts’ (Thuraya, 38, Female).
Although a significant part of the national and civic education schemes in
Jordan attempt to enforce, under the ‘Homeland’ theme, the importance of the Great
Arab Revolt, together with its flag and its slogan, Circassians do not identify with
the Revolt as part of their history, and very few of them recognised its flag.
Additionally, respondents preferred to look at Jordan as their Homeland, and
rejected being part of the ‘Arab’ World. For example, Thuraya said,
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‘I can say that I prefer to call myself Jordanian-Jordanian, not
Jordanian-Arab, or Jordanian-Muslim, because I do not prefer
to be an Egyptian-Arab, or an Algerian-Arab, or a Moroccan-
Arab. If they make me choose between other nationalities, in
addition to Jordanian, I would only take a passport that is
Caucasian’ (Thuraya, 38, Female).
In addition to books of national and civic education, within the official document of
the Jordan First nationalist campaign it is also mentioned that although Jordan First
includes a philosophy that places Jordan’s interests at the forefront,
‘The philosophy does not fall back on issues of concern to the
Arab Nation, or isolate the country from the wider Islamic
circle, in the focal point of which Jordan, under the
Hashemites, has always been. According to the Constitution,
the Jordanian people are “part of the Arab Nation” and “Islam
is the religion of the State”’ (MOFA, 2004) (Original English).
However, interviewees who consider themselves Jordanians of Circassian
origins all expressed that they did not feel that they are part of the ‘Arab’ nation,
despite the fact that the state of Jordan defines itself in terms of ‘Pan-Arabism’.
Textbooks of national and civic education, in addition to the Jordan First campaign,
apparently succeed in emphasising the idea that Jordan is an ‘Arab’ country, and
that its nationalism is based on the narrative of ‘Arabism’, as an ethnicity and
culture. For that reason, research participants’ ethnic narratives are different, and
contradictory to those of the state of Jordan.
Perhaps the promotion of ‘Pan-Arabist’ narratives failed to create a sense of
belonging towards the ‘Arab’ nation amongst research participants. Nonetheless, the
narratives are (re)constructed by research participants, as part of a Jordanianism
they do not identify with. Some respondents preferred to view the ‘Arabist’
narrative of the state in relation to language, rather than a bond of blood relations,
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and that is explored in chapter seven. Although most research participants do not
identify with the ‘Pan-Arabist’ narrative of the state, most of them mentioned that
they identify more with the state’s religious identity, as part of the nationalist
narratives promoted by the state of Jordan. So whilst the concept of ‘Arabism’
appeared throughout all units in the school textbooks of national and civic
education, and Islam was not mentioned as a form of nationalist ideology, but rather
mentioned to support the ‘Pan-Arabist’ nationalist ideology, research participants
preferred to see Islam as a narrative of Jordanian nationalism.
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6.1.2 Pan-Islamism: Overlooked ‘from above’, Emphasised ‘from Below’
‘My homeland is the Islamic world. I live in part of the Arab
world, but for me Islam comes first... Jordan contains Muslims
and Christians, but since the ruler is Muslim, the country is
Islamic. The religion of the country is set according to the
rulers. Jordan is an Islamic country, because the head of the
state is a Muslim’ (Khairi, 77, male).
Khairi identifies himself as a Muslim, first and foremost, and he draws that as
a point of similarity between him and the state of Jordan, which he sees as Islamic.
Since the emergence of Islam, the Middle East, the Arabic speaking Muslim world,
and the non-Arabic speaking Muslim world has witnessed shifts in terms of the form
of collective identity shared by Muslims. As a starting point, Prophet Muhammad
asked his followers to migrate, along with himself, from Mecca to Al-Medina erasing
all the geographical and tribal boundaries that existed before. This represented a
shift from tribal, national paradigms of communities to a community that ‘could
strive to transcend this base tribalism in the name of a greater unity’ (Mandaville,
2002: 63).
The creation of such a unity meant that identities of Muslims have to be
based, above all, on Islam, and that Islam supersedes all other forms of geographic,
ethnic and national divisions amongst them, and labels its followers as ummah
(Marranci, 2004). While the term itself had emerged by the mid 1870s (Qureshi,
1999), Pan-Islamism, the unifying notion of the Islamic ummah, as a phenomenon
dates from the beginning of Islam (Ozcan, 1997).
The death of Prophet Muhammad, in 632 AD, did not mean the end of Islamic
ummah as a form of collective identity, as Pan-Islamism paved the way for the
creation of a state; the caliphate. The caliphate represents the political form of
leadership of the ummah. Caliphates, headed by a caliph, or head of the state, started
to exist straight after the death of Muhammad, and ended by the fall of the Ottoman
Empire. The Caliphate governed the Muslim world, and constituted a form of a
state, based on religion.
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The main caliphates governing the Muslim world were the Rashidun from
632 to 661, the Umayyads between the 7th and the 8th centuries, the Abbasids,
between the 8th and the 13th centuries, and the Shadow Caliphate, between the 13th
and the 16th centuries, and finally, the Ottomans between the 16th and the 20th
centuries. Several other Caliphates had also been established simultaneously with
others, such as the Fatimids, who ruled Shiite Muslims between 909 and 1171.
However, the right to a single state for Islamic ummah ended with the end of the
Ottoman Empire that had been challenged by the rise of ‘Pan-Arabism’, triggered
and inflamed by the Hashemite Sharif Hussein bin Ali.
‘Pan-Arab’ nationalist ideology had been criticised, as many looked at it as a
divisive factor between the whole of the Muslim community or ummah. For example,
Sayid Qutub, the founder of modern radical Islam, stated ‘I believe that the bonds of
ideology and belief are sturdier than those of patriotism based upon region and that
this false distinction among Muslims on a regional basis is but one consequence of
crusading and Zionist imperialism which must be eradicated’ (Quoted in Mortimer,
1982: 271). Islamists, like Sayid Qutub, accused ‘Arab’ nationalists of following
western ideals, and serving Zionism (Yom, 2005). On the other hand, ‘Arab
nationalists have often considered Islam as a most valuable part of the heritage,
turath, of the Arab nation alongside language’ (Zubaida, 2004: 407). Another ‘Arab’
nationalist, Rashid Rida, said,
‘The greatest glory in the Muslim conquests goes to the Arabs,
and that religion grew and became great through them. Their
foundation is the strongest, their light the brightest, and they
are indeed the best ummah brought forth to the world a little
knowledge of past and present history shows that most of the
countries where Islam was established were conquered by the
Arabs’ (Quoted in Haim, 1962: 22-3).
Despite the fact that many ‘non-Arabs’ contributed to the prospering of Islam
throughout history, ‘Arab’ nationalists used this claim to religiously legitimise their
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‘pan-Arabist’ nationalist movements, and emphasise the superiority of ‘Arab’
Muslims over ‘non-Arab’ Muslims.
Throughout the analysis of books of national education and the Jordan First
campaign document, as well as the official website of King Abdullah II and King
Hussein I, there was almost no mention of the Islamic ummah, or Pan-Islamism as a
form of nationalist narrative. Islam has been, rather, used to define the state’s
religion, and always in reference to Jordan’s Islamic heritage and laws. For example,
in the sixth grade, students read,
‘The Arabs held the banner of Islam, and spread it around the
world. They had the most prominent role in shaping the
Islamic civilisations that persisted in the whole region’ (Sixth
grade, taught to students aged 11).
In the first grade, under the Homeland theme, students are expected to become
proud of their homeland and of its Arabic and Islamic community. In the fifth grade,
under the theme Cultural History of Jordan, students are taught the importance of
Jordan as a path for the armies of Islamic conquerors, and under the theme the ‘State
of Jordan and its Institutions’, fifth, sixth, and tenth grade students are taught
human rights and democracy under Islamic law. In the sixth, seventh, eighth, ninth
and tenth grades, under the theme Cultural History of Jordan, students are taught
the importance of the Arab-Islamic role in shaping the civilisation characteristics of
the region and value it. In the twelfth grade under the ‘Hashemites’ theme, students
are expected to trace the Hashemites’ origins, and their position during pre-Islamic
and Islamic periods, and they are taught the Hashemites’ role in terms of supporting
Islam and valuing it.
In Jordan’s national and civic educational scheme, the Jordan First campaign,
and on the official webpage of the kings, Islam is never mentioned in reference to the
state’s official identity. This could be explained by the fact that the Hashemites
founded Jordan on the ideology of ‘Pan-Arabism’ rather than Islamic ummah. Islam
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is always mentioned in reference to the people’s religion, culture, heritage, laws, and
history, as part of the ‘Pan-Arabist’ narrative of nationalism. Additionally, in
textbooks of national and civic education, Islam, as a religion not as a national
narrative, is used to justify the ‘Arabist’ tendency to preserve the family unit, and to
maintain the hierarchical relations within the household. It became clear that books
of national and civic education make use of verses in the Quran to support the
narrative of ‘Pan-Arabism’.
However, questionnaire respondents and interviewees seemed to have
another form of identification—one that is based on Islam, as a religion, an identity,
and as part of the nationalist narrative of Jordan. The reconstructions of nationalist
narratives seem to focus on using Pan-Islamism as an integral part of the narrative of
Jordanianism rather than ‘Arabism’.
Asked to state to what extent they agree or disagree with the statements ‘my
homeland is the Islamic World’ and ‘My Homeland is the Arab World’,
questionnaire respondents were twice as likely to agree with the first statement.
Around fifty four percent of respondents agreed that the Islamic world was their
homeland, while 23 percent of them agreed that the ‘Arab’ world was their
homeland (Tables 6.9 for ‘My homeland is the Islamic world’ and table 6.7 on page
221 for my ‘homeland is the Arab world.’)
Table (6.9) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement: ‘My homeland is the
Islamic world’?
Answer
Men Women Total
Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages
Strongly Agree 11 30.5% 8 30.8% 19 30.6%
Agree 8 22.2% 7 27% 15 24.2%
Neither Agree or
Disagree 6 16.7% 5 19.2% 11 17.7%
Disagree 6 16.7% 3 11.5% 9 14.5%
Strongly Disagree 5 13.9% 3 11.5% 8 13%
Total 36 100% 26 100% 62 100%
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When asked to state to what extent they agreed with the statement that ‘Jordan is an
Islamic country’, 76 percent of questionnaire respondents agreed, and only three
percent disagreed (Table 6.10). However, questionnaire results revealed that 94
percent of respondents agreed with Jordan being an ‘Arab’ country, and none
disagreed (table 6.8 on page 222). This, accompanied with very little mention of
Islam in books of national and civic education, shows that Jordanian state is
succeeding in delivering the message that Jordan adopts a ‘pan-Arabist’ nationalist
ideology. Interviewees provided further elaboration on Islam being considered a
source of identification between the Muslims. Whereas many respondents expressed
that they see Islam as something shared between them, and the Jordanian majority,
others expressed that their Islam is different from that of the ‘Arabs’. Moreover,
many interviewees expressed that they would like to see a unified Islamic ummah,
but for them it seems like a dream.
Table (6.10) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement: ‘Jordan is an Islamic
Country’?
Answer
Men Women Total
Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages
Strongly Agree 11 30.6% 8 30.8% 19 30.6%
Agree 16 44.4% 12 46.2% 28 45.2%
Neither Agree or
Disagree 7 19.4% 6 23% 13 21%
Disagree 2 5.6% 0 0% 2 3.2%
Strongly Disagree 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
Total 36 100% 26 100% 62 100%
Only two Interviewees did not see Jordan as an Islamic country, and their
explanation was based on the fact that firstly it contains other religious minorities,
and that it does not apply strict Shari’a laws, as Saudi Arabia does. For example,
Nuha said,
‘I do not see Jordan as an Islamic country. It is supposed to be
an Islamic country, because the Hashemites are descendents of
the prophet, but the laws are not Islamic. The Jordanian
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constitution is not Islamic at all, and religion for us is different
from that of Arabs’ (Nuha, 22, female).
Adel (22, male), also, mentioned that he prefers not to call Jordan an Islamic country
because that would mean the marginalisation of other religious groups.
Interestingly, part of the upbringing of both Nuha and Adel had been in the USA
and the UK, respectively, which might explain why they hold a different position
from all other interviewees. Moreover, these two questionnaire respondents had
English as their second language spoken at home. This might be because many of
them probably have a more ‘modern’ secular view of the state in general. Adel, for
example, said,
‘You know, now, we are all human, we live in a global village.
Religion should not separate us and we should start thinking in
more modern secular ways, because we have bigger issues, like
global warming for example’ (Adel, 22, male).
Sharabi (1988) argues that in the ‘Arab’ world it is not possible to separate
nationalism from religious identity because, in Jordan for example, the Hashemites
derive their legitimacy from Islam, and this has kept them on the throne. He says,
‘No matter how “modern” neopatriarchal society becomes, the
popular mass will continue to reject secular nationalism in
practice, and to adhere to religious identity’ (Sharabi, 1988: 36).
All other interviewees believed that Jordan is an Islamic country, and
defended its laws and rules, saying that Jordan does not have to apply all
fundamental old Islamic rules and practices to be Islamic. Several mentioned that the
fact that the Hashemites are descendents of the prophet suffice for Jordan to be
considered Islamic, and others pointed out that many pieces of its laws follow
Islamic rules, such as laws related to inheritance, marriage and divorce. In addition
to that, many interviewees mentioned that one thing in common between them and
the Jordanian majority is Islam. And, many of them mentioned that Pan-Islamism is
more inclusive than ‘Pan-Arabism’ as a notion of belonging, as it does not
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differentiate between people’s different origins, between ‘Arabs’ and ‘non-Arabs’.
However, they said this from their own perspective, because they identify
themselves as Muslims; they see pan-Islamism as more inclusive for them than ‘pan-
Arabism’. Muna said,
‘I believe that the Islamic ummah is more comprehensive than
the notion of an Arab nation. The term includes everyone. For
example, I am not an Arab, and my roots and origins are not
Arabic, but what unites me with the Arabs is Islam. The notion
of Islamic ummah means a lot to me, as a religion and as a
term. It is a more comprehensive notion’ (Muna, 22, female).
One of the main themes in books of national and civic education is students
becoming proud of ‘Pan-Arabism’ and the Great Arab Revolt. Interviewees, in
contrast, spoke about pride in Islam and the Islamic ummah.
‘The Islamic ummah is the most glorious nation on earth. It is
the most glorious nation on planet earth, but they have to stick
to their affiliation. But these days, they do not… I would really
really love to see a unified Islamic ummah. Islam is a grand
religion, it is glorious. I have a lot of Christian friends, and I
hear them talk about their religion. Their religion has a
message, but the message of Islam is a… I really cannot even
describe it’ (Tariq, 22, male).
Qasim (22, male) also mentioned that he prefers to call himself a Muslim, rather than
a Circassian or a Jordanian. He mentioned that he feels that he belongs to the nation
of Islam, and he has a sense of loyalty towards it. However, interviewees also made
it clear that they do not see a unity of Muslims around the world any time soon,
because, according to them ‘Islam is hated,’ and because they live in a time of
‘economic ideologies and capitalism.’
Despite the fact that books of national and civic education, as well as the
Jordan First campaign document, overlook the notion of Pan-Islamism, and attempt
to promote a ‘Pan-Arab’ unity, all interviewees mentioned that they are proud of
their Islamic affiliation. Moreover, Islam was been used by most Circassian
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interviewees in reference to the shared characteristics between them and the ‘Arab’
majority in Jordan, whereas ‘Pan-Arabism’ is the main narrative the state of Jordan
promotes. While interviewees showed that their (re)construction of Jordanianism is
strongly linked to pan-Islamism, the state of Jordan uses Islam as a way to
emphasise the ‘glory’ of the ‘Arab’ nation.
Furthermore, interviewees’ (re)construction of Jordanianism by emphasising
the importance of Islam as part of the narratives of the state, which is not echoed in
state promoted narratives, shows that their usage of Islam is related to them being
Muslims, and feeling more included in an Islamic view of the state of Jordan. Data
revealed other narratives used as symbolic narratives of Jordanianism, with which
interviewees could identify and feel comfortable, as part of nationalist narratives.
This, in opposition to ‘Pan-Arabism’, is not based on ethnonational narratives of the
‘Arabs’, which excludes Circassians by virtue of their origin. Those symbols of the
state are mainly based on loyalty towards the Hashemites, and the land of Jordan.
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6.2 Jordan: Symbols of the State
‘Jordan… a land of the free and the proud who bow their heads
only to God; a land of responsibility whose people recognize
balance in all things, especially between rights and
obligations… a land of integrity enjoyed by every one of its
own citizens, as well as by the free who seek its protection, and
by the true who seek to join their people's quest to preserve the
nation's right to life and to lead it out of its disarray, weakness,
despair and loss, to forge a unified, free, dignified and
immortal nation’ King Hussein’s Address to the Nation,
Amman, November 5, 1992 (The Royal Hashemite Court, 2001)
(Original English).
Narratives of Jordanian nationalism are based on ethnic narratives of the
‘Arab’ nation. However, and despite the recognition of research participants that
those narratives are ethnic- ‘Pan-Arabist’, most of them choose to identify with the
official religious identity of the state even with the overshadowing of Pan-Islamism
in the literature under study. Moreover, symbols of the state of Jordan are also
underlined in textbooks of national and civic education, as well as in the official
document of the Jordan First national campaign. Those symbols relate to
identification with the land of Jordan itself, and with the Hashemite family.
Six year old Jordanian students are taught, under the Homeland theme,
symbols of the Homeland. These symbols, according to National and Civic
education textbooks, include the King, the Royal Family, the land and its location,
the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan’s flag, the national anthem, national occasions
such as Jordan’s independence day, and the King’s Birthday. Although those
symbols are directly taught to first grade students, students are repeatedly and
consistently reminded of them until they finish school. Every textbook of national
and civic Education in Jordan includes at least one photograph of the King, Jordan’s
map, and the flag. The front and the back covers of each book has a picture of the
King, and the flag of Jordan.
260
Moreover, the morning routine in all public government schools includes
reciting and listening to the national anthem, and raising the flag. Additionally, the
initial logo of the Jordan First national campaign shows the flag of Jordan held by
several hands. Several logos and advertisements later followed, which included a
picture of the king, his children, and a map of Jordan made of the colours of the flag.
Moreover, as illustrated in books of national and civic education, the national slogan
of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is constituted of a trinity of God, the Watan,
and the King. Moreover, according to Jordanian laws it is a national offence to curse
the King or criticise him, but people are not prosecuted if they curse God. Cursing
the King is considered high treason against the state.
It is important to note that symbols of the state such as the flag, the King and
the national anthem are symbols that represent nationalist narratives of the state. An
example of that is the composition of the flag of Jordan. The black line in the flag
represents the Abbasid caliphates, the white the Umayyads flag, the green for the
Fatimids, and the red stands for the Great Arab Revolt. The red triangle represents
the Hashemite dynasty, the seven-edged star stands for the first sura in the Qur’an,
which is constituted of seven verses, and the star’s central position is meant to reflect
the aim of the Great Arab Revolt, to unify all ‘Arabs’.
The national anthem, on the other hand, also refers to the Hashemites’ ‘Pan-
Arabist’ nationalist ideology, and the fact that the King comes from the dynasty of
the prophet. It says,
Long live the King!
Long live the King!
His position is sublime,
His banners waving in glory supreme,
We achieved our goal,
On the day you gave us the mark,
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A revolution gives us our motivation!
Flying over the shoulders of the highest comets,
Oh! You King of Arabs,
From the best prophet you have.
The honour of dynasty,
Talked about in the depths of books!
All the youthful men,
Are your armed armies
His determination never dies out…
Under your flying flag rests the glory of all Arabs.
Interestingly, when asked about what they see as representing the state, only
some symbols of the state were mentioned by interviewees. Interviewees focused on
the land, and the Hashemites as symbols of their loyalty towards the state. Only one
interviewee mentioned the flag as something shared between him and the majority
of Jordanians.
‘I feel great sense of loyalty towards this flag. The flag is a
symbol of the state, I am very loyal to it, and I am willing to
defend it. Actually, I happened to go through an incident
where I had to defend it, and I had to take a stance in
defending it. I see the flag as something in common between
me and a native Jordanian, because a native Jordanian would
also defend this flag by instinct. Other than something by
instinct, I see defending this flag is a duty because it gave me a
lot of things, it gave me privileges no other Circassian
elsewhere in the world was given’ (Qasim, 22, male).
Symbols of the state, as mentioned in books of national education from the
first grade to twelfth grade, definitely reflect the state’s ‘pan-Arabist’ nationalist
narratives. Although, Circassian respondents didn’t seem to identify with the state’s
‘Pan-Arab’ nationalist ideology, many of them take pride in these symbols, and
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consider them as an indivisible part of their lives, as well as the lives of the Jordanian
majority. This further shows a tendency on the part of research participants to de-
ethnicise these symbols, and strip them of the ‘Pan-Arabist’ narratives they
represent. Although the state’s definition does not take into consideration ‘non-
Arabs’ such as the Circassians, and the fact that these means of channelling the
state’s ‘Pan-Arabist’ official identity and narratives, through books of national
education and through national campaigns, overlook the importance of Pan-
Islamism for Muslim minorities, research participants appeared to reconstruct those
narratives in a way most suited for them. The promotion of such social-nationalist
narratives is influenced by the social actors, who are at the receiving end of these
channels. For that reason, one might argue that the success of these channels greatly
depends on the people, who make sense of those narratives, and who find ways to
incorporate and reconstruct them in their lives.
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6.2.1 The Hashemites: Loyalty and Belonging
‘God only wishes to remove all abomination from you, ye
Members of the Family, and to make you pure and spotless’
(The holy Quran, Surat Al-Ahzab – 33).
The Hashemites of Jordan consider themselves to be Members of the Family,
meaning that they descend from the family of prophet Muhammed (Appendix F). In
the twelfth grade, under the theme ‘the Hashemites’, students aged 18 are taught the
importance of learning the Hashemites’ history and heritage, because of their origin
and position in Islamic and pre-Islamic times, their role in supporting and valuing
Islam, their national ideology, their role in the Great Arab Revolt, their position in
the Palestinian struggle, their role in the modern Arab Renaissance, and their role in
building modern Jordan. Under the same theme, students are taught the Hashemite
national agreement, and their launching of the ‘Jordan First’ campaign. In the second
and fourth grades, under the ‘Homeland’ theme, students are introduced to the
Hashemites’ role in the building of modern Jordan. Moreover, several references to
the Hashemites role in maintaining national and international security had been
made under the theme ‘National Security and International Peace’
The same material provided in books of national and civic education about
the Hashemites is also available on the official website of King Abdullah II. One
must also not forget that Jordan is named after the Hashemites—the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan. Emphasis on Jordan being Hashemite, and the Hashemites
being members of the prophet’s family is evident throughout books of national and
civic education, and the official website of King Hussein I, and King Abdullah II.
Although the Jordan First national campaign document does not put much emphasis
on the Hashemites themselves, the document emphasises the Hashemites’
unchanging ‘Pan-Arabist’ approach to regional issues.
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Circassians, in Jordan, are known for their loyalty to the Hashemites, as they
have been appointed as the ceremonial guards of the Hashemite family for decades,
and they have been granted very high governmental positions. The first mayor of
Amman, appointed by King Abdullah I, was Circassian. All interviewees expressed
their love of, and loyalty to, the Hashemites. However, they all mentioned that they
realise that no one in Jordan is considered Hashemite, although the state carries the
Hashemites’ name. For example, Thuraya said,
‘We are all Jordanians here, but not Hashemite. This state is a
monarchy, ruled by the Hashemites. If you ask me to whom I
feel that I belong, to the Hashemites or to Jordanian, I would
say that I belong more to the Hashemites. I feel that I really,
really, belong to the Hashemites, I trust them blindly. We have
been raised on this blind trust, since the time of King Hussein.
We have faith in this family, this is for me, and I cannot speak
for all Circassians. I am sure that most Circassians feel the same
about belonging. We greatly belong to the state, and the rulers
of the state’ (Thuraya, 38, female).
Interviewees also mentioned that they take pride in the fact that the Hashemites are
descendents of the prophet, and that they built modern Jordan. Interviewees
justified their loyalty to the Hashemites differently. Some of them justified it by
emphasising that,
‘As I told you, when Circassians embraced Islam, they really
clung to it. So, when King Abdullah I came to them and told
them that he descends from the prophet, they respected and
glorified him’ (Tariq, 22, male).
Although interviewees, who did not agree that Jordan is an Islamic country, saw no
correlation between the Hashemites being descendents of the prophet, and the
kingdom being Islamic, they mentioned that the Hashemites deserve respect for
their role in Jordan and in the whole region. They also expressed that because they
are the prophet’s descendents, they deserve to be respected. For example, Adel (22,
male) explained that the Hashemites deserve respect for their role in Arabic and
Islamic issues.
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On the other hand, others explained Circassian closeness to the Hashemite
family by mentioning Circassian attributes. For example, Asad (22, male) said that it
is because of Circassians’ loyalty they are close to the Hashemite family. Others also
mentioned that their love and loyalty towards the Hashemite family is because the
Hashemite rulers of Jordan treated them well, and made them feel that they are no
different to anyone else in the country.
‘We, Circassians, are known for our loyalty. And loyalty comes
from love. And as Circassians, I never met a Circassian who
does not like the Royal family; they adore them…. Not long
time ago, I went to a Circassian concert. When Prince Ali went
to greet the band, and he is the prince and not the king, we all
stood up for him. But I stood up for him because I want to
stand up for him. I felt happy for standing up for him, because
he is proud of us and we are proud of him. We are proud of the
King, and the King is proud of us. He appointed us as the royal
guards, he does not trust anyone with his life the way he trusts
us with his life’ (Qasim, 22, male).
For some interviewees, Circassians’ pride in the Hashemite family also comes from
the policies they apply, in addition to the fact that they are Members of the Prophet
Family.
‘The Hashemite family had never applied any sort of political
or religious extremism, since King Abdullah I till now. I am
proud that the Hashemites are descendents of the prophet,
especially with the policies they are applying now. I am proud
of them’ (Thuraya, 38, female).
Although the Hashemites attempt to portray themselves as ‘fathers’ and bearers of
‘pan-Arabism’ and Circassians do not identify with ‘pan-Arabism’, interviewees
seemed to respect the Hashemites for several other reasons, and chose to ignore their
‘Pan-Arabist’ nationalist ideology. On the other hand, the state of Jordan promotes
the idea that the land of Jordan is an ‘Arab’ land, and along with a primordial view
of the ‘Arab’ nation, this implies an exclusion of those who do not consider
themselves ‘Arabs’.
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6.2.2 The Land
‘Democracy in Jordan has become an example and a model, a
blessed tree deep-rooted in this beloved Arab land, with its
branches reaching towards the horizon of the great homeland’
King Hussein’s, Address on Election Law Amendments,
Amman, August 17, 1993. (The Royal Hashemite Court, 2001).
Jordan is an ‘Arab’ land, according to the Jordanian constitution and several
references made by Jordan’s kings, bearers of ‘Pan-Arabism’. Throughout textbooks
of national and civic education, students from the fifth to twelfth grades, are taught
Jordan’s cultural history theme. One of the most important subthemes of Jordan’s
cultural history is recognising Jordan’s Arabic character, and the impact of ‘Arab’
civilisation on the region. Although the land is portrayed in textbooks of national
and civic education as an ‘Arab’ land, which was liberated from ‘non-Arabs’,
interviewees seemed to ignore this and chose to strip the land from its association
with ‘Arabism’. By doing so, research participants are viewing the land in non-
primordial terms. This (re)construction of the concept of the land seems to be
different between the state’s official documents and in the research participants’
views.
All interviewees mentioned that they share the land with the Jordanian
majority, regardless of how the state of Jordan defines the land. Reference to the
land, as the watan, was made by all interviewees. As shown in section 6.1, the word
watan in Arabic refers to the territory where someone settles, regardless of origin. For
that reason, wataneyah is different from ethnonational narratives of Jordanianism,
and unlike Qawmeyah, which refers to the people, wataneyah is always in reference to
sharing a territory. The narrative of the land as non-primordial also allowed research
participants to identify more with the Hashemite Jordanian state, despite the
attempts to promote an ethnic narrative of the land. Interviewees made it clear that
they do not share the same Qawmeyah as the rest of the people in Jordan. However,
when speaking about the land itself, they all mentioned that it is one of the shared
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characteristics between them and native Jordanians. They mentioned that it is the
land where they settled a long time ago, and to which they have much gratitude.
‘Wherever I settle is my ‘watan’—homeland. For that reason,
wherever we go we belong to the country we settle in. My first
and last belonging is to Jordan’ (Thuraya, 38, Female).
Many also explained that sharing the land is something that makes all Jordanians
work for the sake of the country, more than ethnonational ideologies.
‘The thing in common between me and the Jordanian majority
is that we all share the same land. I believe that no matter how
much trouble there is between Jordanians and other groups, in
the end each one believes that we live on the same land’ (Nuha,
22, female).
Khairi (77, male) said that he loves the land of Jordan, saying that when he was a
farmer he became attached to the land itself, and this makes him Jordanian because
of his love of the land. He exclaimed during the interview ‘My watan is Jordan. My
watan is Jordan—oh how lovely it is!’ Husam (23, male), Adel (22, male), and Asad
(22, male), also, explained that when they deal with ‘native Jordanians’, they simply
forget about ethnicity, because for them the land is prioritised over ethno-nationalist
ideologies. The same interviewees also elaborated that they share the same faith on
this land, Jordan. However, they all were hesitant to decide to choose a homeland,
between Jordan and Caucasia; they felt as though they were expressing
contradictory feelings, which will be explained in the coming chapter.
‘Wataneyah, for me, is the love of the area where I lived in, in
addition to my origins; they are both in my heart. I cannot
choose one only’ (Atef, 39, male).
By referring to the land as separate from a nation that is primordially connected,
research participants were seeking similarities, and commonalities, between them
and the Jordanian majority. This reference to the land is made by stripping the land
from ethnic and primordial meanings attached to it by the state of Jordan, which
reinforces a ‘pan-Arabist’ narrative through its channels.
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Conclusion
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan reinforces an ethnonational ‘pan-Arabist’
nationalist narrative through the ‘Jordan First’ national campaign document,
textbooks of national and civic education, the websites of the Hashemite Kings, and
the constitution. Retaining a ‘pan-Arabist’ narrative is apparently accompanied with
an emphasis on Islamism as part of ‘Arabism’, because the ‘Arabs’ were the ones
who allegedly held the banner of Islam. The emphasis on a ‘glorious’ ‘Arab’ nation
serves the state of Jordan in defining its people as ‘Arabs’. Therefore, ‘Arabism’
seems to be, till this day, a dominant narrative of Jordanianism, and a defining
element of the people of Jordan. In their (re)construction of the narratives of the
state, interviewees leant towards emphasising Islam as a shared characteristic
between them and the majority in Jordan, rather than ‘Arabism’. The majority of
interviewees, in their (re)construction of Jordanianism, overemphasised an Islamist
narrative, and overlooked the ‘pan-Arabist’ narrative in terms of defining
themselves as part of the people of Jordan.
However, questionnaire respondents and interviewees also demonstrated
recognition of the ‘pan-Arabist’ narrative promoted by the state. And, although their
construction of their ethnic narratives depended on showing their distinctiveness
compared to the ‘Arabs’, interviewees recognised that Jordan is an ‘Arab’ state, and
yet they still showed belonging to the state of Jordan, by underlining symbols of the
state and using them as a way to show the similarities between them and the
majority in Jordan. The land and the Hashemite family were used by interviewees to
explain their belonging and feelings towards Jordan. In spite of the state’s definition
of the land as ‘Arab,’ and of the Hashemites as ‘fathers’ of the Great Arab Revolt,
and bearers of ‘Arabism’, interviewees showed that their (re)construction of the
concept of the land and of the Hashemites as well does not include the ‘Arabist’
narrative. Instead the Hashemites are seen as descendents of the prophet, which
relates them to Islam, and the land as a shared territory that is not based on the
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ethnic primordial meanings attached to it. This can show that their (re)construction
revolves around defining themselves as Jordanians, and including themselves within
state promoted narratives that define the nation.
Along with their recognition that a focus on the state’s ‘pan-Arabist’ narrative
of nationalism means the exclusion of those who do not consider themselves to be
‘Arabs’, research participants tended to emphasise their integration through the
subjective reconstruction of the narratives as suited them. Sharing the land, religion,
and the same rulers were the main commonalities interviewees referred to in order
to explain their belonging to the state of Jordan. All interviewees emphasised that
they feel integrated into Jordanian society. However, their integration is dependent
on their reconstruction of state nationalism.
The contradictions between state promoted narratives, and interviewees’
(re)constructions of those narratives, show that they separate their belonging to
Jordan from being ‘non-Arab’ Circassians. Data showed contradictions in the views
of research participants, so that when speaking about being Circassian they
compared themselves to the other ‘Arab’, and when speaking about being Jordanian
their narratives are based on non-primordial narratives. Notwithstanding their
emphasis that they feel integrated into Jordanian society, some interviewees showed
unease with the ‘pan-Arabist’ narrative and chose to overlook it as a defining marker
of the Jordanian nation, while others chose to view ‘Arabism’ in non-primordial
terms. Some attempt to overcome this contradiction by focusing on the concept of
Islamic ummah as a form of unity that allegedly transcends all ethnic and national
boundaries, others attempted to overcome this by stripping the concept ‘Arabism’
from its ethnic primordial implications. The following chapter discusses in detail
how research participants attempted to create a harmony of contradictions. It shows
how research participants speak about similarities in reference to Jordan, and being
Jordanian.
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Chapter Seven
Harmony of Contradictions
Introduction
Narratives promoted by the state of Jordan define the Jordanian nation as
‘Arab’, obscuring the existence of people who do not consider themselves ‘Arabs’.
On the other hand, although all interviewees and questionnaire respondents
identified themselves as Circassians, and all of them realised that Jordan is an ‘Arab’
country, a large majority of them consider themselves Jordanians. This shows that, in
their (re)construction of what it means to be Jordanian, interviewees ‘from below’
contradict what the state of Jordan attempts to promote ‘from above’. However,
interviewees also felt that, by considering themselves Jordanians they are
contradicting their ethnicity, because they realise that the state promotes that an idea
that Jordanians are ‘Arabs’, and that Jordan is an ‘Arab’ country. As previously
mentioned, most interviewees use symbols of the state and religion to highlight the
similarities between them and the majority in Jordan.
Research participants were inclined to de-ethnicise the concept of
Jordanianism, and draw on the similarities between them and the ‘other’ when
speaking about their own conception of the state of Jordan and its people. Most
interviewees preferred to refer to Islam, the Hashemites and the land of Jordan as
part of the Jordanian nationalist narratives, with which they identify and consider
themselves part of. Their reconstruction depended mainly on de-ethnicising state
narratives and viewing them in non-primordial terms. By doing so, research
participants are assuming that in the public sphere they are Jordanians, while in the
private sphere they are ‘non-Arab’ Circassians. This separation between the public
and the private shows that they view their nationality in non-primordial terms and
in their ethnicity becomes significant in the private.
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Research participants expressed that they feel that they are faced with
contradictions by belonging to Jordan and identifying with the Jordanian nationalist
narratives because the Jordanian nation is promoted as ‘Arab’. However, they still
emphasise that they feel that they belong and are integrated into Jordanian society.
This chapter explains how research participants draw on narratives of
commonalities between them and Jordanian society, such as the land and Islam. As
this research is concerned with the construction of ethnic and nationalist narratives
‘from below’, and attempts to answer whether the conventional wisdom about
Circassian integration in Jordan is true, this chapter focuses on how research
participants make sense of such contradictions.
The following sections deal with how research participants reconstruct state
nationalist narratives to prove their integration into Jordanian society, in a manner
that reconciles the supposed contradictory narratives. The first section of this chapter
deals with the narratives of commonalities research participants share with the
‘Arab’ Jordanian majority. It explains that the land and Islam are the two major
elements that contribute to their belonging to Jordan. The first section also shows
how research participants make use of some of their own ethnic narratives, which
they see as facilitators of their integration, and as evidence for their loyalty towards
the Jordanian ‘Arab’ state. Those narratives relating to how they see their group as
characterised by loyalty and courage enabled Circassian men to attain high positions
in the government and the state. It also discusses how research participants
expressed their gratitude to the land, for providing the means of survival for their
group, and to the Hashemites who entrusted them and granted Circassian men high
positions in the government. The second section contrasts research participants’
feelings towards historic Circassia and the state of Jordan. It shows how the feelings
of research participants towards Circassia are different to their feelings towards
Jordan, leading them to struggle to balance between their attachment to Jordan and
to their ethnic homeland.
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7.1 Creating a Harmony of Contradictions
‘Jordanians are equal before the law with no discrimination
among them in rights or duties even though they may differ in
race, language or religion’ (The Constitution of the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan quoted in Massad, 2001: 41).
Citizens of Jordan are equal before the law; however, state narratives of
nationalism suggest that Jordanianism is based on the concept of ‘Pan-Arabism’, i.e.
the narratives are ethnonational. Whereas the ‘Jordan First’ nationalist campaign
aims to create a sense of unity amongst all Jordanian citizens, men and women,
Muslims and non-Muslims, and supposedly ‘Arabs’ and ‘non-Arabs’, it still
emphasises that Jordanian people are part of the ‘Arab’ nation (MOFA, 2004). The
narrative of ‘Pan-Arabism’ obscures the existence of ‘non-Arabs’ within Jordan such
as the Circassians. Research participants identified themselves as ‘non-Arabs’ and, at
the same time, Jordanian, despite their recognition that Jordanianism is linked to
‘Pan-Arabism’. When asked which flag represents their ethnic group, 100 percent of
questionnaire respondents chose the Adyghe flag (flag of Circassia), and three
percent of them chose the Adyghe flag along with the flag of Jordan (Table 7.1).
Table (7.1) Which of the following flags represents your ethnic group?
Answer
Men Women Total
Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages
Flag of Jordan 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
Adyghe Flag 35 97.2% 25 96.2% 60 96.8%
Flag of the Great
Arab Revolt 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
Flag of Jordan and
the Adyghe Flag 1 2.8% 1 3.8% 2 3.2%
Total 36 100% 26 100% 62 100%
This suggests that none of the questionnaire respondents identified the flag of the
Arab Revolt to reflect their ethnic group, and very few consider themselves to be
ethnically Circassians and Jordanians at the same time.
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Despite the fact that all interviewees consider themselves to be an ethnic
minority in Jordan, some chose to reconstruct the concept of Jordanianism by
stripping it of its ethnic nature. For example, some chose to de-ethnicise the whole
concept of ‘Arabism’. Some respondents mentioned that that the word ‘Arab’ could
be used in reference to anyone who speaks Arabic. When asked if they consider
themselves of Arabic origin, 17.7 percent of questionnaire respondents answered
that they are, because in their view the word ‘Arab’ applies to everyone who speaks
Arabic (Table 4.3 on page 136). Many explained that they can be of ‘Arab’ origin,
because it is the language of the Quran and because it is a ‘universal language’. For
those who consider themselves to be of Arabic origin, the word ‘Arab’ does not
imply belonging to an ethnic group; it rather refers to the language, which is seen as
universal and not exclusive for a specific ethnic group, because it is the language of
the Quran, and ‘Islam does not differentiate between the races’. Those who de-
ethnicise the concept of ‘Pan-Arabism’ did not find belonging to Jordan, as an ‘Arab’
state, problematic. At the same time, when speaking about Circassian culture, all
interviewees where talking about it in comparison to the other ‘Arab’. This shows
contradictions in the Circassian and the ‘Arab’ ethnic narratives amongst
interviewees, but it also shows that research participants themselves choose to utilise
the differences when they speak about their group, and de-ethnicise those
differences when speaking about being Jordanian. This shows that ethnic narratives
are contextual.
On the other hand, the majority of interviewees recognised ‘Arabism’ as an
ethnicity. However, the strategy that they used to show their belonging to the state
of Jordan was to de-ethnicise Jordan, rather than the concept of ‘Arabism’. At the
same time, 94 percent of questionnaire respondents believed that Jordan is an ‘Arab’
country (See Table 6.8 on page 222). When asked which of the flags represents their
sense of belonging, responses were almost equally divided between the flag of
Jordan and the Adyghe flag (Table 7.2).
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Table (7.2) Which of the following flags represents your sense of belonging?
Answer
Men Women Total
Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages
Flag of Jordan 18 50% 13 50% 31 50%
Adyghe Flag 15 41.7% 12 46.2% 27 43.5%
Flag of the Great
Arab Revolt
0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
Flag of Jordan and
the Adyghe Flag
3 8.3% 1 3.8% 4 6.5%
Total 36 100% 26 100% 62 100%
Amidst all this confusion and contradictions in the reconstruction of Jordanianism,
and what it means to be Jordanian, the majority of research participants considered
Jordan their homeland (Table 7.3). Data revealed that when expressing their view of
Jordan, and of their belonging to Jordan, research participants were more likely to
refer to ‘non-Arab’ aspects of the Jordanian nationalist narrative such as the land,
and religion, in order to de-ethnicise Jordanianism and to show that they can be
Jordanian with great levels of attachment to Jordan, without being ‘Arabs’. They also
referred to ethnic narratives about how Circassian culture encourages loyalty and
gratitude towards the land and the people who welcomed them in the first place.
Table (7.3) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement: ‘My homeland is Jordan’?
Answer
Men Women Total
Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages
Strongly Agree 14 38.9% 7 27% 21 33.9%
Agree 15 41.7% 14 53.8% 29 46.8%
Neither Agree or
Disagree
5 13.8% 3 11.5% 8 12.9%
Disagree 0 0% 2 7.7% 2 3.2%
Strongly Disagree 2 5.6% 0 0% 2 3.2%
Total 36 100% 26 100% 62 100%
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7.1.1 Shared Land
‘We are the founders of Jordan. We are generally, the oldest
people who inhabited Jordan. A nearby neighbour is better
than a far away brother. I am Jordanian, of Jordanian origin; I
belong to Jordan and not to any other place’ (Khairi, 77, male).
The responses of questionnaire respondents and interviewees varied on
whether they considered themselves to be of Jordanian origin, although the majority
considered themselves to be of Jordanian origin. However, men were more likely to
answer yes to the question ‘do you consider yourself of Jordanian origin’ than
women (Refer to table 4.4 on page 137). When they were asked to elaborate on their
answers, those who did not consider themselves of Jordanian origin wrote that they
are of Caucasian origins, but that they are Jordanian citizens. Respondents who
believed that they are originally Jordanians mentioned that it is because they were
born on the land of Jordan, and because they lived there. One of them said,
‘Although I am not originally an Arab, I was raised in Jordan,
as a Jordanian. One country, one land, and one nation--- that is
Jordan, and I am part of it’ (Questionnaire respondent Number
26, male).
Another questionnaire respondent said ‘Of course, because all of our blessings and
our businesses are in this country’ (Questionnaire respondent number 32). And,
others said that they should be considered of Jordanian origin because they were
born and raised in Jordan. Questionnaire respondents who believed themselves of
Jordanian origins, in fact, do not believe that such a consideration compromises their
Circassian identity, as it reflects their attachment to a de-ethnicised land rather than
to a people or nation, although the land narrative is constructed in textbooks of
national and civic education is one that is related to an ethnic group, the ‘Arabs’.
Additionally, in an attempt to gain a level of social acceptance in the state of Jordan,
interviewees mentioned that they have to belong and be attached to the land of
Jordan, and that their lives are there. For example, Thuraya said,
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‘I know that we are originally from Caucasia, and I visited it, I
had a lot of feelings and I cried when I went there. When I saw
it, I just could not believe that this is our land; I could not
believe that our great great grandparents left this land. They
left it, therefore, when I refer to homeland, I refer to Jordan. My
land is Jordan, and my homeland is Jordan’ (Thuraya, 38,
female).
All research participants said that they find it really hard to choose one homeland,
between historic Circassia and Jordan, because they feel that they are attached to
both. But when they think about it ‘rationally,’ as they said, they choose Jordan, with
all their emotions and feelings directed towards Circassia, as will be explained in
section 7.2.1. When asked to what extent they agreed or disagreed with the
statement ‘my homeland is Jordan’, most respondents agreed (Table 7.3 on page
249); around 80.7 percent agreed, 12.9 percent neither agreed nor disagreed, and
only 6.4 percent disagreed. When asked to what extent they agree or disagree with
the statement ‘my homeland is Circassia’, 58 percent agreed, 19 percent neither
agreed nor disagreed, and 23 percent disagreed (Table 5.3 on page 192); this shows
that respondents were more likely to choose Jordan as a homeland, over Circassia.
However, 90 percent of them agreed that their ethnicity constitutes a great part of
their identities (Table 7.4), with slight gender differences, as women were more
likely to agree with this statement.
Table (7.4) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement: ‘my ethnicity constitutes a
great part of my identity’?
Answer
Men Women Total
Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages
Strongly Agree 24 66.7% 14 53.8% 38 61.3%
Agree 8 22.2% 10 38.5% 18 29%
Neither Agree
or Disagree 4 11.1% 2 7.7% 6 9.7%
Disagree 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
Strongly
Disagree
0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
Total 36 100% 26 100% 62 100%
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This, together with the interview data, shows that research participants
tended to view Jordan as a homeland only by stripping it of its ‘Pan-Arabist’ ethnic
identity, and this is how they identify it as a homeland. Moreover, when asked to
elaborate, interviewees mentioned that their houses, businesses, and everything they
own are in Jordan. Also, that it is very hard for them not to consider it as a
homeland. When they arrived in Jordan in the nineteenth century, Circassians
inhabited agricultural areas in Jordan and this, according to the 77 year old Khairi, is
the reason behind their attachment to the land itself.
Many interviewees expressed that when they choose not to identify with
‘Pan-Arabism’, but identify themselves as Jordanians, they feel as if they are
contradicting themselves, because Jordan is in fact an ‘Arab’ country. Nuha, for
example, said,
‘I consider myself Jordanian, but I have a problem if I am
considered an Arab. For me, when someone asks me I say that I
do not have Arabic roots, I have a Jordanian nationality, and I
belong to Jordan; it is my home. I have been there; I have lived
there all my life. My family, and my friends are here, but I do
not consider myself an Arab. I do not know if I am
contradicting myself, but this is how I feel. When a foreigner
asks me where I am from, I say that I am from Eastern Europe’
(Nuha, 22, female).
Nuha’s quote also shows that ethnicity is contextual, and is fluid in that it can
change according to the context. All interviewees mentioned that despite the fact
that Jordan is an ‘Arab’ country, they still see it as a homeland, and consider
themselves Jordanians, which suggests that they see being Jordanian as about a non-
ethnic, non-primordial nationality, and being Circassian as reflecting their
primordial attachments. Even those who chose the Adyghe flag, in the
questionnaires, to represent their homeland, preferred to say during the
interviewees that their homeland is Jordan. For example, Tariq said,
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‘My homeland is where my house is, where I live, where I have
property, where I am residing—this is the homeland for me.
My whole life is here, it is true that I have land and property
there and a life there, but most of my life is here’ (Tariq, 22,
male).
However, he added that he prefers to choose the Adyghe flag, as the flag which
represents his homeland, because it symbolises his history, and the place where his
people came from. Therefore, it became apparent throughout the interviews that
research participants try to create a harmony of these contradictions through
developing their own narratives of Jordanian nationalism that allow them to be loyal
to Jordan without compromising their Circassian ethnic narratives. Whereas the
state of Jordan portrays the land as ethnic, research participants do not. It also
became clear throughout the interviews that respondents were referring to de-
ethnicised narratives of nationalism, through rationalising that they hold Jordanian
citizenship. For example, Adel said,
‘Even if Jordan is an Arab country, I am treated well here, and I
am respected… Jordan is the land I am living on, and I have a
lot of chances here in Jordan. I can enjoy all of my civil rights. I
have rights and duties, and this is part of being a citizen
anywhere in the world, this is reason and logic, apart from
emotions’ (Adel, 22, male).
All interviewees without exception brought up the narrative of the land, when
speaking about their attachment to Jordan. This deconstruction and reconstruction of
narratives of nationalism promoted by the state of Jordan seem to help research
participants in reconciling the contradictions between their own ethnic narratives,
and the ethnic narratives of state nationalism.
It must be reiterated that when de-ethnicising the land of Jordan, interviewees
also used ethnic narratives from their own culture to demonstrate their integration
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into the ‘Arab’ Jordanian society, and their attachment and belonging towards the
state of Jordan. Many of them mentioned that it is their responsibility to integrate
themselves within the society, and that their culture helps them in accepting that
integration. They all expressed that their integration is part of their loyalty and
courage, which are part of the cultural narratives of their ethnicity. They referred to
qualities they take on through upbringing, which make them legitimate to receive
equal treatment, like the Jordanian majority. These characteristics Circassians
described had been largely linked to their feelings of gratitude towards the land, on
which they were able to survive following their flight to Jordan in 1886. Also, they
have expressed gratitude towards the Hashemites, who have a deeply rooted Islamic
standing in the Muslim world, as the claimed descendents of the prophet. The
following section explores the narratives of courage and loyalty towards the state of
Jordan, which the interviewees drew from their ethnic narratives.
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7.1.2 Loyalty, Courage
‘There is in them the chivalry of warfare. As to their arms, it is
not pride they have in them, but love they entertain for them.
The sense of individual superiority as regards their antagonists,
carried to fanaticism, is yet pure of vain-gloriousness. The
circumstances of that contest in which they are engaged,
environs to them War, with a sense alike of majesty and
sacredness. Courage is here virtue in its Roman sense; it is also
charity, it is also faith, it is also martyrdom. In it consist the
affections of home, the duties of neighbourhood, the respect of
ancestry, the care for futurity; and coldly therewith has to be
enumerated the sense conveyed in our words, ‘duty of
citizenship’’ (Urquhart, 1863: 9).
The excerpt, above, is taken from Urquhart’s writing on the Circassians’
virtue of courage. The unique nature Urquhart describes as Circassians’ virtue of
courage, and reference to the duty of citizenship, used by interviewees to draw
attention to their cultural uniqueness, and prove their belonging to Jordan. In each
and every interview, interviewees mentioned that their Circassian community is
generally loyal by nature, and by upbringing. Interviewees were asked to explain the
position Circassians attained in Jordan, on the social and the political levels. All of
their answers were based on the fact that they are loyal, and courageous, and
brought up on those ideals. With an emphasis that they are the ones responsible for
gaining social acceptance in Jordan, Circassians always referred to themselves in
terms of loyalty and courage, in addition to other traits they are brought up on with,
which make it possible for them to live comfortably in Jordan. As Shami (1993) has
mentioned, when Circassians are asked to describe their culture, it is always in
reference to masculine characteristics in words such as ‘war-like, brave, disciplined,
stubborn, one-track minded, honest to a fault, and loyal to the state’ (ibid: 148).
Although Shami did not support with examples how such characteristics are
masculine ones, throughout my interviews such descriptions had been made in
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reference to Circassian men, who have a role in state life. When talking about
courage and loyalty, interviewees, including women, talked in gendered terms as
though loyalty and courage were exclusively masculine attributes. This, along with
the marginalisation of women from the public sphere, makes men feel more attached
to Jordan than their womenfolk and, as previously shown, more male than female
participants believed that they are of Jordanian origin.
Interviewees appeared to make use of such narratives of their ethnicity in
relation to justifying Circassians social position as the ceremonial guards of the
Hashemite Royal family. Many of them mentioned that Circassians are qualified to
occupy these positions because of their war-like behaviour and braveness. For
example, Nuha said,
‘Circassians are qualified, and they fit within the criterion of
being guards. Circassians are also loyal. They possess certain
qualities; they are loyal, they are honest, and they are straight
forward, and these things qualify them for this position’ (Nuha,
22, female).
Elaboration on this was made in relation to their position in Jordan as a whole had.
And, many of them said that because of these traits they were able to enjoy the same
rights that the majority in Jordan enjoys. For example, Khairi said,
‘We were able to attain our rights, through honesty and faith,
loyalty and effort. I am not saying this because I am Circassian,
but we Circassians are distinguished because of our credibility.
We do not say things that we do not do; we keep our words.
We respect our appointments, because this is part of our faith;
it is a sign of faithfulness’ (Khairi, 77, male).
On the one hand, interviewees emphasised the fact that Circassian men are
generally brought up to possess war-like behaviour in their lives, and for that reason
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many of them were able to reach high ranks in the army. On the other hand, several
interviewees mentioned that this is part of the Circassian peoples’ nature, and that
this is a characteristic they are born with. For example, Husam said,
‘The Circassian people in general have values, due to the
nature of their place of origin. They have values; they are
generous, brave, and they treat women well. It is because of the
nature of their snowy and mountainous place of origin; they
are like that, by nature, and all of them are the same’ (Husam,
23, male).
Husam is obviously talking about Circassian men having values of generosity and
bravery. The quote also shows that when speaking about the ‘Circassian people‘,
Husam is only talking about Circassian men, as if women were not part of the
Circassian people. It is very hard to relate how snow and mountains could shape the
characteristics of a people, but it is very obvious that interviewees were trying their
best to explain Circassian men’s position in Jordan in relation to the distinctiveness
of their culture and people, and that this explanation was itself gendered.
In addition to braveness and war-likeness, all interviewees mentioned loyalty
as part of the people’s nature, or in other words, the nature of Circassian men. For
example, Tariq said,
‘The Circassians are loyal by nature. They remain loyal to the
people they love. It is impossible that a Circassian would
betray. Circassians wanted to participate in the building of new
emerging state… they did not want to ruin it’ (Tariq, 22, male).
And courage had always been mentioned in relation to loyalty, because no one
would appoint a royal guard, who is courageous but not loyal. Qasim said,
‘He [The King] appointed us as the royal guards, he does not
trust anyone with his life the way he trusts us with his life.
Betrayal in Circassian culture is prohibited, it is inappropriate
and unacceptable. We do not betray. But our loyalty comes
from our love. And not to betray is part of the perfect man
theory’ (Qasim, 22, male).
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Again, here, loyalty is part of the perfect man theory—the Adyghe. The
perfect man theory is the basis of Circassian upbringing, as they explained.
Although it did not have any significance for women, young Circassian men seemed
to be very passionate and enthusiastic about emphasising that they are raised to
become ‘perfect’ men, who do not err, betray, and who are brave and war-like. This
further emphasises what Shami (1993) herself mentioned as ‘male characteristics’,
from the point of view of young men. The only elder interviewee explained with
vehemence that perfection is only an attribute of the divine, and no one can be
perfect except for God. Moreover, many also emphasised that their loyalty towards
the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the Hashemites is derived from love, and
feelings of gratitude, again as part of their upbringing and culture. Many of them
mentioned that their love is based on their gratitude and pride of the land, and on
the ruling Hashemite family.
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7.1.3 Gratitude
‘We are raised to become loyal. Who serves us once; we serve
him a hundred times. We are raised to be loyal and grateful to
the ones who serve us and treat us well. Whoever gives me a
hand once; I remain grateful to him for the rest of my life’
(Asad 22, male).
Asad was talking about the Hashemite family, and loyalty towards the
Hashemite family, the gendered language he is using is derived from both state
narratives and ethnic narratives, which marginalise women. In other words, he was
trying to say that the Hashemites, who are the ‘fathers’ of modern Jordan, gave
Circassian men good positions in the government, and thus Circassian men feel
grateful to them. Gratitude had been one of the main reasons interviewees attempted
to explain their loyalty to Jordan and the Hashemites. Gratitude had been expressed
in two main ways; gratitude to the land, which encompassed them after their flight
and provided them with the means of survival, and gratitude towards the
Hashemites, who treated them as ‘part of the family’ (Adel, 22, male), and granted
the men good positions in the military and in Jordan’s political life. Interestingly, the
feelings of gratitude were based on the fact that research participants did not believe
that it is their right to be granted positions or to be accepted in the society, but that
was possible partly because of the generosity of the Hashemite family.
The first form of gratitude, towards the land, which had been expressed by
interviewees, meant that Circassians owe the country itself a lot, based on providing
them with a new home, after providing them with refuge. For example, Khairi (77,
male) stated that he feels sorry for the loss of land, caused by foreign investments,
because people nowadays tend to forget how much they owe and how grateful they
should be towards the land. He said,
‘We sold the lands, filled our pockets with some money, and
we forgot the importance of the land. I used to farm the land,
with a cow, and I am proud of that. We used to plant wheat
and sell to Palestine, and to Beirut. Dealers used to come from
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Amman to take the excess wheat to export them. Now, if you
conduct a research, the Jordanian people might not have a kilo
of flour to bake bread at home. This is because the government
taught the people to be lazy. The government did not improve
or develop the nation; rather they caused destruction and
deterioration’ (Khairi, 77, male).
Khairi is apparently one of those who oppose foreign investment and the emergence
of a global capital market, because in his view it leads the country to deterioration
and dismantles culture and tradition. Several other interviewees reflected on their
emotions towards the land as a provider for their means of survival, but no one
except for Khairi expressed his dissatisfaction with the loss of the lands. Others, also,
used the land as a way to express the commonalities between them and ‘Arab’
Jordanians. For example, Nuha said,
‘The thing in common between me and the Jordanian majority
is that we all share the same land. I believe that no matter how
much trouble there is between Jordanians and other groups, in
the end each one believes that we live on the same land’ (Nuha,
22, female).
When asked what she means by other groups, Nuha explained that she meant the
original Jordanian Bedouin tribes. Husam (23, male) also mentioned that he deals
with ‘Arab’ Jordanians on the basis that they are on the same land, and that they
have to work alongside each other as citizens, to develop Jordan. Adel said,
‘At the end of the day we share the land, we have to live in
peace, because we are all humans. Humans do tend to group
together, but here we are on one land, and our interests are the
same…. For the sake of the land, we have to focus on common
interests. Imagine if both parts are refusing the other… it
would not work. One part has to exert some effort to get closer
to the other, for the sake of common interests’ (Adel, 22, male).
Research participants expressed their feelings of gratitude towards the land, as a
way to position themselves within Jordan, away from the ‘Arab’ Jordanian ethnic
narratives. And, to provide that, notwithstanding their different ethnic origin, their
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loyalty to Jordan is not any less, because of the gratitude they feel towards it.
Thuraya, ‘on behalf of all Circassians’, said,
‘There is something called gratitude. For me, I feel that my
belonging to this country is a way to show my gratitude, it is
obligatory... We feel this gratitude, it is in our blood. We feel
that we belong to this country, it is in our eyes, we feel it when
we hear [nationalist] songs, and we feel it when we see the flag.
We were born here’ (Thuraya, 38, female).
The second form of gratitude research participants referred to is gratitude
towards the Hashemites, particularly to King Hussein I, as many of them said that
they started to feel alienated, in the era of King Abdullah II, which is explained in
the coming section. Those feelings of gratitude, which lead them to love, and become
loyal to the Hashemites, are based on the fact that when the Hashemites came to
occupy Jordan, from the Hejaz region in Saudi Arabia, they did not alienate them,
and even appointed a Circassian as the first governor of the capital city, Amman.
Additionally, many expressed their gratitude because the Hashemites appointed
Circassian men as their ceremonial guards, which means that the trust and relation
between them has to be mutual. However, although interviewees saw this act on
behalf of the Hashemites, as extraordinary and generous, keeping good relations
with the Circassians was mainly because the Hashemites needed allies, and the
Circassians at that time were powerful merchants.
Furthermore, many interviewees mentioned that during their upbringing
they were brought up on the love and loyalty towards the Hashemites. For example,
Thuraya said,
‘If you ask me to whom I feel that I belong to, to the
Hashemites or to Jordanianism, I would say that I belong more
to the Hashemites. I feel that I really, really, belong to the
Hashemites, I trust them blindly. We have been raised on this
blind trust, since the time of King Hussein. We have faith in
this family’ (Thuraya, 38, female).
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Qasim (22, male) also stated that he has never met a Circassian who does not love
and who is not loyal to the Hashemite family. Husam (23, male) also said plainly
that Circassians are in a good position in Jordan because they have really good
relations with the Hashemites, who allocated Circassian men good positions in the
government, and in Jordan’s political life. Some mentioned that Circassians had
previously supported the Hashemites, when they first came to Jordan to fight the
Ottomans, and that made the Hashemites trust them and grant them a status equal
to ‘Arab’ Jordanians.
Moreover, those feelings of gratitude towards the Hashemites oblige
Circassians, as part of their ‘culture, upbringing and blood’ as they put it, to be loyal
to them, love them and never betray them. For example, Qasim expressed his love,
gratitude and loyalty towards the Hashemites by saying,
‘When someone treats you well, and makes you feel that you
are not less than others, and makes you feel that you are
needed, and that your role is highly-valued, you would
definitely love this person. If someone provides you with your
rights, like any other citizen, and gave value to your existence,
you would definitely love him’ (Qasim, 22, male).
It became clear that the reference to gratitude towards the Hashemites reflected a
feeling amongst research participants that because they are not ‘Arabs’, it is not their
right to be included in the narratives of the state, and that is explained in the last
section of this chapter. In addition to feelings of gratitude, research participants used
Islam to point out that they also share an Islamic culture with the Jordanian majority,
and that they fit in within Jordan, thanks to Islam. They spoke of Islam assuming
that it would provide a basis for their inclusion within state narratives, because it
unites the community of adherents and that would include them within the state
nationalist narrative.
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7.1.4 Islam: Preference Unviable
‘The concept of ummah embodies the universalism of Islam and
provides a framework for religious unity, which
accommodates the cultural diversity of believers’ (Hassan,
2006: 311).
Several scholars argue that Islam is not merely a religion, and being a Muslim
should involve divesting the self of all forms of national and ethnic identification.
Ataman (2003: 90) argues that the ‘Islamic theory of ethnicity’ means that all Muslim
ethnic groups are, and should be, one nation, under the banner of a Muslim nation-
state, given that Islam is the legitimating power for a nation-state to be built.
Whereas theories of ummah provide that it should exist, in reality there are very few
Muslim countries that are defined as Islamic states, and only four Muslim countries
are described as Islamic republics19. Whilst the overall of global population of
Muslims is increasing the number of Islamic countries is very low. The dream of a
unified Islamic state still exists, even after the fall of the Ottoman Empire, and the
concept of Pan-Islamism as a nationalist ideology persists ‘from below’, although
state promoted narratives overlook it.
All research participants identified themselves as Muslims, and all
interviewees identified Islam as one of the main things they share with the Jordanian
majority. It must be said though, that many interviewees did not believe that Islam
nowadays is viable as a way of uniformity in the current world order, because other
ideologies have prevailed. For example, Nuha said,
‘I prefer to see Islam as an ideology rather than a religion,
because many people do not understand Islam. But I would
love to see an application of ideological Islam in economics,
politics, and education, but that should be done under a name
other than Islam, because it is now hated in the world. I think
we should have a united ummah, but we should not call it
Islamic’ (Nuha, 22, female).
19 The Islamic Republics of Afghanistan, Iran, Mauritania, and Pakistan
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Moreover, several interviewees mentioned that an Islamic state is unviable
nowadays due to the presence of non-Muslims in Muslim countries. However, they
mostly also mentioned that Islam serves as a point of unification between them and
the Jordanian majority. This had been mentioned by most interviewees; however,
most of them mentioned that an Islamic ummah, as a form of unity is impossible in
nowadays world order.
This shows that despite the existence of an Islamic ummah, in the minds of
Muslims, in reality the non-existence of any state created to encompass all Muslims,
makes it more of a distant dream for them. For example, Qasim said,
‘In our current position, I believe that we are not competent to
have an Islamic ummah... It would be nice to have something
like that unity, it would be a really nice thing, because I feel a
sense of belonging towards Islam, and I am already there. I
already believe in it. If this happens and it works, I will be part
of this unity, I will be happy’ (Qasim, 22, male).
In chapter six, Islam has been discussed as a narrative of nationalism
overlooked by the state, and emphasised by research participants. It became clear
that research participants resort to the narrative of Islam as the means that could
bring them together with the Jordanian majority and with the state of Jordan. This
view of Islam and the emphasis laid on it as a constituent of a unified culture is a
way research participants used to explain their integration into Jordanian society.
With all the efforts research participants exerted to show their loyalty and belonging
to the state of Jordan and to bridge the gap between their narratives and the
ethnonational narratives of the state of Jordan, they all expressed that their feelings
are torn between belonging to the state of Jordan and Circassia, their historic
homeland. They expressed this and said that these are just ‘irrational’ feelings,
because all of them said that Jordan is their homeland and they would not want to
return to Circassia.
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7.2 Feelings and Emotions
Throughout the interviews, interviewees repeatedly referred to feelings and
emotions they encounter as part of being part of a ‘non-Arab’ minority in Jordan,
and to feelings and emotions they have been carrying with them for four generations
towards their original homeland. It is important to note here that these feelings and
emotions are reflections of their ‘irrational thoughts’ as many of them put it, and are
not the same as the rationalisations they attempt to make, with regard to the reasons
behind their integration. In the previous section, it had been established how
interviewees did their best to show their loyalty and attachment to Jordan, through
finding common interests and characteristics with ‘Arab’ Jordanians. For example,
they reflected on behaviours and attributes they are raised with, their gratitude
towards the land and the Hashemites, and some used Islam as a way to explain why
they can identify with Jordan and its ‘Arab’ majority.
However, they were also determined to show their distinctiveness as a group,
and did not want to compromise their Circassian ethnic narratives. They talked
about rationalising their feelings, which is inevitable for them to be able to live in
peace with the ‘Arab’ Jordanian majority. They attempted to explain that they
practice their culture and traditions at home, and that their ethnicity is to a great
extent linked to their lives at home, not in the workplace, in schools, in public life,
not even with their ‘Arab’ friends. It became clear that their ethnic narratives are
used to describe their private lives and their (re)construction of Jordanianism serves
them in public. Their attitude shows that separating ethnicity from state life, for
them, is very similar to separating religion from state life. But, the Hashemite
Kingdom of Jordan’s emphasis on ethnonational narratives of the ‘Arabs’ makes
‘non-Arabs’ vulnerable to confusion and feelings of lack of recognition of their
existence. The confusion and lack of recognition stem mainly from the fact that
research participants felt that they are not recognised within the nationalist
narratives of the state, despite their group’s contribution to the building of the state
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of Jordan. On the other hand, they also expressed that it is hard for them to choose a
‘homeland’.
Questionnaire respondents were asked to what extent they agree or disagree
with the statements that ‘being Circassian constitutes a great part of my identity’,
and ‘being Jordanian constitutes a great part of my identity’ (Tables 7.5 & 7.6).
Although it was previously mentioned that most respondents believed that Jordan is
their homeland, most also believed that being Circassian constitutes a great part of
the identities. Of the total questionnaire respondents, 96.8 percent agreed that being
Circassian constitutes a great part of their identities (Table 7.5), and 69.4 percent
agreed that being Jordanian is a great constituent of their identities (Table 7.6). The
results show that the fact that they were more likely to choose Jordan as their
homeland, and believe that their identities are more Circassian than Jordanian,
reflects a tendency among respondents to separate their ethnic narratives from their
loyalty towards Jordan, and the Jordanian nationalist narrative. Interviewees
expressed two sets of emotions, feelings of belonging to Jordan and to Circassia at
the same time. Whereas their feelings towards Circassia were more related to the
private sphere, they said that they often felt somewhat alienated, and their efforts
seemed to be unvalued in Jordan. The following subsections explain in detail their
feelings towards Circassia and their feelings of alienation in Jordan.
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Table (7.5) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement: ‘Being Circassian
constitutes a great part of my identity’?
Answer
Men Women Total
Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages
Strongly Agree 23 63.9% 17 65.4% 40 64.5%
Agree 12 33.3% 8 30.8% 20 32.3%
Neither Agree
or Disagree
1 2.8% 0 0% 1 1.6%
Disagree 0 0% 0 0% 0 0%
Strongly
Disagree 0 0% 1 3.8% 1 1.6%
Total 36 100% 26 100% 62 100%
Table (7.6) To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement: ‘Being Jordanian
constitutes a great part of my identity’?
Answer
Men Women Total
Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages Numbers Percentages
Strongly Agree 11 30.6% 9 34.6% 20 32.3%
Agree 14 38.9% 9 34.6% 23 37.1%
Neither Agree
or Disagree 8 22.1% 7 27% 15 24.2%
Disagree 2 5.6% 0 0% 2 3.2%
Strongly
Disagree 1 2.8% 1 3.8% 2 3.2%
Total 36 100% 26 100% 62 100%
293
7.2.1 Circassia: Pride, Dreams, Bitterness
‘I cannot answer any question about Adyghea20… please allow
me not to answer it… I have a bitter answer. Adyghea is the
homeland where my fathers and grandfathers came from, I still
have feelings and I am sad when I talk about it. I would love to
visit it, but I would not like to live there, because I lived in
Jordan… Nowadays, there they live differently, I do not accept
their current way of life, and I cannot live amongst them’
(Khairi, 77, male).
Feelings of bitterness and sadness Khairi expressed, were due to the
differences he feels exist, between him as a Jordanian-Circassian and the Circassians
who remained in their original homeland. Khairi’s reference takes us to a different
form of ethnicity that Circassians in Diaspora have developed. Many have argued
that with technological advancements, and the spread of global means of mass
communications, it has become easier for ethnic communities to remain in contact
and in constant exchange with their original communities (Karim, 1998). The flight
of Circassians many generations ago isolated them from their kin, and provided the
basis for the emergence of new forms of ethnic narratives, which is a result of their
presence in Jordan.
Through the maintenance of a culture that dates from the nineteenth century,
the ethnic narratives of Circassians in Jordan were shaped by the heritage they
brought with them, and by the new homeland they ended up in. Interviewees, who
have become aware of the differences, found it hard to relate to their Circassian kin
in Caucasia. None of them would consider returning to historic Circassia. This, in
addition to expressions of bitterness and dreams, had been the main picture
interviewees seemed to visualise about their place of origin. It is important to note
here that most of my respondents were from the third and fourth generation of
Circassian groups in Jordan. However, even the second generation interviewee
20 Another name for Circassia
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mentioned that it is impossible for him to return, because he did not feel that he had
much in common with the Circassians in Caucasia.
‘I lived in the grace of Jordan... When I die, I want to be buried
in Jordan. I was born in Jordan, and I will die in Jordan, and I
will be buried in Jordan’ (Khairi, 77, male).
Return does not seem like an option for all interviewees, but many of them
expressed that they would love to have a Circassian, or Caucasian, passport, which
may document their ancestral attachment to the area. Interviewees attempted to
defend their position in terms of not having the desire to return to their place of
origin, by explaining that they are originally Circassians, and they belong to the
group of Circassians. However Jordan remained the homeland in the eyes of many
because their lives had been established in Jordan, and not Circassia. For example,
Tariq said,
‘For me, my belonging is split between the two. I have been to
former Circassia, and we have a land and a house there, but my
father, my grandfather, and my grandmother are living in
Jordan. And, we ate from this country’s food, and we lived
here all our life, but I do not think that it is my only sense of
belonging. I have a great sense of belonging there, as well.
There was my land, and they took it away from me, and I want
it back. I try to get it back. So, let’s say that my sense of
belonging is divided as in 60 percent here, and 40 percent
there’ (Tariq, 22, male).
Their feelings and emotions towards Circassia had been linked many times,
by interviewees, to their history, and the history of their origins, the myths, and the
stories about the people, the internationally unrecognised genocide their ancestors
went through, and the stories of the flight imposed on them due to their religion.
Many expressed that they could not separate themselves from being Circassian and
become fully Jordanian because, by doing so, they would be undervaluing the
history of their ancestors and their flight. Moreover, all respondents mentioned that
it is very important for them to preserve their Circassian identity, as it symbolises
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the suffering of their grandparents. When asked whether is important or not for
them to preserve their Circassian culture, around 89 percent of questionnaire
respondents agreed, with a majority strongly agreeing (see table 4.9 on page 152).
However, interviewees seemed to separate their memories from the memories
of their ancestors. Many of them said that their personal memories are in Jordan, but
at the same time they expressed that they cannot simply forget the history of their
ancestors (Qasim, 22, male, Adel, 22, male, Tariq 22, male, Nuha, 22, female, Thuraya
38, female, Rana 36, female, Atef, 39, male, Husam 23, male, and Asad 22, male). This
history is what makes them proud and willing to preserve their culture, in order to
safeguard the heritage of their ancestors in Diaspora. Pride in Circassians had been
conveyed throughout the interviews by emphasising the good nature of the people,
such as courage, loyalty, and respect for women.
Additionally, dreams and hopes had also been mentioned during the
interviews, in relation to the people. Firstly, interviewees had dreams about having
an official Circassian state, which would provide a basis for their identities to
prosper and persist. For example, Nuha said,
‘My dream as a Circassian is the same dream Palestinians
have. It is to have a homeland, but sometimes I ask myself if it
happened, would I go back? It is a hard question! I want to
have a homeland so people would know who the Circassians
are’ (Nuha, 22, female).
Moreover, many expressed how it is frustrating for them when they are abroad, and
people do not recognise who the Circassians are. Due to the non-existence of a
Circassian state, most research participants said that Jordan is their homeland. They
seemed to prefer to choose Jordan as their official homeland and Circassia as a
symbol of ancestral attachment. Thuraya put it,
‘No one wants to internationally recognise the presence of our
country... I wish, if not me my children, would see this area
internationally recognised as a state, but I do not wish to go
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live there. I want this recognition, because I want my children
to start saying that they are from there, that their origins came
from there, and that their great grandparents came from there,
that we originate from there. I wish one day people see
Circassian costumes and people say: ‘wow! These are
Circassians.’ Not like when I went to the states to dance there,
people were saying: ‘where do these come from? Are they from
space?’ Scottish, Irish, Palestinian, and Jewish costumes are at
least known. I hope we reach a stage when people recognise at
least our music. This is the dream, I believe, of every
Circassian’ (Thuraya, 38, female).
Another dream interviewees tended to bring up during the interviews had
been international recognition for the genocide which took place in former Circassia,
and which led to the killing and the expulsion of thousands of their grandparents.
Interviewees seemed very keen to gain this sort of international recognition, and
mentioned that what they had to go through is no less than the Armenian genocide.
Qasim said,
‘I wish that one day the genocide against Circassians would be
internationally recognised by the UN. I want recognition that
we were forced to migrate, we were killed, and we were
battered. I do not think that the Jews are better than us. The
Jewish people are still receiving compensations for the
holocaust. The genocide triggers my emotions a lot; it infuriates
my emotions’ (Qasim 22, male).
In additions to their feelings towards their ‘original’ homeland, research participants
also expressed their feelings towards their presence in the state of Jordan. They
expressed that sometimes they do not feel recognised as part of the nation, and also
expressed a fear of losing their governmental positions, and a lack of recognition of
their group’s participation in the building of Jordan.
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7.2.2 Jordan: Alienation, Fear
‘I remember once a university professor, who teaches national
education, saying that the religions in Jordan are: Islam,
Christianity, Baha’is, and Circassian. He is a professor, he has a
PhD… he has to know who the Circassians are. He is
Jordanian, from this country, and he says that Circassian is a
religion… this is a shame… this is a shame not on him; this is a
shame on us. He is from this country and he does not know. I
do not know if this was intentionally said, but this is shameful’
(Qasim, 22, male).
Through dealing with this university professor, Qasim felt his group is not
known, and recognised enough. It has been argued that individuals, through social
interaction, become aware that they matter and are of value to others, which further
enhances their sense of value as individuals (Adams and Marshall, 1996). This
appears to be partly the case with research participants, as they mentioned that they
do not feel that their community’s participation in the building of Jordan, as a
nation-state is recognised. Although, in some way or another, Circassians do feel
that their role is indispensable in state life, many of them mentioned that they cannot
feel their value appreciated through the intergroup interactions, and in their daily
lives. The exclusion of Circassians from the state’s definition and narratives
promoted by the state also reinforces this lack of recognition.
The extract from the interview above does not only show that Qasim felt that
his group is not respected for its value, in the building of Jordan, but also shows the
interviewee’s feelings of alienation, and devaluation. In textbooks of national and
civic education, there is no mention, when talking about the people of Jordan, of the
Circassian community. And, the only official mention of them appears in the
webpage of King Hussein bin Talal. The paragraph begins by a brief history of their
flight and ends with the following few sentences,
‘Today, Circassian Jordanians are a well-educated people who
continue to play a role in Jordan’s political, economic and
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social life, larger than their numbers would indicate. Circassian
culture places strong emphasis on respect for the elderly and
closely-knit extended families. Marriage with anyone sharing
the same surname of either parent is strictly forbidden.
Circassians are also well known for their honesty. In fact,
Jordanian Circassians constitute King Hussein’s ceremonial
guard’ (Original English) (The Royal Hashemite Court, 2001:
Para 2).
Moreover, many interviewees exclaimed that they deserve to be mentioned in
textbooks of national and civic education, because they consider themselves as an
indivisible part of Jordan’s history. All interviewees, without any exceptions, talked
lengthily about the role of Circassians in the building of the state, and in supporting
the Hashemite Royal family when they first arrived to the region. All of them
mentioned that many Circassians occupied high ranks in the army, and in the
government. Moreover, several of them mentioned that Circassians were in Jordan
before the establishment of Jordan as a state, and before the arrival of the
Hashemites. Mention of streets in Jordan having Circassian names, and areas, which
are inhabited by Circassians till this day, was made as a way to emphasise their role
in the state. They have also used terms such as roots of Jordan, foundations, and
founders to describe the role of their group in Jordan. This emphasis was obviously
made to show their sense of the value of their group, which they do not see within
the official documents of the state, whether in the curriculum or throughout the
Jordan First campaign. For example, Nuha said,
‘I got very upset when I realised that books of national
education mention the Palestinian case, the Bedouins, the
refugees, and do not mention Circassians at all. We should be
mentioned. They have to write things about us’ (Nuha, 22,
female).
Many interviewees referred to Palestinians, who are part of the ‘Arab’ nation,
as a good example of a group who had not been of help or participation in the
building of Jordan, and on the contrary attempted to undermine the state authority.
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For example, many interviewees mentioned that people see them as more loyal and
more Jordanian than the ‘Arab’ Palestinians. Also, many expressed their
dissatisfaction with the Palestinian struggle being taught in the curriculum of
national and civic education, while their existence, as a whole, is being ignored. The
word ‘Palestinian’ almost appeared in every interview, always to compare between
Circassians’, and the ‘Arabs’ achievements and loyalty to Jordan. Some of them told
stories, in order to show how the Circassians are considered part of the Jordanian
people more than the Palestinians. For example, Tariq said,
‘For example, one of my friends at university is from Madaba,
and he is a real Jordanian. Once a fight happened at university
between Palestinians and Jordanians, so this Jordanian friend
of mine poked me and said: did we beat them? This shows that
we, Circassians, are part of Jordanians as a group’ (Tariq, 22,
male).
This shows that although interviewees attempted to emphasise the distinctiveness of
their group in comparison to other Jordanians, they also attempt to show that they
are much more part of the Jordanian nation than ‘Arab’ Palestinians. This also
signifies that people can have multiple identities, which operate differently
according to the situation and are contextual.
Interviewees also said that they would love to see recognition for their
existence, in Jordan, in textbooks of national and civic education, like all others. For
example, Asad said,
‘I would love to see a whole chapter about Circassians in books
of national education. People here are ignorant about our
achievements and culture. They only know that we have
dances, and might recognise our music, and in some cases our
cuisine. But, they do not know that many ministers, and prime
ministers are Circassians; they are ignorant about our
achievements’ (Asad, 22, male).
Those issues were brought up by research participants to reflect their feelings of
being undervalued despite the high levels of loyalty they showed. Moreover, such
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lack of recognition had also been expressed in relation to feelings of fear—fear for
the loss of their unique identity, and fear that they might lose their role in Jordan.
During my meeting with the ‘chairman’ of the Circassian Charity
Association, in Amman, he mentioned that many Circassians of the young
generation are very reluctant nowadays to join the army and the government
because of the low pay. He added that this makes him concerned that Circassians
might start losing their role within Jordan. Several other interviewees mentioned the
same concerns. However, one of them (Thuraya, 38, female) added that the policy of
King Abdullah II is to integrate the Palestinians within Jordan, and for that reason
many Circassian employees were dismissed from the Royal Hashemite Court and
substituted by Palestinians. This could, also, explain why respondents attempted to
show their loyalty towards Jordan, as much as they could, because they do not want
to feel excluded from Jordan’s public sphere and state life. Moreover, in a way,
emphasising their loyalty and belonging towards Jordan and their satisfaction with
their lives in it, whilst at the same time expressing feelings of confusion and lack of
recognition, means that the conventional wisdom about Circassians’ integration is an
oversimplification of the experiences of Circassians. It reflects one aspect of reality
but not all of it as there are contradictions between Circassians’ (re)construction of
Jordanianism and the narratives promoted by the state; the community as a whole
tries to create a harmony of their own contradictions.
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Conclusion
The assumption that Circassians are integrated in Jordan does not provide a
whole picture of the Circassian community in Jordan, as this chapter provided that
they feel confusion and lack of recognition of their participation in the building of
the state of Jordan. Their expression of positive feelings towards Jordan is
understandable, because they do not know an actual homeland other than Jordan.
This expression has also been accompanied with emphasis on their feelings of
belonging and attachment, and explaining their attachment by referring to what they
feel they share with the majority of Jordanians, and to Circassian ‘traits’ such as
loyalty and courage which enable their acceptance in society. This also shows the
strategies interviewees use in order to attain a level of social acceptance, to define the
boundaries of their ethnic group, and to appear as loyal as possible to the country,
the land, and the Hashemites. And, by viewing those symbols of the state, the land
and the Hashemites, in non-ethnic and non-primordial terms, interviewees
attempted to reconcile the contradictions between their (re)construction, and the
Jordanian state’s construction, of what being a Jordanian means.
Data also revealed a separation between their ethnicity and their status in
Jordan. Interviewees seemed to realise that in a state based on the ethno-national
narratives of the ‘Arabs’, they could not reflect their ethnic narratives within the
definition of the state, and they would rather separate state life from their ethnicity,
through practising their culture and traditions at home, and within the community
itself. Jordan is their homeland, which makes them no less than ‘Arab’ Jordanians, as
they have explained, but at the same time the preservation of their ancestral
attachments is part of their duty and tasks, and for them it does not destabilize their
belonging to Jordan. As Thuraya put it simply,
‘I do not have the right to reflect my identity through the
identity of the state itself. As you said, we are minorities.
According to the constitution of the state, Islam is its religion,
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and the state is an Arabic state, and part of the Arab world. If I
am to be stubborn, I will face a lot of troubles; this will not
work. I am part of a minority, I should be proud of being part
of this combination... I can preserve my entity, and not to
assimilate, because I want to be, I have the right to be, part of
the minorities who are proud of being of different origins and
upbringing, but I am also proud of being part of this country. It
is an Arab country, of course it is. I cannot say that it is an
Arab-Circassian country, or an Arab-Armenian country,
between brackets. This is not valid. It is an Arab-Muslim
country’ (Thuraya, 38, female).
Because many of the interviewees believe that King Abdullah I granted them
good positions in the government out of generosity, most interviewees felt
gratefulness towards the Hashemites. All interviewees expressed that they feel either
grateful to the land or the Hashemites, or to both. It became clear that research
participants leaned towards de-ethnicising the narratives of nationalism promoted
by the state of Jordan. The de-ethnicisation of the land and narratives of
Jordanianism helped them to position themselves within the state of Jordan, and the
society, albeit with contradictions.
Also interviewees felt that their contribution to the building of the state of Jordan is
undervalued, and that they lack recognition within that context. Thus, one cannot
deny that the primordial ethnic nature of narratives of nationalism promoted by the
state seemed to affect research participants, in a manner that made them seek
alternative means through which they themselves could attain recognition, and be
part of the narratives. On the other hand, feelings of bitterness, and expressions of
hope and dreams, were made exclusively towards their original homeland-
Circassia. For interviewees, their desire for international recognition for the
genocide, which took place in the nineteenth century, seemed as strong as their
desire to be recognised for their efforts in building the state of Jordan.
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Chapter Eight
Conclusions
This research has been a personal journey of discovery, in addition to making
an academic contribution. It provided me with a deeper understanding of the socio-
political situation in Jordan, and how it influences groups such as the Palestinians
and Circassians differently. Although the focus of this thesis is the Circassians, my
initial interest in the Circassian people came from the fact that Circassians are seen
as more integrated than the Palestinians in Jordan, at least politically and
economically. However, before I shed light on the contrast between the positions of
Circassians and Palestinians, I explore how the research questions have been
answered throughout this thesis and demonstrate the academic contribution of this
research.
The answer to questions about the different positions of the Circassians and
Palestinians in Jordan is multi-faceted, and there are various complex factors that
need to be taken into account; this is discussed later in this chapter. In the main body
of this thesis, however, I have focused on the relationship between the Circassians
and the state of Jordan through an exploration of their ethnic narratives and the
nationalist narratives of the state of Jordan. I have done this in order to make sense
of how Circassians are able to identify themselves as Circassian and Jordanian at the
same time, despite the difficulties they experience in doing so (See chapter 7). The
starting point, in understanding this relationship between the Circassians and the
state of Jordan, was to unpack what it means to be Circassian and what it means to
be Jordanian.
This has been guided by my understanding that the boundaries of what it
means to be of a specific ethnic group and of a specific nation are fluid,
(re)constructed, and (re)configured, as I argued in chapter two. Further, based on the
idea that ethnicities and nationalisms are not natural, I argue that ethnic actors often
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construct their ethnicities through narratives that can posit primordial and/or non-
primordial forms of attachments. The research was guided by the following research
questions, with the aim of contributing to the understanding of the relationship
between the Circassians and the state of Jordan, and each question has been the
focus of different chapters:
 What are the ethnic narratives mobilised by the Circassians in Jordan? Do
those narratives differ depending on age and gender? (chapters four and five).
 What are the nationalist narratives and ideologies the state of Jordan
promotes through ‘Jordan First’ and textbooks of national and civic
education? (chapter six).
 How do research participants make sense of and reconstruct state narratives?
(chapters six and seven)
 What is the relationship between the state of Jordan and its Circassian
community? Is the conventional wisdom relating to their integration
accurate? (chapter seven).
To answer the research questions, I first identified the ethnic narratives the research
participants use to define their ethnicity, and the analysis included gender
considerations. Later, I identified the narratives the state of Jordan uses to define the
nation and how the research participants (re)construct those narratives. The
juxtaposition of state narratives alongside research participants’ (re)construction of
these narratives, aided an understanding of the relationship between the state of
Jordan and the research participants, and revealed how research participants
situated themselves as ‘non-Arabs’ who belong to Jordan. Although the literature on
state nationalism in the Middle East is vast, it mostly looks at the narratives Middle
Eastern states promote rather than the construction of nationalism ‘from below’ (see
for e.g. Anderson, 2002, Anderson, 2001, Halliday, 2000b, Kumaraswamy, 2003,
Massad, 2001). Additionally, most of the literature on state nationalism in the Middle
East is based on criticism of the mere existence of Middle Eastern states because they
are ‘modern’, and because the manufacturing of state nationalism in the Middle East
was so recent. This research suggests a different approach to state nationalism: as all
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nationalisms are constructed and often (re)constructed, research should turn to how
people, who are at the receiving end of those narratives, are affected by them, and
how they affect the (re)construction of, and contribute to the reproduction of
narratives of nationalism. Additionally, literature on minority groups and ethnic
minorities is Eurocentric. This research, therefore, contributes to the literature on
diasporic communities living in the Middle East, rather than on groups from the
Middle East living in the West. It also provides a contribution to the literature on
Islam as a nationalist ideology, and critiques the hypothesis that religion constitutes
the basis of state nationalism in the Middle East ‘from above’, by instead evaluating
it ‘from below’ (Halliday, 2000a, Halliday, 2000c, Halliday, 2000b). The following
sections discuss how the research questions have been answered, and identify the
major empirical and theoretical contributions of this investigation. I also reflect on
the contrast between Circassian and Palestinian integration in Jordan. The final
sections of this chapter explore the limitations of this project and suggest further
research that could build on the findings presented here.
Ethnicity
To answer the research question on the ethnic narratives of the Circassians in
Jordan I review in chapter four how research participants defined themselves as
Circassian, and what they believe makes them Circassian. Research participants’
construction of what it means to be Circassian is relational and contextual, or in
other words influenced by their presence in Jordan. I identified two types of ethnic
narrative used by participants to define their ethnic identity: the first type is seen as
‘fixed,’ drawing on primordial conceptions of ethnicity, while the second type is seen
as ‘changing’ and ‘dismantling’ based on culture and language. It is important to
note that even the use of narratives that draw on primordial conceptions of ethnicity
can be seen as contextual and relational and are always used in comparison to ‘the
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other.’ However, in light of Circassians’ feeling that they are losing their culture and
language and their inability to either speak the language or practise their culture,
research participants emphasised the importance of primordial narratives to
distinguish themselves from the ‘Arab’ majority in Jordan. Thus primordialism
becomes important as a distinguishing element of ethnicity, particularly when
research participants felt unable to distinguish themselves culturally and
linguistically.
Although ethnic actors draw on primordial narratives to define their
ethnicities, scholars should not take this tendency for granted, as even primordial
narratives are (re)constructed in contextual and relational terms. Many of those
narratives do not necessarily represent the whole of the Circassian community
around the world; rather they are based on comparisons between the research
participants and the majority of Jordanian ‘Arabs’. This shows that the ethnic
narratives of my Circassian research participants are usually constructed in relation
to the context within which they live, to distinguish between ‘us’ and ‘them’. For
example, participants drew a comparison between their family names, and Arabic
family names, saying that their family names originate from non-Arabic language
roots, making them unique and different from the ‘other’.
One of the major findings of this research is that, for Circassians in Jordan,
narratives related to origin and roots are frequently linked to the relatively recent
stories of their diaspora rather than to the older Nart Sagas, which are considered
the myths of origin for the whole of the Circassian community (Colarusso, 2002).
Therefore, this research reveals that Circassians in Jordan do not share the same
narratives of origin, related to the Nart Sagas. This further emphasises the fact that
their ethnicity is contextualised, and based on constructed narratives that are
influenced in their (re)constructions by the stories research participants hear from
their parents, grandparents, and members of their community.
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On the other hand, the changing narratives of ethnicity were also brought up
by research participants as important markers of difference. Despite the importance
of culture as a marker of difference, interviewees often acknowledged the fact that
culture changes, and is changing. Further, the emphasis on the cultural aspects of
ethnicity meant that many of them see their culture as important. It was also
mentioned that their culture conflicts with the ‘Arab’ culture, and the fact that it is
changing has to do with the fact they are living in an ‘Arab’ country and cannot
always practise their culture. Therefore, practices and traditions remain part of their
private lives, whereas the ‘family name’ is what makes them different in the public
sphere. In other words, people use family names in the public sphere, and what
makes these names different is the fact that they do not derive from Arabic language.
Family names are transferred through the fathers, due to the patrilineal system of
kinship prevalent in Jordan. This implies that ethnicity is seen as transferred through
the father, thus obscuring mothers’ roles in the transmission of ethnicity.
This research also explores the gender implications of the ethnic narratives
the participants used to define their ethnicity. This exploration contributes to the
literature on gender and ethnicity. Gender has often been overlooked in research on
ethnicity and this is particularly true for studies of ethnicity in the Middle East. On
the one hand, there is little research on minority groups in the Middle East, and on
the other hand, gendered aspects of ethnicity and ethnicised aspects of gender are
underrepresented in studies of ethnic minorities, and also in studies of state
nationalisms in the Middle East. This failure to highlight women’s experiences and
women’s contributions to the reproduction of ethnic and national narratives can be a
consequence of associating women with the private sphere and men with the public.
Also, associating the preservation of ethnic practices and traditions with the private
sphere makes women responsible for the transmission of those practices within their
assigned role as mothers. The preservation of practices, culture and tradition is often
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associated with the private sphere and with women, who are expected to do the
‘preservation.’
Gender and Ethnicity
This research reveals that one aspect of the narratives research participants
used to define their ethnicity is related to gender relations within the Circassian
community that are seen as different from those with the ‘Arab’ communities. This
makes the preservation of gender relations as important as preserving other aspects
of culture, especially as they are seen as part of culture. Gender relations often
served to set group boundaries, for example, male interviewees often mentioned that
in Circassian culture, women are respected, while in ‘Arab’ culture women are
‘controlled’. This distinction that was referred to by men and some women
interviewees is not particularly accurate, as one interviewee explained that she was
subjected to violence and control from her brother. However, it was a distinction
used by participants to emphasise the distinctiveness of their culture. Research
participants often used stereotypes about gender relations in ‘Arab’ society to show
the superiority of their culture, as a culture of respect to women, and the elderly as
well.
Interviewees also mentioned ‘Arab’ first cousin marriage, which is not
accepted in Circassian culture. This shows how gender relations serve as ethnic
narratives, and highlights the importance of attending to the centrality of gender in
studies of ethnicity. Additionally, the research reveals that ethnic narratives are
gendered, or in other words, some narratives overlook women’s role in transmitting
ethnicity, while others highlight it. For instance, most male interviewees attempted
to explain their culture by referring to what they called the ‘Adyghe’ or the ‘perfect
man’ theory. The ‘perfect man’ theory means that Circassians are raised on certain
values and principles in an attempt to make them perfect men later in life. They also
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added that Circassian culture and upbringing, along with the perfect man theory,
makes them loyal, courageous, and brave warriors, always in gendered terms, and to
always describe Circassian men not women.
Those attributes were also used by research participants to explain why they
see themselves as integrated into Jordanian society, and why they have been granted
good governmental positions. However, men were the ones who were granted good
governmental positions in Jordan, and not women. Therefore, when research
participants talk about being integrated they are talking about men, rather than
women.
The state of Jordan also promotes its nationalism through referring to gender
relations in ‘Arab’ society, and the importance of preserving the family unit and the
gender division of labour, as part of preserving the ‘authenticity’ of ‘Arab’ culture.
The state of Jordan also deprives women of the right of transferring their nationality
to their children, because nationality is de jure transferred through the father. The
marginalisation of women’s public roles within state narratives also contributes to
the marginalisation of women from nationalist narratives. Handrahan (2002) argues
that men are more likely to identify with ethnicity than women. However, this
research reveals that women were more likely to identify with Circassia as a
homeland than men, and that men were more likely to identify with Jordan as a
homeland. The association of women and ethnicity with the private sphere, and
males with the public, as questionnaire data showed, could explain why women
show more attachment towards Circassia as a homeland compared to Jordan,
whereas men show more attachment to Jordan. Besides, women in Jordan are treated
as second class citizens, as they do not enjoy the rights that men have, and this may
partly explain why women participants were less likely to show attachment towards
the state of Jordan.
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The state of Jordan, and research participants, highlight women’s role in
transmitting culture, and research participants emphasised the importance of
women’s role in the preservation of cultural practices and traditions, in addition to
the preservation of honour, which justifies control over women. Therefore,
Circassian women are expected to be reproducers and bearers of collectivities in the
private sphere, they are expected to teach their children the language, culture and
tradition, and in the public sphere they are expected to represent their group and
preserve the honour of their families.
Circassian women’s experiences are different from those of men, and of other
women, especially with the strict age segregation tradition within the Circassian
community, as this age segregation applies to men, while women are expected to be
responsible for bringing up their children. This was explored in chapter five, which
showed that women are placed in the same category as children. Whereas most
interviewees mentioned that they had ‘formal’ relations with their fathers due to the
strict age segregation tradition, the mothers were the ones who are at home, and
who are expected to stay with the children; this places women and children in the
same category. On the other hand, the fact that Circassian women are expected to
represent their families’ honour and their community as a whole, when interacting
with other groups, very much influences women’s lives, and places particular
restrictions on them due to their gender and ethnicity.
State Promoted Narratives ‘From Above’
Part of this research deals with the narratives and ideologies the state of
Jordan uses to define the nation, which is explored in chapter six. Previous research
suggests that Islam constitutes the basis of state nationalist identity in the Middle
East (Halliday, 2000a, Halliday, 2000c, Halliday, 2000b). Although Islam is used in
state narratives promoted in textbooks of national and civic education, it is used to
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support the ‘superiority’ of the ‘Arabs’, as they were the ones who ‘carried the
banner of Islam.’ Islam is portrayed as part of the legacy of the ‘Arabs,’ and part of
the ‘Arabic’ civilisation, rather than a narrative on its own, which defines the people
or the nation. The people of Jordan are defined as ‘Arabs’, and not Muslims, in state
narratives, and the usage of Islam is limited to representing part of the achievements
of the ‘Arabs.’ On the other hand, Islam is also used to give legitimacy to the Royal
Family in Jordan, which claims to be descendents of the prophet Muhammed. At the
same time, the Hashemite family is presented as the ‘fathers’ of ‘pan-Arabism’, who
represent the ‘Arab’ nation. While it remains unclear what the word ‘Arab’ means or
refers to, it is talked about in primordial terms.
Anderson (2002) identifies two elements of state nationalism in the Middle
East, arguing that nationalism in the Middle East has a dual character or dual
nationalism, one that is based on the ‘Arab’ nation, and the other one based on the
territory or land. The findings of this research build on his argument, as I identified
the same elements of nationalism- ‘pan-Arabism’ and Jordanian territorial
nationalism. However, throughout the analysis of textbooks of national and civic
education, the ‘Jordan First’ campaign, and other state documents, it appeared that
even territorial nationalism is defined in ‘pan-Arab’ terms, as the land or territory
was labelled as ‘Arab’ land, and the people who belong to and own the land are
‘Arabs.’ Although the concept pan-nationalism refers to the people, and territorial
nationalism refers to the land, in textbooks of civic and national education, territorial
nationalism also revolves around the people. Chapter six showed that there is no
clear-cut separation between these two concepts, ‘pan-Arabism’ and Jordanianism,
as they are very much interlinked, and the state of Jordan appears to be emphasising
‘Arabism’ as the basis of its nationalist narrative.
As the term ‘Arab’ remains unclear, research participants used it to refer to
the majority in Jordan, while most of them identified themselves as ‘non-Arabs’,
especially when speaking about their ethnic narratives. It became clear that research
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participants realised that the state of Jordan uses the term in a primordial sense
which is exclusionary for them and disregards their contribution to the building of
the state of Jordan. In spite of their realisation of their exclusion from state
narratives, research participants believed that they are integrated into Jordanian
society because of the fact that many Circassian men attained good governmental
positions. (I discuss the idea of integration in more detail below). This exclusion also
made them feel that the good treatment of the Circassians in Jordan is due to the
Hashemites’ generosity, as they granted them the right to be in Jordan in spite of
their ‘non-Arab’ origins. This generosity on behalf of the Hashemites was a way of
making allegiances with the Circassians in Jordan. At the same time, research
participants seemed to adopt certain strategies to include themselves within the
state’s definition of the nation and to reconcile the differences between state
ethnonationalism and their ‘non-Arab’ origins. For instance, some chose to de-
ethnicise Jordanianism, others chose to view ‘pan-Arabism’ in non-primordial terms,
and the majority emphasised religion as part of their (re)construction of the
narratives. Those strategies show that the (re)construction of state nationalist
narratives ‘from below’ seems very different to how the narratives are promoted
‘from above’, and this has been an area often unexplored in the literature. Research
participants’ (re)construction of nationalism contributes to their feelings of
belonging to the state of Jordan, and for that reason I chose to look at their
(re)construction of state nationalism, as it contributes to our understanding of
belonging amongst ethnic minorities.
(Re)Constructing Jordanianism ‘From Below’
The (re)construction by research participants of what it means to be Jordanian
is very different from the construction of the state. This shows that, although Jordan
is succeeding in promoting itself as an ‘Arab’ country, this does not mean that it is
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succeeding in creating a sense of belonging amongst the people of Jordan towards an
‘Arab’ nation. This is because some research participants chose to either adopt
different views about ‘Arabism’, or to ignore it as part of their (re)construction of
Jordanianism, and their (re)construction appears to be strongly influenced by Islam.
First and foremost, Islam appeared to be a narrative that is prevalent amongst
research participants, as all of them identified themselves as Muslims, and most of
them viewed Jordan as an Islamic country, because the rulers are Muslims and the
majority in Jordan is Muslim.
A main theme identified in the ‘Islam’ narrative was the universalism of
Islam, and that it is not exclusive for one nation. It became clear that, for research
participants, ‘Islam’ is a bond that transcends ethnicities and nationalisms, and a
bond they share with the majority of Jordanians. It was also obvious that research
participants’ view Islam in non-primordial terms, as a commonality between
themselves and the ‘Arabs’ that is not ethnic. Although some argue that there exists
an ‘Islamic theory of ethnicity’ (See Ataman 2003), this research revealed that Islam
is utilised by research participants when they are trying to draw on similarities
between themselves and the majority in Jordan, and when they attempt to reconcile
their narratives with the narratives of the state of Jordan. This also makes the theory
of the existence of an Islamic ethnicity very contextual, as when participants talked
about their ethnic narratives they drew on differences, while when they attempted to
explain their position in Jordan, they drew on similarities. On the other hand, Islam
was also utilised by some research participants to deconstruct the concept of ‘pan-
Arabism’ and strip it of its ethnic and primordial connotations. This leads to the
(re)construction of another view of ‘Arabism’.
Some research participants chose to de-ethnicise ‘Arabism’ by saying that it is
universal, because Arabic is the language of the Quran. By saying that those who
speak Arabic, regardless of origin, are ‘Arabs’ and by saying that Arabism is about a
‘universal’ language, and not limited to an ethnic group, research participants were
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including themselves as part of the ‘Arabs.’ Therefore, for some research participants
the term ‘Arab’ had the same connotations as Islam, especially when emphasised as
the language of the ‘Quran.’ Although language can also be a way to understand
ethnicity, some research participants emphasised that the ‘Arabs’ are neither a
nation nor an ethnic group. Others who believed that the ‘Arabs’ are an ethnic group
chose to look at the land of Jordan in non-primordial terms, despite the fact that the
state of Jordan promotes it as an ‘Arab’ land.
The deconstruction and (re)construction of Jordanianism and ‘Arabism’ were
used as a way of justifying Circassians’ positions in Jordan by research participants.
The (re)construction also shows that, in spite of the primordial narratives the state
promotes about the ‘Arabs’, research participants found other ways and strategies to
explain their position in Jordan. This (re)construction also shows that, for the
research participants, narratives of ethnicities and nationalisms are constantly
(re)constructed, (re)configured, and contextualised. Furthermore, research
participants, who identified themselves as Circassians, were attempting to find a
space for themselves within ethnonational Jordan by linking their feelings towards
being Jordanian to the public sphere, and their feelings towards being Circassian to
the private sphere. This shows how for them, ethnicity is linked to the private
sphere, and their nationalist feelings towards Jordan are not based on primordial
notions of ethnicity. Rather what it means to be Jordanian is (re)configured by
stripping the notion of Jordanianism of its primordial implications, as explored in
chapter four.
It is very important, however, to emphasise that research participants, despite
identifying themselves as Circassian and Jordanian, did this with difficulty. My
findings show that many research participants, as explained in chapter seven, fear
that their political position in Jordan could change, and feel that it is changing due to
the different policies of King Abdullah II and the fact that fewer Circassians from the
younger generations are joining the army or governmental departments because of
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low pay in the public sector. Some even mentioned that Circassians holding
governmental positions were being replaced by Palestinians. Therefore, it is
important to clarify that the position of a particular group can change, and it seems
as if the research participants felt that they, as a group, were going through a stage
of transition in their position and status. Chatty (2010) drawing on historical
narratives of older generations of the Circassian community argues that Circassians
are integrated into Jordanian society. She says,
‘Self-identification of individual Circassians remains firmly
based on ethnic qualities, language, culture and customs. For
many, these markers sat comfortably with those of national
identity. Being Circassian and being Jordanian or Syrian were
not contradictory’ (Chatty, 2010: 133).
In contrast the findings of my research show that many research participants felt
uncomfortable when attempting to bridge the differences between their ethnic
narratives and the national markers of the state of Jordan. This difference between
the findings of the two studies can possibly be explained by the differences in the
samples. My sample was drawn from the younger generations of the Circassian
community, while Chatty’s was drawn from the oldest surviving members of the
Circassian community. Although my questionnaire sample included people of
varying ages, my interviewees were concentrated in the younger age groups. There
may be differences between older and younger generations of Circassians in terms of
how they understand and narrate their relation to the state of Jordan. The fact that
Chatty found that self-identification of Circassians sat comfortably with their
national identity, while, for my research participants, bridging the gap between their
ethnic and national identification created difficulty, may not only reflect a difference
between older and younger generations, but could also reflect a change in the status
of the group, a change in the state’s policies towards numerical minorities and/or
that Circassians in Jordan are not a homogeneous group. An example of such
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changes is provided by the state’s privatisation processes, which will be discussed
and linked to the position of Palestinians in the following section.
Reflections on Integration
I was initially interested in exploring the different experiences of integration
between the Palestinians and Circassians. However, in order to do this it is necessary
to reflect on the different aspects of integration and how it can be understood. It
needs to be looked at on different levels - social, political and economic - but it is
beyond the scope of this research to cover fully all these aspects of integration.
However, my research findings suggest that Circassians believe that they are
integrated into Jordanian society. Many of them mentioned their political
participation in the state of Jordan as an example, with the first mayor of Amman
being Circassian and Amman being characterised as a Circassian village. An
emphasis on their role, as a group, in the building of the state of Jordan also suggests
that research participants believe that they are politically integrated in Jordan.
On the other hand, it is important to recognise that accounts of the economic
integration of Circassians in Jordan derive from the fact that historically they were
amongst the first settlers in Amman, and other Jordanian cities. As their skills and
reputation in trade and agriculture are given special attention, even in literary and
historical accounts of Amman (see chapter one), they are often portrayed and
thought of as land owners and owners of private property. In this study, however, it
has been hard to address the economic integration of the Circassians because most
research participants were relatively well-off and it is hazardous to generalise about
a whole community from such a small sample. However, as highlighted above,
research participants felt that their position in the state of Jordan is changing, and
they mentioned that some Circassians in government positions are being replaced by
Palestinians; this suggests that the relative positions of both groups may be shifting.
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Such shifts could be linked to changing state policies, and brings me back to a
consideration of the different experiences of Circassians and Palestinians in Jordan.
The state of Jordan, under the reign of King Abdullah II, has been going
through major privatisation processes. Ongoing privatisation of the public sector
means that state control is weakening; this may contribute to the different feelings
expressed by older and younger generations of the Circassian community. In other
words, with the shrinking power of the state, the position of minorities privileged by
the state might change and, by the same token, the status of groups previously
discriminated against by the state could also change, transforming a public sector
that largely excludes the Palestinians into a private sector might open opportunities
for Palestinians to prosper economically. Nonetheless, returning to the question of
the position of Palestinians in Jordan, one should acknowledge that Palestinians in
Jordan are a numerical majority, and this means that, unlike the Circassians, they are
a diverse group, with different statuses and positions within Jordan.
Despite the fact that many Palestinians still live in camps in Jordan, others
have managed to move outside the camps, and live in affluent areas. This means that
a generalisation about the economic integration of Palestinians is likely to be
inaccurate. In other words, many Palestinians are upper and upper middle class and
much of the private sector is owned by Palestinian entrepreneurs. Moreover, the
different legal statuses Palestinians have in Jordan also contribute to their varying
positions. For instance, some Palestinians have refugee status, while others have full
Jordanian citizenship. Even those who have full Jordanian citizenship are still
excluded from the public sector, and are not politically represented as an ethnic
group, unlike the Circassians who are included through the ethnic quota law. Other
Palestinians, specifically, those living in refugee camps, suffer from poverty, lack of
good infrastructure and overcrowding. For those reasons, it is very difficult to
discuss the economic integration of Palestinians as a group.
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On the social level, based on the findings of this research, I am unable to
compare the Palestinians and Circassians. Nonetheless, findings show that although
the Circassians might be integrated politically into Jordanian society, they identify
themselves as different from the Jordanian majority, and define themselves as an
ethnic group. Furthermore, as previously explained, research participants found it
difficult to bridge the gap between their being Circassian and Jordanian at the same
time. References to different cultural practices and origins, in addition to their
attempt to present themselves as superior in terms of gender relations, show that the
Circassians still define themselves as different, although Jordanian, but a distinctive
ethnic group. They retain social distinctions between themselves and the majority
population which suggests that their social integration does not involve total
cultural assimilation.
Drawing on the history of the two groups and the history of their relationship
to the state of Jordan, discussed in chapter one, it is possible to draw some tentative
conclusions about the differences between Circassian and Palestinian integration.
Firstly, their migration processes differ significantly. Whereas Circassian migration
took place during Ottoman times, the Palestinian refugee flows took place between
1947-9 when Jordan had already been established as a state. Thus the Circassians
had established themselves as a settler community in what is now Jordan, during
Ottoman times. Despite the fact that Circassians were used by the Ottomans to stand
up against Bedouins and other locals, and that because of this their relationship to
the ‘Arab’ locals had been turbulent, the Circassian community became privileged
particularly in Amman settlement, which later became the capital of Jordan. As
explained in chapter one, Circassians were hated by the ‘Arab’ Bedouin tribes, due
to their alignment with the Ottomans. Thus when the ‘Arabs’ defeated the Ottomans
in the area, Circassians were placed in a very critical position. However, well-
established Circassians in Amman, which was characterised as a Circassian village
after the defeat of the Ottomans, benefited from the political activities taking place in
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Amman under British control, and the initial mistrust between Circassians and
‘Arabs’ was overcome.
Making Amman the capital of Jordan, and the centre of political activity
contributed to the economic and political integration of the Circassian community.
On the political level, creating the Arab Legion and the Transjordan Frontier Force in
Amman inevitably meant Circassian political participation, as more than half the
population in Amman was Circassian. On the economic level, Circassians were
established as landowners and the fact that political activity took place in Amman by
default allowed economic opportunities, particularly with the rapid increase in the
number of inhabitants of the city. These historical factors influenced the relationship
between the Circassian community and the state of Jordan, and also contributed to
their different standing in Jordanian society, when compared to Palestinians.
The case of the Palestinians is different. For a start, they are numerically a
majority in Jordan, while the Circassians are a very small minority. As mentioned
earlier, the Palestinians in Jordan now are a diverse group, and one cannot
generalise about their position or integration, either politically or economically.
However, drawing on the history of the relationship of the Palestinian community to
the state of Jordan, what is now called Palestine and Jordan are only separated by
one river, and for some time they followed the same administration. After the defeat
of the Ottoman Empire, both areas, nowadays Palestine and Jordan, came under
British control. While present-day Jordan attained its independence gradually
starting with the creation of the Emirate of Transjordan in 1920, the occupied
Palestinian territories remained under British control until the UN partition plan in
1947, which allowed for the establishment of the ‘Israeli’ state on Palestinian
territories. Upon the establishment of the state of ‘Israel’, all Palestinians on the West
and the East side of the Jordan River were granted Jordanian citizenship, and the
remaining Palestinian territories came under the administration of the Hashemite
King Abdullah I.
320
The establishment of the state of ‘Israel’, as explained earlier, also created
refugee flows, and many Palestinians from the West side of the Jordan River left
their homes and properties and sought refuge in present-day Jordan. Despite the fact
that all Palestinians were granted Jordanian citizenship, and both banks of the river
came under Hashemite administration, Palestinian refugees wanted to return to the
homes they had to flee. This desire created Palestinian nationalist aspirations, and
was supported by many ‘Arab’ countries that waged wars against ‘Israel’. The result
was ‘Israeli’ control over the whole of the Palestinian territories. Other factors that
could have influenced the relationship between the Palestinians and the state of
Jordan include the assassination of King Abdullah I by a Palestinian in Jerusalem,
and the 1970 civil war in Jordan.
On the economic level, as explained earlier, it is hard to generalise about
Palestinian integration, as they are a diverse group. However, on the political level,
one can see that throughout their presence in Jordan Palestinians’ relationship to the
state of Jordan has not been smooth. In contrast to the Circassians, the Palestinians
have nationalist aspirations, and their claim to a nation-state means that, in a very
real sense, they are not seeking full political integration in the state of Jordan. This is
very different from the Circassians. These factors influence the position of the
Palestinians in Jordan, their relationship to the state of Jordan, and the state’s
attitude towards them as a group. Thus the lack of political recognition Palestinians
experience, within the boundaries of the state of Jordan, can be explained through
their history and their nationalistic feelings towards a homeland that they have been
struggling to reclaim for over sixty years.
This has been partly pointed out by Massad (2001) and Lucas (2008) who say
that Jordanian nationalism was constructed in opposition to Palestinian nationalism
in the aftermath of the civil war that took place in Jordan in the early 1970s. Lucas
(2008) states ‘a rising new form of Palestinian nationalism would set the stage for the
final challenge to the sovereignty of the Jordanian state’ (283). This means that
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Jordanian nationalism is constructed in relation to an ‘other’, which in this case is the
Palestinians. The Circassians, defined and recognised as an ethnic group by the state
of Jordan, are not regarded as threatening to the sovereignty of the state of Jordan,
and this contributes to the differential political integration of both groups.
The answer to the question about Circassian and Palestinian integration in
Jordan is not straightforward. Nonetheless, it has been important to reflect on the
contrast between Palestinians and Circassians in this chapter, as this contrast is what
triggered my interest in the Circassian community. Finally, it is important to
highlight that the major difference between the Palestinians and the Circassians as
groups in Jordan is related to their political standing. In other words, whereas the
Circassians are integrated into the government and the public sector and allowed
seats in the parliament, as a recognised ethnic group, the Palestinians are not. The
numerical superiority of the Palestinians in Jordan also makes it problematic for the
state of Jordan to recognise their presence on Jordanian lands as an ethnic or national
group, as this would be threatening to the whole entity of the state. Therefore, to
sum up the major difference between Circassians and Palestinians can be explained
through the differential political integration both groups experience. Having
reflected on this contrast, I move to a discussion of the theoretical contributions of
this research in the next section.
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Theoretical Contributions
The empirical contributions of this research, discussed above, developed my
understanding of ethnicity, national ideologies, diaspora, and gender and ethnicity.
First and foremost, this research addressed some gaps in the literature on diasporic
communities living in the Middle East. This case study of the Circassian community
in Jordan constitutes an important contribution to knowledge, as it moves away
from the stigmatisation of diasporic communities as having a ‘natural’ bond with
their original homelands. Thus the findings of the research show that the narratives
of Circassians in Jordan are context dependent, and very much influenced by the
prolonged presence of the Circassians in Jordan. The case study also echoes
Anthias’s (1998) argument on ethnicities in diaspora being constructed in relational
and contextual terms. Furthermore, as ethnicities in diaspora are often
(re)constructed and (re)configured, dealing with ethnic minorities as ‘deviant from
the norm’ is problematic. In other words, as ethnicities are (re)constructed, the ethnic
narratives of specific communities can be formulated in ways that enable ethnic
minorities to accommodate themselves in the nationalist narratives of the state
where they reside; this appeared to be the case for the Circassian participants in this
research.
In addition, the research has also addressed how people define their
ethnicities ‘from below’ by building on the circumstantialist approach to the concept
of ethnicity. In other words, looking at ethnicity as a social construct helped me to
understand and gain further insight into the meanings attached to sharing ancestry,
language and culture for research participants; rather than simply how best to
classify people into ethnic categories (Cornell and Hartmann, 2007, Drury, 1994,
Fenton 2010, Jenkins, 2008, Song, 2003). The research findings also show that
although ethnicity is socially constructed, and although my understanding of
ethnicity is based on this, ethnic actors often refer to primordial notions of ethnicity
to define their group boundaries, as explored in chapter four. This approach to
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ethnicity also allowed me to recognise that people have multiple belongings, and
should not simply be treated as ethnic actors; they can belong to class, family,
gender, and/or a state. The findings show that research participants see themselves
both as an ethnic group, and as Jordanian nationals, which shows that their
belongings are multiple; this understanding has been facilitated by the use of the
narrative approach which also helps in exploring the intersections of ethnicity and
gender (Prins, 2006).
Since belonging is multiple, it has also been important to explore gender in
relation to ethnicity, and this exploration provides some theoretical contributions to
this area. Findings show that there are differences between men’s and women’s
identification with ethnic narratives, and that gender relations are used as part of
ethnic narratives and as group boundary markers (Handrahan, 2002), as explored in
chapter five. The findings of this research build on Benton’s (1998) argument that
women play a role in the reproduction of ethnicity, and that they are expected to be
responsible for the upbringing and the transmission of ethnic narratives. The
findings also show how the social view of women as mothers, reproducers, and
representatives of their family’s honour, legitimates control over women and their
sexuality. This has not only been evident through the narratives the participants
mobilised, but also in relation to the nationalist narratives used by the state of
Jordan.
On the other hand, although states own the media through which they
promote their nationalist narratives, my approach to nationalism suggests a binary
approach to nationalism, ‘from above’ and ‘from below’. This approach does not
limit the construction of nationalist narratives to the states or ‘elites’ as ‘ordinary’
people also have power over (re)constructing those narratives; my research findings
support this theoretical approach showing that, although the state of Jordan has the
power to promote nationalist narratives, research participants (re)construct those
narratives in ways that allow them to be included in the definition of the nation. This
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approach informs our understanding of ethnicity and nationalism and helps in
shifting the focus from the assumption that nationalist narratives are imposed ‘from
above,’ to a more informed view of narratives arising ‘from below’.
This thesis addressed and answered the research questions by exploring the
ethnic narratives the research participants mobilised, the nationalist narratives of the
state of Jordan, how research participants (re)construct those narratives, and the
relationship between the state of Jordan and the Circassians from the research
participants’ view points. However, this has been done with some limitations,
discussed in the following section.
Limitations of the research
Throughout the thesis, I attempted to answer the research questions;
however, one of the main limitations of this research has been the limited access I
had to older generations of the Circassian community. Due to access problems
explained in chapter three, the comparison between younger and older generations
of the Circassian community became difficult, as the majority of the interview
sample was young men, and the way the sample has been constructed might have
influenced the research findings. It became difficult to explore fully the age
differences, as the sample was lacking older men and women; however, the 77 year
old interviewee’s responses were different from the responses of younger men and
women. I had intended initially to use only qualitative data collection methods, but
my methods changed to a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods. This
change had both its limitations and positive impacts. Although the quantitative data
provided me with more access to the community, at the same time I could have
benefitted from more interviews with Circassians from different age groups.
Therefore, one of the main limitations of this research is related to the
generalisability of the research findings, as the interview sample is small, and may
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disproportionately reflect the perceptions of the younger generations of men in the
Circassian community.
Moreover, the biases within the sample made an exploration of class and
ethnicity hard, as most interviewees came from similar class backgrounds, and
questionnaire respondents as well seemed to be well-off, with relatively high
household incomes in the context of Jordan. Therefore, class and its influence on the
position of Circassians in Jordan is an area that is worthy of further investigation.
The fact that the interviewees and the questionnaire respondents come from similar
class backgrounds can either mean limitations within the sample, or that the
economic position of Circassians in Jordan is generally very good.
Future Research
Despite these limitations, the research has yielded valuable findings that can
open the door to potential research into the areas of nationalism and ethnic
minorities in the Middle East. Expanding on the research findings might be done
through supplementary research on the ethnic narratives of Circassians in Jordan
and Turkey and/or Syria; this would be a comparative study of the ethnic narratives
identified in this research, and the ethnic narratives of people who consider
themselves Circassians living in different socio-economic and cultural contexts. This
would be particularly important because many research participants consider
themselves Jordanians, as they existed on the land before Jordan became a state,
which is also part of the story of their origins, and many mentioned with pride that
street names in Amman have Circassian names. This feeling towards the state may
not be the case for Circassians in Turkey, Syria, or elsewhere, and may lead to the
construction of distinct ethnic narratives. And, research that is dedicated to the
everyday life experiences and interactions between those who consider themselves
Circassians and ‘non-Arabs’ would also lead to a better understanding of the
position of Circassians in Jordan.
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This research leads to a questioning of the assumptions that all minorities are
de facto excluded from the nation-state, and the assumption that Circassians are
integrated into Jordan; it shows that the position of minorities can change. Further
research on minority groups that define themselves as ‘non-Arabs’ should take into
account the intersection of class and ethnicity. Due to the limited scope of this thesis,
it became hard to include class analysis or class comparisons into the research;
however, it is an area that is worth further investigation. Circassians represent a
unique profile of an ethnic minority in Jordan, especially given that the state of
Jordan defines itself in primordial ethnonational terms. Despite their exclusion from
the state’s nationalist narratives, research participants constantly looked for ways to
include themselves within the state’s definition of the nation, and expressed a
particular fear that they might lose their good positions in Jordan, as a result of the
constantly changing state policies. Another research project could make a
comparison between the Circassians’ and the Palestinians’ (re)construction of state
promoted nationalist narratives; such research would, however, be problematic
given the prohibition on research into the Palestinians within Jordan. A comparative
study, if possible, would be useful to understand the differential position of
Circassians and Palestinians in Jordan, and a comparative study could also show
how people have different (re)constructions of state promoted narratives.
This research also opens the door for more research to be done in the area of
gender and ethnicity. I suggest that, due to the particular neopatriarchal nature of
states in the Middle East, women who belong to ethnic minorities have experiences
that are different from ethnic minority men, and their experiences are shaped by the
intersectionality of gender and ethnicity, which requires further research and
investigation. It has been beyond the scope of this research to account fully for
women’s experiences based on ethnicity and gender; however, the research sheds
light on the particularity of women’s experiences due to the intersectionality of
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gender and ethnicity, and shows how ethnicity is gendered and gender can be
ethnicised to define the boundaries of ethnic and national groups.
Research that focuses on women’s experiences in relation to ethnicity can be a
valuable contribution and complementary to this research, as the experiences of
Circassian women can be different from that of Circassian men, and of other women
in Jordan, and this is an area that is worthy of further investigation. Although there
is a good sum of research on ethnic minority women’s experiences in the West, little
has been done on women in the Middle East and, the literature falls short in terms of
the work done on the intersectionality of ethnicity and gender. The Eurocentric
approach to women in the Middle East assumes that all women share the same
experiences, and provides a basis for stereotypes of women and gender relations in
the Middle East; it also fails to notice the diversity and the multi-ethnic nature of the
region. Thus, this research suggests that a more well-informed approach that takes
into consideration the multiplicity of women’s experiences could provide a better
picture and better understanding of the different experiences ethnic minority women
have in the region, particularly since most states in the Middle East are patriarchal
and promote ethnonationalism.
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Appendix A: Questionnaire Consent Paper Sample
Dear participants,
I am writing to you to thank you for your time and effort exerted in completing this questionnaire,
and to review your rights as participants and contributors to the success of this research, and to
explore with you the aims and the objectives of this research.
Dear participants,
This research is based on a case study of the Circassian community in Jordan, and is part of a doctoral
research project for a thesis I will be submitting at the University of Warwick, Coventry, United
Kingdom. The study focuses on the Circassian participants’ feelings of belonging, and their
preferences when it comes to defining themselves. It explores narratives of ethnicity and nationalism
participants use to define themselves, in Jordan.
Dear participants,
It is my ethical responsibility to review your rights, and clarify that all your answers provided in this
questionnaire will only be used for the research, and is not based on a research for governments. It is
also important to assure you that all the answers you are providing will be handled with
confidentiality, and I guarantee your privacy and anonymity. Your participation is highly
appreciated, and without your valued participation this research would fail.
Many Thanks,
Nour Abu Assab
Participant’s Name: …………………………………………………………….
Phone Number: ………………………………………………………………....
Signature: …………………………………………………………………………
Date: ………………………………………………………………………………
I assure you again that your privacy and identity will not be compromised, and that the information
provided through this questionnaire will only be used for this research, and will not be given to any
bodies, or institutions and the material will be treated with high confidentiality. Your privacy is my
responsibility!
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Appendix B: Interview Consent Paper
Dear interviewee,
I am writing to you to thank you for your time and effort and for allowing me to interview you, and
to review your rights as interviewees and contributors to the success of this research, and to explore
with you the aims and the objectives of this research.
Dear participants,
This research is based on a case study of the Circassian community in Jordan, and is part of a doctoral
research project for a thesis I will be submitting at the University of Warwick, Coventry, United
Kingdom. The study focuses on the Circassian interviewees’ feelings of belonging, and their
preferences when it comes to defining themselves. It explores narratives of ethnicity and nationalism
you use to define yourself, in Jordan.
Dear participants,
It is my ethical responsibility to review your rights, and clarify that this interview will only be used
for the research, and is not based on a research for governments. The tape recorders will only be used
by me, and to make sure that I do not miss any of the information you provide. It is also important to
assure you that all the answers you are providing will be handled with confidentiality, and I
guarantee your privacy and anonymity. Your time and effort are highly appreciated, and without
your valued participation this research would fail.
Many Thanks,
Nour Abu Assab
Interviewee’s Name: …………………………………………………………….
Phone Number: ………………………………………………………………....
Signature: …………………………………………………………………………
Date: ………………………………………………………………………………
I assure you again that your privacy and identity will not be compromised, and that the information
provided through this questionnaire will only be used for this research, and will not be given to any
bodies, or institutions and the material will be treated with high confidentiality. Your privacy is my
responsibility!
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Appendix C: Interview Schedule
1) Do you consider yourself Circassian?
2) The questionnaire questions (Appendix D)
3) How do you define yourself as Circassian? What makes you Circassian?
4) Do you speak the Circassian language? Did your parents encourage you to speak
it? If yes, who encouraged you more, your father or your mother?
5) Is your ethnicity important for you? Why? What does it mean?
6) Is your culture important for you? How do you define your culture?
7) What is your understanding of the words Wataneyah and Qawmeyah? And how do
you define yourself in terms of Qawmeyah and Wataneyah?
8) If asked what do you belong to what would you say?
9) Do you consider yourself a Muslim? What does being a Muslim mean for you?
10) Do you consider yourself an ‘Arab’? What does the word ‘Arab’ mean for you?
And whom does it include?
11) Has anyone of your family encouraged you to preserve Circassian culture? Who
was it?
12) If you get married to a non-Circassian, what would your children be considered?
13) If your sister/brother marries non-Circassians what would their children be
considered? Are you against intermarriage? If yes, why?
14) What was the role of your father and mother in your upbringing?
15) What does the word ‘origin’ mean to you? And how do you define your ‘origin,’
if it means something to you?
351
16) What does the Great Arab Revolt mean to you?
17) What do you know about the Ottoman Empire?
18) Have you ever heard of the ‘Jordan First’ Campaign? What does it mean to you?
19) Do you consider yourself as Circassian integrated into Jordanian society? How
can you explain Circassians’ position in Jordan?
20) How do you define yourself in Jordan?
21) What is Circassians role in the building of Jordan?
22) What does the word ‘native Jordanian’ mean to you? Do you consider yourself a
‘native Jordanian’?
23) How do you define Jordan? ‘Arab’, or Islamic, etc. If you see Jordan as an ‘Arab’
country, how do you define yourself within it? What does being Jordanian mean to
you?
24) What do you believe is in common between you and the majority in Jordan?
What do you share with the majority in Jordan?
25) Where do you believe that your identity and sense of belonging had been
shaped, at home or in school?
26) Where is your homeland? What does it mean to you?
27) Have you ever heard stories about Circassians? Can you tell me about Circassian
personalities, or some Circassian tales you heard?
28) What does Islam mean to you? And what does the word ‘ummah’ mean to you?
29) Is there anything you would like to add?
352
Appendix D: Questionnaire
CIRCASSIAN SOCIAL ATTITUDES
Self-Completion Questionnaire
Please answer the questions in this questionnaire, and bear in mind that all the information provided by you
will be treated with confidentiality and are only collected as part of an independent research.
Section (A) Demographic Data
Gender:  Male  Female
Marital Status:  Single  Married
 Divorced  Widow
Economic Activity:  Employed  Public Sector
 Private Sector
 Unemployed  Independent Worker
Education:  Elementary, Secondary, Preparatory
 High School certificate
 College diploma or equivalent
 Undergraduate Degree/ BA, BSc
 Postgraduate Degree/ MA, PhD
 Vocational Training
Residential Status:  Owned property  Rented property
Monthly Household Income:  Less than 500 JDs  500-1000 JDs
 1000-2500 JDs  More than 2500 JDs
Main Source of Household Income (father, mother, brother, etc.): …………………………………………….
Number of Members in the Household: ………………………………………………………..
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Space of the House: …………………………………………………………………..
Place of Residence: ……………………………………………………………………
Nationality/Nationalities: …………………………………………………………
Place of Birth: ……………………………………………………………………..
Parents’ Place of Birth: Father: ………………………………………..
Mother: ……………………………………….
Languages Spoken at home: 1. …………………………………………….
2. ……………………………………………
 Have you ever travelled outside Jordan?
 Yes  No
 If your answer was yes to the previous question, was that
Another Arab country  another non-Arab country
 An Arab and a non-Arab country
 Is water available 24/7 in your household?
 Yes  No  Most of the time
 Is electricity available 24/7 in your household?
 Yes  No  Most of the time
 In winter times, what is the method of heating you use in your household?
 Central Heating  Gasoline heater
 Electric Heater  Another type of heater ………………………………………………
 What is the main means of transportation you use?
 Public transport  Taxis  private car
 How often do you go out for leisure?
 Once or more a week  Once or more a month
 Once or more a year  Less than that
Please Specify ………………………………………………
 I visited Circassia
 Yes  No
Section (B) Reflections on feelings and Knowledge test
 Which of the following flags reflects your feelings of belonging?

 Which of the following flags reflects your pan

 Which of the following flags reflects your nationalism?

 Which of the following flags represents the ethnic group you belong to?

 Which of the following flags represents your homeland?

 Which of the following flags represents you in an international context?

 The picture below is for:
 The picture below is for:
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
-nationalism?





 Abd-al-qader al-Husseini  King Abdullah I
King Talal bin Abdullah  King Hussein bin Ta
 Abd-al-qader al-Husseini  King Abdullah I
King Talal bin Abdullah  King Hussein bin Talal






lal
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 The picture below is for:
 Abd-al-qader al-Husseini  King Abdullah I
King Talal bin Abdullah  King Hussein bin Talal
Section (C) Questions in relation to self-identification
 Have you ever heard about the ‘Jordan First’ campaign?
 No  Yes  Please specify from where? …………………………………………………….
 Have you ever heard about ‘Amman Message’ before?
 No  Yes  Please specify from where? …………………………………………………….
 Do you consider yourself of Jordanian Origin?
 Yes  No
Please elaborate: ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….....................
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
 Do you consider yourself of an Arab origin?
 Yes  No
Please elaborate: ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….....................
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
 Do you consider yourself of a Muslim origin?
 Yes  No
Please elaborate: ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….....................
………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………
……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
 Are you a practising Muslim?
 Yes  No  Sort of
Please state to what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statements?
 Some say that Jordan is an Arab country, to what extent do you agree or disagree?
 Strongly Agree  Agree  Neither  Disagree  Strongly disagree
Elaborate ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
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 Some say that Jordan is a Muslim country, to what extent do you agree or disagree?
 Strongly Agree  Agree  Neither  Disagree  Strongly disagree
Elaborate ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
 Some say that ethnic minorities should be provided with help and facilities to be able to preserve
their culture and traditions, to what extent do you agree or disagree?
 Strongly Agree  Agree  Neither  Disagree  Strongly disagree
Elaborate ……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….
Section (D) Preferences relating to self-identification
To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement, please choose the appropriate
answer, and elaborate if you feel the need to.
Statement Strong
ly
Agree
Agree Neither Disagree Strongly
disagree
Elaboration
Being Circassians constitutes a huge part of
my identity
Being Jordanian constitutes a huge part of
my identity
Being Muslim constitutes a huge part of my
identity
Speaking Arabic constitutes a huge part of
my identity
Speaking Circassian constitutes a huge part
of my identity
My Homeland is Circassia
My Homeland is Jordan
My Homeland is the Muslim world
My homeland is the Arab world
I do not have a homeland
I do not mind marrying a non-Circassian
My best friend must be Circassian
It is not important for me to teach my
children Circassian language
It is important for me to preserve my
Circassian culture
Islam, for me, does not constitute a big part
of my civilisation
My passport reflects my identity
My origin does not reflect my identity
My language reflects my identity
My identity and sense of belonging were
shaped at school
My identity and sense of belonging were
shaped at home
I like Circassian songs
I do not like Circassian dances
My ethnicity does not constitute a huge part
of my identity
You have reached the end of the questionnaire, many thanks for your participation!
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Appendix E: National and Civic Education Modules
First Second Third Fourth
Family
and
Town
 Selfhood and
Individuality,
 Roles and
Responsibilities of
Family Members,
 The
Neighbourhood,
 Social Relations,
 Public Services.
 Parents’
Rights,
 Town
location,
and its
residents,
 Town
monumen
ts,
 Town
places,
 Prayer
Places,
 Administ
rative
organisati
on of the
town.
 Municipal
ity,
 Monume
nts in the
municipal
ity,
 Public
services,
 Administ
rative
organisati
on of the
municipal
ity.
 Geograph
ical
location,
 The main
natural
geographi
cal
phenome
na,
 Jordanian
touristic
sites
The
Homela
nd
 Homeland symbols,
 National occasions.
 Mode of
governan
ce in
Jordan,
 The role
of the
Hashemit
es in
building
Jordan.
 Jordan’s
relation
with
neighbou
ring
countries,
 Culture
and
traditions,
 The
nature of
the mode
of
governan
ce in
Jordan,
 Public
services
sector.
Nationa
l
Securit
y and
Internat
ional
Peace
 Personal safety,
 Behaviour in roads.
 National
security,
 National
security
guards,
 National
security
institutio
ns,
 Rules and
 The
school’s
role in
enhancin
g
security.
 The
importan
ce of
national
security,
 Security
and
stability,
 Social
protection
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regulatio
ns.
institutio
ns,
 Just war,
 Just
peace.
The
State of
Jordan
and Its
Instituti
ons
 Freedom,
 The
constituti
on,
 Rights
and
duties,
 Debate.
Fifth Sixth Seventh Eighth
Family
and
Town
  The
family
unit and
its
organisati
on,
 Social
structure,
 Gender.
 Social and
education
al role of
the
family,
 Familial
problems.
The
Homela
nd
   Administ
rative
organisati
ons,
 Administ
rative
governors
,
 Taxes,
and fees,
 Illiteracy,
 Road
accidents.

Nationa
l
Securit
y and
Internat
ional
Peace
 Peace keeping
forces,
 Importance of
national security,
 National unity.
 Violence,
 Political
developm
ent,
 Family
protection
.
 Social
security,
 Health
safety,
 Social and
economic
problems.
 Peace,
 The role
of the
Hashemit
e
leadershi
p in
keeping
internatio
nal peace,
 Peace
keeping
forces,
 Social
intoleranc
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e
The
State of
Jordan
and Its
Instituti
ons
 The state (its forms
and basis),
 Human rights,
 The constitution.
 Elements
of the
state,
 Functions
of the
state,
 Forms of
the state,
 Democrac
y and
human
rights,
 Public
services
institutio
ns.
 Youth
clubs and
centres,
 Scouts,
 Prince
Hassan
award for
the youth.
 Citizenshi
p,
 Rights
and
duties,
 The
constituti
on,
 Belonging
.
Jordan’
s
Cultura
l
History
 Importance of
location,
 Cultural
monuments
(Amman and
Zarqa)
 Importan
ce of
location,
 Cultural
monumen
ts (Jerash
and
Petra)
 Importan
ce of
location,
 Cultural
monumen
ts (Kerak,
Shoubak,
Ajlun)
 Importan
ce of
location,
 Cultural
monume
nts (Irbid,
and
Aqaba)
Cogniti
on,
Logic
and
Debate
 Thinking and its
strategies,
 Observing,
 Classifying.
  Language
,
 Basis of
scientific
methods.
 Forms of
thinking
 Critical
and
creative
thinking,
 Problem
solving.
Manage
ment,
Econom
y and
Techno
logy
 Financial
institutions,
 Money and
currency.
 Labour,
 Productio
n,
 Unemplo
yment.
 Public
fund,
 Jordanian
labour
market,
 State
budget,
 Vocationa
l training,
 Social
security
system.
Ninth Tenth Eleventh Twelfth
Family
and
Town
 Social change
 Modernity and
authenticity
 Selfhood,
and
individua
lism,
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 Character
istics of
Develop
ment,
 Youth
problems
The
Homela
nd
 Education
al
institutio
ns,
 Mass
Media,
 Public
opinion,
 Social
culture
and
traditions.
Nationa
l
Securit
y and
Internat
ional
Peace
 Economic stability,
 National security,
 Public fund.
 The army,
 Security
forces,
 Armed
forces,
and
developm
ent
The
State of
Jordan
and Its
Instituti
ons
 The state (its forms
and characteristics),
 Professional and
trade unions,
 Public fund.
 Citizenshi
p,
 Belonging
,
 Loyalty,
 Safe
environm
ent,
 National
courts,
 Democrac
y,
 Rights
and
duties,
 Political
parties,
 Political
participat
ion.
 Financial
and
monetary
establish
ments,
 Financial
crimes,
 Public
establish
ments.
 Mode of
governan
ce in
Jordan,
 The three
authoritie
s,
 The
governme
nt,
 Ministries
.
Jordan’
s
Cultura
l
History
 Importance of
location,
 Cultural
monuments (Saltt
and Tafeelah)
 Importan
ce of
location,
 Cultural
 Importan
ce of
location,
 Cultural
 Importan
ce of
location,
 Cultural
monume
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monumen
ts
(Madaba,
Thibyan,
al-
Mafraq)
monumen
ts (Kerak,
Shoubak,
Ajlun)
nts (ten of
Jordan’s
main
cities)
 Dead Sea
and its
plan.
Cogniti
on,
Logic
and
Debate
 Rationalisation,
hypothesis, and
speculation,
 Debate,
 Fallacy,
 Thought
ownership.
 Public
opinion,
 Tolerance
,
 Intoleranc
e.
 Knowled
ge,
 Ethics,
 Beliefs.
 Appropri
ate
thinking,
 Creativity
.
Manage
ment,
Econom
y and
Techno
logy
 Work ethics,
 Economic and
administrative
establishments,
 Budget.
 Administ
rative
process,
 Leadershi
p,
 Communi
cation,
 Censorshi
p.
 Economic
functions
of the
state,
 Income
and
spending,
 Public
sector
employm
ent,
 Social
security.
The
Hashe
mites
 The
Hashemit
es
througho
ut history,
 The
Hashemit
es
ideology.
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Appendix F: Hashemite Family Tree
